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The most important question for the Psychoanalytic Process Research is presumably what Mitchell 
calls the problem of “bootstrapping” the transferential matrix: how do the members of the dyad 
manage to disengage from being ‘heard’ according to old or unsuitable affective categories? On the 
grounds of a bi-phasic Conceptual and in-depth Analysis of the Psychoanalytic Complexity literature, 
I construct a minimal model of the psychoanalytic process as a theoretical context for conducting 
Process Research. According to the ‘story’ that I have read in the literature four main themes 
describe the process: a) the gradual emergence of a ‘phenomenological’ language that facilitates 
the flow of experience, b) the coupling, synchronicity and coordination of analyst and analysand, in 
‘phase’ and ‘anti-phase’ at several levels, c) the shifting of the mental states and the thin and delicate 
slicing and sampling of experience that actualizes the emergence of mental objects and finally, d) 
Scaling that involves all those ‘mental’ processes that correct for the excesses or the deficiencies 
that are made evident during the shifting of mental states. Experience is generated as we ‘couple 
and shift’, and generative tensions appear as we ‘scale’ through this coupling and shifting process. 
Enactments, role-responsive transferences and countertransferences, testing of the transference 
and alliance or communication ruptures appear as coupled oscillating patterns that have both a 
repetitive and a developmental dynamic. 
 
Regarding the question of how we should study ‘Coupling, Shifting and Scaling’ I propose the 
adoption of an Enactivist epistemological framework which perceives the mind not as the workings 
of a representational machine but as a living process and the expression of an embodied living 
organism which in a “precarious” state of “needful freedom” (Jonas, in Thompson, 2007) strives to 
make sense of its environment. On the grounds of this framework I defend the view that we should 
study Scaling as an expression of the ‘radical dialogicality’ of the human mind that underlies the 
‘structuring of experience’. I examine this ‘radical dialogicality’ at the level of inter-hemispheric 
differences, psychopathology and the enactive structuring of experience and the horizon of 
affective affordances in the clinical process.  
 
Finally, on the grounds of this conceptual analysis and its application to a case-study, I try to defend 
the view that, adopting relevant “dialogical” and micro-analytic methodological tools, we can 
achieve an appropriate level of ‘resolution’ so as to study “bootstrapping” at the moment-to-
moment shifts in the experiential states or the shifts in attitudes that appear at bifurcation points 
in the system’s evolution. Through Scaling, the clinical dyad strives for a “maximum grip” of those 
experiential dimensions that carry the potential to expand the shared reality as a generative field 
and engage those surfaces of experience that bridge lost connections and separations, by 
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fractalizing the dimensionality of the generative space. A detailed examination of the Scaling 
processes may bring us closer to a better understanding of the problem of “bootstrapping”.  
 
Keywords: “Bootstrapping”, Psychoanalytic Process Research, Psychoanalytic Complexity, 
Dynamic Systems Theory, Enactivism, Dialogicality, Meaning-Making. 
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How do people change in psychoanalysis? What is it that actually changes? Is it something inside 
them? Is it the whole person or some kind of internal psychic structures? Is it the way they narrate 
themselves and their stories or it is the way they relate to people around themselves? These two 
seemingly simple questions, the how and what of change, suggest the core of the pressing matter 
of therapeutic change in psychoanalysis. Greenberg (2012) believes that we will never arrive at some 
convincing and universally accepted answers to these questions. Moreover, he notes that we should 
rather start exploring new ways of conceptualizing the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis, 
refraining from models of thinking where the analyst purposefully does something that has some 
curative effect. May be, “we don’t cure”, he writes, “we do our jobs and cure happens” (ibid, p.241). 
Despite the collective efforts of clinicians and empirical researchers, the question of how any 
psychotherapy cures and, why it does cure in the way it does, it has not been answered (Salvatore, 
2011). It is almost impossible to understand what is happening in the consulting room (Canestri, 
2007; Spezzano, 2007; Steiner, 1994). 
 
Process research promises to bring up interesting knowledge regarding the question of how people 
change in psychotherapy (Elliot, 2010; Salvatore & Valsiner, 2008; Salvatore, 2011). Much of the 
interest of the psychotherapeutic community has moved from questions of outcome to questions 
of process, of how change happens in psychotherapy. As already mentioned, many researchers now 
recognize that research “in” and “on” (Salvatore & Gennaro, 2015) the process has to follow the 
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route of theory-driven paradigms. As Salvatore, Tschacher, Gelo and Koch (2015) mention “[t]he key 
to open the black box is theory not data” (p.2). I can summarize the main tenets of the paradigmatic 
shift that takes place in a large part of the field in two points. According to the first point, the use of 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies that build on the premises of linear causality where 
some variables have an effect on a single variable, are not relevant for studying the 
psychotherapeutic process. As Gennaro (2011) notes, we should aim at “developing a 
comprehensive model about the clinical process intended as phenomenon to be modelled in its 
globality, rather than a mere view point in which analyse the contribution of discrete factors in 
producing change” (p. 356). According to the second point, we need to make a deep 
reconsideration of our epistemological assumptions in psychotherapeutic research, moving away 
from the inductive – deductive polarity and start thinking on building models of the processes under 
study that are mainly contextual and idiographic. The overall aim is to organize into a meta-
theoretical framework the different perspectives regarding the change processes refining our 
starting process models (Valsiner & Salvatore, 2012; Salvatore & Gennaro, 2015). Can we really 
achieve such a meta-theoretical synthesis in psychoanalysis? Is a model of the psychoanalytic clinical 
process achievable so as to study change according to the emerging process paradigms appearing 
in the psychotherapeutic research literature? This thesis is a conceptual research that following this 
paradigmatic shift will try to explore if such a model of the psychoanalytic process is feasible and 
relevant. I am asking, can we work towards building a model of the psychoanalytic process, besides 
our many differences in the way we perceive the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis in order to craft 
research that will explore deeply into the clinical process the mechanisms of change?  
 
Friedman (1988) in his seminal text, “The Anatomy of Psychotherapy” identifies three broad 
categories of mechanisms of therapeutic action: Attachment, Insight and Integration. I scaffolded 
the conceptual axes of the Scoping review which aimed at clarifying the dimensions of therapeutic 
action in the literature having in mind Friedman’s matrix. I describe the review process in more detail 
in the methodological section. As the review progressed I decided to expand the matrix by 
collapsing the conceptual axis of therapeutic action in four questions: how does analysis cure, how 
	 12	
do techniques work, what does an analyst do, what happens between analyst and analysand. These 
dimensions helped me see the interrelationships between theoretical abstractions (analysis as 
cure/techniques – effect on the patient) and the process oriented concepts (analyst’s actions, 
interactions between analyst/analysand, emergent phenomena). So following this line of reasoning 
and decisions I concluded with the following matrix which involves six main broad categories of 
proposed mechanisms of change that, suggest unique combinations of the how and what 
dimensions of the question of therapeutic action (I did not expand the categories which occurred 
in the scoping review after the systematic searches and reviews of the empirical literature and the 
critical review of the conceptual literature, while I added some dimensions to categories, i.e. 
mentalizing, meta-cognitive skills): 
• Insight: the analysand changes through gaining understanding over his conflicts, fantasies, motives 
and wishes unassimilated to his narrative and the representations about the self (Abend, 2007; 
Gabbard & Westen, 2003), patterns of relating to other persons (Jones, 2000), the organizing 
principles of his interpersonal experience or the experience of the self in relation to others 
(Newman, 2007). 
• Repair of a Deficit: the analysand changes through assimilating in his personality structure a missing 
function such as a self-object, a benign superego introject (Newman, 2007; Spezzano, 2007), a 
capacity to think about oneself such as in the mentalizing self-reflexivity or some meta-cognitive 
skill (Fonagy & Bateman, 2006). 
• Integration of unintegrated parts of the self: the analysand changes through integrating in his self 
- narrative or representation or personality structure – previously dissociated parts of self-other 
configurations or experience (Bromberg, 1993; 1998). 
• Testing the transference: the analysand changes through disconfirming his expectancies about 
what usually happens in his relationships by unconsciously testing the relationship to the analyst 
(Greenberg, 2012; Silberschatz, Fretter & Curtis, 1986). 
•  Attachment: the analysand changes through the concurrent activation of the attachment and 
mentalizing systems that facilitates a re-contextualization of processes, representations (Fonagy & 
Bateman, 2006), mental contents and Internal Working Models (IWMs) regarding his self-other 
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configurations and the creation of a secure base for the exploration of the self and its relationships 
(Greenberg, 2012; Holmes, 2001).  
• Repair of communication misattunements: the analysand changes through the repair of alliance 
ruptures that build a basic sense of trust and safety in relationships (Safran & Muran, 2000; 2006), 
facilitate the refinement of IWMs (Diamond & Blatt, 1999), promote the creation of new meaning 
spaces and develop new abilities in managing the internal dialogue (Greenberg, 2012; Harris, 2012; 
Jones, 2000).  
 
These categories are not mutually exclusive. There is no theory of therapeutic action in 
psychoanalysis that does not suggest a unique combination of elements from all the above six 
categories. Moreover, any private theory that an analyst holds about her own clinical work suggests 
a unique combination of the above dimensions, putting special emphasis to only one or some of 
these perspectives. Empirical research as will be shown in Chapter 2, has presumably failed to help 
clinicians ‘putting their perspectives into perspective’. As I already mentioned we may rather need 
a new way of conceiving research that is less data-driven and more theory-driven to succeed in 
organizing synthesizing frameworks that will help us as clinicians to integrate our perspectives into 
a meaningful dialogue.  From the previous question of what are the relevant questions we should 
ask in order to gain a deeper understanding of the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis, we are 
moving to an equally important question that is: can we really work towards a synthesizing 
framework of the process that can help us put the multiple psychoanalytic perspectives on 
therapeutic action into a meaningful dialogue?  
 
In all of the above mentioned thematic categories there is inherently lurking, more or less, a post-
positivistic spirit of causality where one or a combination of some variables cause an effect; that is 
produce change at some level. In the few previous decades, a large part of psychoanalytic scholars 
has moved from a positivistic or post-positivistic conception of how we should approach and study 
the clinical encounter to a hermeneutic one. This actually meant a shift of interest from causes to 
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meanings. Following this shift a new wave of scholars proposed another shift to a new paradigm of 
thinking that promises to deconstruct the polarity between causes and meanings. DST offers a 
unique opportunity, according to these authors, to re-think the relationship between causes and 
meanings in new terms. My proposal is that building upon this new way of thinking we are in a better 
place to work towards an appropriate synthesizing framework and model of the psychoanalytic 
process that will in turn guide research in new directions.   
 
However, DST - or chaos and complexity theory in other terms – is a good theoretical and 
methodological candidate in modelling and gaining a deeper understanding of how things change, 
given that we apply it to relevant ontologies. The question of what is this that changes is the most 
pressing matter in the question of therapeutic action from the perspective of DST. Where should 
we apply DST modelling and research: to the development of insight, the repair of deficits and what 
kind of deficits, the integration of dissociated parts of self, the vicissitudes of attachment in the 
clinical encounter or the testing of the transference? Palombo (1999) for example describes the free 
associative process as a self-organizing adaptive system working at the edge of chaos. Associations 
organize themselves as rigid periodic oscillators ending in interruptions and recurrences of the same 
pattern while suddenly, at the edge of chaos, they evolve and self-organize into a non-predictable, 
non-linear system that brings about change and re-organization.  Is this a relevant ontology to study 
the issue of therapeutic change in psychoanalysis? Taking into consideration the above six 
categories-dimensions of therapeutic action it seems that Palombo’s proposal does not put any 
special emphasis on the relational categories. From my point of view, I think that any DST 
perspective in order to offer good service to the profession through the development of relevant 
process research, should try to integrate all six perspectives into a unifying framework according to 
the spirit of the emerging paradigm of process research in psychotherapy described above. The aim 
of process research is not to select among competing theories but to turn back new knowledge 
about the clinical process and especially mechanisms of change. All the above mentioned different 
lines of thinking on therapeutic action should be considered perspectives of the same field 
illuminating different dimensions.   
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Obviously then the selection of relevant ontologies should be guided by the perspective of such a 
unifying framework and in turn it should help this framework refine itself and evolve through 
research. Salvatore (2011) notes that “the study of psychotherapy requires a reversal of the 
relationship between empirical and conceptual research: more theory is needed” (p.368), while at 
the same moment we have to challenge “the belief that data accumulation by itself leads to 
solutions for conceptual problems” (ibid).  In this thesis then, I am asking how we should proceed 
in building a theoretical model of the process that may account for all the above-mentioned 
dimensions of therapeutic action. Summarizing the narrative algorithm I used up to this point to 
develop my research question, I would emphasise the following points: 
• The existing data-driven paradigms fail to account for the way people change in psychotherapy, DST 
and a theory-driven approach may help us gain a deeper understanding of the process. 
• In order to develop process oriented research in psychoanalysis according to the emerging process 
research paradigm, we need to build a unifying framework of the psychoanalytic process.  
• This unifying framework may take into account and work towards synthesizing all the different 
dimensions regarding the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis that appear as prevalent in the 
psychoanalytic literature. 
 
What I am asking then, first and foremost, is if we can develop such a unifying framework that 
describes what happens inside the session from the perspective of the psychoanalytic process, 
with the aim of guiding process research and developing relevant questions regarding the 
therapeutic action of psychoanalysis. How should we proceed in order to develop such a 
framework? Much of the contemporary discussion on process research adopts a view of the clinical 
situation as a dynamic sense-making (Salvatore & Gennaro, 2015) or meaning-making process and 
develops a Semiotic/mediational or a Constructivistic and Social constructionist dialogical 
perspective (Lourenco, Basto, Cunha & Bento, 2013; Martinez, Tomicic & Medina, 2014; Salgado & 
Cunha, 2013; Salvatore et al., 2010; Salvatore & Venuleo, 2013;). In Chapter 5 I will discuss in detail 
why this epistemological framework is inappropriate for a psychoanalytic research agenda and I will 
propose an overall Enactivist epistemological framework as more relevant. As I will try to show any 
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semiotic/mediational, constructivistic or social constructionist dialogical perspective cannot 
approach the generative dimensions of dialogicality (Baerveldt, 2014a) inherent in the 
psychoanalytic process. The working through of transference is a special kind of meaning-making 
process that as Loewald (1975) notes emerges out of a dramatization of the relational 
configurations in the dyad out of which the mental elaboration of what happened emerges.  
 
What kind of meaning-making process is the psychoanalytic encounter then if a 
semiotic/mediational or a constructivistic/dialogical framework does not look justly appropriate for 
its study? I propose that we should rather think about the kind of data that the psychoanalytic 
encounter produces. How does an analyst know what happens to her patient? One of the main 
epistemological problems regarding the validity of psychoanalytic knowledge is that the analyst’s 
organ of knowing what happens during the clinical encounter is her own mind. She tries to gain 
access to another mind through her own mind. According to the classical psychoanalytic theory the 
analyst knows what happens in the mind of the analysand by closely following the analysand’s 
associations and by watching for her own countertransference.  
 
Issues that organize themselves in thematic patterns and the ideational contiguities that present 
themselves in the turns of the free association process (Kris, 1996) suggest the primary tools 
through which the analyst’s mind organizes the verbal material into meaningful patterns that can 
be communicated to the patient. The analyst developing interpretations out of the analysands’ 
verbal material, works much like a grounded theorist exploring thematic categories in the data, 
argues Tuckett (1994). From this perspective the psychoanalytic encounter may have important 
similarities to many other forms of psychotherapy. In this sense, it may not be an impossible task to 
adopt and adapt relevant micro-analytic and micro-genetic qualitative methodologies for studying 
the development of process as a semiotic or constructivistic dialogical meaning-making process, 
since process research is not interested in validating the theory of psychoanalysis but in exploring 
the processes of change. 
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Another royal road for gaining access to the analysand’s intrapsychic life is the analyst’s 
countertransference. Relationals and Intersubjectivists during the recent decades have put on the 
map of theory a new dimension of the countertransferential experience. It is not only what the 
analyst feels that matters and where she might apply her reflective powers but, what she also does 
or what the analytic dyad does that may reveal aspects of the unconscious relational dynamics 
lurking in the transferential matrix. Talking about an issue of importance with the patient, the 
analytic dyad is already enacting a relational configuration that may exemplify or be closely related 
to the discussion’s ideational content. Many Relationals and Intersubjectivists argue that working 
through the enactments that arise in therapy, the dyad can gain access to dissociated parts of the 
self and this is a principal mechanism of cure in analysis. So we may categorize data collected i 
n the clinical encounter in three broad categories: data originating in the analysand’s verbal material 
(where thematic patterns and ideational contiguities in the free association matters for their 
interpretation), data originating in the analyst’s mind (her observations and reports regarding her 
thoughts and feelings in the course of the clinical encounter that can be considered as unassimilated 
aspects of the analysand’s experience) and finally data that originate in/between the transferential 
matrix where the analysand’s verbal material and the analyst’s internal experience couple and 
intersect creating a unique entity.  I now have to explain why this third kind of data are of special 
importance for understanding the psychoanalytic encounter and unavoidably it should be taken 
seriously under consideration in any model of the therapeutic process. First, I will provide a brief 
clinical example taken from Mitchell’s (1988) Influence and Autonomy to exemplify the third 
category of data.  
 
Mitchell describes the case of a woman on a low fee schedule who unexpectedly receives a good 
amount of money and discusses with her analyst if she should either save the money or increase the 
number of sessions. The woman seems to have had a history of unreflective compliance to parental 
figures. The analyst finds himself in an agonizing conflict to refrain from what he felt as 
seductiveness, to avoid abandoning the patient, to make meaning of his own feelings and thoughts 
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and to hold the situation. He chooses an ‘outburst’ talking to the patient who, had probably already 
taken notice of the subtle non-verbal cues signifying how stymied her analyst was, about his 
dilemma and how it might reflect her own struggles with choices. Mitchell does his best to escape 
the impasse of being heard as something old.  
 
Friedman (1988) notes that, any comment from the analyst, is not received by the patient as the result 
of a biopsy. The analysand picks up with the comment the analyst’s perspective especially filtered 
through his own transferential fantasies. Mitchell writes that no matter how hard the analyst tries, 
in a “sadomasochistic transference/countertransference matrix his interpretations are either 
sadistic assaults or pitiful surrenders” (1988,p.294), in a matrix of symbiotic qualities his words are 
“experienced either as seductive fusions or remote detachments” (ibid.p.294). Even if “the analyst 
makes an interpretation about the way in which the patient transforms every interaction into a 
battle” (1997, p.45), it is hopeless; “the patient experiences the interpretation itself as a power 
operation” (ibid. p.45).  Thus “altering the analysand’s relational matrix seems to require a kind of 
bootstrapping operation in which analyst and analysand in a quantum leap lift themselves from one 
kind of interpersonal engagement to another” (1988, p.294).  
 
Mitchell’s “bootstrapping problem” is the main problem that psychoanalysts have to account for in 
explaining how people change during the course of a psychoanalytic treatment. Any perspective on 
therapeutic action then has to answer the question: how does interpretation reaches to the 
unconscious of the analysand since as Orange (2003) mentions there is no view from nowhere and 
as Friedman (1988) argues interpretation is not experienced as a biopsy? Any perspective on 
meaning-making in the psychoanalytic process should account for how the clinical dyad escapes the 
clinical impasses created by the “bootstrapping problem”. At this level of data then, the content of 
psychoanalytic theory on the role of unconscious processes becomes crucially important for 
crafting process research.  
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So, a model of the psychoanalytic process that will be relevant and appropriate in guiding process 
research, it may satisfy two necessary conditions: 
• It may be appropriate for studying all the six dimensions of therapeutic action prevalent in the 
psychoanalytic literature 
• It must be able to address the particularities of the meaning-making processes from the 
psychoanalytic point of view.  
 
Summarizing the narrative algorithm through which I developed my research question I may 
emphasise the following points: We do not know how psychoanalysis works. The existing 
methodological paradigms seem to have serious limitations in studying the question. We need to 
develop process research emphasising the dynamic and the meaning-making dimensions of the 
clinical situation. There are two current trends in the development of process research. According 
to the first paradigmatic methodological shift we need to develop comprehensive conceptual 
models of the psychotherapeutic process that will be a posteriori enriched by idiographic and 
contextual qualitative models of the process. At the same time, these models should be oriented in 
modelling the process in its totality rather than facilitating the study of the effects of certain 
variables. The introduction of DST has entrenched this paradigmatic shift in the field of process 
research, according to which we are encouraged to consider the process as a hermeneutic field 
where understanding of the parts presupposes an understanding of the whole and vice versa.  
 
A model of the clinical process that will be of relevance to psychoanalysis should satisfy two 
conditions: it needs to take into account all the six dimensions of therapeutic action prevalent in the 
literature and it must be able to address the particularities of meaning-making from the 
psychoanalytic point of view. In this thesis, I will try to show what are the problems that we have 
to address in order to build such a model of the process and, I will propose the appropriate steps 
we have to follow in order to overcome the limitations towards building a model of the 
psychoanalytic process originating in DST that should be able to satisfy to some extend both the 
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above mentioned necessary conditions while it may also suggest a good candidate in developing 
psychoanalytic process research.  
 
1.1   Methodological Considerations 
1.1.1 The Epistemological Framework and the Logic of justification 
Following the organizing framework that Leuzinger-Bohleber and Fischmann (2006) propose as a 
taxonomy of conceptual research in psychoanalysis, I would classify my own research in three of 
the seven proposed axes: Interdisciplinary research (aiming in the critical reflection of existing 
concepts and the formulation of new concepts), Conceptual research with theoretical ambitions 
(theoretical integration and the development of new concepts) and finally Empirically based 
conceptual research (results of empirical research are taken as the basis of critical reflection on 
specific psychoanalytic concepts or for the development of new concepts). Dreher (2000) notes 
that, the principal aim of conceptual research in psychoanalysis, is working through constructive 
and critical tools to avoid the empirical flattening of psychoanalytic concepts. As Dreher (2000) and 
Leuzinger-Bohleber and Fischmann (2006) note conceptual research does not have a set of robust 
quality criteria beyond the systematic development of ideas that is showing a reasonably coherent 
set of practices working towards its aims. A strong component of the present study is an in-depth 
analysis of the psychoanalytic complexity literature designed for the purposes of the study. I will 
develop the methodological considerations for this part of my research in Chapter 4. While both the 
surface and the in-depth Conceptual analytic components escape the pitfalls of an “oppressive 
disciplinary technology” (Hammersley, 2013, p.93), from my point of view, I think any enriching form 
of research (Stiles, 2015) should follow what most qualitative researchers now recognize as the 
principal criterion of methodological quality, that is the epistemological clarity and consistency. 
Distinguishing between method as procedures or techniques and method as the epistemological 
criteria and the logic of justification about what one does, several authors note that we should think 
the quality of research from the perspective of its logic of justification and its epistemological 
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consistency (Hammersley, 2008; 2011; 2013; Smith & Heshusius, 1986). Piantanida and Garman 
(2009) use an interesting metaphor to exemplify the matter, comparing research to a football game. 
Good research they note is the one that makes clear, distinct and visible the rules of the game 
working as a fabric in the background. In this sense before explaining how I will proceed in a 
systematic manner to deal with my research question, I have to make the rules of the game clear, 
distinct and visible.  
 
In this thesis, trying to explore the difficulties and the possibilities arising from a process model of 
the psychoanalytic encounter originating in DST, I adopt a pragmatist epistemological standpoint 
very close to what has been exemplified by Orange (2003) as “Perspectival Realism”. My own 
perspectival realism stands at the crossroads of post-positivism, interpretivism, Constructionism, 
Critical theory and Post-modernism with principal criterion the avoidance of any kind of 
reductionism. My research question guides me to explore the advantages that a Complexity 
paradigm has to offer in process research in psychoanalysis and in this sense I try to remain 
consistent with the spirit of a Complexity paradigm epistemologically arguing that any truth is a 
perspectival abstraction from the whole. I adopt Orange’s point of view rejecting any totalizing 
objectification or reifying reductionism coming from any of the above mentioned epistemological 
paradigms. I consider both the post-positivistic objectivism and the post-modern or constructivist 
stance of ‘anything is a constructed fiction” as similar forms of a reifying reductionism, since they 
reduce any phenomenon or perspective to a “this is nothing but” object. I adopt from 
constructionism its aim to undermine the inevitability that follows conceptual categories 
(Hammersley, 2008). From the post-structuralist and the post-modern perspectival standpoint, I 
consider any kind of research, either empirical or conceptual as a text worth considering in the sense 
that our principal aim is to examine what kind of meaning and how meaning is produced 
(Hammersely, 2011). From the Interpretivist tradition, I adopt the main tenet of my epistemological 
framework which is the Gadamerian dialogical understanding according to which truth emerges in 
dialogues where irreducibly different perspectives are brought together. Conversation according to 
Gadamer increases our access to the whole, since each one of us can have a partial, perspectival 
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view of truth (Orange, 2003; Stern, 2010). I bring all these different points of view together under a 
pragmatist premise which I clearly exemplify in Chapter 4, where I argue that I do not consider 
subjectivity and objectivity as mutually exclusive polarities, since for every question there is only one 
possible answer, the matter though is that we usually fail to meet each other in the same question; 
the multidimensionality and the complexity of the world disturbs our questions.  
 
Pragmatism is promoted by several authors as a promising epistemological alternative to the Post-
positivist/Quantitative-Constructivist/Qualitative Divide (Morgan, 2007; 2013; Felizer, 2010), notable 
for promoting a dialectic relationship between the knower and the known and the special emphasis 
it puts on the process of inquiry which is presumed to be guided by the original purposes and the 
nature of the research question and not a supposed hierarchy of methods and evidence (Cornish & 
Gillespie, 2009). Designing a research project on the grounds of a pragmatic attitude, it means you 
are ready to use a multiplicity of evidence and methodologies in a flexible and coherent way to serve 
the purposes immanent in your questions.  
 
In the methodological section of Chapter 4, the reader will be navigated through an elaborate 
presentation of the evolution of the Pragmatist epistemological framework of the thesis.  For now, 
I think it is enough to acknowledge that the review of the several different psychoanalytic 
perspectives on therapeutic action, it was done having in mind a Pragmatist dialectic perspective, 
the aim to integrate them into a coherent and comprehensive minimal framework. So, I do not 
evaluate them according to some supposedly integrative criteria which remain external to the 
original thinking of each perspective but looking through their similarities and differences, as well 
as the contradictions internal to their reasoning, having in mind my original purpose, to bring them 




1.1.2 How did I plan the Systematic Searches and the Literature Reviews 
Following the selection of a broad meta-theoretical viewpoint, the “Relational context” which I 
present in Chapter 2, I planned the necessary systematic searches and reviews of the psychoanalytic 
literature, empirical and conceptual. I started on reviewing the literature on therapeutic action, 
using the Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing database. The principal aim of this review was to 
develop a deep conversance with the data that is the theoretical texts on the therapeutic action of 
psychoanalysis. My goal was to develop some initial categorization schemes that would help me 
rethink the problem of how we should proceed in developing a process model of the psychoanalytic 
encounter. The review has been done in two phases, since I had to interrupt my studies. Up to year 
2011, which is the year of the complementary review, I identified 128 documents, that is 10 more 
documents compared to the first review, done in 2008. After an initial reading of these documents 
which did not involve coding and thematic categorizing, I identified 26 more documents that were 
mainly published books, through snowballing sampling. I did not analyze all 144 documents in detail 
during the first phase but did a first broad analysis to see what main categories emerge from the 
data. In this first analysis, I proceeded with an open coding of categories. I dropped most of my 
categories for a second phase axial coding and kept a first categorizing scheme that involved beliefs 
regarding the different levels of therapeutic action. Four main categories emerged: 1) therapeutic 
action at the level of analysis as a cure, 2) therapeutic action at the level of specific techniques, 3) 
therapeutic action at the level of an analyst’s actions, 4) therapeutic action as emerging phenomena 
in the intermediate space between analyst and analysand. I used these ‘levels of action’ categories 
as inclusion criteria for selecting a sample of documents for more detailed analysis. In the second 
phase I manually selected 48 of the 144 documents based on the following inclusion criteria: 1) they 
included comparisons and theoretical discussion between different views of therapeutic action 
since the original aim of my project was a synthesis of the divergent psychoanalytic viewpoints into 
a minimal coherent framework, 2) they were discussing the matter of therapeutic action at all 
different ‘levels of action’ since the principal aim of the review was to consider the concepts through 
one another, consider similarities and differences among them, possible contradictions with their 
respective frameworks and consider how they fit in respect to certain conceptual dimensions, i.e. 
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how does Joseph’s concept of “relationship to interpretation” fits with Levenson’s “curiosity about 
what happens between us” in the dimensions of freedom and attention, 3) they were documents 
of historical value to the development of the concept apparent in the number of citations, so as to 
ensure that I had a good sense of the evolution of ideas and how they fit into the overall frame. I 
coded for mechanisms of therapeutic action that appeared in the literature as discrete ontologies 
and, I identified six main categories, already mentioned in the Introduction.  
 
Since I had to work towards a model of process, I re-visited my first open coding scheme and looked 
at the last two categories that is the level of an analyst’s action and the emerging phenomena in the 
clinical field. I identified there two recurrent themes as the main themes in the literature that had 
received empirical attention, the level of interpretation and the level of the therapeutic relationship. 
Mechanisms of therapeutic action focus on what does an interpretation achieves or on what 
happens in the psychoanalytic relationship. In the first cluster, transference interpretation and the 
development of insight were the main themes, while in the second attachment and repair of alliance 
ruptures seemed prominent.  
 
As a next step, I briefly reviewed the literature on the development of these concepts. For the first 
phase of this review I used a snowballing method beginning from basic texts with which I already 
had some acquaintance from the preceding stage of analysis. From these documents, I identified 36 
more relevant documents that helped me build the narrative review of the conceptual literature 
(List B, Appendix II). I present the results of this review in the form of a narrative summary in Chapter 
2. For the next phase, systematic searches of the empirical literature using PsychINFO was planned.  
 
Using PsychINFO I obtained the following results: 1) Using the term “transference interpretation” 
crossed by the methodological filter “empirical study” and the classification filter “Psychoanalytic 
therapy”, I identified 151 documents up to the year 2011 (137 articles in peer-reviewed journals and 
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14 books or book chapters), 2) using the terms “insight” and “psychotherapy” in search of abstracts, 
crossed by the methodological filter “empirical study” and the classification filter “psychoanalytic 
therapy”, I identified up to the year 2011, 44 journal articles and 8 books, 3) using the terms 
“working” or “therapeutic alliance” both crossed by the methodological filter “empirical research” 
and the classification filter “psychotherapy & psychotherapeutic counselling”, I identified up to the 
year 2011, 337 peer-reviewed journal articles and 13 books, 3) Using the terms “attachment” and 
“therapeutic alliance” crossed by the methodological filter “empirical research” I identified 34 
journal articles, and 35 dissertations. From these documents I manually selected 106 articles and 12 
book chapters to include in my review based on the following inclusion criteria: a) for the literature 
on Transference Interpretation: 1) the studies were published after the 1985 since according to 
Gabbard (2006) earlier most studies suffered from issues of poor design, 2) the studies in their 
introduction offered a good comprehensive review of the existing literature, as a quality criterion, 
since I could review how they fit into the literature emerging after 1985 3) the studies where 
studying the effectiveness of transference interpretations in comparison to other forms of 
treatment , since I wished to ensure a good level of conceptual relevance among the four reviewed 
factors (interpretation, insight, alliance, attachment/alliance interaction) avoiding significant 
interferences by analyses on data collapsed on a discrete factor such as diagnostic categories, or 
finally 4) the studies examined both an in- and post-treatment correlation of transference 
interpretation to outcomes, since they included discussions on treatment effects on certain 
personality factors (i.e. family functioning, insight, problem solving). b) for the studies examining 
the role of insight the following inclusion criteria were adopted:  1) only studies in English language 
were included due to language access limitations, 2) studies should involve adults’ treatment so as 
to ensure conceptual relevance to the overall design of the project, 3) studies should not focus on 
specific pathologies and diagnostic categories unless they compared different treatment 
modalities, in order to ensure the best possible conceptual relevance among the four reviewed 
factors avoiding significant interferences by analyses on data collapsed on a discrete sampling 
factor, c) for the literature on alliance and repair of ruptures, the following kind of studies were 
included: 1) studies adopting a psychodynamic/interpersonal perspective were necessarily included, 
since commensurability with the orientation of the project was ensured, 2) studies should 
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emphasise the evolution of alliance during a course of treatment and not only correlate alliance 
variables to outcome measures, since the principal interest of the project is to consider the in-
process factors, 3) studies that developed a qualitative understanding of the therapeutic 
relationship out of their empirical research design were necessarily included since they fit with the 
overall of the project to consider the complexity of the in-process factors, and finally 4) the studies 
should ensure the maximum level of data triangulation through including measures by both patient, 
therapist and independent observers, since from the pre-screening search I had already noticed that 
there were significant discrepancies among such measures, 5) the studies should focus on the 
psychotherapy or counselling process beyond diagnostic categories, in order to ensure the best 
possible conceptual relevance among the four reviewed factors avoiding significant interferences 
by analyses on data collapsed on a discrete sampling factor., d) for the literature on attachment and 
alliance, the following criteria might be satisfied for inclusion: 1) studies should not focus on a 
specific classification of attachment but should compare different forms of attachment 
classification to alliance, in order to ensure the best possible conceptual relevance among the four 
reviewed factors avoiding significant interferences by analyses on data collapsed on a discrete 
sampling factor , 2)studies designed to recruit subjects from a population of inpatients or focusing 
on very brief counselling schemes were excluded since considered irrelevant to the form of a 
psychoanalytic therapy. 
 
Since the role of both these reviews was to construct a conceptual map of where we stand at the 
moment in relation to the status of empirical and conceptual research on the matter of therapeutic 
action I tried to be closer to the methodology of inclusion criteria that are used by aggregative 
reviews while critically analyzing and discussing the findings I adopted the perspective of a meta-
interpretative framework (Weed, 2008). Meta-interpretative reviews are usually based on an 
iterative process of data collection and aim at what Weed calls a triple hermeneutic approach that 
is an “interpretation of interpretations of interpretations”. As I already mentioned in the first 
paragraphs of this methodological chapter and as I note in Chapter 3 (p. 41) I explored the voice of 
empirical research in transference interpretation, insight and the therapeutic relationship as a 
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“text” worth considering. Following Saini and Shlonsky (2012) I do not consider the different 
epistemological frameworks that these studies adopt as a barrier in their meta-interpretative 
analysis as long as I adopt a clear epistemological stance through which I analyze the material while 
I respect at the same moment the authors’ epistemological position. I present my analysis in Chapter 
3 using the form of a narrative review.  
 
The next step I had to take before bringing all the pieces together, it was to undertake another 
systematic search, the most important from the perspective of my research question, where I had 
to review the psychoanalytic literature on chaos, complexity and dynamic systems theory and finally 
build on the grounds of this review a thorough Conceptual and in-depth Analysis. Using the 
Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing I identified up to the year 2011, 120 documents in English 
containing in the main text the phrase “Dynamic Systems Theory”, 96 documents containing the 
phrase “Nonlinear Dynamic Systems” and 13 documents containing all three phrases: “chaos”, 
“complexity” and “dynamic systems”. The only exclusion criterion for this sample of documents I 
decided to apply was the exclusion of documents that do not address clinical issues but focus on 
developmental issues since my principal aim was to study the way that clinicians discussed the 
influence of Complexity on their clinical work and reasoning. 117 documents were included after the 
first selection process and 16 more documents were included through snowballing, collected from 
references inside the texts. In a second selection phase which involved the material selected for the 
in-depth analysis, I manually collected all those documents: a) with a strong emphasis in the clinical 
process, since documents with no direct references to clinical material were considered irrelevant 
for the in-depth analysis where my principal aim was to consider the differences and similarities in 
relation to how clinicians discuss concepts in the context of clinical descriptions, b) which develop 
theoretical formulations that link the concepts that emerged as important from my previous 
reviews (i.e. transference, interpretation, insight, the “bootstrapping problem”, alliance ruptures 
and repairs) to concepts originating in the chaos, complexity and dynamic systems theory literature, 
since in the first phase of the Conceptual analysis documents with little emphasis on psychodynamic 
work were included. 105 documents were included in the final sample. I will present the 
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methodological details of this bi-phasic Conceptual in-depth Analysis in Chapter 4 together with the 





  1.2   Reflexively Positioning Myself as a Researcher 
 
Positioning as a concept is highly implicated in my own research. I criticize the social constructionist 
conception of the term, which emphasises the discursive dimensions of positioning “incapacitating” 
the inherent generativity and the radical dialogicality implied in Bakhtin’s and Merleau-Ponty’s 
thinking on the dialogical. Reflexivity and positioning involve something more than the awareness 
of our implicit assumptions, the rhetoric acts, the self-presentation and the epistemological beliefs. 
Positioning, as I now understand it, mainly involves the story and the scenic narrative that attempts 
to shake identity “implicatives” by making what Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012) calls “style” as 
transparent as possible. Reflexivity and positioning imply our efforts to find ourselves within the 
generative space of experience, it is mostly not about understanding but about standing around the 
generative gap that makes change possible. It is not about making clear where I am coming from; 
this is impossible. There is no place I can stand on to know where I am talking from beyond the 
socially normative, and this again can only be reflected in the dialogical space which involves the 
Other. Neither is it about avoiding reification of biases and assumptions, but about hunting the 
dialogical gap that may keep biases and assumptions in a state of generative uneasiness. Positioning 
and reflexivity might engage the powers of a narrative to speak the otherness and the invisible 
through the visible and the common.  Positioning oneself reflexively means revealing the 
vulnerabilities and fragilities at the joints which make one’s stories personal, meaningful and agile, 
as they are felt and enacted.  
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I come from an academic background in cognitive science, occupational therapy and psychology, 
and a background of professional training in occupational therapy and psychoanalysis. I have been 
trained in both advanced experimental design and ethnography. I also have some expertise in 
administering tests of frontal lobe executive control, thinking people’s everyday activity in terms of 
their ability for inhibiting pre-potent responses, planning and organizing purposeful behaviour. At 
the same time, I observe, in a qualitative manner, how people make meaning out of their everyday 
activities in particular contexts, and how this affects their health, both physical and mental. And 
finally, I work as a psychoanalyst with people who try to make meaning out of their relationships 
and their experience. I am not competent enough in every of these activities all the time.  What I 
like in all three of them is this common feeling of not knowing and waiting for something to emerge 
while processes iterate in circles. As I have developed my expertise in all three of these areas, I have 
realized that this calls for a sharpening of one’s critical vigilance in order to equivocate its 
authoritarian dynamics.  There is no alibi in existence, as Bakhtin (1993) notes: our thinking, our 
attitudes, our practices have immense ethical and practical consequences. I embarked on this 
research degree out of an interest to develop a process framework to study my own work. The idea 
of developing a process model that may help me and possibly other colleagues developing 
qualitative methodologies to study the process of the clinical encounter seemed completely right 
some years ago. Now, I view things from a radically different perspective: a process model is 
enough; methodologies should be very flexible and contextual. First and foremost, they should be 
the result of a collective dialogue among people deciding to study a process, and that in iterative 
cycles they calibrate the relationship between the model and their discrete methodologies.  
 
My original dissatisfaction with the perpetuating polarities that sustain the “longstanding holy war” 
(Carere-Comes, 2015; p.313) in psychotherapeutic research between the systematic empirical and 
the traditional case study discourse which failed to unpack the intermediate transitional space is 
what pushed me towards developing this project. A Gadamerian (1975/1989) “fusion of horizons” 
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(p.305) was and remained the ‘model scene’ throughout my research. What radically changed was 
my logocentric and constructivist sensibilities. I embarked on my psychoanalytic training already 
disillusioned with the second wave of cognitive science, also known as Connectionism, and its ability 
to develop into a meaningful discourse on the human mind. Even if “our language in psychoanalysis 
is still primitive and undeveloped” (Cooper, 2010; p.2) it remains one of the most comprehensive 
models of the human mind. I have been trained in psychoanalysis in a society that cultivates an 
eclectic object-relational climate mostly inspired by British Independents but which also has 
affinities to the Relational school of thought. I have been in analysis for 9 years with a declared 
Independent. During this analysis, which was a transformative life experience, I started developing 
my affinities to Relational theory. One of my supervisors, with whom I have been working for many 
years, is a declared Independent. Moreover, she has extensive training in Family therapy from a 
Systemic viewpoint and is among the founders of the Greek Systemic Association.  My other 
supervisor is also a declared Independent with strong affinities to Bion’s and Winnicott’s thinking. 
After my training, I gradually moved to the Relational-Intersubjective camp of thinking, something 
which I believe I have consolidated during this research experience.  
 
From the moment I embarked on this project I was already inquiring deeply into Relationality. At 
the same time, a significant turn was taking place in cognitive science which transformed the 
theoretical and the epistemological climate in unimaginable ways, with the rise of Enactivism acting 
as a unifying paradigm for the 4E perspectives on the human mind (the embodied, the embedded, 
the extended and the enactive) (Thompson, 2007). Cognitive science seemed interesting and 
promising once again. The paradigm shift was like wildfire in all relevant disciplines such as 
linguistics, psychology, philosophy, and robotics. Discovering the work of Bert Hodges (2009), his 
idea that we use language because we care about our niche helped me to see my own logocentric 
and constructivist affinities in a new light.  
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During this time my country, Greece, was experiencing a massive societal collapse with 
unimaginable consequences for how we worked and lived. People were losing their jobs from one 
day to another and analysands who seemed to be making some progress were finding themselves 
violently returning to the ‘heart’ of their traumas’ attractor to find some painful and costly comfort. 
As therapists, we had to double the hours we worked in order to maintain our quality of life. I 
experienced firsthand the strong pulls of a trauma attractor that organized itself into a stable 
system facilitated by societal attractors. As a society, we experienced the sudden rise of a fascist 
party, the reproduction of a paranoid-schizoid discourse everywhere around us, the rise of new 
forms of ethnic pride coming out of the most violent forms of masculinity, idealization of hate and 
revenge. It was a societal collapse, sometimes creeping into the consulting room like invisible 
germs, and other times crashing in like a tsunami. Moreover, we had to learn to find the necessary 
courage and trust to ‘not-know’ and wait for a solution to this collapse to present itself. I had to 
interrupt my studies, double my workload, support friends and family, and retain my mental sanity 
enough to help people re-organize their lives and find meaning in them. I had to let myself scale-
match to what they experienced and feel it, however terrifying it was, and at the same time find 
some comfort in de-ontologizing it. This climate may have affected the patterning of the ideas that 
came out of this research process, into the belief that a semiotic/mediational and a constructivist 
perspective while not irrelevant are highly restrictive, in the way we understand the processes of 
change.  
 
While always highly influenced in my thinking by Adorno’s (1973) Negative Dialectics, I started 
realizing that as Adorno failed to reject, not only the Hegelian affirmative dimension, but the 
dialectic part of his thinking altogether, he actually remained tied to the processes of reification. 
The societal collapse in Greece was teaching us day by day that people use their extraordinary 
creative abilities to reinvent meaning in their lives in surprising ways. Greece was exploring 
generativity in practice and psychoanalysts were exploring the fragility of the reifying processes 
under the pressure of a massive societal change. Our Deleuzian sensibilities were intensifying in a 
way that surprised many of us. The inherent tension between negativity and generativity is an 
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ongoing debate in philosophy and especially political theory (Coole, 2000). Between the 
deconstruction of a reified commodity and the expansion of experience through a generative 
inclusion of reality’s invisible dimensions, there is an unknown territory, a tension that calls for a 
response.   
 
At the crossroads of a paradigm shift in cognitive science, the unimaginable consequences of a 
societal collapse and my critical explorations in relational thinking, I had to review, rethink and 
qualitatively interpret the psychoanalytic complexity literature. Obviously, my personal experience 
was a big influence on my proposal that we should take some distance from the assimilative in order 
to explore the accommodative pressures, the reactive and the generative, thus to better 
understand change. From my perspective, understanding the reification of a commodity as Adorno 
did is not the most interesting form of knowing anymore. We experienced highly esteemed 
colleagues teaching the habits of good life to the public in a highly criticizing and authoritarian way. 
Greeks were told that they were simply immature and were living beyond their potentials. An 
authoritarian and hegemonic discourse was reproduced under the clothes of psychoanalysis once 
again. It was simply not meaningful to discuss these desperate defensive manoeuvres at a moment 
when people were using all of their creative powers to reinvent their lives. The political occupied 
the centre of the therapeutic space and psychoanalysis was utterly failing to speak it, while analysts 
were successfully holding people as they were uncontrollably whirling around dissolving attractors. 
It was not about a transformation of the habitus but a sudden dissolution, the “fragmented and 
fleeting musings” (Sayer, 2010; p.116) of the inner dialogue suggesting a space of both agony and 
relief. Under this climate, the anti-representational thinking of third-wave Enactive cognitive science 
not only made sense but came as no surprise at all. A few years from now, we may be once again 
interested in “representing” change, in constructing a discourse that describes what happened, but 
we will certainly know in a very tacit way that this is not what helped most in the moments of the 
sudden dissolution. Rather, it was mainly our ability to hold one another while we were reinventing 
a personal way of being together, of being there, out of the excessiveness of reality. Ten years ago 
I considered the Winnicotian True Self, through my social constructionist sensibilities, to be a fancy 
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metaphor, a discursive device that helped psychoanalysts conceive transformation. Now, I know in 
a way beyond words that the ‘True Self’ is not simply a couple of words but an expressive ‘display’ 
of reality. It is a couple of hands that held me in moments of great agony when people were 
revealing an unknown tonality, an unanticipated imagery, a startling in-betweenness, their 
unimaginable excessiveness.  Words may be living organisms in whose multiple rebirths surprising 
mutations can happen, worlds that had an incarnate life in the past. Perhaps words are not ghosts 
or ancestors; perhaps they are us; perhaps we are the words.  
 
 
1.3   Presentation of the Chapters 
The aim of Chapter 2 is to provide the “Relational context” of the proposed process model. In this 
chapter I mainly explain my choice of Relational theory as a starting point for developing a process 
model. Firstly, I present the development of Relational ideas on multiplicity, transference 
interpretation as an ‘elaboration over a dramatization’ and the problem of “bootstrapping”. Next, 
I introduce the main dimensions into which the question of the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis 
has unfolded. I also briefly critique those perspectives that intellectualize insight or consider the 
debate over ‘insight vs the relationship’ as a polarity, which has been settled by the adoption of a 
middle road. I argue that we should go back to theory and change the way we think about these 
two concepts, since we have a lot to learn by moving away from a rigid “intellectualization” of 
insight or “emotionalization” of the therapeutic relationship.  
 
In Chapter 3 I present in the form of a narrative summary the results of two reviews. Firstly, I review 
and critically analyze the existing empirical research on transference interpretation, insight and the 
alliance. I criticize both the empirical research, for utterly decontextualizing phenomena and 
crafting answers to questions that are of no direct relevance to the dynamically reassembled 
“puzzle” of the clinical situation, and the hermeneutic traditions of psychoanalysis, which embrace 
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the complexity of the clinical situation with some unnecessary idealization. Instead, I propose the 
paradigmatic shift of process research that builds on conceptual models that try to keep processes 
of contextualization and decontextualization in a constant dialogical relationship. Following this, I 
present and discuss the results of the review of the conceptual literature, where I mainly try to 
exemplify the development of the ideas regarding the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis, the role 
of insight, transference interpretation and the therapeutic relationship. Finally, I mention the rapidly 
growing paradigmatic shift in the psychoanalytic literature where the concepts of insight and 
transference interpretation, alongside a discourse focusing on structures, are gradually moving to 
the background, while it is the interest in the nature of experience and processes that comes to the 
foreground.  
 
In Chapter 4, I am presenting the results of a bi-phasic Conceptual in-depth Analysis on the 
psychoanalytic Chaos and Complexity literature, with the overall aim of building a minimal model of 
the clinical process from the psychoanalytic point of view. After describing the methodological 
considerations that determined my work, I present the Conceptual Framework that helped me build 
a “story” about what kind of process the clinical situation is, through an in-depth Analysis. This 
Conceptual Framework exemplifies the main theoretical and conceptual issues that give shape to 
the identity of psychoanalytic complexity authors. In the second part of the chapter, I present the 
“story” that emerged from the in-depth Analysis, which suggests the organizing frame of the 
proposed minimal model. The thematic categories of Experience, Coupling, Shifting States and 
Scaling suggest the main organizing axes of the proposed model. Scaling appears as the unifying 
theme which gives to the process its overall shape.  
 
In Chapter 5, I explore an enactivist theoretical and epistemological framework as the organic 
ground for developing psychoanalytic process research by probing the workings of Scaling in the 
structuring of experience. I first explore the inherent dialogicality of the human mind at the level of 
inter-hemispheric differences and how these differences relate to the organism-environment 
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dialogical relationship. Secondly, I examine an enactivist perspective on psychopathology in order 
to understand how the collapse of scaling undermines the generativity of the mind as a relational 
experience. In the third part, I try to make clear the assets of using an enactivist theoretical and 
methodological framework for process research, inquiring at the same time the advantages of a 
dialogical and generative understanding of the process over the semiotic/mediational or 
constructivist perspectives. Finally, I employ the reasoning advanced in the proposed process model 
in a single case study to show that psychoanalysis, using a wide array of methodological tools 
originating in Dialogicality, Conversation Analysis and Ethnomethodological research and the 
Distributed Language Approach, can reach a high level of resolution in interaction episodes that may 
help us dig deeper into the mystery of change.  
 
In my Conclusions I briefly review the story that I have read through the conceptual and qualitative 
analysis of the literature, and emphasise that both the research focus and the methodological 














The Relational Context 
 
If there is one line that bending in space creates the ‘shape’ and the ‘figure’ of the Relational school 
of thought, it may look something like this: “the acceptance of paradox and the tolerance of 
ambiguity” (Aron & Starr, 2013); this ability for ‘riding on the crest of the conflictual wave’ of 
paradox. We owe this inspiring metaphor to Andre Green and his exemplary formulation of 
Winnicott’s spirit: “…to be alive is somehow to ride on the crest of this conflictual wave…. between 
the fear to be mad and the need to be mad” (interview to Gregorio Kohon; Kohon,1999, pp.29). 
Dialectics (Ghent, 1989, 1992, 1995; Benjamin, 1988; Ogden, 1994), ambiguity (Levenson, 1972/2005; 
Mitchell, 1992), paradox (Ghent, 1989, Mitchell, 1988; Hoffman, 2001), multiplicity (Davies, 1997 ; 
Bromberg, 1993), process (Ghent; Mitchell, 1988; Harris, 2008; Stern, 2003), intersubjectivity and 
thirdness (Benjamin, 2004; Ogden, 1994b) suggest the constituting dimensions of modern day 
Relational thought.  
 
As this is a clinically-oriented conceptual research study, it will mainly draw from clinically oriented 
metaphors and the narratives of “what’s going on around here” (Levenson, 1989, p. 538). This is the 
attitude which the Relational search for meaning has moved towards, distancing itself from the 
traditional school’s focus on searching for meaning in patient’s words and actions (Bromberg, 2006; 
Mitchell, 1988; Stern, 2010). “The Penelope’s loom” is one such metaphor that vivifies the felt 
experience of the patient in the transferential matrix from the Relational point of view. Pizer’s 
(1998a, 2001) metaphor of “building bridges” is another good description of the patient’s internal 
experience and dynamics as well as of the transferential relational encounter. Bridging the two I 
think we can create a clinically relevant, three dimensional ‘holographic’ metaphor of the clinical 
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situation, the phenomenon of transference and the felt experience of both the patient’s and the 
therapist’s internal workings.  
 
The tapestry in the looms of each one, says Mitchell (1988), is rich in interacting figures, “images 
and metaphors” (p.273) about the self, as well as “images and phantoms of others, whom one 
endlessly pursues or escapes” (ibid. p.273). Our self-definition and connection to others is a 
constantly conflicting process, while pathology reflects those repetitive conflicts that accompany 
our “accommodation to a particular other” (Mitchell, 1988; p.277) where “the price of connection 
to each parent” at the same time, “is far too great” (ibid. p.273). At Penelope’s loom “we excise 
strings and weave them in another pattern” (ibid. p.273) being in a constant state of tension in order 
to accommodate new experiences. Pathology is the result of commitment to patterns that do not 
connect smoothly and of the recurring counter-pressure “to reclaim what has been given over, to 
escape the limits of self which serve as the precondition of any connection” (1988; p.277). The real 
trouble is that there are no completely ubiquitous solutions, and the relational matrix requires us to 
work without protest at the loom constantly, finding what Bateson (1972/2000) would call “patterns 
that connect patterns that connect”.   
 
Conflicts do not only arise between different channels of connection to each individual parent 
separately, but also between the channels of connection to the same parent, says Mitchell. It is 
necessarily so, argues Pizer (1998a), because we make our experience through bridging these 
‘conflictual’ channels; the hurting mother and the loving mother are one and the same and we need 
to master this paradoxical experience through the other’s help, since this strain places “a demand 
on mind to work on overload” (2005; p.116). The one who brings us into the space of paradox is the 
same one who may help us “straddle” and “bridge” to bear the paradox, since the paradox cannot 
be repudiated, repressed or resolved. “The concept of a core unitary self may be our field’s teddy 
bear, our transitional object” (Harris, 2008; p.47). “Fluidity and uncertainty, the movement within 
and between persons” (ibid. p.47) is nothing more than this “shadow show of shifting silhouettes, 
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leaving lasting traces of discrepant shades of meaning and affect that cluster around separate 
islands within each person’s internal universe” (Pizer, 2001; p.116). When paradox bridging fails 
these islands remain unconnected, dissociated.  “An aerial view may show stanchions and 
incomplete ramps left suddenly abandoned …[and] … the skeletons of some workers crushed by 
collapsing structures…[when]…a catamaran from one island strays inadvertently near the other 
island, senses the pull of a cataclysmic “black hole,” and flees” (Pizer, 1998a; p. 73).  
 
We live in an “archipelago of multiple meaning-and-affect centers” that in health somehow become 
more bridgeable, says Pizer (1998a). Strings in the loom somehow get organized in smooth patterns 
finding “patterns that connect patterns that connect”. But similarly to Mitchell, Pizer (1998a, 2001) 
argues that this laborious weaving never ends for anyone and never becomes easier.  The tension 
between experiences, i.e., the present and the past experience, is constant; we always re-categorize 
and re-contextualize these affective categories that give meaning to experience and at the heart of 
which reside “value-laden memories”. The patient “enters treatment looking for something new 
and for something old” (Mitchell, 1988; p.292); or, to put it in another way, for something old in new 
ways. His experience, argues Stern (2004, 2010) is unformulated. That is, it is either dissociated in 
‘the strong sense’, like in the terrible catastrophe that Pizer describes above, or narratively rigid, like 
having constraints in the possible paths one can follow in a constellation of islands. Following Pizer, 
we can say that bridges between islands may not necessarily be destroyed, but simply not 
constructed. Islands may connect through a complicated system of bridges, but not necessarily 
directly all to each other, making our crossing over meanings effortful. The “relational 
interpretation” calls the analyst to imagine this complex patterning of bridges between islands, of 
patterns that connect in the weaving loom.  
 
In this complex world of psychic islands, insight cannot be the recovery of something that 
happened, since something always happens anew again and again. There are only processes, mental 
contents which are always reformed. The relational interpretation calls the analyst to take the shape 
	 39	
of the analysand’s patterns, and it is only through her enactive and embodied presence in the 
in/between of the matrix that the analyst can find herself shaped by “the patient’s projections, 
antagonized by the patient’s defenses” (Mitchell, 1988; p. 292). The ‘relational interpretation’, then, 
is experience, words, feelings and shifting self-states, organized in a unique choreography. It is the 
experience of what happens in the in/between when two looms weave together to form a unique 
pattern (Knoblauch, 2005). It is what happens when two people decide to have a long journey in a 
virtual constellation of islands, that is the “third” (Benjamin, 1994; Ogden, 1992), and both think they 
know this new constellation, since they both have one of their own that seems similar. One of them, 
the analyst, claims that she has done this journey, many times, so that she can ‘resign’ of her own 
maps to see why the other (i.e., the analysand) makes these moment-to-moment decisions on how 
they should travel. This means that she can negotiate the paths, and bear the analysand’s misleading 
imagination which will drive them through complicated paths where they will both be in danger of 
losing hope of a meaningful journey. Sometimes she may feel it is acceptable to fail ‘holding’ the 
process, to negotiate these paths through an almost assertive manner; at other times she hopes 
that by lending her own imagination things will change of their own accord; sometimes she follows 
the analysand declining her right to have a separate imagination, she ‘holds’ the patient and follows.  
 
Racker (1968) forewarns this courageous co-traveler, however, that before embarking on this 
journey she should keep in mind that ‘the myth of the analytic situation’ is that “analysis is an 
interaction between a sick person and a healthy one” (p. 132). Both participants try to have an aerial 
view of the third landscape from the ground, something impossible but meaningful. Even if the 
analyst can somehow construct such an aerial view of her own maps through experience in theory, 
personal analysis, and clinical experience what the relational interpretation of this complex situation 
teaches her is that she has to ‘rehearse’ the maps of the co-traveler to make her ‘functional’ aerial 
view meaningful.  Without rehearsing, she can only work with her own past experience. And the 
patient has not embarked on this journey to “surrender” (Ghent, 1990) his own old ways in order to 
replace them with the old ways of another. This would be impossible, for no-one can learn this 
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lesson without having a new experience. The person is there to have this experience, and learn how 
one can actually reconstruct his maps by surrendering his knowledge of his old maps.  
 
In Influence and Autonomy in Psychoanalysis, Mitchell (1997) describes an intense experience in the 
countertransference. Reading his ‘outburst out of impasse’, for the first time, I felt he was talking 
about something somehow familiar and yet not so familiar as well. Ralph Emerson writes that “in 
every work of genius, we recognize our own rejected thoughts; they come back to us with a certain 
alienated majesty”. What Mitchell was describing might not be majestic but it was certainly thought 
provoking; it was the first time I thought of transference interpretation as a “quantum leap”. 
Mitchell describes the case of a woman on a low fee schedule who unexpectedly receives a good 
amount of money and discusses with her analyst if she should either save the money or increase the 
number of sessions. The woman seems to have had a history of unreflective compliance to parental 
figures. The analyst finds himself in an agonizing conflict to refrain from what he felt as 
seductiveness, to avoid abandoning the patient, to make meaning of his own feelings and thoughts 
and to hold the situation. He chooses an ‘outburst’ talking to the patient who, had probably already 
taken notice of the subtle non-verbal cues signifying how stymied her analyst was, about his 
dilemma and how it might reflect her own struggles with choices. Mitchell does his best to escape 
the impasse of being heard as something old (Mitchell, 1988). This is part of an endless discussion 
in psychoanalytic literature, what Mitchell (1988; 1997) calls the problem of “bootstrapping”. This is 
somehow the same as what Pizer (1998a; 2001) describes as the problem of “building bridges” and 
what Benjamin (1995; 2004) thinks of as a “doer-done complementarity” that shuts-off the dyad out 
of thirdness. It is the problem of the analyst being caught in one of the patient’s old patterns, of 
being experienced by the patient according to his old affective categories, no matter how hard the 
analyst tries to escape this prison. Mitchell writes that no matter how hard the analyst tries, in a 
“sadomasochistic transference/countertransference matrix his interpretations are either sadistic 
assaults or pitiful surrenders” (1988,p.294), in a matrix of symbiotic qualities his words are 
“experienced either as seductive fusions or remote detachments” (ibid.p.294). Even if “the analyst 
makes an interpretation about the way in which the patient transforms every interaction into a 
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battle” (1997, p.45), it is hopeless; “the patient experiences the interpretation itself as a power 
operation” (ibid. p.45).  Thus “altering the analysand’s relational matrix seems to require a kind of 
bootstrapping operation in which analyst and analysand in a quantum leap lift themselves from one 
kind of interpersonal engagement to another” (1988, p.294). The clinical situation, any clinical 
situation, seems even more hopeless if one is to take seriously Edgar Levenson’s (1976) clinical 
wisdom, where “any small piece of the clinical material contains the total configuration...any 10 
minutes of a taped session can be explicated to an entire analysis. Any dream of a patient contains 
implicit in it –literally enfolded in it – the entire story of the patient’s neurotic difficulties” (p. 10). If 
the clinical situation truly is this world of fuzzy and fractal boundaries, as we come to realize more 
and more (Marks-Tarlow, 2008; Pizer, 1998a, 2001; Seligman, 2005) then we cannot help but accept 
that the “analytic work proceeds with an irreducible degree of uncertainty” (Harris, 2011; p.726, 
emphasis and italics mine).  
 
What Mitchell describes here does not seem to be the miracle of a Winnicotian “sacred moment”. 
Rather it is very close to the search for the contingency and markedness of “mentalizing” 
experience (Fonagy et al. 2004), to what Stern (2010) describes as “Witnessing”, or what Spezzano 
(2007) - building on a John Dunne’s metaphor - puts in an elegant way as a “home for the mind”, a 
“home for exiled, half-formed and missing parts of the self” (p.1579). Harris (2008) notes that, “[w]e 
often rather melodramatically, link intrapsychic change to immediate, short-term actions” (p.95), 
while “[m]utative action emerges in the spaces…at the edge of chaos” (ibid. p.42). This is where 
Mitchel, I think, hopes the dyad will move, to the edge of chaos, but he does not seem quite sure 
that his ‘witnessing’ has such an effect.  I think he would agree with Harris that “we must use caution 
in claiming a mutative effect of either the dramatic enactments or the powerful resonant 
interpretation” (ibid. p.45, italics and emphasis mine).  
 
Reading his later writings, it is evident that Mitchell was critically influenced by Loewald. Loewald 
(1972) in The Experience of Time, was the first amongst analysts theorizing time as the structural 
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nexus of psychic experience. Time is subjective, fragmented, eternal, relative to other times, and it 
is a felt experience; time replaces the spatial dimension of psychic structure. Mitchell (2003) writes: 
“For Loewald…each of the concepts – past, present, future – has no meaning in itself. Past in 
relation to what? Present in relation to what? They imply each other, and create a subjective sense 
of connection, a narrative scaffolding for organizing experiences” (p.47). According to Loewald, the 
analyst’s interpretations “anticipate the patient’s future psychic growth” (Cooper, 2000; p.151). This 
is how I read Mitchell in this clinical example; as trying to hold maps in a superposition, from where 
both he and his patient see why their maps are different, why he one thinks this is the path and the 
patient has a different view, where they are at this moment, and which past is meaningful according 
to which future. Maps are not static, and Loewald’s insight is illuminating; we can no longer consider 
islands as grounded on space; they are grounded in time, or rather time is the organizing nexus of 
each island.  
 
 
What Mitchell describes in this case is not an enactment. In an enactment, the freedom of the “eye 
to see itself” is severely compromised, as Stern (1997, 2010) notes. Even in enactments though, 
freedom comes from a reflection on the patient’s eyes. Translating Stern, we could say that the “eye 
sees itself” after making out of a fragment of its own image reflected in the eyes of the patient a 
whole percept. Stern (2010) presenting a case of his own, asks: “But was he also giving me my own 
chance for “cure” in the transference?” (p.99). The felt presence of the analyst is not outside the 
equation that organizes the transferential matrix, it is the re-entry loop that drives the choice of the 
equation. The analysand interprets this felt presence “by structuring it along old relational lines, by 
seeking to engage the analyst according to pre-structured notions of how people really connect, 
really touch each other” (Mitchell, 1988; p.292). At the same time, a communication of this felt 
presence is lurking in the in/between. However much the analyst values freedom, she will sooner or 
later loose her mind into this patient’s reading of her felt presence. To reclaim her freedom she must 
search for her own contribution, and find out what of her own action in the field, says the patient, 
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made this imprisonment sensible. Reclaiming freedom is not an easy task as most Relational 
theorists nowadays recognize. Sterba’s “observing ego”, however comfortable as an imaginary site 
of freedom from conflict is now only a ‘fiction’. Maps are not grounded on earth; “the passing 
thought is itself the thinker” used to say William James (2001/1890). We have a comprehensive 
theory of enactments (Bromberg, 1998; Davies, 1997; Stern, 2004, 2010); what we do not have is an 
understanding of this subtle interplay where the felt presence of the analyst is usurped by the 
patient’s weaving loom. The opposite direction is also not clear enough, i.e. how the patient’s felt 
presence, his signals to the analyst, that she is unconfined not only bound, to reclaim her freedom, 
disappear woven with the analyst’s own strings. We do not have a sound understanding of these 
processes but we have elegant and detailed descriptions of these enactment scripts.  
 
And this is where Loewald’s contribution, I think, is important once again. According to Loewald 
transference is a “dramatization” (1975, p.293), a “dramatic play” (ibid. p. 279). “In contrast to a 
play conceived and composed by its author as a deliberate creation of his mind to be enjoyed by an 
audience, the transference neurosis is an unwitting fantasy creation which is considered or clearly 
recognized as such—at any rate in earlier stages of the analysis—only by the analyst” (ibid. p. 279). 
“Narrative, historical account, may be regarded as imitation of action too” (ibid. p.292). Loewald’s 
understanding of the role of language, the collapse and re-assembling of times in narrative, the 
vibes of preverbal experience and the oscillating waves between different modes of experience, 
and the coalescence of primary and secondary processes in language is another potent medium 
through which the dramatic play acquires both its powerful and illusory nature, on the one hand, 
and dramatic and transformative impact, on the other (Chodorow, 2009; Teicholz, 1999). I think that 
Loewald portrays a critical dimension of the inbetweenity of transference, that of experience, the 
felt experience of this inbetweenity:  
“The transition between transference neurosis and the patient's life outside of it, or the 
reciprocal communication between them, is similar to that between a dramatic play, a 
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fantasy creation, and the life that people lead before seeing the play and after they come 
home from an evening in the theatre—if the play for them is more than a pastime (p.282). 
The transferential experience is more than a pastime, argues Loewald, if the analyst, as the director 
of the play is able to “relive and re-create” (1975, p.280) the action of the play through the powers 
of his own inner mental life. And, “this is what makes analysis so compelling and so dangerous”, 
notes Harris; “the analyst like any artist in any medium must be lost in the material and be in control 
of it” (2008, p.46). This paradoxical ‘riding on the crest’ between loss and control, between you and 
me, between past and future, between old and emerging objects, between “hope and dread” 
(Mitchell, 1995), between being sure that one is known but unsure how one is known, both by the 
other and by himself, between words and actions, between something sensed and felt and 
something imagined and theorized, is what strikes me as important in Influence and Autonomy in 
Psychoanalysis (Mitchell, 1997). Mitchell’s work cannot be read as a manual of therapeutic action but 
must rather be seen as a description of the complex process that an analyst has to undergo suffering 
the despair in order to “untie the knots” (Pizer, 1998a), in order to deal with impasses. The journey 
is actually a play, a dramatization and this I believe is part of the trance; it feels very real and very 
unreal at the same moment.  
 
In this process of intimacy that therapy is, where two minds transform themselves through this 
inbetweenity created by their own mental processes, can we really rely on such moments acting as 
mooring buoys? If one can ever know, most Relational analysts agree, one can only know ‘ex post 
facto’. Stern (2010) seems almost sure that the new narrative is the mark that change leaves behind, 
what matters is the freedom to “feel, relate, see and say differently than before” (p.116); before this 
hypnotic dive into the text of the play, that transference is. Borrowing terms from psychoanalytic 
gender studies, I will argue in this thesis that any moment of connection in the analytic pair is a ‘real 
appearance’ (Benjamin, 1998), a ‘necessary fiction’ (Harris, 2008) that will acquire and lose its sacred 
qualities in different ways and in different times both during treatment and afterwards. The 
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‘performativity’ of these moments does not make them less real; it is exactly that ‘performativity’ 
which makes them real.  
 
This new emerging relational understanding of the unconscious as less factual and more as a 
metaphorical playfield is a controversial yet necessary step for psychoanalysis in order to gain a new 
insight about the “unthought” of the already known unconscious life. Psychoanalysis has to 
immerse itself into hermeneutics in order to express its knowledge in new voices. Scientific 
metaphors are no less important but not as a criterion of truthfulness. Instead they should be 
viewed as a generative source of meaning, as that potential space of interplay between 
concreteness and pretense. Losing and finding our concepts in this ‘fractalized’ and transitional 
area, we can hope for a new voice. But there is this pressing matter of “therapeutic action” as well, 
of what is therapeutic in psychoanalysis.  
 
I will begin exploring this question by returning to Mitchell’s moment of “outburst out of impasse”. 
Neville Symington (1983) believes that such an authentic spontaneous interpretation is a sign of 
change that has already happened; it speaks about the change occurring in the relationship. Past 
tense then, the interpretation follows something that happened; it is a sign of that something. 
Obviously this is a view very close to the one adopted by Stern, mentioned above. Symington, 
however, understands that something as something that begins in the processing of the 
countertransference, the “essential agent of change is the inner act of the analyst” (p.286). 
Symington, more or less, expresses this shared belief of many post-Kleinians that the necessary 
transformation happens in the inner world of the analyst, expressed or not, and that this 
transformation will bring a change into the field. Relationals approach the subject matter in a 
different way. The inner act of the analyst is another such “moment” that reflects what has already 
happened in the field; it is inseparable from the dyadic interplay. The analyst’s freedom to think has 
been laboriously negotiated in the in/between, her new narrative, her new understanding, is not 
liberating in itself, but the expression of a liberating process.  
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It was Ghent who wrote back in 1995 that: “in the early years of psychoanalysis, the prevailing view 
was that therapeusis was essentially informational - insight and awareness would bring about 
changes in the ways one could experience events and respond to them. Over time, there has been 
a subtle shift from the informational perspective to the transformational, where insight is often 
retrospective rather than the active agent”, (p.475).  Ghent is speaking about the insight of both 
analyst and analysand; insight is retrospective for both. What is clearly different between Symington 
and the Relationals is the latter’s strong belief, that for the process to acquire mutative qualities, 
the analyst’s subjectivity must be negotiated in the in/between of the analytic space; either way, it 
cannot remain hidden behind the couch (Aron, 1996). Bollas (2007) feels that the analyst’s 
subjectivity is inextricably mingled in the in/between but doesn’t necessarily need to be so in a 
marked way as it quite often happens in relational encounters. While not taking a radically different 
position he reminds us that in some cases, spontaneous relief from symptoms in an analysis is not 
an unnatural phenomenon. Insight is not necessary for such an achievement, and a patient freely 
associating accompanied by a listening analyst may free the patient from symptoms (Bollas, 2007).  
 
The question of therapeutic action in psychoanalysis does not fence itself simply and smoothly in 
these three categories; the inner act of the analyst, the negotiation of subjectivities in the 
in/between or even the ‘capacity to play alone in the presence of another’. It seems more like the 
mythological chthonic water beast, Lernaean Hydra. Categories collapse and re-collapse into new 
categories in a never-ending game. From Glover’s (1931) “inexact interpretations” psychoanalysts 
are always wrestling with the question of therapeutic action: insight or the relationship; “deep” or 
carefully moving towards the depth interpretations, interpreting the defense or the content; 
interpreting at the point of urgency where anxiety is raised or facilitating regression; interpreting to 
resolve conflict or to hold and facilitate a gradual separateness. An acknowledgement that “we 
don’t cure, we do our jobs and cure happens” (Greenberg, 2012; p.241) might be a good starting 
point for the bold enterprise of searching for the right questions since, as Greenberg  notes, “history 
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suggests that we will come up with interesting questions than that we will arrive at convincing 
answers” (ibid, p.273).  
 
Gabbard and Westen (2003) believe that the heated debate of ‘interpretation versus relationship’ 
has run out of ‘steam of interest’. They suggest that a middle road has developed where neither 
insight (into conflicts, fantasies, memories, wishes) nor the relational matrix (mirroring, holding, 
alliance rupture repairs) can be held to account per se as a royal mechanism of therapeutic action; 
namely this middle road is the facilitation of thinking, the facilitation of processes that give meaning 
to experience. Their belief is a ‘perch’ on which many theorists from diverse psychoanalytic 
traditions stand at the moment. The expansion of “the field of thought” (Aisenstein, 2007; p.1458) 
is an expression in which Aisenstein summarizes this position. Cure is a byproduct of this thought 
field expansion. Insight then retains some of its ‘intellectual’ qualities and this uncharted intellectual 
something is somehow related to this: ‘cure happens’. On the other hand, as it will become evident 
from the brief review of the empirical literature, we have learned many valuable lessons, but what 
we can prove beyond dispute is exactly the same thing, ‘cure happens’. From my point of view, there 
is nothing wrong with this as I will discuss in Chapter 3. What is problematic is the ‘intellectualization’ 
of insight or this collapse of a complex network of meanings and causes into a phrase – ‘the 
expansion of the field of thought’ – that pretends to ‘know’.  I believe, that this perspective, does 
nothing more than split and distribute in neat categories something that is complex and resists our 
efforts to divide and control. The complex and multi-causal relationships between self-definition 
and connectedness cannot be split, categorized, reduced to one another.  
 
The reason that I think Relationality is a good place to start off, is because it is where some of the 
most important insights of psychoanalytic thinking have been brought to a new level; the 
recognition of paradox, multiplicity, ambiguity and spontaneity have found a central theoretical 
place. For the Relationals the transitional tension between internal and external, first recognized by 
Winnicott, moves into the intrapsychic sphere. Bromberg (1998) gives us a good description of this 
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idea, where mental health is the ability to “stand in abstract spaces” between realities without 
losing any of them. The meaning and the mind are formed in this transitional matrix, and neither the 
meaning nor the mind exist outside of the in/between. In this sense, Relationals are in accordance 
with the contemporary Philosophy of Mind, which advocates that it is the embodied and enactive 
nature of the human mind and not its computational properties that ground cognition. The brain 
may lie behind a boundary but the mind is extended; it is both inside and outside (Thompson, 2007). 
“There is no need for a separate source of meaning….relatedness is not an expression of mind, 
relatedness is part of mind”, argues Stern (2010, p.23).  
 
Castonguay (2000) discusses the empirical studies that measure the effect of consistency, between 
initial case formulation and interpretation, in the outcome of treatment, and argues that since these 
studies measure congruence between conceptualization and delivery, they may be actually 
measuring the structuring role of a consistent narrative instead of insight. Jopling (2001) raises the 
question of whether insight-oriented therapies actually promote some kind of “adaptive self-
misunderstandings” (p.25). If one understands the Bionian “O” as some kind of a Platonic idea, then 
the answer to Jopling’s question, from the perspective of this study is: yes, we are unavoidably 
caught in a web of ‘adaptive self-misunderstandings’. But if one considers Bion’s “O” as the 
inconceivable and irreducible multidimensionality of a world that, in reducing it, we create and re-
create the poem of living matter, then, the answer is that insight-oriented therapies strive for the 
growth of the mind. Following Winnicott, Bion and the Relationals we can say that psychic reality 
cannot be revealed, corrected, uncovered. But it also cannot be made; it can only be poetized. 
Ogden (1992) puts it elegantly: “[A]nalysis is not simply a method of uncovering the hidden; it is 
more importantly a process of creating an analytic subject who had not previously existed” (p.619). 
It is created but no less real because as Roth (2000) writes in The Human Stain: “the truth about us 






Insight, Interpretation, and the Therapeutic Relationship: Reviewing and Critically 
Discussing the Empirical and Conceptual Literature 
 
In the historical psychoanalytic debate on the question “how change is effected in treatment” there 
were five almost distinct positions advocated by leading figures in the field: i) the belief that only 
transference interpretation could lead to permanent change in interpersonal functioning or ego 
pathology through insight (Rank, Gill), ii) the opinion that transference interpretation is not a 
necessary mediator of change (Hartmann), iii) the position arguing for the very cautious use of 
transference interpretations while advocating the explorations of conflicts in relationships outside 
the dyad (Glover), iv) the belief that neither insight through transference interpretation nor any 
insight from the exploration of dynamic conflicts outside the dyad are necessary mediators of 
change favouring growth of personality through the therapeutic relationship (Ballint, Winnicott, 
Kohut),  and v) those favouring a growth of the mind perspective over the ego pathology or 
interpersonal functioning dimensions and for whom working in the transference was the sine qua 
non (Klein/Bion model) (Fonagy & Target, 2003; Gabbard & Westen, 2003; Goldstein & Goldberg, 
2006; Greenberg, 2005; Harris, 2012; Hoffmann, 1998).  
 
However, the deeper clash or schism under all these debates though was the question regarding 
the nature of the mind, ordered or disordered. All questions regarding transference and 
transference interpretations were unavoidably related to these more fundamental controversies. 
Fonagy et al. (1993) suggest there was kind of a dualism developing in the field regarding 
therapeutic action and the insight-transference debate. They suggest that opinions were 
developing along two main axes that failed to cross most of the time, that of a ‘representational 
model’ and the ‘mental process’ model. In the first model working in the transference the 
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therapeutic dyad can achieve a re-organization of representations at the Freudian ‘plate’. In the 
second model there were missing elements, that is, in the Freudian metaphor the plate itself was 
disordered.  
 
All these arguments, pro or against working and interpreting in the transference, prematurely or 
after the establishment of an alliance, in a distinct transference neurosis or the more or less 
exclusive need for extra-transferential interpretations, may be brought in a new light if we think of 
them along dimensions and dualisms proposed by Friedman (1988) and Akhtar (1992). Friedman 
proposed a distinction between hard object-relational theories emphasising hate, destruction, 
anger (Fairbairn, Klein, Kernebrg) and soft object-relational theories moving the emphasis towards 
growth needs, fulfillment, innocence and love (Ballint, Winnicott, Kohut).  Akhtar proposes a 
distinction between the classic and the romantic view of the human situation. In the classic view, 
which grows from a Kantian tradition, autonomy and reason are the most important human 
aspirations while conflict is in the root of suffering. In the romantic view of Goethe and Rousseau, 
authenticity and spontaneity have supremacy over reason and logic, as the human being is 
inherently good but vulnerable, and suffering is always related to restriction, to some sort of injury. 
Conflict or deficit? The need for insight or for a facilitative environment? Psychoanalysts were finding 
themselves divided, both at Institutional and personal level, between what Ricouer calls the 
‘hermeneutics of the school of suspicion’ (Marx, Freud and Nietzsche) and what Orange (2011) calls 
the ‘hermeneutics of trust’. Underlying the positions of the ‘uncovered truth’ and the ‘unmet need’, 







3.1 Reviewing and Critically Discussing the Empirical Literature on ‘Transference 
Interpretations’, ‘Insight’ and the ‘Working’ or ‘Therapeutic Alliance’ 
 
A last step before delving into the particularities of research is to let ourselves have a panoramic 
snapshot of were empirical research in relation to psychotherapy in general stands at the moment. 
A task force of American Psychological Association’s Division of Psychotherapy was commissioned 
in 1999 to identify and disseminate information regarding the status of empirically supported 
treatment methods. The results were first presented in a publication in 2002 (Norcross, 2002) which 
was republished with revisions in 2011 (Norcross, 2011). Norcross and Lambert (2011) report a model 
of improvement as a function of therapeutic factors: 40% of change is attributable to extra-
therapeutic factors, 30% attributable to common factors in all psychotherapy methods (meaning the 
therapeutic relationship, warmth, acceptance flexibility etc), 15% is related to specific technique 
(such as free association and transference interpretations in psychoanalysis) and the last 15% is 
related to placebo effects. In another model, apportioning outcome variance, the therapeutic 
relationship accounts for the 12%, 8% is explained by the treatment method and 7% by the individual 
therapist.  
 
Presenting their conclusions the authors make some significant remarks that I consider relevant to 
emphasise: a) “treatment methods are relational acts” (p.8) and there is no easy way to separate 
method from the relationship, b) that science is not any kind of answer but rather all those 
‘processes and steps’ we take to arrive closer to the elusive answers. And these remarks are relevant 
to this study because they are just as true in the case of psychoanalytic controversies over the last 
decades: is insight the outcome of interpretation or an effect of multiple factors where relationship 
is the organizing context? Should one aim for an understanding of the psychodynamics of conflict 
or an empathic understanding is more favorable?  Especially in Relational psychoanalytic thinking, 
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but not only there, such dualisms have been criticized and a ‘both/and’ reasoning has replaced the 
dichotomous ‘either/or’ one (Aron, 2012; Greenberg, 2005).  
 
The Menninger Project was one of the first empirical outcome studies of psychoanalytic process 
(Wallerstein, 1986). Wallerstein’s book ‘Forty-two Lives in Treatment’ describes a remarkable study 
in many ways, a study that tried to pose the long held theoretical disputes in an empirically ‘meaty’ 
and meaningful way while struggling to leave aside the valued psychoanalytic language of the case 
study. Gabbard (2007a, p.853) in an editorial commenting on the state of affairs of research in 
psychoanalysis, rightly remarks that: “psychotherapy research has long been cursed by designs in 
which a therapy that is expected to work is compared with one that is expected to fail”. In this sense 
the Menninger Project showed that transference oriented psychotherapy by highly skilled 
therapists had better results than supportive psychotherapies.  It is also true that the study 
courageously showed that psychoanalysis did worse in many respects compared to dynamic 
psychotherapy oriented towards transference. Kernberg (1973) discussing the findings of this 
extensive psychoanalytic outcome empirical study, reports that interpretations in the transference 
had better results, especially for those patients with poor ego strength. Patients had better 
outcomes working in the transference than in supportive psychotherapies. There is now a large 
amount of well-designed studies that have measured the effects of transference interpretation in 
relation to outcomes and in relation to in-treatment effects and important interactions among 
variables, which confirm some of these original findings.  
 
In the early 80’s most studies suffered from issues of poor design (Gabbard, 2006). Marziali and 
Sullivan (1980) and Marziali (1980) correlated transference interpretations with good outcome. One 
of the problems with these studies, however, was that they failed to carefully control other variables 
that might have accounted for the outcome. McCoullough et al’s (1991) study, as several other 
studies of brief dynamic therapy, found controversial results, where interpretations in the 
transference can be correlated with good outcomes but with the increased risk for defensive 
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responses in the session as well. A study by Piper et al (1999) is interesting as it is the first which 
clearly correlates therapists’ insistence on transference interpretations with a higher drop-out rate; 
therapeutic alliance though and lower exploration scores suggested confounding variables.  Ryum 
et al. (2010) examined the interaction between transference and therapeutic alliance in a 
randomized control trial (RCT) including 49 patients with cluster C personality disorders. In this 
study, they found a sound interaction effect between working alliance and transference 
interpretations, where weaker alliance by increased interpretations in the transference, predicted a 
poorer outcome for interpersonal problems. Henry and Strupp (1994) found that effectiveness of 
transference interpretations was controlled by the quality of interpersonal relationship between 
therapist and patient. The trend observed in these earlier studies is that the effectiveness of 
transference interpretations is controlled by the quality of working alliance, where patients with 
low quality object-relations fail to benefit from working in the transference, while interpretations 
might compromise alliance upon which their effectiveness depends and may increase defensive 
responses in-session. The next generation of research studies showed transference interpretations 
to be effective for people with low quality object-relations but in all likelihood these next-generation 
studies measure a much more careful delivery of interpretation, as will be shown shortly.  
 
Gabbard et al. (1994) suggest that transference interpretations are a high-risk/high-gain 
phenomenon. Personalizing the use of interpretation is crucial for a good outcome meaning that 
patients with trauma that have a persistent need to externalize hostility and aggression will not 
respond favourably to an interpretation attributing such emotional states to them. Gabbard (2006, 
pp.1668) notes: “A surgeon needs anesthesia to operate. A psychotherapist may need a holding 
environment before interpreting”. Summarizing the findings, one can say that a careful delivery of 
transference interpretations in the context of a good alliance or the safeguard of a holding 




Transference Focused Psychotherapy (TFP) is a term coined by Kernberg and is an object-relational 
model, especially researched with borderline patients, while developed for working with any kind 
of personality disorders. A well-designed RCT comparing the effectiveness of TFP to Dialectic-
Behavioural Therapy (DBT) and Supportive Dynamic Psychotherapy (SDP) for people with 
Borderline Personality Disorder, assessed six classes of outcome measures at 4 and 12 months 
intervals. While all treatments turned positive changes in several domains to an equivalent extend, 
TFP did better than the other two modalities in measures of impulsivity, irritability and verbal 
assault. Both TFP and DBT did better than SDP in reducing suicidality (Clarkin et al., 2007; Levy et al., 
2006). There is also preliminary evidence showing that transference interpretations may be related 
to structural changes. Several studies measured changes in the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) 
as part of RCTs which showed good evidence that narrative coherence as well as reflective 
functioning and mentalizing capacity exhibit change as outcome of transference interpretation 
(Levy et al., 2006). More specifically, Levy et al. (2006) showed that TFP participants were more 
likely than DBT or SDP participants to move onto a secure attachment classification.  
 
From the above comparisons, it is obvious that there are more similarities than differences in 
outcomes across the different modalities. Non-specific therapy effects such as warmth, empathy, 
and a patient’s feeling of being understood may be critical as some researchers note (Luborsky et 
al., 2002). However, I find Strupp’s (1995) perspective to be more meaningful. Strupp, while not 
denying the importance of those common non-specific factors, he suggests that often this 
distinction is trivial. What is non-specific for one patient at one moment may become highly specific 
at another, and what is completely non-specific for one patient, may be highly specific for a different 
patient. Strupp believes that “the quality of the interpersonal relationship is the sine qua non in all 
forms of psychotherapy” (1995; p.70). Summarizing his research experience, he suggests that it is 
the negative complementarity - which he defines as “the therapist’s response to and management 
of negative transference” (ibid. p.73) – which controls therapeutic outcomes. On the other hand, in 
the above mentioned RCT, it seems that TFP did better than both DBT and SDP in controlling 
impulsivity, irritability and verbal assault while it also improved classification in the AAI and these 
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are differences that can hardly be considered as related to non-specific factors in an RCT. We will 
discuss these effects shortly comparing TFP to another psychoanalyticically inspired treatment for 
BPD, Mentalization-Based Treatment.  
 
Hoglend and his colleagues (2007) did several studies measuring the effect of transference 
interpretation in the therapeutic outcome in both brief and long term therapies. A consistent finding 
among their results is that the more severely disturbed patients benefit more from moderate level 
of interpretations in the transference. A higher level of transference interpretations may result in a 
fortification of defenses since persons with severe personality disorders experience them as attacks 
on their defenses. Compared to other non-interpretative treatment modalities, interventions with 
a medium level of transference interpretation yielded sustained effects over a 3 year period, better 
than other treatments, even when these other treatments offered double therapy time to patients. 
The surprising find in all these studies is that healthier patients benefited from both treatments - 
that is the dynamically oriented psychotherapy with emphasis on transference interpretations and 
the dynamically oriented treatment with no emphasis on transference interpretations – alike, while 
when groups were divided into a mild and a moderate-to-severe pathology groups, the mild group 
showed a statistically non-significant but nonetheless observable as a trend negative effect to the 
transference-oriented interpretative work. The authors hypothesised that persons with milder 
pathologies usually have more circumscribed conflicts that are less easily observable in short term 
therapies or else : “…their conflicts may be about rivalry and competition. Transference 
interpretations of oedipal conflicts may be anxiety provoking in brief therapy also for therapists. 
Transference interpretations of conflicts over separation, loss, and attachment issues, more often 
seen in more disturbed patients, may help these patients to view the therapist in a more accurate 
and less threatening way” (Hoglend et al., 2007, pp. 171).  
 
Hoglend and colleagues (in Johansson et al., 2010) discussing the results of FEST (First Experimental 
Study of Transference) hypothesize a causal relationship between transference interpretations, 
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insight and the outcome for the subgroup with lower scores in measures of object-relations quality.  
Insight improved during treatment and predicted outcome, while interpersonal functioning 
continued to improve 3 years after treatment. The authors hypothesize that not only insight but the 
internalization of therapeutic relationship as measured in their research contributes to 
improvements in interpersonal functioning, although insight gained in transference interpretations 
explains part of the variance. As in all mediator studies, the authors conclude that while insight 
seems to suggest a strong mediator variable, another correlated to insight variable may also 
mediate results (Johansson et al. 2010).  
 
The major difficulty for these studies though, I think, is that they cannot answer the difficult question 
of the ‘nature of insight’. What research proves beyond dispute is that insight is achieved in 
psychoanalytic treatment but the nature and mechanisms of insight remain unclear. Mitchell (1988) 
elaborating on Levenson’s thinking writes: 
“…when we talk with someone, we also act with him. This action or behaviour is, in the 
semiotic sense, coded like a language. The language of speech and the language of action 
will be transforms of each other; that is they will be, in musical terms, harmonic variations 
on the same theme. The resultant behaviour of the dyad will emerge out of this semiotic 
discourse” (p.81).  
And Levenson (2010) writes: 
“…learning may be first bodily, first imitative, mimetic, and then cerebral (Levenson 1998). 
This suggests the interesting possibility that psychoanalytic insight may be first experienced 
and then formulated; that the direction of learning may be, not from the head to the body, 
but quite the opposite—a matter of what is said about what is experienced…It is a common 
clinical experience that Interpretations of both meaning and awareness (Gill 1983) work 
better after enactment. If interpretations precede enactment it doesn’t work. At best, one 
gets intellectual agreement, compliance, from the patient” (p.15) 
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Both authors bring to mind, Loewald’s dramatic play, where insight is the afterwards of the 
transferential mimesis. If, when we talk with someone we act with him, as Mitchel notes, and if 
interpretations work better after enactment, as Levenson mentions, then the hypothesis that 
insight is built on the mimetic and enactive aspects of the transference situation is reasonable.  
 
At this point, we should discuss some interesting paradoxes in the empirical research. In a special 
issue of The Journal of Clinical Psychology, dedicated on Putative Mechanisms of Action in the 
Psychotherapy Treatment of Borderline Personality Disorder, there appear two articles one by Clarkin 
and Levy (2006) and another by Fonagy and Bateman (2006) discussing possible mechanisms of 
therapeutic action in TFP and MBT respectively. Mentalizaton-Based Treatment (MBT) is another 
psychoanalytically inspired approach for the treatment of severe personality disorders, especially 
BPD. In contrast to TFP, MBT protocols suggest postponing working in the transference after 
mentalization capacities have been established (Fonagy & Bateman, 2006). This concept is highly 
similar to Slochower’s (2004) concept of holding and Budd’s (2010) perspective on the way British 
Independents work in the transference. In MBT therapy proceeds from establishing a safety base 
where the patient experiences introspection as something quite safe towards the exploration of 
mental states (Fonagy & Bateman, 2006). Several studies have established its effectiveness in 
treating BPD patients compared to routine psychiatric care (Bateman & Fonagy, 1999; 2001; 2008). 
TFP focuses mainly on the integration of split self-object representations into a coherent whole and 
emphasises the difficult emotions - mainly hatred and anger -, as the factor perpetuating un-
integration (Caligor et al., 2007; Clarkin et al., 1998). It is interesting that MBT and TFP both seem 
effective in working with persons with BPD, along with various other treatments. The only certainty 
one can draw from these findings is that we only hypothesize possible mechanisms of change while 
evidence does not favour any particular theory. For our discussion it is interesting though that both 
TFP and MBT who perceive therapeutic action in relation to transference interpretation, under a 
quite different prism, both seem effective. There are several possible hypotheses here.  
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Systematicity and coherence of treatment works at a level that helps patients organize their 
experiences. Different patients have different needs and respond differently to different strategies. 
Working in the relationship and the maintenance of alliance may suggest a mediating mechanism as 
will be shown in the next paragraphs. Moreover, therapeutic strategies employed but not 
recognized as mediators of change may play some critical role. For example, Gabbard (2010) notes 
that the mitigation of transferential anxieties may have some similarities to mechanisms related to 
exposure therapies. Brakel (2013) makes a similar argument where working in ‘the transferences’ 
may suggest some kind of extinction contexts for aversive conditionings. Confrontation may play 
its own independent mediating role, acting as a form of suggestion and validation of feelings and 
experiences, a mechanism critically implicated in another evidence-based treatment such as DBT 
(Gabbard & Westen, 2003). Fonagy and Bateman (2006) also suggest the concurrent activation of 
the attachment neurobiological system and the mentalizing circuits as a possible mechanism of 
change. Since these two mechanisms are functionally dissociated, their concurrent activation, while 
talking for thoughts, beliefs and feelings with a significant other who arouses the need for a secure 
base, may facilitate a re-contextualization of contents and processes in the mentalizing circuits. 
Kernberg et al. (2008) argue for a similar mechanism, noting how insight gained in a transferential 
interpretation can create a more powerful and long-lasting impression compared to an insight 
regarding dynamic conflicts in an extra-transferential relationship. These remarks seem to 
strengthen and add weight to the argument I made above. On the one hand, it is the mimetic 
aspects of transference where meaning develops through this interplay of action and semiosis. On 
the other, it seems that some aspects of this “trance in the transference” may be mediated by the 
activation of hierarchical attachment systems. 
 
The question and the doubt regarding the mutative value of insight have been there from the 
beginning of psychoanalytic thinking. Freud moved from a view of ‘catharsis’ to that of self-
awareness as the main therapeutic agent, while Ferenczi suggested early on that analysis should 
put special emphasis on the role of the therapeutic relationship disfavoring insight as a central agent 
of change (Ferenczi, 1931; Greenberg, 2005; Harris, 2012). Early on though, analysts were uneasy with 
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thinking relationship as a machine of change due to the early affinities of the idea with hypnosis, 
influence and suggestion which was the criterion of the non-scientific treatment (Greenberg, 2005; 
Mitchell, 1997; Wallerstein, 1990). Another straw man just like suggestion years later, Alexander’s 
‘corrective emotional experience’ functioned as a pole towards which analysts negatively defined 
themselves; any proposed mechanism of change might be clearly and sharply defined against 
‘corrective emotional experience’ (Greenberg, 2012 ; Hamilton, 1996; Mitchell, 1997; Eissler, 1953). 
Eissler (1953) makes an almost urgent plea to analysts for favoring insight against the developing 
trend of ‘corrective emotional experience”. Hamilton (1996) notes that analysts always become 
surprisingly uneasy at the nearness of ideas like ‘the introjection of analyst’s good qualities’ to that 
of ‘corrective emotional experience’. Insight was the descendant of memory recovery in hypnosis 
purified from anything related to Janet’s decay (Mitchell, 1997). Even if insight was, for independent 
reasons, to acquire such a pervasively central role in psychoanalytic thinking, it eventually 
established its position through its opposing relation to other proposed mechanisms charged with 
a derogatory value.  
 
Insight appears under different definitions in psychoanalytic literature. Still all of these definitions 
emphasise the ‘cognitive and emotional’ aspects of self-understanding. What is also common in all 
these definitions is connection; elements that were previously considered unrelated now appear to 
have some unforeseen connection. Insight is something more than understanding; it is this special 
“I would have not thought but I recognize it now” (Garduk & Haggard, 1972; p.45) quality that 
defines it by other forms of awareness. Luborsky et al. (1988, pp. xii) define dynamic insight as the 
‘awareness of one’s one behavioural patterns and motivations’. Sandler et al. (1973/1992) extend 
the debate regarding the emotional and cognitive aspects of insight and its relation to cure. They 
note that one of the main difficulties with its definition is the fact that many efforts have slipped 
into tautologies, like: “if insight is ineffective in producing change, it is not ‘true’ insight” (p.165). 
Moreover, they note how a definition of insight related to issues of therapeutic change is rather 
problematic since insight and observable change need not be coincidental. They finally see fit to 
construct a definition of insight where it: “…may be regarded as ‘emotionally’ or ‘dynamically 
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effective’, if it makes the patient conscious of a fact, which itself may or may not be an emotion, 
that releases or sets off an emotional response (pp.170)”. From my point of view such a definition 
of insight is equally problematic since it only serves to rectify a gap that was artificially created in 
the first place. Omitting the patient’s perspective the observing and interpreting analyst needs to 
justify the gap observed between interpretation and change. An interactive perspective between 
two interpreters in this interplay of action and semiosis escapes the need of such an artificial gap, 
while creating a scenery of indisputable complexity. 
 
The main questions regarding insight revolved around its relation to removal of symptoms, how it 
was related to the whole process of therapy, if it was affect-driven and - after the 70’s when its 
central role was again under dispute - if it was the product or the mediator of an authentic and 
empathic relationship (Goldstein & Goldberg, 2006; Greenberg, 2005; Mitchell, 1997; Orange, 1995). 
For Self-psychologists insight was the distillate of an empathic relationship where shame and other 
difficult emotions were successfully processed, and curiosity and creativity emerged as safe mental 
states (Orange, 1995). The then emerging group of Relationals converged into a similar position 
where insight was the emergence of meaning in the context of a trustful and safe relationship 
(Mitchell, 1997; Hoffman, 1998).  
 
Empirical literature on insight is not extensive and appears mostly after 1990. Most researchers, 
summarizing findings from smaller and earlier studies examining the ability for insight prior to 
therapy outcomes, track the positive correlation of pre-treatment insight to better outcomes, as a 
general trend. Two well-designed studies appeared in the 90’s which confirmed this hypothesis 
(Hoglend et al., 1994; Crits-Cristoph et al., 1988). Another study fails to confirm the established trend 
in a 12 week counseling protocol but shows an interaction between transference and insight, where 
better outcomes were predicted by the interaction between higher levels of transference by higher 
levels of pre-treatment insight (Gelso et al., 1997).  In studies examining the effects of insight during 
treatment on therapy outcome, a general trend appears where long-term studies confirm a positive 
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correlation while short-term studies disconfirm any such correlation (Hoglend et al., 1994; Kivlighan 
et al., 2000; Grande et al., 2003). I consider these findings as important since one may read them as 
supporting the hypotheses I have presented above; or simply, as suggesting that insight and the 
working through of difficult emotional states, such as Orange notes, go hand-in-hand.   
 
Researchers studying insight in relation to the therapeutic process turned up some interesting 
findings. In Raingruber’s (2000) study, eight patient – therapist dyads were filmed during sessions 
and then asked independently to watch the films and identify the most helpful and significant 
interactions. A group of independent raters identified themes after coding the sessions’ material. 
According to Raingruber what most contributed to self-understanding was the therapists’ attention 
to the emotional issues that patients’ brought to the sessions and the recognition of the relevance 
that these issues had to patients’ lives outside treatment. Elliot et al. (1994) employing a qualitative 
methodology, namely Comprehensive Process Analysis, showed that clients were more likely to 
engage in interpretative work when they themselves exhibited signs of implicit or explicit request 
for the therapist’s contribution. This in turn when adequately met contributed to an enhancement 
of working alliance. I think we can learn something important about the therapeutic process from 
both studies. First, it is the patient’s initiatives, their implicit or explicit requests for meaning-making 
that are the sine qua none for the opening of an area where negotiation of meanings is possible. This 
is not an unknown fact in psychoanalytic literature. Spillius (1994), for example, describes how 
between the conceptualization of an interpretation and its formulation to the patient, there may be 
a long laborious process that requires patients to arrive near there themselves for a meaningful 
interpretation to be formulated. Second, what Raingruber (2000; 2003) discusses is the importance 
of resonance for the co-creation of meaning, of recognizing the emotional importance of a moment 
for the patient. The Boston Change Process Study Group (BCPSG) (2010) has made significant 
theoretical contributions regarding these processes describing how in the therapeutic process the 
dyad continuously moves from a “negotiation of sloppiness and indeterminacy” (p.208) towards 
“engaged search for directionality and fittedness” (p.203).  
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Another cluster of studies compared consistency of initial case formulation to the transference 
interpretations appearing in the treatment. The two most prominent studies were by Silberchatz et 
al. (1986) and by Norville et al., (1996). This second study built upon the first one while adding a 
number of cases. Both these studies showed that consistency of interpretation in relation to initial 
case formulation predicted better outcomes. The authors carefully discuss their findings not 
claiming that insight leads to direct improvements in patients’ life but as an interesting finding 
where even if a mediating variable controls the relationship, insight and improvement are related. 
Castonguay (2000) criticized these studies that as they measure congruence between 
conceptualization and delivery they actually measure the structuring role of a consistent narrative. 
Several authors note, though, that insight certainly increases during psychodynamic therapy. We do 
not know the exact mechanisms and its relation to treatment outcome. But there are hypotheses 
that it is related to the cognitive-affective integration of experience (Gabbard, 2006), the processing 
of difficult emotions (Orange, 1995) and the co-creative regulatory processes (BCPSG, 2010) in the 
context of a relationship which offers itself as a secure base for exploration (Holmes, 2001). People 
feel safe in psychotherapy to recognize their emotional states in a way that feels authentic and to 
achieve some coherence in the way they narrate their experiences. Holmes notes: “The quest is 
always for a more elaborated, all embracing, spontaneous, individualized flexible story that 
encompasses a greater range of experience” (2001, p.84), moreover “to tell a story about oneself 
in relation to others one has to be able to reflect on oneself – to see oneself, partially at least from 
the outside” (ibid., p.69).  
 
While empirical research on insight may remain inconclusive, the study of some aspects of the 
therapeutic relationship is far more extended and has brought about interesting conclusions during 
the last thirty years. Orlinsky et al. (1994) note that amongst the most researched phenomena in 
psychotherapy research literature, if not the most, is the relation between therapeutic alliance and 
treatment outcome. The term ‘therapeutic alliance’ (Zetzel, 1956) first appeared in psychoanalytic 
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literature and has since been used interchangeably with the term ‘working alliance’ (Greenson, 
1965). In Greenson (1965) alliance was the non-neurotic rational rapport the therapist could 
establish with a patient that, had the capacity to tolerate frustration and realistically observe the 
self and the process, whilst also being able to both invest trust and have reasonable hopes. Several 
authors discuss the term’s origins in Freud’s unobjectionable transference (Thoma & Kachele, 1994; 
Goldstein & Goldberg, 2004); while Sandler et al. (1973/1992) suggest that the term brought some 
clarity lacking in Freud’s inclusion of both positive and unobjectionable transference under the same 
category, namely that of positive transferences.  Alliance has been highly debated in psychoanalytic 
literature regarding its relations to transference, the ‘real relationship’ and its possibly misleading 
effects in treatment. Brenner (1979) argued strongly against the use of the term since it misguides 
therapists from interpretative work in the defenses which is the only kind of work having 
advantages over self-understanding. Bordin’s transtheoretical conceptualization and 
operationalization of alliance though helped in spreading the concept and the relevant research 
findings across the whole spectrum of psychotherapeutic schools (Horvath & Luborsky, 1993; 
Goldstein & Goldberg, 2004; Safran & Muran, 2000). Bordin (1979) understand alliance as the key 
engine of change in psychotherapy: “the working alliance between the person who seeks change 
and the one who offers to be a change agent is one of the keys, if not the key, to the change 
process” (p.252).  He was also the first to introduce the “strain –repair” model of alliance upon 
which the most recent “rupture – repair” model develops. Bordin (1994) believes that as any 
treatment advances, “the kinds of problems that stimulate the person to seek psychotherapy will 
be manifested…in the work of therapy as represented by the therapeutic task” (p.18). Applied to 
psychoanalysis this can be understood as a blurring of boundaries between alliance and 
transference as the treatment advances and practically that makes sense. Safran and Muran (2000) 
make an important remark regarding the effects that this widespread use of the concept in every 
therapeutic tradition had in the psychoanalytic culture especially; they discuss how the concept 
brought some flexibility and elasticity much needed in the field, since it helped therapists feel less 




Alliance is not only amongst the most researched phenomena in psychotherapy but it is also 
considered amongst the most important mechanisms of therapeutic action; the resolution and 
repair of alliance ruptures explains a great proportion of variance in relation to treatment outcome. 
Horvath and Bedi (2002) and Horvath et al. (2011) report on the most recent meta-analytic reviews 
of alliance-outcome correlational studies. The first study reports an effect size of 0.21, while the 
second including many more recent studies reports a close but clearly increased effect size 0.275. 
Horvath and Bedi (2002) regard effect sizes of this magnitude important since “the impact of the 
alliance across studies is far in excess of the outcome variance that can be accounted for by 
techniques” (p.61).  
 
One interesting controversy noticed in alliance research is on whose ratings – therapists’, patients’ 
or independent predictors’ – better predict correlation of alliance to treatment. Horvath and 
Symonds (1991) summarizing early research showed that therapists’ ratings had poor correlation 
with patients’ ratings, and which in turn predicted better the outcome. More recent studies show 
that both patients’ and independent predictors’ ratings are more accurate than therapists’ (Horvath 
et al., 2011); while Kivilghan and Shaughnessy (1995) showed a trend where therapists’ ratings were 
a better predictor in the advanced phases of treatment. Research, studying the development of 
alliance during treatment, presents two differential trends. Gelso and Carter (1994) found a 
curvilinear trajectory where an initially well-established alliance deteriorates as the treatment 
advances while it clearly improves again approaching end. Other studies found a rather linear 
ascending or stable across treatment trajectory (Bachelor & Salame, 2000; Krupnick et al., 1996; 
Kivlighan & Shaughnessy, 1995). Horvath and Marx (1991) in a longitudinal study with good 
outcomes found a trajectory similar to that of Gelso and Carter’s study. Authors in both studies 
discuss their findings as expressing the difficult issues that patient and therapist have to face in the 
middle phase of treatment. It is possible though that Bordin’s comment mentioned earlier has 
something to do with this finding. Especially in dynamic psychotherapies, it is rather expectable such 
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a blur of boundaries between alliance and transferential dynamics, while the resolution of impasses 
improves alliance towards the end.  
 
The rupture – repair model, while related to the ego-psychological perspective of working around 
defenses, builds on a rather different theoretical framework closer to the Relational concept of 
enactment, where impasses are not attributed to patient alone (Safran & Muran, 2000; Safran & 
Muran, 2006; Jones, 2000). It is closer to a Kohutian perspective as well where empathic failures 
were both desirable and unavoidable and it is clearly inspired by the now transtheoretical belief – 
after Bordin’s work – that, working through impasses is the engine of change (Safran & Muran, 
2000; Bordin, 1994). Strupp (1995; 1998) summarizing findings from his empirical research notes 
that it is not uncommon for therapists to get involved in negative interactions with patients that 
provoke in them strong feelings, and since such interactions may only come into therapist’s 
awareness to some extent, they are many times intractable. The phenomenon says Strupp is far 
more common than generally recognized. The appearance of enactment impediments and alliance 
ruptures during treatment may considerably vary in terms of duration and intensity (Jones, 2000; 
Safran & Muran, 2002; Safran & Muran, 2006).  
 
In general, empirical research shows that patients usually find it uncomfortable to express negative 
feelings and communicate their distress in relation to the therapist (Hill et al., 1993). On the other 
hand, therapists are not only reluctant to acknowledge their own involvement in ruptures and 
enactments as Strupp noticed but they frequently fail to detect in patients’ communication what is 
progressively experienced as an impasse or rupture for the patient (Hill et al., 1996). Regan and Hill 
(1992) note that it might suggest an adaptive solution for therapists to remain unaware of patients’ 
negative feelings since they may operate more effectively under this adaptive misperception. When 
therapists’ are confronted with ruptures as research shows they often prefer to adhere to those 
techniques and protocols which are usually the cause of the rupture itself, instead of actively 
exploring the meanings of an impasse with the patient (Piper et al., 1999; Safran & Muran, 2000; 
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Jones, 2000). Regan and Hill may be right in a sense then, some misperception of patients’ 
discomfort may help therapists operate effectively at times, but if not transient it increases the risk 
that therapists may resort to another non-adaptive solution when confronted with the rupture, 
which is adherence to manuals and techniques. 
 
Research has shown that the therapist’s ability to examine the way they themselves contribute to 
an impasse is critical for the advancement of treatment. Safran, Muran and their colleagues (1996; 
2000; 20002; 2006) have focused specifically on studying ruptures from an interpersonal/relational 
- psychodynamic perspective. In their model therapists’ disengagement from enactments is the 
critical factor of resolution. Metacommunication of therapist’s understanding of an impasse and 
acceptance of his responsibility are essential for the resolution. Safran and colleagues identify two 
distinct classes of rupture-resolution cycles with distinct patterns of rupture occurrence and 
resolution. In confrontation ruptures there are usually underlying feelings of anger and 
disappointment lurking in the patient or a sense that he has been failed by the therapist. Resolution 
of these kinds of ruptures usually uncovers an underlying vulnerability, wishes for care and 
subsequent fears of rejection. In withdrawal ruptures the path is from a passive withdrawn stance 
to recognition of lurking wishes for someone to accept the patient’s need for assertiveness and 
agency.  
 
Obviously, the therapists’ ability to disengage and self-reflect is connected to their own personality 
characteristics. I have found few published studies researching therapist’s personality in relation to 
alliance rupture and resolution. There is a study by Strupp, Schacht and Gaston (cited in Strupp, 
1998) which, while not directly related to issues of alliance, has some relevant interest, examining 
psychodynamic therapists’ ‘introjects’ in relation to treatment process. The authors measure as 
introjects the characteristic ways therapists treat their own selves. They found that there was a 
good match between therapists introjects and the way they treat their own patients but the most 
important finding was that for patients who failed to change their introjects therapists were always 
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blameful, critical and distant in the third session. Beyond this study, there are also some studies 
examining counselors’ attachment classification in relation to alliance and treatment choices. Dozier 
et al., (1994) report that securely attached therapists were more comfortable with exploring their 
countertransference; preoccupied therapists perceived patients’ dependency needs easily and 
intervened in more depth while dismissive therapists tended to intervene in less depth and had 
greater difficulty in perceiving dependency needs.  
 
Another trend in empirical research on alliance developing through the last two decades is the 
examination of alliance in relation to attachment patterns. Reviewing the literature on the topic, 
one can collect several prominent themes that have emerged such as: the effect of attachment 
classification on alliance formation and maintenance, the impact of attachment patterns on the 
perception of the therapist as ‘secure base’ or attachment figure, and the role of hierarchical 
attachment patterns in therapeutic outcome and process.  
 
Zegers et al. (2006) discuss the fact that since therapy is about fears and wishes for proximity 
seeking, care and security, alliance is unavoidably related to attachment variables. Parish and Eagle 
(2003), on the other hand, discuss the close relation of the concepts of attachment and transference 
since both imply patterns of relatedness rooted in early experiences and a strong emotional 
connection with a person in the present. Diamond and Blatt (1999) suggest that “the power of the 
patient’s state of mind” (p.67) has inevitable consequences for the alliance as process. 
 
Parish and Eagle (2003) examined whether the ‘defining components of attachment’ - that is secure 
base, proximity seeking, separation protest, availability etc. - correlate with the development of 
alliance. They found that with the exception of ‘strong feelings’ and ‘separation protest’, all the 
other factors loaded on alliance while, ‘secure base’ and ‘availability’ appeared to have a strong 
relation to alliance. The authors note: “…sought proximity to their therapists, turned to them in 
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times of distress, evoked a mental representation of them in their absence and, relied on them as a 
secure base, helping them to feel confident in their work and exploration outside of therapy…thus 
these therapy relationships had every feature of attachment identified in the theoretical literature 
with the sole exception that the respondents did not generally report protesting separation from 
the therapists” (p.280). Mallinckrodt et al. (2005) study, examining the relation to the therapist as 
a ‘secure base’, agree with Parish and Eagle that patients use therapists as this ‘secure base’ from 
which they toddle off in order to explore the world of interpersonal relationships and then return 
back. This provides them with a “sense of felt security” (p.273).  
 
Attachment classification affects alliance development. Safran and Muran (1996) showed that 
beyond the repair ability, it is also attachment that mediates alliance since people with secure 
attachment classifications had the least ruptures in the process. Malinckrodt et al. (1995) showed 
how individuals classified as ‘preoccupied’ in the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI), “…long for 
more contact and to be ‘at one’ with the therapist, wishing to expand the relationship beyond of 
the therapy, and preoccupation with the therapist and the therapist’s other clients” (p.310). In 
general, findings for preoccupied patients show that alliances fluctuate more widely (Eames & Roth, 
2000; Kanninen et al., 2000), more ruptures and rupture-repair events appear (Safran et al., 2001) 
and the curvilinear trajectory observed by Gelso and Carter, mentioned earlier, appears steeper 
both while decreasing during the middle phase of treatment and while increasing during the end 
(Kanninen et al., 2000). In contrast for those patients classified in the avoidant cluster, such as 
dismissive patients, Kanninnen et al. (2000) showed a constant pattern of alliance which increases 
approaching the end. Another important finding was the dissociation between the cognitive and 
the emotional aspects of alliance, in dismissive patients, with the second appearing clearly to be 
lower. Eames and Roth (2000) observed a rather different pattern, where in patients with 
‘dissmissing’ classification, alliance improves over time. It is a matter of interpretation, of course, 
but one cannot dismiss these findings as inconclusive since both report improvement towards the 
end. What is clearly evident, though, is that dismissive patients suggest a group that requires special 




Diamond and Blatt (1999) suggest that the shape of internal working models unavoidably affect the 
therapeutic relationship. Several authors have associated attachment to the therapeutic 
relationship in different senses. Farber et al. (1995) suggest that the therapist may become a figure 
of intense affect and longing for since, she is perceived as ensuring survival, reminding us Freud’s 
unobjectionable positive transference. Silverman (1998) emphasises the symmetries between the 
therapeutic and the parent-child relationship that may re-create needs for pleasing the significant 
other or turn to her for safety.  Davila and Levy (2006) stress the importance of a secure safe base 
for the development of a working alliance. There is a growing recognition then that attachment 
conceptually explains some of the phenomena we put under the rubric of transference. The subject 
matter then becomes even more complicated if we think that attachment classification is not an all-
or-nothing phenomenon. In attachment literature there is a wide held belief supported by empirical 
findings that persons can have several differential attachment patterns hierarchically organized, so 
that depending on the context secure, preoccupied, or avoidant motives may emerge (Diamond & 
Blatt, 1999; Holmes, 2001;). While aspects of secure attachment may contribute to a deepening of 
alliance other aspects of insecure attachment may appear organized under the ‘trance of 
transference’ (Ammaniti, 1999).  
 
Summarizing the overall picture one can say that technique, any technique, is a relational event. 
Gabbard’s comparison between anesthesia and holding seems to perfectly describe this dangerous 
and laborious path from processing difficult emotions to self-awareness. At the same time, though, 
if it is the therapist that ‘does’ something to the patient, then Pandora’s Box opens and Jopling 
rightfully asks : “Are insight oriented therapies some kind of “adaptive self-misunderstandings”? I 
made clear my own perspective about this view in the Introduction. I believe that insight oriented 
therapies strive for the growth of the mind. This position I think is defended in part by the findings 
of empirical research at least at the macro-level. From the findings presented it seems the therapist 
	 70	
helps the patient to achieve a much-needed coherence in the way he narrates his experience, his 
intentions, and his actions. At the foundational level of what we call transference, there may lie this 
hierarchical system of attachments which presides over much of what we perceive as the dynamic 
aspects of transference. For the other dynamical components of transference, we currently have 
only some viable theoretical propositions. Westen and Gabbard (2002a; 2002b) make an interesting 
contribution mixing hypotheses from contemporary theories of cognitive science and findings from 
research on cognitive processes. Transference is “not about transfer at all” (p.30) they say; it is 
about the constant reconstruction and re-contextualization of feelings, anxieties, wishes, thoughts, 
patterns of relating and ways of affect-regulation. The other dynamic components of transference 
may then have deep roots going from the conflict between different cognitive categories that arise 
upon the activation of conflictual affective categories, where both may reach the level of sensory 
representations that are part of a whole representational category.  
 
It is obvious from research that the safe base of therapy becomes safe during the process. The repair 
of difficult relational episodes strengthens its effectiveness and quality as safe space for 
exploration. Therapists’ contribution to ruptures is indisputable, and while their inattention to the 
development of a rupture may at times be adaptive at moments for them, in order to recollect their 
ability to see the whole picture, if this persists then it can only be catastrophic. Adherence to 
techniques as an unintended defence closes the relational space, while their flexible use may create 
openings for exploration. Being sensitive to implicit and explicit requests for meaning-making also 
creates such openings for exploration. Closely following the way patients’ construct meanings out 
of the interaction or their own associations is also a directing force that organizes into the mind of 
the analyst a coherent narrative out of sparse elements. If this coherence organizing process in the 
mind of the analyst does not closely follow and match what happens in the patient’s mind, then it 
is doomed to failure. We therefore know many things about this intimate choreography, but we 




3.2 Reviewing and Critically Discussing the Conceptual Literature on ‘Transference 
Interpretations’, ‘Insight’ and the ‘Therapeutic Relationship’ 
 
This part of the review is a brief expedition into the evolution of the meanings of interpretation, 
insight and relationship within the psychoanalytic language. An important point into this 
evolutionary map is the crisis of the 1920’s, the crisis of technique (Etchegoyen, 1991; Harris & Aron, 
1993). It was a time of expansion for psychoanalysis and unavoidably a time for self-reflection; the 
theory of technique was questioned and heated debates were developing. In a very sketchy 
simplification, a branch of ideas started to clearly distance itself from classical theory and technique, 
culminating in the group of Interpersonals at 1934 with Sullivan, Thompson, Fromm and Horney 
where the question of “what does it mean” was slowly replaced by the “what happens between 
us” (Fonagy & Target, 2003; Mitchell, 1997). Another branch tried to remain faithful to the basic 
principles of theory and technique, while critically questioning the intellectualism that was creeping 
into the consulting room with the rising investment of faith on insight and self-awareness. Ferenczi 
and Rank (1924/1986) published The Development of Psychoanalysis in 1924, where they speak for 
the need of a technique that will favor the expression of affect at a time when the celebrated idea 
of therapeutic action was the ‘Remembering instead of Repeating’ – the first branch actually sprung 
out very much from the Ferenczian spirit. A third branch questions only the details of the 
mainstream ‘Remembering’ paradigm. As a matter of fact, no branch was so clearly distinguished 
from the others, since very soon the air of innovation made it possible for an elegant embrangle of 
branches to develop. In the meantime, the ‘severe weather’ of institutional “power and interests”  
and “the anxiety of influence” (Bloom, 1997) were destroying the elegance of this embranglement.  
 
Glover (1931) was the first to recognize the effect of inexact interpretations under the pressure of a 
paradox, as Greenberg (2012) notes, where a theory ‘cured’ but in a way not anticipated by its own 
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propositions of what is curative. Wilhelm Reich talks about character and favors a technique that 
prioritizes systematic interpretation of defences instead of content (Fenichel, 1938; Goldberg, 
2005). For Wilhelm Reich, as Fenichel mentions, the stratified analysis through interpretation of 
defenses from the surface to the depths is the road to follow in order to uncover the historical truth 
of neurosis. This is the path that Ego psychology will follow with important modifications by Anna 
Freud and Hartmann later on (Fonagy & Target, 2003; Etchegoyen, 1991; Mitchell, 1997). Theodor 
Reik (1933), on the other hand, emphasises the role of surprise. Insight is effective when it contains 
surprise. Surprise is the expression of something that presents itself to us which we already knew 
but only unconsciously. “To put it in a nutshell: I hold that the more important discoveries and 
insights in an analysis come as a surprise to analysand and analyst alike” (p.328) writes in a landmark 
article, where he attempts to deter his colleagues from going into a systematic approach of 
interpretation and technique. Nothing other than the encouragement of free association qualifies 
as a legitimate psychoanalytic stance. Free association and psychoanalytic intuition are enough for 
the transformative experience of surprise to take place in an analysis.  
 
Fenichel in a series of articles appearing in Psychoanalytic Quarterly criticizes Reik for turning 
psychoanalysis from a science into an art through emphasising the role of intuition in clinical 
technique (Fenichel, 1938). The argument is that Reik’s perspective collapses the nature of the 
method we should use to know the unconscious with the nature of the unconscious itself, that is, 
irrationality. At the same time, however, he praises Theodor Reik for his valuable ‘insights’ regarding 
surprise. In the same series of articles, he discusses Wilhelm Reich’s stratification hypothesis. He 
agrees that interpretation should proceed from the surface to the depths, but he disagrees with 
Reich’s hypothesis suggesting that a layer-by-layer discovery of the traces of personality 
development is not possible. Fenichel thinks there are ‘spontaneous chaotic situations” (1939, p.81), 
such as traumas, which may modify the stratification of the structure.  In these articles, he also 
crystallizes his ideas regarding how the analyst reaches the unconscious that is impermeable. He 
proposes that analysts work with preconscious derivatives of impulses and their work is to educate 
the ego and enable it to tolerate less distorted derivatives (Fenichel, 1938). Another significant point 
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made by Fenichel as a response to Wilhelm Reich’s belief that interpretation should aim to liquefy 
characterological resistances is that interpretations may have unexpected effects which analysts 
should carefully consider before proceeding. Fenichel forewarns his colleagues of the possible 
danger that they may wound their patient’s narcissism, who in turn may feel interpretations of their 
characterological organisation and resistances as concrete attacks. Such strategies, he advocates, 
may reach an impasse where the interpretation of characterological resistances becomes a 
resistance itself.  
 
In the same period, Strachey made another ‘breakthrough’ with his idea of ‘mutative interpretation’ 
that would carry a special weight for generations of analysts and would deeply affect the Kleinian 
school (Hinshelwood, 1989). A ‘mutative interpretation’ is made up of two components. In a first 
movement, a projection of an object to the analyst takes place where this projection usually 
contains the patient’s archaic superego, with both its punitive, harsh and seductive, warm aspects; 
after the projection there is a feeling as if the analyst really possesses these qualities (Strachey, 
1934). Meltzer (1967/2008) calls this ‘the gathering of the transference” (2008, p.1). The mutative 
effect of the interpretation builds on the patient’s ability to discriminate between his expectations 
for a punitive or seductive object and the analyst’s non expectable realistic response. In a second 
phase the patient is then able to dismantle what is a projection of his inner reality and what belongs 
to the outer world, “an undoing of confusion between his inner and outer worlds, which permits a 
clearer view of both” (Caper, 1999, p.31). The analyst’s superego becomes what the archaic 
superego cannot really be, that is, realistic. Functioning as a more reality oriented ‘auxilliary 
superego’, the analyst helps the patient to internalize this function (Strachey, 1934). Strachey 
believes that the analyst is always pulled away from a realistic response that will ensure the mutative 
effect of her interpretation. He may be right in a sense but he collapses any other possible 
interpretative act that does not fit his mutative scheme, into a defensive avoidance criticism. 
According to Strachey, things are almost black and white; either the analyst ‘mutatively’ interprets 
or she defensively avoids the painful advocacy of reality. He notes:  
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“…for there seems to be a constant temptation for the analyst to do something else 
instead. He may ask questions, or he may give reassurances or advice or discourses upon 
theory, or he may give interpretations – but interpretations that are not mutative, extra-
transference interpretations, interpretations that are non-immediate, or ambiguous, or 
inexact – or he may give two or more alternative interpretations simultaneously, or he may 
give interpretations and at the same time show his own skepticism about them. All of this 
strongly suggests that the giving of a mutative interpretation is a crucial act for the analyst 
as well as for the patient, and that he is exposing himself to some great danger in doing so” 
(Strachey, 1934, pp.290-91).  
More or less all the prominent themes that would develop into the different languages of 
psychoanalysis were already there from the 1930’s: the nature of insight, the importance of surprise 
and psychoanalytic intuition, the interpretation of defences as a priority, the architecture of 
interpretation, the “Freudian pair” (Bollas, 2001, p.93) of free association and evenly hovering 
attention, and the “between us” relationship. What was missing, and it was missing for reasons now 
intelligible, was the intuition that in the collapsed space between material and psychic reality, a 
whole new world was soon to emerge. The advent of the British object-relations emphasis on the 
maternal (Goldberg, 2012), affected psychoanalytic thinking in unimaginable ways. While the 
American Pragmatism and the European Phenomenology were quietly transforming the social 
scientific thinking into a humanities affair, “holding” and the “container”, the “potential space”, 
the “transitional” relinquishment by “memory and desire” were triggering the modern-day 
psychoanalytic imagination. The historical dimension of analysis was slowly replaced by the 
“synchronic” one (A. Cooper, 1987, p. 85) and the “plate” and the “blank screen” adopted by 
generations of analysts searching for their origins were soon to discover that they were twins, two 
“hermeneutic machines’ (Stern, 2010). Perhaps Bion and Winnicott negotiated meanings in a 
coherent narrative that had been long searching for a thinker to think them; and it was Ferenczi 
who first experimented in transitional spaces.     
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Ferenczi writes in 1931 about child analysis in the analysis of adults:  
“Suddenly, in the midst of what he was saying, he threw his arm round my neck and 
whispered in my ear: 'I say, Grandpapa, I am afraid I am going to have a baby!' Thereupon I 
had what seems to me a happy inspiration: I said nothing to him for the moment about 
transference, etc., but retorted, in a similar whisper: 'Well, but why do you think so?' (p.470).  
Ferenczi changes the rule of the ‘Freudian pair’ game; he calls on his patients to indulge into a child-
like free association, into a play situation. He himself communicates through a ‘transitional’ 
language, non-adult, non-childlike. He realizes that the fundamental rule is not enough by itself to 
facilitate free association and while Freud had already invented transference and transference 
interpretations precisely as a means of overcoming this resistance by people to surrender to their 
free associative stream (Kris, 1996; Thoma & Kachele; 1994; Etchegoyen, 1991), Ferenczi decides to 
turn his inner ear to what his patients have told him: 
 “I said to myself then that there must be some way or means of getting rid of this 
disturbance of association and affording the patient an opportunity of giving freer play to 
the repetition-tendency as it strove to break through. (p.470).  
Even if Ferenczi “confused the liberating possibilities of mutuality with the disastrous consequences 
of symmetry” (Aron & Harris, 1993, p. 23), he commits himself to free the repetition tendency as it 
strives to break through, taking a higher risk than the “high-risk, high-value” transference 
interpretation. This change of emphasis from resistance to repetition was a liberating possibility 
that psychoanalysis was not ready to digest at that time. What Ferenczi may have missed was rather 
the fact that the repetition had little to do with conflict, it was the effect of something unformulated 
(Stern, 2004), split from the rest of the self and ahistorical.  
 
It was Klein and the Kleinians that understood transference as an ahistorical repetition through the 
workings of phantasy (Segal, 1988). Given the ‘suspended temporality’ (Thoma & Kachele, 1984) of 
the unconscious, Klein pleads for a transference interpretation at the point of urgency, where the 
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anxiety springs up (Etchegoyen, 1991; Goldberg, 2012; Hinshelwood, 1994). Ego psychologists after 
Reich and Anna Freud were moving in the direction of uncovering mental contents and ego 
defenses against these contents (Breener; Goldberg, 2005). Klein calls for an emphasis on the 
economic aspects of interpretation; it is the balance between instinctual tensions and object 
relations that must be affected, making the anxiety manifest, so that the ego’s integrative ability is 
thereby strengthened. While Kleinians have been widely criticized for the precocious interpretation 
of transference and their emphasis in transference interpretation (Etchegoyen, 1991; Hinselwood, 
1998; Mitchell, 1997), it is true that Klein, while strongly advocating that transference is there right 
from the first moment of meeting, nevertheless she reminded her students that they should try to 
bring up the topic of transference at least once in a session (Budd, 2012; Etchegoyen, 1991). It was 
Paula Heimann, though, who articulated the main arguments of Kleinian thinking in a paper 
presented at the Geneva Congress of 1955. This, along with Strachey’s paper, has been considered 
to be one of the most influential papers on interpretation by the psychoanalytic community and 
especially the Kleinian circle.  
 
Heimann (1956) begins her discussion with the axiom that therapy addresses the patient’s ego. 
Driven by the life instinct, that operates searching unity, perception structuralizes the ego, through 
projections and introjections. Perception then is to ego what instinct is to the id:  
“The fundamental task of psychoanalytic work then is transference interpretation since, 
“…transference interpretation enables the patient's ego to perceive its emotional 
experiences, its impulses and their vicissitudes, makes them conscious, at the moment 
when they are actively roused in a direct and immediate relationship with their object. The 
emotional excitation must be followed closely by perception of it, and almost coincide with 
conscious awareness of it” (p.305). 
  
The question the analyst has to ask himself constantly is: “'Why is the patient now doing what to 
whom?' The answer to this question, constitutes the transference interpretation” (ibid. p.307). 
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Heimman makes a powerful argument. The ego is better able to address un-integration when 
perceiving impulses and their derivatives just at the moment of their active contact with the object 
and interpretation of phantasy is the engine for this perceptual contact. What Heimman leaves 
unquestioned is the problem of ‘bootstrapping’ (Mitchell, 1988; 1997) as described in the 
Introduction of this thesis. The ego makes contact at this live moment with objects of its own desire, 
anxiety and phantasy; but if an interpretation, as Heimman says, is perceived as either good or bad 
milk, then its mutative effect remains unclear. The interpretation has been incorporated into the 
very structure that it aims to change.  
 
Psychoanalysts of different theoretical orientations criticized the incompleteness of Kleinian 
transferential interpretations. Ego psychologists especially stressed the importance of linking the 
present to the past (Rangell, 1985). Etchegoyen (1991) citing an unpublished quote of Pichion Riviere 
suggests that a complete interpretation “has to take the three spheres and show the essential 
identity of what happens in the consulting-room with what is happening outside and what 
happened in the past. If we take only one of these areas, whichever it be, as if the other two did not 
exist,  then  we  no  longer  operate  with  the  theory  of transference” (p.431). For Kleinians the 
ahistorical nature of the unconscious solves this problem. Moreover, it was implied that quite often 
the reason analysts were so hesitant with transferential work and preferred extra-transferential 
interpretations, was the difficult nature of this kind of interpretative work; interpretation in the 
transference is mostly uncomfortable since it may raise strong emotions and paranoid responses 
(Etchegoyen, 1991).  
 
On the other hand, contemporary Relational theorists and many British Independent 
Psychoanalysts stress how comfortable, even if unproductive, it may also be for the analyst to 
interpret the transference in one direction without acknowledging his own involvement in the 
enactments. It was Hoffman (1983) who first summarized, in a seminal article with the provocative 
title “The Patient as Interpreter of the Analyst’s Experience”, decades of criticism against what he 
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calls the “asocial paradigm”, formulating the simple truth that “the patient understands that, 
however different it is, the analyst’s experience is no less complex than his own” (p.421). For 
Hoffman, the analyst is known by the patient in many ways and, even if not in other ways, at least 
she is known, she is sensed, at these moments when she tries to integrate in the “total experience 
of the relationship” (ibid. p.421) the conflicts of understanding while feeling them in her 
countertransference. Beyond Relationals, where the recognition of the analyst’s involvement in the 
transferential/countertransferential matrix is the standard practice and the belief that the analyst is 
known by the patient in one way or another is widely held, voices from different schools and 
theoretical orientations joined Hoffman over the course of time. Hamilton (1996) makes a good 
point arguing that when the psychoanalysts talk about what the patient fantasizes about them, they 
divert their attention from what the patient really knows about the analyst. Budd (2012) citing a 
handful of resources – this is not an easily approachable matter in psychoanalysis – and reporting 
on her own experiences, asserts that patients know their analyst in many different ways. Borderline 
and psychotic patients, who most fear the analyst’s separateness, know their analyst in concrete 
ways that may sometimes be alarming.  
 
Beyond these criticisms on the overemphasis on transference interpretation, it is true that it was 
the language of Kleinian interpretation that brought unconscious primary processes into a more 
prominent position. It is a language that interprets unconscious phantasy, as Heimann mentioned; 
psychoanalysis thereby acquired an elegant, flexible narrative and rhetoric device to describe the 
inner workings of the mind. Etchegoyen (1991) mentions a distinction in the way that Anna Freud 
and Klein viewed child and adult analysis that is important from the perspective of this study. He 
says that Anna Freud emphasises the differences between child and adult analysis since she was 
interested in the operations of the ego while Klein emphasises their similarities as she focused on 
phantasy and the unconscious (pp.417-18).  
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Winnicott’s conception of psychoanalytic interpretation respects this intuited fact that the human 
mind is not what Freud sketched it to be where the unconscious operates under the aegis of primary 
processes while consciousness is the seat of secondary processes. For Winnicott creativity and 
culture, our capacity to play, springs from a potential space made out of the primary material of 
illusion, where the subjective object and the objectively perceived object are in an ever-recreating 
tension. Winnicott writes: “I think I interpret mainly to let the patient know the limits of my 
understanding” (1968; p.711). We owe a creative reading of this sentence and of Winnicott’s clinical 
attitude ‘on interpretation’ to Aron (1996). He finds in the Winnicotian interpretation the spatula, 
the squiggle and the transitional object. The patient scrutinizes this weird object that excites his 
greed, while still hesitant if he will put the interpretation in his mouth or throw it down and see what 
other things he can do with it. Resistance is not refusal to accept, it is an inextricable part of 
exploration. Playing with the interpretation the analysand finds a ‘potential’ shape. The 
interpretation is not useful because of the information it conveys but just because the analysand 
can “carry it around and suck on” (Aron, 1996, p.101) meanings when the analyst is away. “The 
patient can play with it, cling to it, incorporate it, love it, modify it, attack it, discard it, transform it, 
or throw it back at the analyst” (ibid. p.101). ‘Who’s squiggle is it?” (ibid. p.101) asks Aron, the fact is 
that the analyst does not “necessarily know what will come out when he begins to draw” (ibid. 
p.102) but “he has the patient in mind” (ibid. p.102). 
 
Winnicott liberated himself from the need to understand, spontaneity and authenticity oscillated 
with anxiety and ritual. However romantic Winnicott’s perspective on interpretation seems to be, 
or at least Aron’s reading of it, an expression of what analysts have for years sought to grasp in 
‘insight’, a critical dimension of insight, the vitality of an unprecedented exploration. For Winnicott, 
meaning-making is not related to knowledge, but to the ability for a creative gesture; it is only the 
primary creativity that colours the objective world with the fantasy that belongs to our subjective 
and private worlds (Newirth, 2005a; Philips, 1989). 
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Bion was not a romantic. He had been “certified in the nameless dread”, writes Grotstein (2007). 
Perhaps this is why he was in a position to conceive the full importance of a containing function. For 
Bion, the screen became a container, writes Mitchell (1997, p.116). And the container grew into an 
interpersonalization of projective identification (Sandler, 2009). This development was of 
tremendous importance for the psychoanalytic community since the ‘material’ of listening was 
displaced within the therapist herself. Bion’s interest was focused on the therapist, on her listening 
to herself while listening to the patient (Grotstein, 2007).  The Bionian interpretation waits for a 
“selected fact” that will organize disparate elements into a coherent whole and will turn it into 
something that can be communicated to the patient. At a first reading this is no different from a 
classical interpretative mode with the exception of patience and inhibition that Bion proposes so 
that the analyst do not deceive herself in her evenly hovering attention mode by appreciating an 
‘overvalued idea’ as a real ‘selected fact’ (Grotstein, 2007; Sandler, 2009). Britton and Steiner (1994) 
formulate the distinction between overvalued ideas and selected facts in a less complex language; 
the latter are “a creative integration of disparate facts into a meaningful pattern” (p.1070) in 
contrast to overvalued ideas where facts are forced to fit the hypothesis, and where it is exactly this 
forcing intellectual action that brings a “sense of integration to otherwise disparate and confusing 
experiences” (p.1070). 
 
 Grotstein writes that in Bion’s “autobiography and metapsychology” one may hear “desperate 
‘radio signals’ from an ‘undead’/’dead’ self who is struggling to be heard” (2007; p.117). Bion’s theory 
of catastrophic change is very close to contemporary theories of dissociation. Bion writes, 
“…mental evolution or growth is catastrophic and timeless” (1970; pp. 107–8), “[a]nalysis in the 
precatastrophic stage is to be distinguished from the post-catastrophic stage by the following 
superficial characteristics: it is unemotional, theoretical, and devoid of any marked outward 
change…in the post-catastrophic stage, by contrast…emotion is obvious and is aroused in the 
analyst” (1965; pp.8-9). The patient dreads making contact with an island kept separate and floating 
with no connections.  
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In the evolution of psychoanalytic interpretation from Racker, Winnicott and Bion to the post-
Kleinians, there appear to be some important voices like that of Didier Anzieu who questions 
Strachey’s belief that the analyst’s response can be realistic and conflict-free if she does not let 
herself be seduced. Anzieu believes that the analyst’s interpretation is necessarily a mix of primary 
and secondary processes, otherwise it would be impossible to reach the analysand’s unconscious 
(Etchgoyen, 1991). Interpretation is “a spontaneous and primal psychic activity”, writes Anzieu 
(1968; p.307). In the same fashion as Loewald, he understands interpretation as the work of the 
analyst’s fantasy, through which she interprets as if interpreting a musical or a written text 
preserving the text but reproducing it in her own way (Etchegoyen, 1991).  
 
In Racker (1968), there is something like a synchronic oscillation between states of mind in the 
patient and analyst. The analyst can listen to primitive states of mind through identifications made 
possible by her own similar experiences; the exploration of the transference is only made possible 
through the exploration of the countertransference. Post-Kleinians assimilating Racker’s, 
Winnicott’s and Bion’s work recognized the ‘blind spots’ in Heimman’s work. “If there is a mouth 
that seeks a breast as an inborn potential” argues Pick, “there is I believe a psychological equivalent, 
i.e., a state of mind which seeks out other states of mind” (1985, p.157). Similarly, in Joseph (1989), 
in the space created between the patient’s and the analyst’s minds, an ambience emerges created 
by words and silences. The relationship is alive and messages go back and forth through different 
channels and modes of communication. Joseph’s analyst is closer to contemporary Relationals. She 
recognizes that “in some part of oneself, one can feel an area in the patient’s communications that 
one wishes not to attend to” (1989, p.111), while she also carefully tries to distinguish between 
projections and less distorted perceptions. Joseph (1989) writes, “I would then wish to explore 
more carefully her picture of me… how much of these ideas might be linked with actual 
observations of myself or the way I function, how much projected parts of herself and so on…to 
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assume that all these ideas were projections from the beginning would almost certainly be 
inaccurate, would numb one’s sensitivity as to what was going on…” (ibid. p.148).   
 
As Mitchell (1997) recognizes, this attitude developed by Racker and Joseph, which he calls the 
patient’s ‘relation to the interpretation’, is often a creative way of dealing with the ‘bootstrapping’ 
problem. After Racker, post-Kleinian thinking develops a sense that the patient’s capacity to use 
interpretation is not a given; it is not an unquestionable feature of the correct interpretation to 
reach the deep levels of the unconscious. It is actually an achievement. The analyst has to explore 
how the patient uses and relates to the interpretation (Joseph, 1989). For the patient in the 
paranoid-schizoid mode, the interpretation is either a God-given revelation to be worshipped or a 
poison to be dreaded (Etchegoyen, 1991; Mitchell, 1997). As Joseph (1989) states: “If the analyst 
struggles in such situations to give detailed interpretations of the meaning of individual associations 
then she is living out the patient’s own defensive system, making pseudo-sense of the 
incomprehensible world. The latter can be a very disturbing experience for the analyst too. It is more 
comfortable to believe that one understands “material” than to live out the role of a mother who 
cannot understand her infant/patient” (1989; p.158), while on the other hand “our healthier patients 
will soon be able to tell us if they feel, rightly or wrongly, that an interpretation suggests that we 
are on the defensive and interpreting accordingly.” (ibid.p.112). “Our predecessors were overly 
enamored with the magical therapeutics of interpretation”, says Wolstein, and “they 
counterproject their own belief and values onto their patients” (Interview in Hirsch, 2000; p.232). 
Some of them were and are still enamoured with the process of free association itself. As I will argue 
later on, this notion of ‘freedom’ inherent in the concept of the free-associating mind, Bion’s 
listening ‘without memory and desire’ and the Relational freedom expressed as the ‘curiosity about’ 
what ‘happens between us’ (Levenson, 1972/2005; Mitchell, 1997; Stern, 2010) suggests that this is 
the heart and soul of the psychoanalytic project. However, each of them is an ideal and, as an ideal, 
it can easily become a tyrannical demand and finally lead to the vanishing of its own essence, the 
matter of freedom.    
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Bollas (2007) believes that within the here-and-now transference interpretation, within this 
obsessive question of “what about the transference” that moves the analyst away from listening to 
the free association, there is a form of paranoia “perpetuated by a group-delusional process that 
has transformed a selected fact into a total truth” (p.99). His perspective has its merits but, I think, 
he in turn makes the same mistake turning another selected fact or overvalued idea into a ‘total’ 
truth. The evenly suspended analyst with the free-associating patient is only one among many 
possible techniques and ways of listening and interacting. Each analyst makes her own way through 
this multitude of ways and tools, the multiplicity of her own available channels of communication 
and through her own personality. Is it actually pragmatic and salutary to ask for a collapse of this 
multitude to fit a pre-selected way? However, Bollas describes a process that many analysts have 
found useful and meaningful in their work, this listening for the “revelation” (2007; p.87) of the 
unconscious. The unconscious of the analyst, says Bollas, tuned to the analysand’s unconscious 
receives latent mental contents and then his conscious is surprised by what was hidden and 
extracted in these latent communications.  
 
Bollas thinks analysts should return to how Freud viewed free associating before reviewing his 
hypotheses on the grounds of his failure with Dora. In the context of an unobjectionable 
transference, he believes that transferences may appear as resistances but will eventually dissolve 
into the process of free association. He is not the only one that finds much value in this process. 
Many ego psychologists consider free association as curative by itself, as Freud initially conceived it. 
Kris (1996), Hoffer (2006) and Busch (1997) credit free association as the only road the analyst can 
follow, watching for impediments and breaks, in order to gain access to the unconscious meanings 
of anxieties. Kris says, “It is probably more accurate…that the free association method leads 
concomitantly to insight, resolution of symptoms, and other aspects of the free association 
process” (1996; p.4). Free association is the cure for our inability to associate freely according to 
Kris. Insight and interpretation are used to promote free association. On the other hand, free 
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association promotes insight. “For me the process of free association yields a necessary enrichment 
of conscious meaning for the patient. This is one aspect of insight” writes Kris (1996, p.9).  
 
I think that the fallacy of these arguments does not lie in their circularity but rather in the fact that 
the analyst herself disappears within the method. It is another kind of collapse between fantasy and 
reality. It is as if the evenly hovering attention, reception and extraction of unconscious meanings 
are part of some kind of computational process that more or less takes the same form in each 
analyst. What I will argue in the next chapter when I will be discussing the analytic imagination is 
that each analyst has her own way of facilitating the process, receiving and extracting that is much 
more dependent on her own idiosyncratic patterns of arousal and sensory integration, her own 
patterns of communicating and receiving inner states, her own personality (that is how she solves 
the problem of building bridges between islands of experience and affective categories), her own 
values and ideals, and her own transferences to theories and teachers. Freedom, the freedom to 
think and relate in different ways, the freedom to experience oneself, one’s own mind and the mind 
of another is an ideal destination, a personal path which is unique, complex, and emerging in an 
unprecedented ‘meeting of two minds’. Our encounter with the Bionian infinite is disturbing; there 
is something excessive that the mind cannot grasp in a finite way. Attempting to fit the analyst to 
the method, though, is the wrong choice, in the same way as fitting the patient’s way to that of the 
analyst may be disastrous.  
 
Bollas may be reaching the right conclusions while following the wrong path; Dora, indeed, may 
have left treatment not due to Freud’s failure to gather and interpret the transference, but due to 
an unresolved ‘negative complementarity’. Mitchell (1997) writes, that “while many interpersonal 
analysts have provided refuge for patients fleeing years of frustration and stagnation in classical 
analysis, many Freudian analysts have provided refuge for patients fleeing experiences with 
interpersonal analysts that they experienced as out of control and intrusive” (p.94). It is 
questionable then why the world of psychoanalysis still wonders about what the perfect method is 
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instead of turning an eye towards the ‘good-enough match”. Ogden (1996) and Hoffman (2006), in 
contrast to Bollas and the ego psychologists, expressed their unease at the fundamental rule, the 
calls for the patient to speak anything that comes to mind. They both ask whether this actually 
suggests a violation of privacy or agency and an unnecessary empowerment of the analyst. Hoffman 
(2006) believes that “free association is still one of the sacred cows of the psychoanalytic tradition” 
(p. 43) and makes a rather powerful argument by stating that “no one would think twice about 
telling a patient who was starting to undress to keep his or her clothes on” (p.59). I think they are 
both right, as the fundamental requirement for the psychoanalytic condition to develop, this call for 
speaking whatever comes to mind is problematic. But as a claim that the analyst is available to listen 
to whatever comes to patient’s mind, it may still be revolutionary.   
 
Technical innovation in psychoanalysis has always come through experimentation with the modes 
of interaction that the analyst feels the patient has asked for, as in Ferenczi’s case described above, 
or with the modes the analyst finds meaningful and personally relevant or some times out of 
despair. Gedo (1996) describes the case of a man trying to talk about his erotic longings for his 
mother as a child. “I feel most comfortable quoting music through whistling” (p.6) says Gedo and 
describes how he started whistling a piece of music that the patient once said was his mother’s 
favourite. “Slowly the patient became aware first that the analyst was whistling, and then of the 
specific music” (Levin, 2004; p.154). “His affective response was dramatic” writes Gedo, “[H]e was 
able to put the whole matter into secondary process language without further intervention on my 
part” (p. 6). Gedo, following what he himself finds a comfortable and meaningful way of expressing 
his individual imagination and understanding, created an open space for meaning-making with his 
analysand. Grossmark (2012b) created such a space out of despair experimenting with new ways of 
being with his analysand while he constantly re-examined his analytic and personal values and 
turned to theory for comfort and containment. Following Bollas who suggests the analyst should 
not prevent free associations to emerge, Grossmark (2012a; 2012b) suggests that the analyst should 
refrain from disturbing the “flow of enactive engagement” (2012a; p.289). Following Ballint, 
Grossmark believes that for some patients the relationship cannot work at the level of words, that 
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separateness is experienced as persecution and that only through a mutual regression can they 
speak their lives and their pains in their own personal idiom. He describes such a patient for whom 
words did not function as a means for communication but were lifeless and repetitive (2012b), and 
with whom Grossmark follows the patient’s lead, letting the patient to tell his life through a series 
of enactments, in order to communicate his fragmented and inarticulate islands of experience 
through dramatic actions and chats in the consulting room. Grossmark (2012b) describes how he 
surrendered to the patient’s way out of despair, submitting that no other means other than letting 
himself, however terrifying that might be, delve into this psychotic mass would allow them to find 
some meaning. He used whatever means were at his disposal; attunement and mentalizing skills, 
his like of the patient, fragments of theory, improvisation, his unstable ability to bear fragmentation, 
the patient’s affects as containers of his own anxieties. He describes a successful treatment, where 
the patient finally surrendered some of his own defensive structures and a transformation was 
possible. “The prize” writes Grossmark “goes to the session where I heard a persistent noise while 
we talked, and in response to my inquiry, he mentioned ‘Oh, I’m in the shower’…what country he 
was in? I didn’t feel it really mattered at that point” (2012b; p.637). The analyst’s own pain when 
bearable didn’t matter. Grossmark gathered Ballint’s call to the analyst to offer herself as a place 
where the patient can become a whole, especially the patient whose inner states resist description, 
and turned his own self into this fragmented, confused but still self-rehabilitating place the patient 
needed.  
 
Somehow in the above paragraphs we found ourselves a small distance away from the concepts of 
insight and interpretation, and this happened exactly at the point where we focused on issues of 
technique. Fonagy (2006) and Stern (2012) following different lines of argument conclude that the 
analyst has to imaginatively use an array of ambiguous implicit theories sometimes contradictory in 
a creative synthesis, within the clinical encounter, which is a space of infinite complexity. The path 
from theory to clinical praxis is neither straightforward nor linear (Canestri, 2012). In the 
contemporary psychoanalytic discourse that informs these implicit theories, insight and 
interpretation seem more and more fragile and awkward; in a sense both concepts follow the fate 
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of transference, they become ‘buzzwords’ with loose and easily slipping meanings. I think their 
unavoidable destiny as concepts, as distinct theoretical categories is to disappear into this hyper-
complex world that ‘thinking in’ the clinical encounter is, and to re-appear with different meanings 
and connotations at some future theoretical synthesis. I will try to briefly sketch the contemporary 
landscape to support my argument, a landscape where the dividing lines between theoretical 
orientations become fuzzy and unclear.  
 
The analyst is still seen as an ‘assistant autobiographer’ (Holmes, 2001, p.86) that helps the patient 
give coherent meaning to experience but this is a bird’s-eye view, a metaphor that says little about 
micro-processes. BCPSG (2010) following a dynamic systems methodology created a new language 
for these micro-processes. Their ‘something more than interpretation’ perspective, however, has 
raised a lot of criticism; it seems to confound the non-dynamic implicit processes with the 
unconscious (Modell, 2008a) and it leaves little room for ‘language’ (Vivona, 2003; 2006). Both 
criticisms are somewhat justified, but I also think that they both overlook the importance of a new 
language developing in psychoanalysis in order to approach an area of experience for which there 
were no words until now.  
 
Vivona (2003), reviving Loewald’s thinking, emphasises this ‘beyond the interpretation’ area of 
speech that gathers much attention in contemporary thinking. As Harris (2011) elegantly puts it: 
“words catch fire in [the] relational context” (p.715). Figures of speech create, transmit and receive 
experience; language is always disturbed by primary processes. Language gives us a necessary 
distance from immediate experience (Foehl, 2011), and it can reach the ineffable and the inarticulate 
in a creative or in a discomposing manner (Reed, Levine & Scarfone, 2013). It can create novelty 
through the free associating mind. When we “lend ourselves to its life” as Merleau-Ponty 
(1973/1993, p.42) puts it, it can carry us to the ‘unformulated experience’ (Stern, 2004), towards the 
dissociated (Bromberg, 2006) and from there on it can bring us into a more abstract place where 
reflective meanings are articulated (Stern, 2004). Words carry unintended meanings that may 
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attract or divert our attention, and generate meanings before we are even aware of them (Rodman, 
2006). We say more than we want to and we understand less than we wish to (Rodman, 2006; Stern, 
2004). Words can both create and heal ruptures, sometimes inadvertently. Short stories that will 
embed themselves into the long narrative of a treatment can regulate affects. Words open a world 
of multiple parallel meanings creating freedom and other words slip by their side to close the path. 
Words deceive both members of the dyad; transitory spaces open for exploration and while one of 
the two participants surrenders, the other complies through a non-genuine curiosity. Words 
associatively carry each person to her/his own theory; the patient to his own theory of self-cure, the 
therapist to her own theories that suggest another universe. Obviously, psychoanalysis embraces 
the Bionian infinite with less despair. Or, from another perspective, psychoanalysis recognizes the 
Jamesian self-multiplicity where “the passing thought … is itself the thinker” (p.401).  
 
I think that Foehl (2010) and Ogden (2010) beautifully capture these movements of theory. Foehl 
(2010) notes that theory is no more concerned with the causes of experience; it is the nature of 
experience, our new subject of inquiry. Ogden (2010) writes: “[O]ur attention as analytic clinicians 
and analytic theorists has been increasingly focused on the way a person thinks, as opposed to what 
he thinks” (p.318). It is the nature of experience and processes instead of structures and contents 
that determine the future course of psychoanalytic theory. In this theoretical ambience, Bion’s and 
Winnicott’s interest in the analyst’s mind is again the focus of attention. It is the analyst’s mind that 
is the new field of enquiry. The analyst has to take himself as the other patient in the room (Bollas, 
1979). The analyst has to surrender just like the patient, to let herself be shaped by the analysand’s 
relational configurations (Mitchell, 1997; Stark, 2000), to show some emotion (Maroda, 2002), to 
throw the book (Hoffman, 2003). The analyst will be shaped by the unconscious ‘field’ (Baranger & 
Baranger, 2008; Ferro, 2006). She has to be self-reflective about her own contributions to the 
process and her use of theory (Mitchell, 1997), and has to attune herself to her own mind and take 
it as an object of inquiry and reverie (Jacobs, 1997; Rodman, 2006; Stern, 2010) . The analyst also has 
to constantly re-shape her analytic function (Lear, 2003) and to assume “responsibility for 
maintaining the analysis as an analysis” (Bollas, 1989, p. 56). From Racker’s (1968) analyst that 
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showed through interpretation that she was not drowning in the countertransference, we have 
moved to Davie’s (2006), Knox’s (2010) and Maroda’s (2002) analyst who has to let the analysand 
have a real emotional impact upon her in order to feel that his self-agency is not compromised. 
Racker’s (1968) wisdom that, if the patient is to change then the analyst must change too, has 



















“Don’t push a car with its breaks on and don’t push one which is already rolling”: A 




The discussion regarding what Schiepek (2009) calls the “anomalies of the linear input-output 
model of psychological treatments” (p.334) has been flourishing in psychotherapeutic discourse 
during the last few years. The fact that specific factors related to specific techniques seems to 
explain a small portion of the outcome variance (Wampold, 2001; Lambert & Ogles, 2004). Some 
findings suggest that early rapid improvements in treatment precede the application of specific 
treatment components (Hayes et al., 2007), that highly structured manualized treatments are not 
necessarily more effective than less structured interactions occurring in naturalistic settings 
(Schiepek, 2009) and that “people with no specific expert knowledge and psychotherapy 
training…are astonishingly successful” (ibid. p.332). This all demands a recognition of the fact that 
we know little about the processes of change. Several authors coming from diverse 
psychotherapeutic traditions arrive at conclusions almost identical to Schiepek’s, namely that we 
need to move away from a linear input-output model of the clinical process. Complexity and 
Nonlinear Dynamic Systems (NDS) Theory appeared during the last few decades as an overarching 
meta-framework promising to tie together the several psychotherapeutic approaches “through a 
deeper understanding of the self-organizing interpersonal processes in psychotherapy” (Pincus, 
2009; p.337). The goal here, notes Pincus, “is not to do away with the rich diversity” (p.337) but the 




4.1 The Evolution of the Epistemological Infrastructure and the Analytic 
Methodology Used for “Making-Sense” of the Data 
 
 
The pragmatist epistemological infrastructure of the thesis evolved during the research 
process, and its evolution suggests an integral part of the answer to the research question.  
In this section, I will describe in brief this development and the analytic methodologies I 
used to approach the Complexity literature data.  
 
Pragmatism rejects the Rationalist/Empiricist debate and the ensuing deduction/induction 
polarity as an unfathomable search over a gap created by our pre-Hegelian and pre-
Darwinian understanding of knowledge, Reason, and Experience (Rorty, 1998). Putnam 
(2001) describes Pragmatism as the third Enlightenment that achieves a step further from 
the Transcendentalist ideal of freedom through doubt, responsibility, criticism and self-
awareness and towards the Deweyan antiauthoritarian “criticism of criticisms” a standing 
back and criticise “the ways in which we are accustomed to criticising ideas” (ibid; p.18). A 
minimal description of the Pragmatic thesis is that knowledge as we understand it, it is a 
habit. We know through our habitual ways of thinking and not through some supposedly 
disengaged rational abilities, while the production of knowledge is effected through the 
anomalies and surprise of experience. Inquiry which is the very essence of knowledge in 
everyday life and science alike is reflected in the function of a “third”, another viewpoint, 
a synthesis, an extra “sense”, which grants us access to a basic relationship (i.e. between 
different perspectives, between propositions and objects). Reality has a structure, but this 
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is in flux. According to Pragmatists and Neo-pragmatists, Epistemology, the problem of 
knowledge in general, is irresolvable (Misak, 2013). Rationalism and Empiricism, deduction 
and induction dissolve in a dialectic process of inquiry which is the very nature of 
knowledge and through abduction, which according to Pierce is the inferential process we 
commonly call intuition, bring the variance that disturbs our known categories of thinking 
into a new level of coherence (Arens, 1994).  
 
Pragmatism brings from Hegel the recognition that rationality is an evolving structure and 
reflects a set of cultural and historical practices. Moreover, the idea that knower and 
known do not correspond to one another but coherently integrate into one another; 
experience brings together the experienced and the experiencing subject. So, cognition is 
a non-decomposable part of our action- and process-oriented mind which creates 
experience (Gimmler, 2004). Any normativity upon which rationality is grounded reflects 
the evolution of human social practices. Talking and writing is not a better way to know 
the “intrinsic nature of things, than does the anteater’s snout or the bowerbird’s skill at 
weaving” (Rorty, 1998; p.48).   
 
We navigate the world only through beliefs which justify other beliefs and concepts that 
relate to other concepts in a “space of implications” (Brandom, 2009; p.202). The problem 
of how we get from a sentient classification of the world by differentially responding to it - 
just as sunflowers that turn to the sun-, into the sapient distinctions - what Sellars (1997) 
calls the “Space of Reasons” -, has raised enormous and unresolvable debates among 
contemporary Analytic philosophers. The common denominator in Neo-Pragmatists’ 
position on the debate is that once we enter the space of reasons and the space of 
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implications, Truth and Reference cannot be considered foundational, the test of truth is 
coherence. Meaning is a function of the inferential relations between expressions which in 
turn they are referentially founded on the underlying normative pragmatics; what we are 
doing by using them. This is a game of “Giving and Asking for Reasons” notes Brandom 
(2009), in which we assert, infer and claim, according to normative standards, claimable 
and believable propositional content. The next big problem, however, is where does the 
friction of the world come from since, as arguably Sellars (1997) notes, the “Myth of the 
Given” cannot efficiently stand the test of analytic thinking; rationality transverses the 
space of experience to the bottom, there is no bare given. Brandom (2001), as well as his 
Neo-Pragmatist teacher Rorty (2009/1979), remain satisfied with a deflationary pragmatist-
realist account; friction between skills, capacities, and concepts in our practices in the 
world as it is given to us is enough explanation. I do not find the answer satisfactory. 
Dreyfus (2013) discloses the other side of the coin that Sellars ignores: we do not endorse 
a pure given but a meaningful given. To put things, in a nutshell, I will use an experimental 
image. Newborn ducklings that were imprinted on pairs of coloured shapes matched in 
one aspect, shape or colour, ‘extracted’ this “matching” dimension and then followed only 
pairs matching in at least one aspect (Martinho & kacelnik, 2016). Rationality and affectivity 
arrive at the moment together, but as I will argue in Chapter 5, affectivity is the 
gravitational field which regulates the collapse or the expansion of the space of 
implications, all our sapient distinctions, by permeating the horizon of experience with 
value. Agency comes from a world of affectivity, rules from a space of values, identities 
from a space of multiplicity, representation from a space of access, the categorical 
distinctions from a space of affordances. So, I am convinced that no “mediational theory 
of knowledge” can survive the test, mindedness makes sense only through a “contact 
theory” (Dreyfus, 2013).  The critical point, however, in the evolution of the epistemological 
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framework of this thesis was the transition to a Deleuzian pragmatism, which happened 
during the last phase of the project.  
 
Brandom (2004) notes that pragmatism had already brought together Hegel with Darwin. 
The message that he absorbed from his predecessors was that: nature is fluid and 
“stochastic”, regularities are the product of many “contingent interactions” between 
things and their environments, “emergent and potentially evanescent, floating statistically 
in the sea of chaos” (p.3). The message I absorbed from Deleuze was that Pragmatists fail 
to see the full implications of the Darwinian engine, the improvisational unison on melodic 
variations. They overemphasise coherence and conflict and underemphasise multiplicity 
and improvisation. We live in a world of dialogical rhythms; we are oscillating networks 
embedded in a world of oscillating rhythms. A Deleuzian answer to the question “where 
does friction come from” is from the in/between. We make sense because we are a rhythm, 
made up of rhythms, which do not correspond or represent the world but are in search for 
unison in variation between themselves and the rhythms encountered in the world; world 
and mind are absorbed the one into the other and distinguished in attunement. Our 
rhythms are in unison, melodic multiplicity and variation and friction both between 
themselves and the rhythms of the world. Friction and unison are in the in/betweenity. It is 
not about broadcasting from one rhythm, a network within networks, to another; 
networks live in difference. The site of change is both the originality of difference, the 
ensuing multiplicity and conflict as well.  
 
The engine of life in Deleuze is pure, untamed difference. If you look things from the side 
of representation and judgement you see subjects and predicates in hierarchical ordering, 
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delimitation according to oppositional categorizations, differences grounded in negation, 
subjects that possess properties, agents responsible for their actions; you mind for 
coherence and check for conflict (Sommers-Holmes, 2013). Looking from the side of 
multiplicity, you see a site of liberating possibilities; you see moving phase-spaces full of 
differences in unison, the melodic attunement of difference which is the generator of life, 
difference exploring the limits of coherence (DeLanda, 2002).  
 
However, the methodological framework for the bi-phasic conceptual analysis was built 
along the lines of pragmatist frameworks for theory construction (Swedberg, 2011; 2014a; 
2014b; Tavory and Timmermans, 2009; 2014; Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). The authors 
propose practical pragmatist frameworks in which abduction works with a lot of deductive 
theoretical preparation which brings in the data an array of different theoretical 
frameworks, and detailed inductive analyses that search within the data for surprises, 
contradictions, variation. Theoretical preparation aims at making meaning from various 
perspectives while checking across the data for the resistance they have to offer. In 
particular, Tavory and Timmermans propose a phase of axial coding after the first open 
phase and then a construction of sets-themes which are constantly fine-tuned according 
to the different perspectives as we account for variations and differences.  
 
Before employing the in-depth analysis, I extracted from a preliminary reading of the 
material a semantic network of concepts originating in the language of Complexity and 
Nonlinear Dynamic Systems: nonlinearity, emergence, self-criticality, self-organization, 
attractors, phase spaces, recurrency, perturbation, bifurcation, irreducibility, auto-catalysm, 
order and control parameters, fractals and scaling. This phase was followed by a review of 
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the extra-psychoanalytic literature in Complexity and NDS to acquire a de-centralized and 
rich sense of the implicated concepts. In a next phase, I read the material to familiarize 
myself with the multiple ways that psychoanalytic clinicians put these concepts into use in 
their understanding of the process. Each writer emphasises a unique combination and puts 
differential emphasis on the following aspects: a. emergence and criticality, b. multiplicity 
and bifurcations, c. recurrency, auto-catalysm, re-iterating patterns, d. perturbations that 
shift the system’s self-organization processes, e. self-similarity at different scales. This 
familiarization process allowed me to extract the conceptual dimensions each writer 
emphasises and make comparisons in the fine-tuning of sets in the next phase. Moreover, 
during this process, I could associate psychoanalytic complexity thinking to its origins in 
psychoanalytic theories and practices and the complexity thinking of neuroscience, 
philosophy of mind and modelling in physical sciences and psychology. This part of the 
work, on the origins of psychoanalytic complexity thinking, scaffolded the in-depth analysis 
and its main points appear in the four conceptual categories that turn up in the next part 
of this chapter, with the title: “From Structural to Process Theories: Discussing the Ideas 
that Framed the In-Depth Analysis”.  
 
Since my overall aim was the construction of a coherent story, a minimal model about what 
happens in the process, I needed to employ a flexible coding-thematizing ‘technology’ that 
would help me search from the semantic towards the latent in order to locate the sites of 
coherence within the data, while I was reducing the data complexity. The process involved 
minimal transcription procedures. I created ‘word processing’ documents copying the 
articles from Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing and for books and chapters I used 
separate white sheets for each page to record the codes. I approached the data according 
to the hierarchy of my research questions and aims, placing first the emphasis in the 
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semantic and descriptive levels with questions like "How is the understanding of the 
process structured and organized?". And then, I moved with a curiosity attitude towards 
the latent and the interpretative levels with questions like "Why do clinicians make sense 
of things the way they do? What kind of assumptions underpins their writing and 
understanding of the process? What are the implications of the way they approach the 
clinical situation?". Following Tavory’s and Timmerman’s spirit I plugged concepts into the 
data to break my habits of thought and practical understanding of psychoanalytic thinking 
and check the resistance of the data. What happens if instead of the experiential organising 
themes and the experiential cycles the writer mentions, I bring in Watzl’s (2011) ideas on 
the structuring role of attention? In example, one of the writers mentions that while she 
was fully aware of her negative feelings only after the discussion with her colleague she 
felt remorse for not expressing them. What if thinking the field of attention as larger 
experiential cycles, what if considering this focusing of attention on certain dimensions of 
the surface of emotional experience in the discussion with the colleague as the necessary 
ingredient of restructuring the field of attention? How do the experiential cycles then 
relate to the concept of the field of attention? What if I bring the other writer’s concept of 
attitude in the discussion, how does attitude relate to the values the writer mentions, the 
field of attention and the experiential cycles? What are the differences and similarities? 
Does my understanding bring any coherence to disparate elements from my previous 
reviews of the literature in therapeutic action? What happens if I plug in my new 
understanding of attitude as the transformation of attention to joseph’s “relationship to 
interpretation”?  In the open coding phase, codes were short phrases that liberated me 
from the need to always consult the data. Having in mind an abductive attitude, during the 
progress of the analysis, I avoided using existing codes, trying to expand similar codes and 
conclude with as pluralistic a first phase as possible. In the focused coding phase I 
organized categories, coding for the subtle differences between codes, where needed. I 
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did not follow a procedure of comparisons according to codes’ origination (my point of 
view or the writer’s) but remained with an organic approach. I approached conceptual 
congruence of themes from the process perspective; they should tell a minimal coherent 
story about what happens in the process. I took care each theme to suggest a unique frame 
of the process with clear boundaries, where focused codes and subthemes were closely 
interrelated even if there were interconnecting threads to the other themes.  
 
Working ‘abductively’ is risky. Induction is riskier than deduction and abduction is riskier 
than both. Nevertheless, by staying close to the variance and the sites of resistance data 
have to offer, it may suggest our way out of this “more of the same” mentality either at 
the level of rationality (deduction) or our habits in extracting regularities (induction) 
(Tavory & Timmermans, 2014). Findings from a pragmatic point of view always reflect the 
processes we use to break our habitual ways of understanding reality, the evidence and 
the methods we use (Cornish & Gillespie, 2009). But, at the same moment, this is what 
makes knowledge valuable. Triangulation, as I will argue, is the engine of cognition and 
reflects our ability to move and bring the world forth; we change perspective and we 
uncover possibilities.  A pragmatic attitude treats research as an event, not a product, and 
a pragmatist perspective on triangulation necessarily moves the emphasis from 
reconciliation towards transparency of the frameworks used to make sense. Inter-rater 
agreement shows that researchers have been trained to code the data in the same way 
(Braun & Clarke, 2014). Pragmatism emphasises dialogue and deformation, not conformity 
to a habit.  A pragmatic triangulation attitude is reflected towards working with “the same 
data chunks repeatedly to “deform [them], to make [them] groan and protest” with an 
overabundance of meaning, which in turn not only creates new knowledge but also shows 
the suppleness of each when plugged in” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2011; p.5). A classical 
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pragmatist perspective on research evaluates findings on the grounds of usefulness and 
achievement of ‘practical certainty’ (Misak, 2013; p.34) through a process of bringing 
together several perspectives into a meaningful dialogue. Following Tavory’s and 
Timmerman’s (2014) evaluative criteria of fit, plausibility, and relevance I will discuss a 
critical evaluation of the bi-phasic analysis, embedded in the overall project evaluation in 
the conclusions chapter. However, at this point, I may make clear to the reader that during 
the analysis I emphasised sensitivity to the data through the use of multiple perspectives 
than objectivity.  
 
My emphasis is not on making fully transparent the construction of categories but how 
concepts and frameworks regulated my sensitivity to the data during the construction 
process. So, at the foreground of transparency concerns in this chapter are the concerns 
to reveal how several concepts and frameworks are implicated in the process of making 
me sensitive to this particular reading of the data.  Objectivity concerns are managed in the 
next chapter, where I ‘triangulate’ by bringing together perspectives from neuroscience, 
psychology, and philosophy of mind in order to ensure that the concepts and frameworks 
used have merits upon alternatives and that the reading of the process can stand the test 
of coherence from several points of view and prove its usefulness.  
 
Evaluating the evidence used in the construction of the model I may stress two points. I 
focused on complexity since it promises to deconstruct the perpetuating polarity in the 
psychoanalytic ‘therapeutic action’ thinking between causes and meanings. Plus, I 
considered the complexity literature as the best possible source of data since it is a rich site 
of information where you can track the development and interdependence of ideas 
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alongside thoughtful and careful clinical descriptions and descriptions of institutional 
practices. This original site of reflexivity was considered from the viewpoint of my aims, 
the construction of a minimal abstract model, the best possible source for studying the 
multiple connections between ideas and practices. The first four themes (4.2 section), 
reveal my interpretation of the multiple points of origin of psychoanalytic complexity 
thinking and the ways these origins influence complexity clinicians’ understanding of the 
process. So, my sensitivity to the data has been influenced by these interpretations, which 
the reader can follow in section 4.2 and the concepts and frameworks I ‘plug’ in  section 4.3 
(like Merleau-Ponty’s field concept, the experiential figure-grounding, chiasmatic and the 
interweaving ‘separation-in-relation” that overlaps with Downes’s concentric, Downes’ 
concentric and diametric, ideas on attention, joint attention and selective inattention, 
Jonas’s ‘needful freedom’) that narrates the story I have read in the complexity literature 
regarding the clinical process. 
 
Finally, the writing up, which suggests the integrating part of the enquiry process, reflects 
the movement of the epistemological infrastructure and the assimilation of the Deleuzian 
thinking. The clinical and the research processes are isomorphic, they involve uneven 
phases, a lot of confusion, order that finally brings disorder and vice versa. All this is usually 
lost in coherence. However, the Deleuzian Post-Qualitatives convinced me that I should 
write with the intensities in mind, not the 'extensities.' They suggest us to avoid closure 
and design research that makes the world visible not fixed (Jackson & Mazzei, 2009; 
St.Pierre, 2011); to get into things from the middle (Koro-Ljungberg, 2016); to plug concepts 
into one another to let the world reveal its joints; to stop reflecting since you get more of 
the same, to start diffracting, letting the waves pass through the small openings (Jackson 
& Mazzei, 2011); there is nothing in the world that may stand as an evidence of something 
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else, so we should give access not representation, stay on the threshold, the intensive, the 
passage, where things are pregnant with transformation (Honan & Bright, 2016; Jackson & 
Mazzei, 2011) .  
 
The discursive writing style may reflect this process of searching on the surface of concepts 
their points of opening and connection, the small differences that open a space of 
possibilities; it emphasises the passages.  Moreover, it shows how concepts were 
“plugged” in a whole field of observations or plugged into one another and transformed 
my understanding. The clinical and the research process are isomorphic. In both we strive 
to expand our agency, our ability to act in the world in a way that best satisfies our multiple 
intentions in this interaction without creating insurmountable conflicts. The reader will 
experience first-hand my answer to the question of “bootstrapping”. Concepts, 
continuously shifting, search in their background, surfaces through which they connect to 
the space of implications of other concepts and create a new field of implications.   
However, underlying this work, there is a lot of coherence and a lot of “practical certainty”. 
The reader is encouraged to use the supplemental material included in Appendix I (Tables 
with the organization of the 4 Themes (Experience/Flow, Coupling, Shifting, Scaling)) in 
order to have a more enriching experience of navigation through the narrative and get 








4.2 From Structures to Processes: Discussing the Ideas that Framed the In-Depth 
Analysis 
 
In this part of the Chapter, I will describe in brief the conceptual frame which occurred in the first 
analytic phase and helped me understand the infrastructure of Complexity thinking in 
Psychoanalysis. The first theme explores the “thinking space” from which Complexity writers draw 
their ideas of therapeutic action, the points of emphasis and how these ideas relate to the wider 
psychoanalytic thinking on therapeutic action. The second theme describes how they are positioned 
in relation to the wider Complexity landscape, from which process mind/brain theories they draw, 
and how they approach Complexity modelling. The third theme describes the action and process-
nature of theory, thinking, concepts and ideas as an integral part of field experience for Complexity 
clinicians, it discusses the role of multiplicity in theory and introduces the idea that interpretation 
cannot bring absence into full presence but provides access to surfaces of experience. The fourth 
theme describes in a practical way the main Complexity ideas the reader must have in mind in order 
to follow the next Section, how they relate to known psychoanalytic concepts and the small 
productive differences that appear in their use according to the original psychoanalytic school of 
thought from which Complexity clinicians are coming. So, the main function of this section is not to 
provide the overall answers that I gathered by approaching the literature through a set of 
foundational questions and those that emerged through the process and the ‘plugging in’ of 
concepts into one-another. Its function is to prepare the reader, by linking concepts and practices, 
to follow the story that I have read questioning the Complexity literature, and reveal my sensitivity 





4.2.1 How Complexity Thinking Integrates Theories of Therapeutic Action: The 
therapeutic process is beyond our understanding. It is almost impossible to understand what is 
happening in the consulting room (Canestri, 2007; Spezzano, 2007; Steiner, 1994). Coburn (2014), 
when he thinks of theories of therapeutic action and change, is reminded of enacted narratives like 
those of an “early man at the nighttime communal fire, reenacting for his clan his late-afternoon 
killing of a saber-tooth tiger” (p.2). We just construct good and coherent stories through our case 
studies, he notices since we naturally “want to make sense of things…” (ibid).  
 
In most of the analysed literature, people seem to struggle to correct for the gross reductionisms 
lurking in the traditional theories of therapeutic action. An overemphasis to the symbolic level may 
make a story seem more elegant compared to a scientific article about reducing ‘Behaviour X’ to 
‘Gene or Hormone Y’, but it may remain no far less reductionistic, collapsing all the immense 
complexity and dimensionality of the clinical situation to a manageable single level of analysis. From 
a Complexity viewpoint, the polarity that emerges between insight and interpretation on the one 
hand, and the therapeutic relationship on the other, may be totally misleading, while it may also 
reflect the fallacies of how we perceive the workings of the human mind. 
 
Any theory of therapeutic action and cure must be at the same time a theory of the mind, a theory 
of psychopathology, and a set of theories about clinical techniques. Where most researchers and 
clinicians writing from a Complexity perspective differ to those endorsing traditional 
metapsychologies, is that they try to underemphasise or eliminate the discourse on structures, 
internal mechanisms and mental contents, emphasising processes. The traditional psychoanalytic 
metapsychologies originating in Freud’s economic, topographic and structural viewpoints, 
reproduce a conception of the mind as a ‘representational’ machine relating to an independently 
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existing, external reality. Winnicott, while he did not create a discrete metapsychology, freed 
himself from thinking of the relationship of the mind to the world as originating in the frustration of 
the pleasure principle. The mind, according to Winnicott, does not grow out of frustration; the mind 
grows out of the acceptance that the environment is part of the mind and, at the same time, it is 
not a part of it. This paradox, writes Winnicott, has to be “accepted not resolved” (1989, p.580). The 
acceptance of this paradox, as well as the absorption of conflicts and ambiguities through the 
expansion of consciousness and the increased complexity of the meaning-making processes, seems 
to suggest the engine of change for most Complexity writers.  
 
All psychoanalytic schools meet in a very vague description of the therapeutic process. In an 
environment that suggests a safe base for exploration, the patient considers new perspectives and is 
actively held and contained while giving up old ways of organizing experience and relating to the 
world. Ego psychology emphasises the re-organization of defences through the resolution of 
conflicts; self-psychology emphasises the evolution of a benign self-image; post-Kleinian psychology 
emphasises the maturation of raw ideas about the self into a thinkable form (Friedman, 2007). 
Winnicott emphasised the play ambience that facilitates the development of new meanings. In a 
Complexity-inspired framework of the clinical situation, conflict, the thinking process, and self-
image are not discrete aspects of the process, but rather blend during the unfolding of the process.  
 
Theories of therapeutic action tried to answer the question at different levels of abstraction: 
• How does analysis cure? (i.e. by modifying the superego, by lifting repression barriers, by 
altering internal structures, re-organizing defences)  
• How does technique work? (i.e. How does empathic attunement promotes transmuting 
internalizations?) 
• What does an analyst do? (i.e. she contains intense affects, she links unlinked ideas and 
experiences to provide insight)  
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• What happens in the intermediate space between the analyst and the analysand? (i.e. 
development of an alliance, identifications, containment, internalization of a self-object 
function, resolution of impasses) 
From the Complexity standpoint, this fourth level is not only the most important but the level at 
which all other levels of explanation should necessarily collapse and expand. In the rest of the 
Chapter, we will discuss all relevant aspects of this in/betweenity.  
 
Friedman (2007) notes that any theory of therapeutic action actually amounts to a theory of defence. 
The conceptual boundaries between defence and resistance are blurred in the Complexity 
literature. The language of conflict is almost absent, while the language of mechanisms gently gives 
way to a language of experience. Moreover, Sullivanian ‘beats’ are heard throughout the complexity 
literature, where conflict is interpersonally generated and re-created. At the same time, if we 
misplace any phenomenon the analyst understands as resistance under the conceptual umbrella of 
the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ where the analysand does not want to know about himself, then 
we commit a serious philosophical fallacy, since we conceptualize resistance along only one of its 
possible dimensions. The analysand wants to grow out of his troubles. What the analyst knows is 
that, in order to achieve this new level of agency, the patient needs to expand his mind. In this 
process, the patient will resist being viewed by the analyst as the object of a theory; he will resist 
any perspective that he feels might unnecessarily destabilize his safety with no real effect on his 
development. He will also resist any misunderstanding on the part of the analyst, such as 
communicating at a level he does not find meaningful, relevant or comprehensible. Slavin and 
Kriegman (1998) discuss patient’s resistance as a protective manoeuvre against the influence of 
another with possibly conflicting interests. Knox (2010) as a communication that his subjective 
experience is treated as irrelevant and his self-agency is compromised; sometimes, to the level of 
feeling annihilated by the analyst’s resistance to let him have a real emotional impact on her. 
Bromberg (2010) as the widening of the dissociative gap after interpretations of splitting and 
conflict that compromise his affective safety.   Resistance is a sign that the patient cannot grow this 
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way; the damage inflicted is greater than the potential gains. The analyst’s mind has to transform 
itself then, in order to create an alternative context that will facilitate growth. 
 
The patient remains uninfluenced. According to the Complexity conception of the process, patient 
and therapist create a coupled oscillating system. Models exploring the coupling at the level of 
emotional space hypothesize that attunement and resonance are preconditions of influence. Miller 
(1999) for example, following this kind of thinking, understands influence as a process of mutual 
regulation originating in coupling, attunement and resonance, where the therapist communicates 
her acceptance and understanding of the patient’s feelings. After “matching the patient’s state”, 
she then “aids a patient in regulating these feelings”, by “ratcheting up or down his or her own 
feeling states, so that the patient can attempt to match the analyst's affective states within himself 
or herself” (p.376). Very few authors openly discuss the matter of influence (Arnetoli, 2002; Carlton, 
2009; Coburn, 2002;2014; Lichtenberg, Lachmann & Fosshage, 2010; Marks-Tarlow, 2008) while, as 
it will be shown in the next phase, they all think and implicitly take into account this dimension of 
“Influence and Autonomy”. Sperry (2011) is among those few giving immanent importance to the 
matter of influence. “[A]gents dread influence,” she notes, “thus impairing the system's capacity 
to adapt to influence in a manner that supports possibilities for therapeutic change” (p.76). While 
she also mentions that despite advances in theory: 
 
 “the classical ‘taboo’ on influence continues to infuse contemporary theories and limit our 
ability to use influence creatively and ‘passionately’ to bring about therapeutic change. In 
addition, most considerations of the reciprocal nature of influence are limited to dyadic 
interactional sequences and focus predominately on specific aspects of dyadic experience 
such as regulation (Beebe and Lachmann, 2002), self-object needs (Bacal and Thomson, 
1996), mutual recognition (Benjamin, 1995, 2004), and so forth. This dyadic focus also has 
limited our understanding and ability to use influence creatively. Many of these 
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descriptions also perpetuate a linear and individualistic, albeit bidirectional, view of 
influence.” (p.78). 
 
The lifting of the repression barrier and the linking of word to thing representations is, in Freud’s 
teachings, the central mechanism of therapeutic action. Smith (2007) notes that there is no 
comparable explanation for the effectiveness of interpretation in any other psychoanalytic model; 
while Smith is correct that there is no comparable theory of therapeutic action explaining the 
effectiveness of interpretation, this theory creates another serious problem. The lifting of the 
repression barrier and the linking of word- to thing-representations presuppose that the human 
mind ‘contains’ exact copies of representations of its childhood experience. But as Stein (1996) 
notes from the perspective of a nonlinear science of the mind, “You can’t go home again” (p.272). 
If interpretation does not repair a historical ‘unlinking’, then we need a complementary viable 
theory of how it works. Moreover, psychoanalytic complexity moves slowly but steadily away 
from a representational, or a primarily representational, view of the human mind. Coburn (2014) 
notes that:  
“It eschews the notion of intrapsychic representation (not to be confused with the action 
of consciously representing something via symbol), as well as the notion that emotional 
experience and meaning emanate from an inside, intrapsychic space concerned with the 
management of representations of an objective, external world” (p. 43). 
The mechanisms of therapeutic action in the complexity literature are much more diverse and 
complex than the lifting of the repression barrier. While people bring into discussion several 
proposed mechanisms originating in Classical or Relational theory, Self-psychology and 
Intersubjectivity – like the investigation of the experiential organizing themes and the affects that 
contour them, the repair of self-object need disruptions and the integration of self/other relational 
configurations –slowly start to build a language that emphasises experience. What is clearly evident 
from the Complexity literature is the fact that there are deep resonances between the Complexity, 
the Relational and the Intersubjective Self-psychological literature. Concepts and ideas cut across 
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boundaries and easily broadcast in the respective literatures. Stern’s “unformulated experience”, 
for example, is a term widely used in all three areas of literature to denote aspects of experience 
that go unnoticed due to selective inattention. It is important here to create an image of 
contemporary Relational thinking that highlights its deep affinities to Complexity.  
 
What distinguishes the Relational school of thought is the emphasis on the multiplicity of self-states, 
on dissociation as the central mechanism of pathology – either as narrative rigidity, or in the strong 
sense (Stern, 2010), or even as a form of alexithymia (Maroda, 2002) – and enactment as a form of 
communication (Bromberg, 1993; Stern, 2004,2010; Harris, 2012). Concepts like abstinence, 
neutrality and negative therapeutic reaction have no meaning in the Relational context (Ehrenberg, 
2005; Harris, 2011). The analyst is felt, imagined, known; she disrupts the field in the same way as the 
analysand does through projective identifications and dissociations. Therapeutic impasses are co-
created and the only compass is the knowledge that “where dissociations were, internal conflicts 
shall be” (Bromberg, 2006; Stern 2010). Improvisation, negotiations of meaning and the bridging of 
paradox have a central place as concepts of therapeutic action (Pizer, 1998a; Knoblauch, 2000). 
Perfect attunement and accurate empathy are seen as damaging ideals which embroil the 
therapeutic relationship (Hoffman, 1996). Empathy is always an interpretation; it is imperfect and 
unstable (Stern, 2003; Jaenicke, 2011).  It looks as though all psychoanalytic ideals have been 
deconstructed and replaced by a more pragmatic and humanistic perspective of the therapeutic 
encounter. What I think to be an important advancement in Relational thinking, however, is the 
emphasis on process; mental structures and mental contents are more and more often replaced by 
process terms. I will decontextualize a phrase of Lauro-Grotto et al. (2009) to emphasise what I 
want to delineate: we are faced with the “unbearable dynamicity” of the dynamic unconscious. 
Getting rid of the ‘repression barrier’, psychoanalytic thinking, step by step, discovered that 
whatever the “dynamic” component is, it is certainly something more than the descriptive category 
of the pre-reflective unconscious, it lies in-between self-states, and in-between persons. This slow 
painful progression from contents and structures to processes, from the cause of experience to the 
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nature of experience, from what one thinks to how one thinks, seems to be a ubiquitous 
advancement (Foehl, 2010; Ogden, 2010) deeply linking Relationality to Complexity. 
 
4.2.2 From Structural to Dynamic Theories of Brain/Mind:  There are a number of writers 
in the NDS psychoanalytic literature who do not explicitly or directly refer to brain/mind theories 
contiguous or associated with Complexity ideas. Rather, they prefer to stay close to a Complexity 
relevant to the conception of the human mind, making sporadic references to a neurodiscourse. All 
writers who do refer or draw heavily from such brain/mind theories exclusively mention three 
particular theories: Walter Freeman’s Neurodynamics, Maturana and Varela and, Varela, Thompson 
and Rosch, Autopoietic Enactivism, and Edelman’s Dynamic Core hypothesis and Neural 
Selectionism. All three bodies of theories, beyond their obvious compatibility to chaos and self-
organization ideas, show deep affinities: what makes their kinship clearly apparent is their emphasis 
on action. They all move away from what Hurley (1998) calls a “sandwich model” of cognition, 
where cognition mediates the relation between perception and action, and from a computational 
or a primarily representational conception of the human mind.  
 
Freeman adopts what he calls a Thomist conception of the human brain/mind relationships.  
According to Freeman, all knowledge about the world is constructed within the brain and is not 
imported in the form of information or representation. His research on rabbits exposed to different 
smells showed that the brain, out of a state of creative randomness and chaos, created order in the 
form of lower dimensional attractors. The most important finding in Freeman’s research was that 
the firing patterns were different after each re-exposure to the same smell. Freeman believes that 
the response to an expected stimulus anticipates the arrival of the stimulus by the formation of a 
hypothesis, based on the organism’s ever-changing goal states. This hypothesis-testing nature of 
perception is, according to him, the solution brains have found in dealing with the infinite 
complexity of the world. Grisby and Osuch (2007), discussing Neurodynamics, note that personality 
	 110	
has no structure, that “it is an abstraction of regularly occurring activities . . . [it is] nothing but 
processes . . . emergent properties of the brain’s self-organizing activities” (p.42-43). The organism’s 
state changes constantly, even if most of the time these changes are not observable.  
 
Edelman’s Selectionism moves away – in the same manner that Freeman’s Neurodynamics – from 
the idea that information originating in the environment is transferred and represented in the 
human brain. The brain recognizes and adaptively matches to environmental elements according to 
a pre-existent variability that has been developed by its own action into the world. Perceptual 
categorization and re-categorization is a constant process. Ghent (2002), describing the process of 
re-categorization of experience which he equates to meaning-making, writes:  
“Considering that there are about one billion synaptic connections in a section of the 
brain the size of a matchhead, it is not difficult to imagine the degree of complexity of 
connections, repertoires, maps of repertoires, and maps of maps that evolve in the 
course of experience. These maps and circuits automatically adapt their boundaries, 
sometimes quite dramatically (italics mine), on the basis of lived experience”. 
Edelman thinks that neural assemblies that were able to pilot our most adaptive action in the world 
are selected in a Darwinian fashion. However, as Ghent mentions, this process never ends. “We 
agree with Ghent and Edelman” write Lichtenberg et al. (2010), “no narrowly fixed universals, no 
drives…development creates its own categories, meanings, intentions and goals” (p.15). Emotional 
disturbances, notes Davis (2002) after Edelman, are diseases of consciousness. Depression, for 
example, is a disturbance of the quality of experience. Transferences, says Fajardo (2000), which 
serve to hold together the subjective experiences of patient and analyst, draw their salience in 
directing the person’s actions and responses, from past experiences and present day interaction, 
organized into perceptual categories. Primary consciousness and awareness, a right hemispheric 
process according to Edelman, directs this perceptual categorization and re-categorization.  
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Beyond Freeman and Edelman, Haken’s (1983) Synergetics have inspired a lot of research on the 
brain being a chaotic system, while he has also influenced many researchers working in empirical 
psychotherapy research paradigms, such as Schiepek and Tschatcher.  His direct influence on 
psychoanalytic writers, however, is sporadic and rather minimal. Synergetics originate in laser 
physics, and Haken’s studies on how a laser light wave is self-organized by the behaviour of single 
atoms which produce light waves that amplify and compete with one another until a specific wave 
length is established as the order parameter that enslaves the single atoms and organizes their 
behaviour. What is important to mention here, in order to frame the discussion regarding dynamic 
theories of brain/mind, is that dynamic approaches to the human mind evolved quickly as an 
alternative to symbolic and representational approaches to cognition. They are mostly bottom-up 
approaches, considering cognition not as something grounded in symbol manipulation, but rather 
emerging from elementary loops originating in our interaction with the environment. To put it 
simply, the organism constrains the environment and the environment constrains the organism, and 
these interdependent constraints act as control parameters that order the flow of our experience, 
perception and thinking. What connects ideas like Freeman’s, Edelman’s, Haken’s and numerous 
other researchers on NDS, and what captures clinicians’ interest in these idea, is their implications 
regarding pathology and the clinical process. Pathology is not a matter of structural deformation, 
lesion or deficit, but the idea that “mental states, disordered or not, are viewed as attractors, as 
dynamic invariants that are constantly in flux”. “A psychopathological state is not fundamentally 
different from a healthy state in this respect” (Tschatcher & Junghan, 2009; p. 327).  
 
Complexity seems like a unified approach to science-based modelling and understanding of 
phenomena, while it is actually a set of coherent beliefs and practices that may show decisive 
discrepancies and differences from field to field or among fields (Hooker, 2011). I will try to give a 
idea of how complexity has been used in the world of psychotherapy theory and empirical research. 
Agent-based modelling in Complexity has followed two different roads: the differential equation 
modelling approach, and the algorithmic computational approach. Chaos and complexity theories 
originating in Artificial Life tried to understand the collective behaviour of large systems like stock 
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markets, flying birds, and ant colonies by looking at how Complexity can emerge by the re-iterating 
workings of simple computational algorithmic rules. In these models, algorithmic rules actually 
substitute for the role that differential equations play in the modelling of the behaviour of physical 
systems. An equation describes the structure and the behaviour of a system over time. In linear 
equations, over time this behaviour can be graphically modelled by a straight line. A differential 
equation is more or less a mathematical formula that represents the rule of how an agent will react 
to himself and other agents, a description of how the two agents couple, and which exhibits a 
nonlinear behaviour in the graphical space. The trajectory of this nonlinear line describing the 
behaviour of the system creates a space that depicts the values that variables get over the re-
iterations of solving the equation. All the possible values that the equation can take create a phase 
space. The system is, in fact, a coupling of equations.  
 
Complexity agent-based modelling in empirical research within psychotherapy has focused mainly 
on the behaviour rather than the structure of systems. Modelling the behaviour though, even if the 
researcher succeeds in identifying and measuring the relevant parameters at the relevant scaling, 
and even if they achieve astonishingly accurate predictions, does not mean that we come any closer 
qualitatively to the enormous complexity of the system. Gottman et al. (2002), for example, 
modelled marriage relationships, following very brief discussions among partners, through 
differential equations, achieving a surprising predictive rate regarding divorce of about 90%. 
Liebovitch et al. (2011), using a similar model inspired by Gottman’s work, modelled the emotional 
dynamics of the therapist-client dyad in terms of emotional inertia and influence, making predictions 
about the system’s behaviour by manipulating control parameters. Dynamic Systems theory and 
Complexity tools have been also used in numerous empirical studies to model the progress and 
“behaviour” of therapy regimes based on time-series data from assessments and questionnaires 
(Schiepek et al., 2013; Schiepek, Tominschek & Heinzel, 2014). While in researching psychotherapy 
and psychopathology many researchers use modelling tools inspired by Dynamic Systems theory, 
all these approaches do not necessarily register as being relevant to Complexity. The hallmark of 
Complexity is self-organization, that is the unpredictable and spontaneous emergence of novel 
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qualities, a higher level of order and complexity as the system moves in time. The behaviour of a 
system, as it approaches a critical or a point of instability, is determined by order parameters which 
enslave the system’s elements in a certain flow into the phase space, as mentioned in Haken’s 
example of laser light waves. The qualitative description of this process is what captured clinicians’ 
imaginations and interest, and ordered their ideas like an enslaving order parameter around 
complexity metaphors.  
 
At the other end of the complexity spectrum, the philosopher Esa Saarinen notes that systems 
thinking is an integral part of human intelligence. He proposes that we do not need to model 
complexity in scientifically accurate ways through objectifying principles. From a systems 
intelligence perspective, “a system that works comes first, why it works comes second” 
(Hamalainen & Saarinen, 2006; p.173). What we need most is the development of a convincing and 
pragmatic sensibility about systems, a kind of awareness about the shape and direction of change, 
the emerging patterns, the context specific events in the flow of the messy, the fluid and the 
multidimensional (Martela & Saarinen, 2013). Systems thinking requires us to avoid the seduction of 
the cognitively transparent and the human habit of fragmentary thought which divides everything 
up and, instead, let ourselves tune in through our multiple channels of communication with the non-
propositional, the non-rational, instinctual sensibilities to wholes, emphasising sloppiness and 
moment-to-moment productivity. Particularly in psychotherapy, Matela & Saarinen argue, the way 
we present ourselves, the tact and the timing of our interventions, may be more important than 
what is actually said.  
 
Psychoanalytic complexity authors, with the exception of a limited number of researchers whose 
work is strictly empirically oriented, continue to develop their ideas closer to what Saarinen 
considers a system’s intelligence perspective, but they are also considerably inspired by the 
concrete modelling of complex systems. However, their use of concepts coming from system’s 
modelling is mostly flexible and variable. Some authors (eg. Galatzer-Levy, 1995; 2004; 2009; Piers, 
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2005) show a high consistency in the way they use concepts coming from modelling, and their work, 
developing over the years, is emphasising precision and clarity. Other authors (e.g. Coburn, 
2002;2014; Orange, Atwood & Stolorow, 1997) are mostly interested in the philosophical 
implications of Complexity concepts and the ensuing ramifications for treatment. Most authors, I 
think, are highly selective in the emphasis they put on precision and clarity on the one hand, and the 
metaphorical understanding of concepts on the other. Their preeminent interest is a deeper 
understanding of the clinical process, so they mostly remain relaxed on the subject of the 
relationship between a coherent theory of the mind and pathology and their understanding of what 
happens within the clinical process.  
 
A most notable example regarding these differences is the concept of ‘attractors’. A remarkable 
number of authors discuss in a highly metaphorical way unconscious fantasies as the attractors of 
the phase space towards which the flow of experience is ordered. By contrast, Piers (2007) tries to 
define unconscious attitude as a set of “transition rules” by adopting a computational agent-based 
modelling thinking. Transition rules in complex artificial systems are very simple rules that define 
agents’ behaviour and which in turn create an enormous Complexity as the system progresses. So, 
drawing from Shapiro’s work, he notes that a “rule-based” attitude towards subjective experience, 
where the person tries to hold ambivalent standards and rules regarding who he should be, what 
he should do and how he should feel, may underlie the obsessive’s compulsions, the paranoid’s 
suspiciousness and the hypomanic’s spontaneity. These attitudes direct the flow of subjective 
experience and create positive intensifying feedback loops. Symptoms are emergent – and we feel 
them as such, as unwanted and nonsensical - on the grounds of such simple ‘transition rules’. Piers’ 
clear and parsimonious account on attitudes as ‘transition rules’ creates as many problems as it 
solves. It may explain how a simple set of initial conditions creates an enormous complexity at the 
behavioural level, but it lacks strength in examining what happens at the multiple intersecting lines 
between the individual and the interpersonal levels.  
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Coburn (2014) prefers a less precise but more illustrative approach to attitudes as attractors of 
subjective experience, echoing Piers’ claim that “it’s almost all about attitude” (p.1). Remaining 
close to Piers’ or Palombo’s thinking, Coburn notes that experiential worlds “are algorithmically 
described over time, via their gradual unfolding and investigating in the context of the therapeutic 
relationship” (p.63). Unlike Piers and Palombo, though, he understands psychological phenomena 
“as distributed across a network of which each individual is a part” (ibid., p.64). What emerges at 
the experiential realm does not come from an individual psyche alone; the mind is extended. And 
while Coburn thinks in terms of connectionist networks following Cilliers, I prefer a more enactive 
reading of the situation, as I will argue in the next chapter. Hutchins (2010) argues that, while 
performing a complex task like navigating a boat, the mind becomes inseparable by the mediating 
artefacts, that is the navigation organs. These mediating artefacts are not simply extensions of the 
mind; they are brought into coordination with the organism’s processes in such a way that they 
become part of the mind. In a similar fashion, each member’s intonation and movement, which are 
not simply signs of something else, but this something else itself, the shifting experiential states, 
may become an integral part of the other member’s mind.  
 
Enactivists, criticizing Cartesian-like isolationism perpetuated in theories of social cognition like 
Theory of Mind (ToM) and Simulation Theory (ST), propose that we are in much more direct contact 
with one another’s experiential state. While Enactivism shall be discussed in greater detail in the 
next chapter, it is important at this point to discuss what contemporary Enactivists working in 
Cognitive Science call the “narrow corridor” paradigmatic scene, and the “Participatory sense-
making” intersubjective perspective on social cognition. Both concepts originate in the work of De 
Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007), extending and exemplifying Maturana and Varela’s ideas on autonomy 
and coupling.  Exploring these concepts may help us frame the discussion on therapeutic action, 
transferences and dynamic theories of the mind drawing from complexity. The ideas will sound 
familiar to psychoanalysts, since the authors refer on established psychoanalytic ideas from authors 
like Daniel Stern and Jessica Benjamin. Social interactions, according to Enactivists, are sustained by 
the embodied coupling and coordination of two autonomous agents, a process involving breakdowns 
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and repairs. Through co-regulation and coupling, where the one process affects the other, an 
“autonomous self-sustaining organization” (De Jaegher, Di Paolo & Gallagher, 2010; p.442) emerges 
at the level of relational dynamics. Encountering someone coming from the other direction of a 
narrow corridor, a “scene that writes itself” (Ringstrom, 2007) may self-organize and maintain itself. 
While your original intention is to pass along the other person, you suddenly find yourself entangled 
in a dynamic where each of you ends up in front of the other, again and again, while each of you 
tries to realize the original intention which is to pass along. The scene may develop into an 
autonomous interaction with a life of its own, like chatting or flirting, where the participants (while 
updating their original intentions) still retain their autonomy.  “The dynamics of interaction” write 
De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2008) “are not simply the data that an individual must evaluate; they are an 
integral part of the evaluation process itself” (italics in the original) (p.44). “If one of the 
participants,” note Fantasia et al. (2014), “loses their autonomy, for the other it would be like 
interacting with an object or a tool, and thus not a social interaction anymore”. One can hear the 
echoes of psychoanalytic “third”, of Penelope’s loom, Pizer’s “building bridges”, Benjamin’s “doer-
done complementarities”, thinking of the narrow corridor in terms of relational configurations, and 
how our theories blend with our relational configurations. I think Cooperman vividly profiles the 
situation, saying that: “The patient comes to analysis with symptoms and the analyst comes to analysis 
with a theory. If things go well they each give up what they initially brought to analysis” (italics mine) 
(cited in Cooper, 2010; p.7).  
 
4.2.3 Theory as a Live Object of the Clinical Situation: From the 70s onwards, people in 
psychoanalysis were already discussing the unavoidable reduction of the complexity and the 
richness of the clinical process that theory entailed. The process is the “meeting and interacting of 
two real people in all its complex possibilities”, writes Guntrip (1975, p. 753). Theory wasn’t a major 
concern for him: “It is a useful servant but a bad master, liable to produce orthodox defenders of 
every variety of the faith. We ought always to sit light to theory…” (ibid., p.740). Wolstein, an 
Interpersonally trained analyst during the same period, started articulating his disbelief regarding 
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the importance of theory for the clinical practice. In a recent interview to Hirsch (2000), he vividly 
and with force expressed this attitude: “Interpretation's not live, lived experience … The true 
metapsychology? That's a crap shoot—put down your money. Let all therapists and patients believe 
their own: it's not the heart of psychoanalytic therapy, in any case” (emphasis and italics mine) (p.192). 
Levenson (2005), in ‘The Ambiguity of Change’ and ‘The Fallacy of Understanding’, starts pointing 
towards the need for to recognize the richness of the process beyond the confines of partial and 
sectional theories which obscure our vision at least as much as they widen it. It is no coincidence 
that Levenson was among the first who welcomed Chaos into analysis. This ‘light on theory’ climate 
spreading slowly into the psychoanalytic world devitalized the nerves of the strong grip of the 
metapsychological and especially the “structural” ambience, preparing for the emergence of 
Intersubjectivity, Relationality and Complexity.  Complexity is a meta-theory that comes both from 
the insides and the outsides of psychoanalysis. It is an adopted universal language that lets analysts 
talk with the rest of the psychotherapeutic world about things they have already named and felt in 
their own unique ways. Winnicott’s transitionality, Bion’s “without memory and desire” or the 
movement between “Ps <-> D”, Bromberg’s “standing in the spaces”, Willy and Madeleine 
Barangers’ “field” and numerous other signifiers have already pointed towards the ‘unnamed 
known’ of working at the edge of chaos.  
 
Canestri (2007) takes issue with Renik’s (2007) dislike for theory, emphasising that principles of 
technique are derived from theory. While this is partly true, I think that we really do not know the 
complex connections between theory and technical decisions. Besides, we use theory in a 
pretentious manner, granting to it an explanatory power that is arbitrary and unjustified. The most 
interesting aspect of our relationship to theory is the way that we use this abstract system in 
moment-to-moment interaction. What comes and goes in the analyst’s mind and how concepts and 
ideas selectively cue the perception and action of the analyst is the most complex matter. However, 
we are hardly able to think about it since we lack the relevant conceptual tools. Renik (2007) 
describes Intersubjectivism as “an increased appreciation of the epistemology of the clinical analytic 
encounter” (p. 1549). Canestri (2007) comments on Renik’s position that, from the epistemological 
point of view, the unit of analysis is the theory, not an encounter. I cannot disagree more with this 
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statement. I think the real problem under the psychoanalytic confusion of tongues is our inability to 
perceive theory as a live object. Theory is a process of re-describing and abstracting into patterns 
aspects of experience, and it cannot be considered apart from the autonomous and coupled thinking 
and interacting mind. At the heart of any epistemological question, there is the question of how the 
mind interacts with the world. The question of how we know things should always be addressed to 
the clinical moment. In this sense, Canestri’s position “confuses the map with the territory”. The 
epistemological question actually pertains to the encounter, not our abstractions.  
 
I think at this point, a twist towards the theme of “How Complexity Thinking Integrated Theories of 
Therapeutic Action” is important, by following the connecting threads and the porous fractal 
boundaries of concepts. Theories may suggest a ‘symptom-like’ conceptual space, where we often 
fail to absorb the paradox and the ambiguity that our own actions in the world reproduce, while 
constantly trying to untie knots. Most psychoanalytic complexity scholars, as will be evident in the 
next section of this Chapter, think that we continually interpret to absorb the ambiguity. Let us 
return to resistances mentioned in the previous theme and follow this process. Slavin and Kriegman 
(1998) arguably redefined resistance from an evolutionary adaptive function viewpoint. Resistance 
is the effort of the patient to protect himself from the influence of another whose interests may 
conflict with his own. This perspective decentres our thinking about resistance from bad introjects. 
One contemporary theoretical synthesis that approaches the matter of resistance from a multitude 
of perspectives is that of Knox (2010). Analyst and analysand may use language at different levels. 
In a battle between them, the analysand, operating at the teleological level, may need to have a real 
effect on the analyst since the symbolic function of language is lost or unstable. The analysand’s 
self-agency is compromised by an attitude where the analyst’s language conveys the message, but 
her behaviour (which is the only area where the patient expects something to happen) does not. 
Knox describes through this context several possible therapeutic impasses. Both Stern (2010) and 
Bromberg (2010) put more emphasis on the language of dissociation relating to resistance: “Only 
one side of the patient’s mouth can exist experientially at any given time … the patient’s 
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hippocampus and frontal cortex are not processing as conflict what is taking place between patient 
and analyst, the analyst’s use of conflict language widens the dissociative gap both interpersonally 
and within the self-state organization of the patient”. Davies (2004), Benjamin (1998) and Mitchell 
(1997) report similar clinical cases, presenting in their own way an overlapping descriptive and 
explanatory language with minor differences. They all belong to the Relational school of thought; 
they all use a ‘process’ language, and none of them attributes to the patient some ‘inner bad’ motive 
such as destructiveness, envy and sadism. In the analyst’s clinical work, I believe that these ‘small 
differences’ can make a huge difference. Before delving into Chaos and Complexity, I will simply cite 
Davies (2004) in a moment of ‘clinical thinking’:  
“My milk is good and nourishing; it will heal you,” says Karen's gesture. “Yes, your milk is 
good and nourishing and healing,” responds my action. I think of Harold Searles's (1979) 
belief that the patient needs to feel capable of healing the analyst. I think also of Thomas 
Ogden's (1994) description of “interpretive action” … I think here of Emmanuel Ghent’s 
(1992) notion of “object probing” … Of course, in these moments with Karen, I think of 
none of these things explicitly. It is not that I am aware of my eyebrows, my lips, or whether 
or not I drink or don't drink at a particular moment. Such movements are part of an 
unconscious psychoanalytic sensibility … But they speak along with our words” (emphasis 
and italics mine) (pp. 727-729) 
Theory ‘happens’ to the analyst’s imagination and, as Davies notes, it does not happen explicitly. 
Whose words, whose perspective (both similar but simultaneously different) will come to mind or 
will be implicitly brought forth? As these theories share many ‘elements’, in connectionist terms, 
activation will easily spread from one theory to another. But a connectionist understanding of the 
human mind, while dynamic, still remains a representational conception of the mind. Dynamic and 
complexity theories of the mind, at least those that leave aside any discourse on structures, 
understand this process as something that is less confined in a solipsistic Cartesian theatre of the 
mind. “I am not aware of my eyebrows”, says Davis, “they speak along with my words”. I add 
emphasis and italics, to magnify what I – following the thinking of many Complexity writers – believe 
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there is a causal connection here that often goes unnoticed. Lips, dancing sounds, eyebrow 
movements are ‘theories’ and ‘theories are muscle contractions’. Theories are shared cultures: the 
words of another person that acquire personal meaning may transform and remodel our bodies in 
no significantly different ways than Mayan family joint activities around the loom transform their 
girls’ knees to prepare them for looming, as Roggoff (2011) narrates. Moreover, the semantic 
content of our spoken words may be unimaginably disturbed by what Merleau-Ponty calls “style”. 
The implications for process research may be decisive, but I leave this thread hanging for the 
moment to follow a question that readily comes to mind when reading this literature: Why do we 
need so many similar but – at the same time - distinct and divergent narrations “around the fire” as 
Coburn mentions?  
 
All these accounts can be easily contained without creating conflict within the same internal 
framework, with no cognitive dissonance, nor need for the mind to ‘dissociate’. Do we need so much 
‘information’? The analysand’s resistance, says Almond (2003), will steer counter-resistance in the 
analyst, and the analysand’s regression will induce a countertransference regression in the analyst. 
If left uncontrolled, these forces and counterforces may become mutually destructive. The analyst 
can be ‘held’ by her theory to avoid traumatic levels of affective overstimulation. Through theory, 
the analyst can ‘see’ through this hyper-complex world. But theory, as Almond reminds us, is not a 
truth about the mind “but rather a lighthouse we use to orient ourselves on stormy, uncharted 
analytic seas” (pp.151). Theories, then, that have subtle conceptual differences while also having 
major similarities may suggest ‘lighthouses’ that are necessary for the contemporary analyst. They 
function as the safety net that holds her during clinical moments. If the analyst does not defend 
herself in a rigid manner, avoiding the ‘abyss of contextualism’ where the contemporary subject 
(the patient) loses his sense of agency, she will not be able to navigate the complex world the 
patient brings with him. Discussion of how analysts preconsciously hold metaphors, with 
conceptually contradictory elements, to navigate the clinical encounter is now widespread 
(Canestri, 2006; Canestri, 2012; Bohleber, 2012). Where we need to turn our attention to is how they 
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also hold metaphors with subtle conceptual differences that do not suggest an ‘anomalous’, 
ambiguous, paradoxical cohabitation. Analysts think and create within overlapping conceptual 
spaces urged not only by a personal drive, or a motive of several origins to think and create or a 
need to establish a group identity. They talk and write about clinical moments; they theorize and 
they disseminate perspectives as they themselves try to assimilate this hyper-complexity, the 
slipping dimensions of the encounter with another mind. If it is true that something is always lost in 
the interpretation, then this reiteration is meaningful. 
 
As ‘connections’ increase in our world, infinity has an increasingly disturbing effect on our questions 
and, interdisciplinarity represents a possible answer to this destabilisation. Agency becomes more 
fragile. It is not that our world ‘was’ less relational a hundred years ago, it is just that we now need 
this metaphor in order to navigate the world. The metaphor is widespread. Irun Cohen (2000), for 
example, has changed the way we view the immune system: there are no essentialist distinctions 
between self and non-self cells for the immune system, and everything finds meaning in context. 
Metaphors move like nomads between fields. Neuman (2008) turned to Pierce, Bateson and 
Bakhtin’s dialogism to make a theory where the DNA is not an essentialist language with inscribed 
meanings. Meaning is created in context and at the boundaries between organization and 
disorganization. Organisms are irreversible dynamic systems that assemble themselves. This 
assemblage is a meaning-making process where different perspectives are brought together to 
achieve a specific response. Neuman calls this process ‘symmetry restoration’.  
 
This fusion of perspectives brings to mind Sander’s ‘coupled oscillations’. Sander (2002) says that 
when the rhythms of two oscillating systems couple, the energy is free to flow and a transformation 
is possible where new information is generated. This is a Winnicotian transitional poem, a Sternian 
‘moment of meeting’. Imagine for a moment what Mitchell did in his outburst as a symmetry 
restoration. But what is really intriguing in how Neuman regards assemblage is vulnerability to loss 
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of information; interpretation necessarily means loss of information and is always a contextual 
response. Bromberg (2011) discussing Frost, a poet, writes: “It is also what is lost in interpretation”! 
What a find for a psychoanalytic writer who believes that the concept of interpretation is in need of 
serious revisiting” (p.2). Unfortunately, Bromberg here leaves his thought suspended; he does not 
tell us why he finds this loss of information meaningful. What struck me as important in my analytic 
work with complexity literature is this evolving understanding of interpretation not as a presence 
but as an absence. It is not simply that people are not discussing interpretation as such anymore, it 
is this unnamed and still un-signified or under-theorized emphasis on what is missing in the effort to 
bring things together, at once and in a row. Thinking of interpretation not as a presence but as an 
absence, resistance acquires a new meaning. Knox discusses it as language operating at different 
developmental levels. Stern and Bromberg view it as a co-constructed avoidance of what is 
unformulated. What interpretations ‘do’ in the ‘third’ is directly affect the organization of swarms 
of elements into patterns that the patient does not find meaningful and so resists. All these theories 
circle around the same matter, approaching the interpretation of resistance from a similar 
perspective try to incorporate something that has been left behind.  
 
 
4.2.4 Working at the Edge of Chaos: Self-Organization, Emergence and Novelty 
Jaenicke (2011) notes that if therapist’s views are too similar to that of the patient, the therapist may 
wrongly hypothesize that he understands the patient. If views are too dissimilar, then the therapist 
may fail or refuse to understand the patient.  Networks, complex adaptive systems (CAS) and minds 
have something in common. Bound, they ‘feel’ the dread of deadness. Unbound, they ‘feel’ the 
dread of annihilation. Freedom develops at the ‘edge’. The “edge of chaos” is for a system the 
“situation most pregnant with the possibility for change” (Ghent, 2002, p.769), it is “this critical 
edge between unbridled disorder and stagnant stability” (Marks-Tarlow, 2008, p. 189), “the phase 
space transition between frozen and fluid states” (Palombo, 2007, p.11). Order, periodicity, 
“[r]egularity and sameness suggest a deadly rigidity that bars growth” (Marshall, 2011, p.71). The 
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edge of chaos is the movement from this “diphasic zone which…protects the psyche from greater 
disorganization by organizing chaos” (Quinodoz, 1997, p.713), the paranoid-schizoid position, 
towards the depressive which “exhibits the characteristics of a complex system with a high degree 
of organisation and integration, capable of flexibly absorbing perturbations without a significant 
threat to its stability” (ibid; p.712). It is the movement from things kept apart at the personal and 
the interpersonal level to avoid conflict, towards the absorption of paradox and ambiguity; from 
things contradictory, that are displaced and evacuated, towards things contradictory, that become 
well-tolerated and ambivalently held together. The edge of chaos is the “window of opportunity for 
emergence” (Goldstein, 2007; p.124). “Whereas ordinary change is a gradual change taking place 
within a particular attractor, radical change corresponds to the emergence of new attractor(s) 
taking place at bifurcations” (ibid; p.125).  
 
Piers (2005) illustrates the process of movement into chaos by applying it within the context of a 
simple logistic equation such as the following: xn = r xn-1 (1 – xn – 1), a reasoning similar to Liebovich 
et al.’s model of influence and inertia. In the terms of this equation, xn is the patient’s subjective 
state, the control parameter r represents the analyst’s affective attunement, xn-1 represents the 
previous subjective state of the patient, while the term (1-xn-1) represents the patient’s 
defensiveness. As the value of the control parameter increases (that is, the analyst’s affective 
attunement in this case) the system moves towards the first bifurcation point (that is, the 
emergence of new attractor basins - see figure 1). Continuing to increase the value of the control 
parameter, the ordered moves into disorder, and even more new attractor basins emerge. All 
possible xn values fall under a certain phase space, where each point in this space represents the 
patient’s subjective state for a certain value of the control parameter. The white areas after each 
bifurcation point represent packets of regular and periodic activity which reappear as aperiodicity 
increases. A period doubling pushes the system harder into chaos as the control parameter 
increases and then the system “snaps back or self-organizes into periodic behaviour” once again 










Figure 1: Bifurcation logistic map1 
Kelso (1995) studied phase transition processes in motor control experiments which may give us a 
very concrete feeling of the phase transition at bifurcation points. If you try to move your two index 
fingers coupled at a coordinated pace but in anti-phase movement (figure 22) you will notice that at 
low frequencies the oscillation pattern remains almost stable, while as you increase the speed 














Kelso studied the transition in horse movement patterns from walking to canter to galloping, where 
in each phase transition several patterns mix together. Kelso’s examples are really illustrative, but 
how do these moments at the edge of chaos and the bifurcations feel for the clinician?  How does 
pure chaos itself feel for the clinician? 
 
“At the threshold of change”, “a pattern every clinician knows”, writes Marks-Tarlow (2008), 
develops, which is best illustrated by the “clinical cliché: ‘one step forward, two steps back’ “(p.34). 
Bifurcations, after Prigogine, are often referred as “symmetry breaking”. Aron (2006) imagines 
them as the breaking of a Benjaminian complementarity, a linear “doer-done” seesaw. “Once she 
could take a step to the side, outside of the ‘push me-pull you’ tug of war with her patient,” writes 
Aron discussing a supervisory session, “other relational positions became immediately available to 
her. Thinking and feeling within the newly created triangular space allowed her to shift from the 
limiting structure of a polarizing flat line to a space with possibility and depth” (p. 355). Kay, Bonn’s 
patient (2010), floods the session with questions about her children, addressed to an idealized 
therapist. Bonn consciously decides to change her “educative” attitude and Kay responds with 
anxiety: “[T]he horizons of the system expand and explode at each bifurcation point” (ibid.; p.7). “I 
continued to point out that Kay's focus on her children precluded her from being aware of thoughts 
that reflected her longings. I wondered if she had ever felt herself to exist inside someone else's 
mind as firmly as she felt her children existed inside hers. Hearing this, she paused in wide-eyed 
silence with quiet tears flowing down her face. This led me to explore and interpret the danger of a 
life where if Kay paid attention to her needs and feelings, trouble was certain to follow” (ibid.; p.11).  
 
The dense, serried dotted red area in figure 1 is full of bifurcations, where the little white spaces 
signify the return of periodicity. Margy Sperry (2011) writes:  
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“It was several months before I experienced John as receptive to my participation 
in the sessions. Initially, my varying attempts to contribute to the dialogue only 
intensified John's argumentative rages. Frustrated and increasingly reluctant to 
expose myself to his criticism, I began to refrain from commenting on his fears and 
vulnerabilities, or from interpreting his demands. When I ventured a remark, I tried 
to do so from an empathic perspective; but as soon as he protested, I did not 
comment further. After a few months, I noted a shift in our interactions” (p. 90).  
This was just a gradual change, even if a bifurcation point – Sperry does not mention it as such - 
periodicity returned. During the next months, John gradually began to realize that he was 
desperately trying to compensate for his failure to “be great”. “Simultaneously, his reactivity to 
misattunements was even more pronounced, as was his sensitivity to my “imperfections.” He 
highlighted grammatical errors and exposed gaps in my knowledge of English literature. To him, I 
was the epitome of a “bloody American”” (p.91). It was only after the system experienced a lot of 
such gradual changes, where the analysts efforts were catapulted by the matrix and only little 
gradual changes appeared, that “the dyadic capacity to adapt to influence with less rigidity fully 
emerged” (ibid;. p.92):  
 In the midst of one of his rages, I spontaneously interrupted him and in a very firm 
voice stated, “John! May I say something? I'd like to comment, but you're not 
allowing me to speak. If you want me to remain silent, I'll do so. But let's be clear—
you're choosing that rather than allowing me to respond!” I am not sure who was 
more stunned. I braced myself for the rage I knew would follow. John was silent for 
a moment. Then he glared. Looking me directly in the eye, John pointed at me, and 
emphatically said, “This better be good!”… I could not help it. I burst into 
laughter… It took him a moment to recover before he started laughing” (ibid; p.92).  
The rage she “knew would follow” lost its road at a real bifurcation point. Sperry does not tell us if 
this treatment delved into pure chaos, but had it done so, she would certainly have mentioned it. 
The pure chaos is something much more pronounced and difficult for both patient and analyst. 
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Milner (1969), before the emergence of a complexity language in psychoanalysis, named it “chaos” 
in The Hands of the Living Gods:  
“Certainly, some patients seemed to be aware, dimly or increasingly, of a force in them 
to do with growth, growth towards their own shape, also as something that seemed 
to be sensed as driving them to break down false inner organizations which do not 
really belong to them; something which can also be deeply feared, as a kind of creative 
fury that will not let them rest content with a merely compliant adaptation; and also 
feared because of the temporary chaos it must cause when the integrations on a false 
basis are in process of being broken down in order that a better one may emerge” 
(emphasis and italics mine) (pp. 384–385). 
Ghent (1990), in an article in which he does not mention Complexity, describes it as a surrender of 
the defensive hyperstructure, which may frighten many analysts “viewing it as either depression or 
withdrawal or even a heralding of psychosis” (p.219). He quotes Eigen:  
“It was as though a reaction to the over-stimulating pleasure orientation had begun 
to set in. … The practical-social milieu was viewed increasingly as lacking in crucial 
respects and discounted as a place one could want to take root in. Neither people nor 
things seemed any longer to offer the promise, pleasure or satisfaction ‘similar’ 
patients just some years before had compulsively sought. … The process took place 
‘blindly’ and was often frightening. Most generally, patients felt they were being 
drawn down out of the world as though by a magnet towards a sense of self they 
knew they had at bottom. … Often a state of seemingly endless, painful emptiness 
preceded the clear experiencing of this I-kernel.” (ibid; p.219).  
“Chaos, which represents the drift toward entropy, also represents the breakdown in organization 
and/or coherence” writes Grotstein (1990). “In human systems we can understand chaos, first as 
the natural drift from or the outer edge of coherence, and second as the default toward psychotic, 
helter-skelter randomness. In all probability psychosis is randomness, or at least it is the result of 
the mind's inability to order its randomness and/or to maintain and to regenerate its structures” 
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(p.384). In Catch Them Before They Fall, Bollas (2013) does not deal with chaos and complexities, 
although he beautifully describes this uncontrollable movement into the “too many roads to travel” 
of the striated bifurcated space, “this disease that promotes itself as a cure” (p.73), the pure space 
of chaos. He describes psychotic breakdowns which are “held” by all-day sessions, and, which 
suggest a “paradoxical gestalt: a moment of self-fragmentation is, at the same time, a moment of 
coming together inside the self” (p.69). It may appear as: 
 “a psychotic democratization in which the hierarchy of meaning is lost. One idea is as 
significant as the next. Without such a hierarchical order the self is without a mental 
rudder; there is only one direction and that is circular. A psychotic vicious circle is 
established in which the person goes endlessly round and round and round. Sometimes 
they may feel that they have grasped something, but nothing is retained and no 
understanding is achieved” (p.29).  
The patient’s internal world may end up as: 
“a disparate group of people who do not know one another and can, therefore, have 
no coordinated, collective thought process. In a matter of days, this can lead to psychic 
dehydration, the drying up of mental life. The self is now just a voice. Thoughts emerge 
at a fast pace but with no life behind them except for repeated, urgent pleas for help” 
(ibid; p.30).  
Palombo (2007), talking about the form and quality of free associations, notes: “[i]n the chaotic 
realm, the patient's productions are neither deterministic nor predictable. No pattern is discernible 
in them, even in retrospect” (p. 9). The patient is flooding the analyst with unworkable material. Far 
from the edge of chaos, “in the realm of frozen order, the patient's productions are deterministic 
and predictable” (p.9). They are predictable, since the patient’s responses are known, expected, 
stereotyped and limited, while Palombo believes they are also deterministic since we can 
understand in retrospect where did they came from. At the edge of chaos, things previously 
disconnected start connecting themselves. Patients bring in new material that creates a new 
context from previously little-understood material. “Patients in psychoanalysis,” writes Palombo, 
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“especially in the early stages, may not appreciate the adaptive value of working toward the edge 
of chaos” (ibid; p.9). The edge may be frightening and patients may actively avoid it, while “trains 
of associations become longer and better connected. Finer and finer distinctions appear between 
emotionally similar events. The therapeutic ecosystem becomes stabilized nearer the edge of 
chaos” (ibid; p.9). At the edge, one association leads in an unpredictable way to another; the 
branching of associations feels meaningful, and the patient talks about things normally difficult for 
him to open and discuss, while his thinking “converges with that of the analyst” and “resistance is 
normally overcome” (ibid; p.10).  
 
Obviously, then, the language of Complexity paradoxically is and is not an extra-psychoanalytic 
language. It does not feel uncanny. It does feel alien but not strange, as if it is something very 
familiar with a different name. Why was this loan important for analysts? They already had a process 
language; their literature was already full of stories narrated “around the nighttime fire”. I think it 
was an attractive story because it helped analysts move away from using a language of mechanisms 
and structures and instead describing the clinical situation in experiential terms. Reviewing the 
previous chapter one can easily notice that analysts were always emphasising this closeness to the 
experiential dimension right from the start. Working with transferences necessarily involves 
working with the immediate material of experience. Reviewing the previous chapter under this 
light, one can see the ubiquity of experience in every turn of psychoanalytic theory. Ferenzsci’s 
“playful attitude”, Reich and Fenichel’s call to “work from the surface towards the depth”, 
Heimmann’s plea to “make impulses conscious at the moment they arise”, Pick’s “mental states 
which seek out other mental state”, Racker’s “synchronic oscillations”: all these suggest calls to pay 
special attention to experience.  What Complexity brought into analysis was a new awareness that 
an understanding of the structure of experience may not be the necessary ingredient of change; we 
may grow through experience per se, not through understanding. Aisenstein’s “expansion of the 
field of thought” transforms into the “expansion of consciousness”, which is qualitatively different 
since it involves a dyadic interpenetration of consciousnesses. The “procedural” discourse on 
therapeutic change expands, whether theorists come from a Complexity background or not. Fonagy 
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(1991) and Gabbard and Westen (2002) are examples of such an expansion, originating in classical 
representational cognitive psychological terms and talking about procedural memories. For 
Complexity theorists, this procedural element acquires more and more the nature of a bottom-up 
process. Action in the relational field coordinates the shifting of attention and attention, as Pincus 
(2015) notes, is the breath of consciousness; it expands and contracts the field of experience. 
Complexity pushes towards an amplification of our attention to the immediacy of the process and 
















4.3 Shifting Phases and Connecting: Themes Emerging in the In-Depth Analytic Phase  
 
Instead of a summary of the ideas discussed in the previous section, I will introduce a “metaphoric 
machine” that connects the threads to this one and the next Chapter, taking the lead from the 
previous paragraph. Reviewing the psychological and philosophical literature on attention, Watzl 
(2012) concludes that it is unlikely that we will ever pick up the nature of attention at the sub-
personal level; we need an anti-reductionist model. Allport (1993) had already mentioned that it is 
highly unlikely that attention operates on the grounds of particular processes, it should be better 
interpreted as a whole-organism state occurring from the interaction of control mechanisms across 
the brain. Mole (2011) in Attention is Cognitive Unison, takes the challenge by Allport and proposes a 
further shift of perspective. Thinking attention in terms of cause-and-effect places it in the wrong 
metaphysical category, attention is rather a way according to which cognitive processes are inter-
related, its nature is adverbial. Watzl makes another interesting phenomenological hypothesis, the 
role of attention is Structuring; some things come to the foreground of mental life, and others go 
to the background. He mentions the examples of writing a book or raising a child. The implications 
of his account for the relationships between agency and consciousness are profound as he 
mentions. If attention is the structuring: of the immediate phenomenological-perceptual field, of 
our whole mental life and the way mental processes inter-relate to structure this field, then 
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Figure 3. African fractal village (architectural diagram of Mokulek in Cameroon (From Ron Eaglash’s website, 







Figure 4. Concentric (separation in relation) and Diametric (relation in separation) structures of relation. 
Adapted from Downes (2012).  
Instead of talking then about attention, I will introduce Downes’ (2012) primordial structuring of 
experience according to two modes-structures of relations, a concentric and a diametric (Figure 4). 
Downes finds these relational structures in Levi-Strauss’s anthropological studies. Throughout the 
thesis, several concepts will be introduced that will make this “metaphoric machine” more 
meaningful. In Eaglash’s diagram (Figure 3) one can observe the concentric spaces where any 
distinction emerges without losing its contact with the centre, a “separation in relation” and the 
spaces of diametric relation, like the bigger circles that are more ‘related in separation” and start 
losing their concentric attraction. In the next chapter I will argue that the mind emerges from a 
separation in relation mode; however, our ability to make distinctions requires the close interaction 
of both modes. As the mind grows, parts of the mind start relating diametrically. Imagine growth, 
however, not only as the development of the ground base but as an off-ground growth as well from 
the very first moments of life, and which suggests the field of experience.  
 
As Brandom (2010) notes rationality is not about labelling but describing, bringing the world into 
expressions in the space of implications, where compounding operators (negation and 
conditionals) treat one classification as providing a reason for or against another. Wittgenstein 
	 133	
(1969) arguably notes that: “[w]hen we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a 
single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)” 
(p.149). There can be no single distinction; it is like clapping with one hand (ibid.). The structuring of 
experience brings several elements to the foreground while it is concurrently structured at several 
levels of backgrounding according to how the foreground elements are ‘implicated’ in the ‘space of 
implications’. We may consider now any mental state as the structuring of experience that brings 
some elements to the foreground retaining statuses of connection to several backgrounding 
stratums in the space of implications. As any constellation emerges on the foreground, the fabric of 
the world unfolds and enfolds as Merlau-Ponty (1968) mentions. Now, if we supplement this 
understanding with an understanding of the intersubjective system as two interpenetrating 
horizons of experience that create a third overlapping space, we can put some of the concepts 
encountered in the previous section into perspective. The expansion of consciousness presupposes 
the expansion of the background space, or the bringing of elements of experience that are 
'diametric/related-in-separation' to a concentric relation, a fractalization of the boundaries in the 
space of implications. Bringing the absent into presence – through interpretation, conceptually in 
theory by elaborating in the multiplicity of subtle differences, or as a live object of the field -  means 
that access is provided in distinctions and backgrounding distinctions at several levels that were 
previously impossible. Working at the edge of chaos means opening the boundaries of the mind to 
lost levels of the backgrounding. The reader may now enter into the next section more prepared to 
bring together: a Complexity understanding of therapeutic action as the expansion of 
consciousness; the dynamic-process brain theories, Neurodynamics’ non-structure of personality 
but regularly occurring patterns, Edelman’s pre-existing variability and selection of states, Piers 
unconscious attitude like transition rules in the algorithmic development; pathological mental 
states as dynamic invariants; attractors as the backgrounding of the space of implications. 
 
The psychoanalytic Complexity literature is full of experience, and the mental states and the 
mechanisms language remodel into a language of experience. Synchronicity, coordination and 
coupling are ubiquitous, as is this constant process of adjusting and matching, of moving towards a 
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shared known, named and recognizable environment, a shared Umwelt. People try to find meaning 
in their shared experience by picking up slices of these experiences; they constantly sample to 
confirm their expectations about other people and the world around them while concurrently 
avoiding and looking out for something unusual that may shake their convictions. Scaling, at the 
level of empathy, the level of word meanings and the dimensions of experiences seems to be the 
most needed and at the same time the most unstable achievement. The language of experience, 
the ubiquity of synchronicity and coordination, the shifting states (the thin and delicate slicing and 
sampling of experience) and the scaling for meaning-making, suggest the four main themes which 
construct the Complexity story I have read in the literature surrounding the subject. Several sub-
themes emerge as connecting threads that organize these themes into a coherent story.  
 
4.3.1 The Language of Experience: The psychoanalytic language of Complexity becomes more 
experiential in several ways. It marks the explanatory less than the phenomenological in the 
description of the clinical process. It emphasises the specificity of each therapeutic dyad, 
downplaying the role of theory. It emphasises sloppiness in the process and moment-to-moment 
productivity. It interpersonalizes conflict, while it highlights the quality of engagement as 
emergent in the process. The most important way that this language becomes experiential, though, 
is the emerging emphasis on the experiential flow as the geyser of change, thinking and 
understanding. 
 
Looking for the etymological roots of the words Reality and Experience in the Oxford English 
Dictionary revealed that ‘reality’ comes from the Latin word res, meaning ‘matter’, or better ‘thing’, 
while ‘experience’ traces its origins from the Latin experiri meaning ‘try’. To ‘try things out’ 
translates then into the experience of reality, a fact that comes as almost no surprise. But the reality 
of an experience is symmetrically translated into the ‘thing’ of a trial, or better the ‘matter’ of an 
experiment. Experience is always about something, but things are always made, recycled, 
discarded, transformed. The possibilities are not endless; you cannot make anything out of 
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something else, even if you can always make something new out of something else by trying. The 
psychoanalytic language of Complexity tries to move things away from their ‘material’ dimension 
into their moment of transformation. Marks-Tarlow (2008) quotes a personal communication with 
Brenner:  
“[I]mmediate experience is like melted wax in that once it comes out it begins to harden 
and cool. As it cools it becomes more and more rigid, from association, to loose metaphor, 
to solid metaphor, to theory, and so on. Culture is divided as to where people tend to 
reside in relation to immediate experience, depending on what kind of anxiety they are 
most comfortable with, perhaps . . . Wolstein wonders if a metaphor exists which can 
move with experience, and so do I. Can such a metaphor be constructed or as I suspect, 
must it create itself as highly flexible to approach the unique, unpredictable dynamics that 
emerge out of the present moment?” (p. 109). 
There is a deep and profound continuity between working at the edge of chaos and the emerging 
language of experience in psychoanalytic Complexity literature. This is what most Complexity 
writers are doing, as the reader may already have noticed through the descriptions in the Working 
at the Edge section; they try to move their stories closer to the melted, to make them almost live 
objects of the flow. The moving and the emoting body are vividly described; the explanatory comes 
second after the phenomenological.   
 
I will try to construct a metaphor that strives to remain at equal distance from the melted experience 
and the solid theory and which may help us to exemplify this movement from the explanatory to 
the phenomenological discourse. The metaphor I propose is a variation of the “gorilla” selective 
inattentional blindness experiment3 (Simons & Chabris, 1999). This is an interesting experiment 
showing the powers of focused attention in the selective perceptual construction of a scene, in our 
																																								 																				
3	The Videos used in their research are publicly available on their website: http://www.theinvisiblegorilla.com/videos.html 
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inability to detect changes and discrete perceptual entities that exist beyond the focus of our 
attention. What the experimenters do not discuss is that this selective attention puzzle can be 
equally interpreted as a ‘joint attention’ puzzle. If the players were upset by the gorilla, we would 
all be upset. We were pushed to avoid the gorilla. If the players had sent us even a slight ‘sign’ that 
they had noticed something unusual, the gorilla would have been noticed. One can use exactly the 
same visual material to show the powers of social referencing, how children make meaning of the 
stimuli in the world by taking information from their parents’ reactions to these stimuli. Obviously, 
the experimenters created their own puzzle and they solved it, and their conclusions make sense 
within the context they use. However, if we are talking about joint attention, then we are involved 
in another puzzle.  
 
 ‘How does the eye see itself?” asks Stern (2010), and he answers through the creation of an inner 
conflict. The eye sees itself when one self-state is in conflict with another. Therapists value freedom 
more than safety, concludes Stern. There is no such thing as a detached perch, like Sterba’s self-
observing ego, from where one can unobtrusively observe the patient’s and one’s own relational 
configurations play the game. Let us decontextualize the gorilla experiment and imagine it as a non-
competitive ball game where the two teams are playing both a game of their own and a shared 
game exchanging passes in the same field. The game can take any form; it may end up as a 
competitive game, as an emergent absorption into creativity, or as a game that finds its rules during 
the play process. It is a game between the relational configurations of the patient and either the 
analyst or other people in the patient’s life. The gorillas in both groups are players who remain 
unnoticed for their respective group. Due to each groups players’ “joint attentional conventions”, 
they remain the “unthought known” of the field. From a traditional psychoanalytic viewpoint, the 
analyst observes the patient’s players and comments. The field, on the other hand, is not distanced; 
players and the patient’s ego, as the team coach, listen to the comments and are affected by what 
is said. An object-relational, like a TFP therapist believes that her theory ‘knows’ and helps her 
construct a viable hypothesis on why the players in each group split and play the way they do.  It is 
her theory and her previous experience that gives her this necessary distance from immediate 
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experience. The analyst comments on how the patient directs attention to a group of players ruling 
the game each time and on how he identifies with them. The analyst believes her comments relax 
the analysand’s biases towards some subgroups and constellations. Working through several cycles 
of interactions, she believes she can teach the patient how to coach the players. During the process, 
she closely follows how the patient relates to her comments – the relationship to the interpretation.  
 
The Relational, Intersubjective, Complexity puzzle is different. There is no such perch. The coaches 
are part of the group. A player or a number of players from the analyst’s group take some distance 
and talk with a player or a number of players from the patient’s group. Interpretation here is always 
something provisional. It is the way the analyst’s players relate to themselves, the patient’s players 
and the abandoned players, and the understanding that gradually develops or the changes that 
suddenly emerge in both groups, that is particularly significant. The gorilla in the Relational puzzle 
is the actively avoided, the selectively unattended; no one wants to know about his presence on the 
field. Imagine now that players in one or both of the groups who show more or less rigid patterns 
of organizing the game end up in ‘attractors’ that control the flow of the team’s behaviour into a 
lack of assertiveness, or massive dependence on the other group or distancing and competitiveness. 
As the game unfolds; some understanding of the patterns builds up and some new configurations 
emerge. Understanding of and changes within the flow of the game do not have linear relationships; 
the one may support or hinder the other. In this scenario, interpretation is something dynamic; it 
develops as the game unfolds; it always builds on unstable and partial insights; it is not directly 
translated to expected changes. Insight is more like a recognition of the boundaries of the 
configurations and patterns emerging in the field, and interpretation is more like action in the field 
that pushes towards the creation of new attractors. The boundaries between the explanatory and 
the phenomenological discourse utterly blur in this understanding of the process. The ‘players’ are 
actually the shifting experiential states. The “passing thought is the thinker”, as William James had 
it (quoted in Knox, 2010). Thoughts pass and exchange passes, not only in the intra-mental but in 
the inter-mental as well, and shifting states are observed and have an impact. The analyst is called 
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by Fajardo (2000) to direct her attention to these transitions in states of mind or breaks in 
consciousness. 
 
In the psychoanalytic Complexity literature, it is the context that organizes the elements. Relational 
configurations always move into either the background or the foreground according to the context. 
The context can “amplify or dampen personality patterns” (Selngman, 2005; p, 302). Transference 
has both a repetitive and a developmental dimension (Stollorow, Atwood & Orange, 2002). Ghent 
(2002) notes that experience is organized around two poles: a need for consistency and coherence, 
which is expressed as the repetitive dimension of transference and resistance, and a need for 
growth, for the expansion of consciousness at the danger of disruption, which is experienced as 
movement towards wholeness, the true self, the personal idiom. Between the two, the repetitive 
and the developmental, the expansive and the coherent, there is an ongoing tension. The role of 
the analyst is to create the context that allows growth ensuring safety, to hold the system in its 
turbulent shifts. “[E]ach analytic pair develops in its own way without much explicit planning about 
how things should go” (Selingman, 2005; p.292). Bacal and Carlton (2011) turns this uniqueness of 
the process into a theory: “Specificity theory as a process theory shifts our focus from a designated 
response as the sine qua non of psychoanalytic cure to a process that seeks to discover within each 
dyad that which might be healing . . . we do not know how we may optimally be with [the patient] 
therapeutically from moment to moment, until we discover this through the unfolding specificity of 
our process” (p.15).  
 
“For Molly, my every move was, at best, inept; and, at worst, aimed at destroying her. Regardless 
of how I framed my thoughts, she experienced me as relentlessly seeking out and exposing her 
flaws” notes VanDerHeide (2009; p.436). Her therapist’s admiration felt as patronizing. Attempts 
by her therapist to understand how she experienced her world and organized these experiences 
were felt as blameful and critical. Countless hours in supervision were not enough to move the 
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treatment along. A strange coincidence was enough to do the job. “After a brief silence, I said, ‘You 
know, this is the strangest coincidence, but my grandmother died last night, and all I could think of 
was, ‘ding dong the witch is dead’.’ Molly's mouth literally dropped open. ‘You didn't like her?’ she 
asked. There was no way of predicting that my statement would have that kind of effect” (emphasis 
and italics added; ibid; p.437). “Such recognition is usually given sotto voce, shared, as it were, in 
hallways between trusted colleagues—” You won’t believe what was crucial for this patient!!”” 
(Bacal & Carlton, 2011; p.51). Molly underwent a dramatic change; she started accepting her feelings 
and needs as valid. “Nonlinearity removes the illusion of certainty from our interactions” 
(VanDerHeide, 2009; p.438), small, seemingly unimportant events may open the fork.  
 
“The three moments of spontaneity and surprise I describe with my patient,” writes Taerk (2002) 
“breached the rules of interaction that the analytic dyad had established. Each of these violations 
of expectancy had led to a sudden and dramatic shift in the intersubjective terrain” (p. 735).  “Such 
moments, “afford access to the implicit relational domain and thereby have mutative potential. 
Often they require no interpretation or verbal explication” (ibid; p.730). Many writers of 
psychoanalytic Complexity literature emphasise that we grow through experience, that 
understanding is part of the process, but also that one cannot not immediately see the connections 
to change. At the same time, while the connections between change and a new experience seem 
often more immediate and pronounced, all authors argue for a cautious reading of this immediate 
relationship. Pizer (1998b) notes that “while analytically ‘informative experiences’ are not 
‘corrective emotional experiences’ in a simple sense, in a paradoxical sense they are” (p.66). Pizer 
talks about mutual engagement, reciprocal influence and shared expanding awareness that, help the 
patient negotiate the paradox that the analyst is both a new and an old object.  
 
The rage that Sperry knew “would follow” lost its way at the opening of the fork; Taerk reports a 
similar experience. Van der Heide and Bacal and Carlton express their surprise at what finally proves 
	 140	
to be the change kick for their patients. The examples are numerous in psychoanalytic Complexity 
literature. Surprise is the rule, not the exception. At this point, I would rather make an important 
clarification: the language of experience, as I read it in the Complexity literature, does not slope into 
a language of consciousness. It is a language of surprise, of the unexpected, of the emergent 
developments which give a new direction to the system; but it is not only that. Moments that seem 
to mark this movement towards the experiential can be found in the work of Complexity pioneers 
like Daniel Stern and the members of the Boston Change Process Study Group (BCPSG), as well in 
the work of Stolorow, Atwood and Orange. In Worlds of Experience, Stolorow, Atwood and Orange 
(2002) make a preliminary effort to define the shape of this new language. Its most defining feature 
is that it strives to suggest a “radical alternative to Cartesian” mentalism. “The human being cannot 
be reduced to a particular case of a diagnosis, nor human experience to a particular case of a so-
called mechanism of defence” (p.35-36). The most striking shift must come “in the rejection of ‘clear 
and distinct’ ideas in the favor of the complexity, nonlinearity” (p.36). “The experiential world can 
only fleetingly be the world of logic and reason” (ibid; p.36). “[T]he representationalism of Cartesian 
thinking gives way to a dialogic (not dyadic), participatory, perspectival, and hermeneutic concept 
of understanding. To understand a person, we cannot enter that person’s mind, catalog its mental 
furniture (ideas, affects, and fantasies), and write a case report” (ibid; p.37). “In this sense, our lived 
lives, experienced, investigated, and understood over time, are their own shortest description” 
writes Coburn (2014; p.50). They can be witnessed (Orange, 2011), but not represented, and at best 
compressed into a narrative.  
 
This brings to mind Rodney Brooks’ (1991) change of paradigm in artificial intelligence, saying that 
“the world is the best model of its own self”, that machines do not need to represent, plan and then 
act, but merely act and relate. In contemporary Evolutionary Robotics, it is obvious that reverse 
engineering of behaviours emergent from simple rules in complex environments is almost 
impossible (Vargas et al., 2014). The social domain “is a kind of amplifier of the sophistication, 
intelligence, and complexity of the evolved behaviours in mobile robots” (ibid; p.10). Some higher 
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mental functions can only be developed in a social context, even for machines. However, machines 
are not concerned – to use Hans Jonas’ expression – about their environments. “The great 
contradictions which man discovers in himself;” writes Jonas (quoted in Thompson, 2007) “freedom 
and necessity, autonomy and dependence, self and world, relation and isolation, creativity and 
mortality—have their rudimentary traces in even the most primitive forms of life, each precariously 
balanced between being and not-being, and each already endowed with an internal horizon of 
'transcendence'” (p.129). A living and a dead cell may be composed of exactly the same biological 
material. Explaining Jonas’s “needful freedom”, Thompson writes: “Every organism enacts a lifeline 
and thus is marked by a kind of freedom in relation to the materiality of the world. An organism's 
identity is not bound to its material constitution, for this constitution is constantly renewed; its 
identity is accomplished dynamically at a formal level. Yet with this freedom comes a correlative 
necessity: the organism has to change; stasis is impossible” (p. 152)’. “This is the antinomy of 
freedom at the roots of life and in its most elementary form, that of metabolism" says Jonas (in 
Thompson, 2007; p.152). “In observing other creatures struggling to continue their existence—
starting with bacteria that actively swim away from a chemical repellent,” (p.163), writes Thompson. 
‘How interesting’, I think reading this sentence, is Jonas life-mind continuity thesis and how 
beautifully captures the process of Stern’s “unformulated experience”, which notably lies at the 
core of Stolorow, Atwood and Orange conception of the unconscious. Machines may build skills 
from the ground up, and dynamic systems concepts and mathematical tools may describe these 
processes. But machines are not concerned about their environments; they do not move away from 
things they find dangerous, repellent, or obtrusive. Machines do not construct experience from the 
ground up; they construct skills and behaviours. They do not develop into organisms that enact a 
world where distancing seems protective, even if not consciously and agentively chosen, or where 
dependence seems comfortable and intentionally enacted even if not consciously selected.  
 
In the article that enlightened psychoanalysts regarding Complexity, Thelen (2005) explains that an 
infant’s stepping reflex never disappears; it continues to exist in water, where gravity is lessened, 
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and is merely constrained by the infant’s leg weight and its strength. As this ratio changes, the 
coordination between organism and environment changes, and stepping reappears as a skill. Leg 
weight and length are the control parameters which regulate the sudden emergence of a 
qualitatively different motor behaviour (Thelen & Smith, 1994). “There is no part of the mind that 
exists apart from the influence of the other,” posits Stern (2010; p.170). Experience for each member 
of a dyad is generated in a field where forces may be more elusive than gravity and muscle forces, 
but constraints in the field regulate the flow of experience and the relational configurations which 
move into the foreground or the background. The gravitational pull of perfection and self-
enhancement coming from an analysand may require the counter-resistance, a ‘counterforce’ 
experiential state in the analyst, of feeling fewer warm, accepting and admiring feelings, in order 
for both agents to retain their autonomy into this independently developing third space.  
 
Ron is a very bright, middle-aged professional who seeks analysis with Donnel Stern (2010). He 
manages to avoid being openly angry and dissatisfied; an unshakeable politeness is the usual way 
of presenting himself. One and a half years into analysis, and Stern finds himself dreading sessions 
with Ron. “[H]e frequently told me that my skill was inadequate and that I was not warm enough in 
manner … There was a continuous and subtle suggestion that his virtue was notable, especially 
when compared to others—and I felt that “others” in this case certainly included me” (p.174). 
“Ron’s critical observations of me were perfectly accurate, of course, because my reaction to the 
way he treated me was to feel irritated with him . . . I did not know which I disliked more, him with 
me or me with him” (ibid; p.175) admits Stern. “Any attempt on my part to point out things in his 
experience that might complicate this picture (for example, less positive effects) was met with a 
rueful smile and a demurral. Ron really wished he could identify what I saw in his experience, he 
would say, but he just could not” (ibid; p.174).  
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Stern points out to Ron that they needed a new way to see what has transpired between them, and 
admits that he feels he is at loss. Ron realizes that this is a known motif running in many of his close 
relationships. “He was willing to go this far, I think, because he saw that I took his distress seriously, 
even though he also still felt that I was culpable. But we did not have a convincing way to 
characterize this problem, which therefore remained mutual in only a hypothetical way,” (p.176) 
writes Stern. The fork opens one day when Ron talks again about his doubts on continuing 
treatment. “This time, though, he did not say it with anger, but with regret. He looked different to 
me, helpless, despairing. He said he did not want the same thing to happen yet again: another 
relationship abandoned because of his dissatisfaction with it. In response, I said something to him 
that I had said more than once before: I told him I felt sure that our relationship was somehow 
mirroring a significant relationship from his past, though I did not know which one” (ibid; p.176).  
Stern comments also on his belief that he contributes to the impasse: “Before I had spoken I had 
gauged that Ron would understand and accept what I said as an expression of my regret . . . But 
when I say that I ‘gauged’ Ron’s response, I do not mean that I actually formulated this meaning in 
my mind. Nor did I formulate until a few minutes later the part of this moment that surprised me 
most: my confidence that I could trust Ron not to use what I said as one more reason to criticize me. 
This was a new perception of Ron, and I would not have had it unless he had somehow treated me 
differently, in some small way I could not specify. And so it seems likely that he had also perceived 
me differently. Something between us had shifted” (emphasis and italics added; ibid; p.176). Ron 
responds by talking about how far harshly critical and unnecessarily brutal the father could be in his 
criticisms. It was the first time the issue had been vocalized in such a way. Stern asks Ron whether 
he knows why he had not told him about this aspect of his relationship with the father. Ron slowly 
realizes that he has always been ashamed for being treated this way. Having mentalized shame, the 
dyad is able to move into considering Ron’s longings for his father and his analyst that were 
previously masked by the rage and humiliation feelings. Ron immediately actually mentalizes his 
shame once the ‘fork’ opened, the critical point is the emergence of a “new perception” as Stern 
mentions. “I believe that, while there are indeed some significant things that can be said about the 
reasons for new perceptions, there is a mystery at the heart of the matter. Seldom if ever do we 
really know exactly why new perceptions and the interactive freedom they herald arrive when they 
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do” (p.176) admits Stern. None of the explanations “touch on the intrinsic mystery of the process”, 
‘[t]hey are far too pragmatic” writes Levenson (1994; p.17). 
 
We cannot undo the past, but we can make the present more complex by adding dimensions to 
experience. Following this sentence, the whole list in Appendix IIA could be added here as a list of 
citations. In the psychoanalytic Complexity literature, this new understanding and writing about  
experience - that is signified by expressions like “new perception”, “adaptation to one another’s 
influence in a manner that builds complexity” (Sperry, 2011; p. 84), the “focused attention on 
verbally and consciously capturing” the “new experience [which] arises and takes shape from 
multiple interpenetrating systems” (Weissel-Barth, 2006, p. 379), and numerous other such 
signifiers - strives to symbolize the emergent idea of increased complexity.  
 
On Saturday mornings, the fresh croissants from the bakery near my home, the smell of fresh coffee 
at the bistro on the corner, and a mass of familiar calming noises and colours, motivate my legs to 
find my usual seat and enjoy reading the book I had been thinking about during the working week. 
My neighbour greets me and passes across the road to buy a newspaper and have his breakfast at 
a small shop across the other corner. I am sure we experience this same neighbourhood in many 
different ways. Different Gibsonian affordances capture our bodies and our imaginations; we enact 
a different world within the same world. I am sure my neighbour has noticed things in this small 
environment that never captured my attention and vice versa: different signs, spaces, people, 
movements, lights, sounds - all these things organize his experience of the same but different world. 
The easy part of this equation is that me and my neighbour can each keep our autonomy at no cost; 
we do not have to find a shared way to navigate this same but different environment. Had we to 
share our Saturday mornings, it would be really difficult for both of us until we were able to enact a 
comfortable, joint environment. The smell of coffee seems so necessary for my reading 
environment, such an ‘attractive attractor’, that I am not sure how far I can go in increasing 
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complexity. The smell of coffee is in fact an order parameter, organizing the ambience at the certain 
place, which is made up by memories, persons, music, relationships, books, conditionings at 
multiple distant times and places, complex contingencies. It is a sign, telling stories long forgotten 
and lost in time but, which at signs reappearance will remodel my internal ambience.  
 
Experience and its capacitors may have a very private and intimate component form and makeup, 
but this is the part of the story that will be addressed in the upcoming themes. The important point 
we should mention here is that we are drawn to some aspects of experience, like bacteria to sugar, 
and/or we are repelled from formulating experience in certain dimensions. Change is difficult, most 
of the time. If we find sugar avoiding poisons, we seldom question why other organisms starve, 
even if our experiential world narrows and our ecosystem suffers as a result. This metaphor may 
seem oversimplified, but the idea of the therapeutic relationship as an experiential ecosystem is 
popular among writers in psychoanalytic Complexity, even among those coming from an Ego-
psychological perspective, like Palombo (1999; 2007). Adding dimensions to the experiential system 
means increasing intentionality (Bacal & Carlton, 2011; Lichtenberg, Lachmann & Fosschage, 2010; 
Palombo, 1999; Pickles, 2006) and the sense of agency (Grisby & Osuch, 2007); it means changing 
the mutual regulatory patterns (Lichtenberg, Lachmann & Fosschage, 2010), it means changing the 
experiential flow (Pincus, 2014); it means “more behaviour is possible” (Moran, 1991); it means 
expanding awareness (Levenson, 1994), expanding consciousness (Fajardo, 2000; Marks-Tarlow, 
2008) and dyadic consciousness (Bacal & Carlton, 2011).  
 
Empirical researchers with a Complexity psychodynamic orientation think that the control 
parameter that sent Ron and Stern to the critical point of the ‘fork’ was Ron’s motivation to change, 
the emotional significance of his goals, and the activation of resources that regulated his motivation 
(Gumz et al., 2014). Ron implied the same thing when he said he did not want the same thing to 
happen once again. DeFelice and Andreassi (2014) put the matter into more abstract terms, 
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proposing the emergence of a meta-position as the control parameter that appears after the auto-
catalytic reiterations of the differential equation. The meta-position is openness to new information, 
a new way, a new behavioural pattern, a new idea (Leiman, 2012). Obviously, we do not have to 
choose between these positions, as we are talking about a ‘mystery’ as Stern, Levenson and other 
writers point out. This mystery is an open question for psychoanalytic process research.  
 
Ron and Stern were trapped in a ‘doer-done’ complementarity, in the narrow corridor. Ron made 
sure that he was coordinating with those aspects of the context that intensified his perception of 
himself as warm and polite. Offering a narrative with constant and subtle suggestions that his virtue 
is notable, and through this “rueful smile and demurral” (Stern, 2010; p.174),  he enacted a world 
that was less warm and polite towards him. “The environment (Umwelt) emerges from the world 
through the actualization or the being of the organism,” writes Merleau-Ponty, foretelling a science 
of emergence (1963; p.13). “One cannot assign a moment in which the world acts on the organism, 
since the very effect of this ‘action’ expresses the internal law of the organism” (ibid; p.161). This 
new perception comes as a disentanglement in the narrow corridor that emerges as the two 
experiential worlds offer one another the possibility for a new freedom, for increased complexity, 
for additional dimensions to experience.  
 
“Contexts [are] enveloping atmospheres [where some] kinds of experience and interaction can 
take shape and others not”, says Stern (2010; p. 43). The analyst co-creates the context that will give 
form to the unformulated experience and such a context can only emerge on the grounds of 
genuine curiosity (Stern, 2004). “We are inside the vicious circle when we know the answer before 
we ask the question,” writes Stern (2010) in Partners in Thought. “[W]hen we are in its grip, the 
vicious circle may not feel vicious: Until some later time, we may remain utterly convinced of our 
openness to the other [but it] sustains our continuing projection of poorly suited contexts [and this]  
is the outcome of the dissociation of the analyst’s self-states from one another” (2010, p.49). We 
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cannot extricate ourselves from contexts, notes Coburn (2002). Character, as Goldstein (2007) says, 
allows into consciousness that which is congruent with itself; it “propagates with experience more 
of the same” (p.128). Being open and “curious about our patient’s experience, including his 
experience of us, using our curiosity about our own experience” (Bass, 2014; p.670) is what brings 
us, according to most Complexity writers (Bacal & Carlton, 2011, Lichtenberg, Lachmann & Fosshage, 
2010; Marks-Tarlow, 2008) into a symmetry breaking for a new symmetry restoration, into new 
‘enveloping atmospheres’.  
 
The “process is almost pure improvisation” (BCPSG, 2010; p. 41). It moves along, revising goals and 
values through ruptures and repairs in a process of “mutual regulation – matching, mismatching 
and reparation” (ibid; p.42). Intentions are implicitly experienced, and meaning emerges from the 
elaboration back and forth between the implicit components of experience and the verbal – 
reflective dimensions. The disjunction between the two, is not a problem, a deficit or a ‘lack’, - it is 
exactly the process through which complexity increases. “We do not immediately divide up the 
gestalt of implicit/verbal/disjunction into its ‘separate’ parts and analyse each in relative isolation, 
academic style. It is this gestalt intuition that directs the second-by-second clinical inquiry . . . 
Ultimately the meaning is captured in an intuitive grasp” (BCPSG, 2010; p.183).  
 
Moving along, qualitatively different and unpredicted moments arise, the ‘now moment’ which is an 
“emergent property of the complex dynamic system made up of two people moving along in the 
therapeutic process” (ibid; p.43), a moment that “challenges or threatens the stability” (ibid; p.43). 
This is a “moment of truth . . . laden with potential importance . . . a moment called kairos . . . the 
moment that must be seized if one is going to change his destiny, and if it is not seized, one’s destiny 
will be changed anyway for not having seized it” (ibid; p.42).  The ‘now moment’ is another term for 
the ‘new perception’, the moment that an established symmetry breaks and, the ‘moment of 
meeting’ is another term for the increased complexity, the symmetry restoration. It is a moment 
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when a “new intersubjective context is enacted [that] will act to catapult the implicit intersubjective 
context into a new state . . . a dyadic state of consciousness” (ibid; p. 44). It is the moment where 
the attractor that was “phagocytizing” (DeFelice & Andreassi, 2014; p.113) all the analyst’s 
comments suddenly dissolves and a new attractor emerges. “Our experiential worlds are always 
changing as they are emerging and emerging as they are changing. As complexity theorists are wont 
to say, the rules of the game change as a result of the play” (Coburn, 2014; p.50).  
 
Experience, in the Complexity literature, is represented as “swimming in the implicit soup” (Marks-
Tarlow, 2008; p. 41) out of which each member’s experiential state arises. States are perpetually in 
transition; they cannot be objectified; they are movement. I return to the metaphor I introduced at 
the beginning of this theme, this time reading it through an Enactivist Complexity lens which 
Merleau-Ponty (1963) introduced even before Enactivism and Complexity were known terms:  
“For the player in action the . . . field is not an ‘object’ . . . It is pervaded with lines of force 
. . .  and articulated in sectors . . . which call for a certain mode of action and which initiate 
and guide the action as if the player were unaware of it. The field itself is not given to him, 
but present as the immanent term of his practical intentions; the player becomes one with 
it and feels the direction of the ‘goal’," for example, just as immediately as the vertical and 
the horizontal planes of his own body. It would not be sufficient to say that consciousness 
inhabits this milieu. At this moment consciousness is nothing other than the dialectic of 
milieu and action. Each manoeuvre undertaken by the player modifies the character of the 
field and establishes in it new lines of force in which the action in turn unfolds and is 
accomplished, again altering the phenomenal field” (pp. 168-169).  
Going from experience to consciousness, through this dialectic of milieu and action, we create 
“an integrated seemingly seamless scene of the world” note Bacal & Carlton (2011), which “is 
not in fact a seamless whole”; there are “blanks and blind spots; we just are not able to hold 
such in awareness when we are actively engaged in creating a scene” (p.38). The primary 
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therapeutic activity is not to make something unconscious and unformulated into something 
conscious and formulated; since both these categories reflect things, the material dimension 
of the flow. The “primary therapeutic activity,” notes Levenson (1994), “is facilitating [the] 
flow” (p.14). He continues by arguing that too much understanding and too much effort at 
clarifying will block the “rolling along” (ibid; p.15). Understanding either “pushes a car with its 
breaks on” or pushes “one which is already rolling” (ibid; p.15). “[S]mall interventions – 
interpretative or enactments – may make a tremendous difference” (ibid; p.15). Levenson is 
bold regarding what he sees as being curative, namely the process itself; an expansion of 
awareness that leads to increased Complexity. Nobody believes what it is heard, both members 
match speech against experience, and the flow goes on. Totally “banal remarks” can have a 
‘butterfly effect’. “One hears these funny reports from therapists who ask a patient, after nine 
years of treatment, what was it that seemed to make the difference and are told that, ‘Well, 
about three years into the treatment you said, "Don't wish your life away". What ever became 
of all the painfully elaborated wonderful insights?’” (ibid; p.19). “Follow the flow,” insists 
Levenson, and “disavow any intentions of curing or helping” (p.19). Both you and your patient, 
he notes, will soon see much more about your “being in the world”; you will learn to trust your 
perceptions, to “accord them relevance and to follow where they lead” (p.16).  
 
Carol Levin (2011) courageously and vividly describes the flow from the insides of an analyst’s mind 
during a training analysis. She describes an analysis that ‘locks down’ in an impasse which Levin 
describes as: “be grown up for me/no-please get it that I can't” (p.573); an impasse that is enacted 
at several levels and through multiple configurations. “You don't show that you need me,” responds 
the analyst to one of Levin’s complaints about her lack of availability. “She needed me to spell things 
out for her in words or she was lost” (p.573), posits Levin. She then describes a difficult process 
during which she was continuously feeling let down by her analyst. “I longed for my analyst to reach 
out to me with words of her own, and at times she did. But she wasn't reliably available, and I had 
stopped trusting her. I stopped talking. First I couldn't, then later I wouldn't speak. I didn't want to 
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help my analyst. ‘Girls only talk,’ Carol Gilligan once said to me, ‘to someone whom they know can 
hear’ (ibid; p.573). Her mother's “Carol you're crazy” condemnation became in her mind “Carol 
you're unanalyzable”. Levin describes a moment in analysis that opens the fork:  
“As our work had deepened and my early experience with my mother emerged in all its 
affective intensity, my analyst couldn't find an internal reservoir of help. Her 
experiential world intertwined with mine. Her training at our ego-psychological institute 
(or consultation help she tried to find) hadn't given her theory that could sustain her or 
technique for using analytic activity to engage with me in the present moment. I was 
surprised when my analyst once found a way to say ‘I'm no stranger to trauma. There 
can't be two babies in the room. One of us has to get ourselves out of it.’ My analyst's 
authentic unselfconscious honesty profoundly touched me. It finally made meaning of 
the experience that was actualized between us and created understanding that 
diminishes pain. James Grotstein once said to me that ‘analysis isn't just about 
understanding, it's about touching and being touched’” (p.574). 
What is most interesting in Levin’s narrative about her analysis is not any dramatic shift after the 
fork opening, but the way that different interpenetrating experiential worlds made the slow shifts 
in her experience of herself possible. Moments with her patients, a comment made by her 
supervisor, a smile from her analyst at an unexpected time, all disturbed the frozen orbit of the flow 
in small increments. “[H]ow it happened that I changed while in an analysis that moved into and … 
remained in lockdown”(p.579) asks Levin. She gives an answer:  
“Things began to make sense when I happened upon complexity theory, because I 
could come to see change as an emergent property of complex, open, dynamic 
systems. While I was in my analysis, I was ‘of a context’ (Coburn, 2002, p. 672), but I was 
simultaneously ‘of’ (Coburn, 2002) a multiplicity of other contexts that I was recruiting 
to use for my growth—my analysis, my analytic work with David, my supervision, and 
my worlds of experiencing, both past and present. I was free to explore, and events, 
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emergent at a local level as well as ‘systems generated’ (p. 663), were ‘reiterated or 
distributed across multiple, experiential worlds [that] seamlessly intertwin[ed]’ (p. 657) 
with each other and with the ideas I discovered and made my own. The field of 
therapeutic change (p. 658) expanded ‘beyond the dyad’ (Chodorow, 2010).  Everything 
played its part in this rich field of chaotic possibilities for change, more than could be 
actualized (Coburn, 2002, p. 661). In it my growth and the therapeutic actions of my 
analysis assembled softly in fluid, contingent, and novel ways” (p.580).  
Randomness is a kind of order, notes Coburn (2014), and the task of making meaning out of 
randomness is “what self-organization is all about” (Atlan, cited in Coburn, 2014; p.54). Meaning-
making in this clinical process was extended well beyond the perceived boundaries of the clinical 
process. The process did not actually bootstrap inside the consulting room and the dyad remained 
locked in certain coupling patterns. Even so, “touching” and “feeling touched” at a level far beyond 
words was enough for Levin to find the freedom to explore and fully experience her story through 
the aid of other interpenetrating experiential worlds. “I have internalized her kindness and her 
profound belief in the power of analytic process to transform. It was who she was and her attitudes, 
rather than what she could not do, that mattered most in the end,” writes Levin; “I feel sorrow for 
the suffering I caused her” (p.579). “One need not understand something to experience it” (p.23) 
writes Levenson (1994), and it seems that for Levin her experience of the couplings and the anti-
phase ‘coordinations’ to her therapist, the emerging interactive order, was enough to prompt an 
avalanche of changes, mediated by other experiential systems.  
 
4.3.2 The Ubiquity of Coupling, Synchronicity and Coordination  
 
 We create puzzles and we solve them. Lichtenberg (2012) writes, “For creativity to occur, the critical 
requirement is the emergence of a puzzle” (p.295). The context the analyst provides is a movement 
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towards a shared puzzle. It is the context that makes something objective or not. Subjectivity and 
objectivity are not real polarities; they are not mutually exclusive. Subjectivity embraces the infinity 
of human affairs and the world alike. Bakhtin (1981) notes that the authoritative discourse is finite. 
I believe that this is the problem with how we define objectivity. If objectivity is informed by the 
finite then it stands in opposition to subjectivity, creating a real polarity. Subjectivity and objectivity 
alike are in opposition to narcissism, the negation of otherness, the possibility of another puzzle, 
another question made up of similar dimensions. At the same time, however, for any question there 
is only one objective answer; if I ask you ‘What is the colour of what we understand as the sky, in 
Greece, during the summer, at lunchtime, when there are no clouds, according to the conventions 
we use regarding colors?’ the answer can be only one: blue. If we disturb one of the dimensions in 
this question, e.g. the conventions we use about colors and replace it with a range in the spectrum 
of Company X’s color palette, suddenly all the rest of the dimensions in the question have to be re-
arranged. If I ask a person sitting by me at the dinner table, “Could you please pass me the salad?”, 
the answer I am expecting is an action. Asking the same question to a person who understands 
communication through an autistic prism, the answer may be a single “Yes”. We are simply not 
working on the same puzzle. Both answers, though, can be perfectly objective for their respective 
puzzles. The problem is that we decontextualize puzzles, we give them a universal status, we 
‘legislate’ and ‘nomothetize’ our puzzles.  
 
The Bionian infinite disturbs our questions and our puzzles, not the answers. In other words, the 
question we always have to ask is whether we are in the same puzzle. From this point of view, 
Ferenczi’s playful attitude, Reik’s openness to surprise, the Kleinian narrative structure of 
unconscious experience, the ‘Freudian pair’, Bion’s “without memory and desire” and the “selected 
fact”, Winnicott’s “spatula, transitional object and the squiggle”, and Mitchell’s “outburst out of 
impasse” all have something in common: they are all imaginative efforts for the creation of a shared 
matched puzzle. They suggest approaches towards the breaking of symmetries, recreated by the 
patient’s constant efforts for self-cure and new symmetry restorations. All these approaches avoid 
rigid formulations, either by reconstructing meanings using an evocative metaphoric language or 
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by presenting new combinations of experience’s dimensions, a new pattern for meaning-making. 
Relationality provided a clear emphasis on the “hold your beliefs lightly, even if with conviction” 
(Bass, 2014; p.670) sensibility that might be implied by all these approaches, but was relatively 
underemphasised. Analyst and analysand try to write the story line into a shared narrative through 
improvisation. Before looking at how this constantly matching and adjusting process is portrayed in 
the psychoanalytic Complexity literature, I think it is important to frame this understanding within 
the general picture of how Complexity regards interpersonal interaction and the role of language in 
the process. I will then briefly present the findings and the respective conceptual understanding 
appearing in the work of psychodynamically oriented Complexity researchers, and finally focus on 
the findings of my TA.  
 
Kendon’s (1990) context analysis is a form of qualitative analysis of interactions greatly inspired by 
the work of Goffmann and Conversation Analysis. Kendon looks at interaction as a whole without 
breaking the process into segments or looking for causal connections. He was among the first who 
observed some kind of interactive synchrony emerging in the field without design but as the result 
of agents coordinating responses. The discussants co-create a framework of synchronies which 
flows conversationally; they keep their lower bodies closer, and when one moves away, the other 
makes a small approaching movement, etc. The most important finding in Kendon’s research on 
interaction was the synchronicity of boundaries: “[T]he movements of P and L, though now not 
reciprocal and quite different in form, are nonetheless synchronous – boundaries of their 
components coincide . . . as if both are dancing to the same beat, though the movements they make 
are quite different. This analogy is not too far-fetched. They are now both attending to T and in 
doing so, they both move synchronously with him and hence synchronously with each other” (p.110, 
1990).  
 
Several researchers have worked on the issue of interpersonal synchronies from a Complexity 
perspective. They all agree that the control of interpersonal coordination emerges in the field of 
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actions. The degrees of freedom in motor patterns of different agents are coupled in a low-
dimensional reciprocal adjusting synchrony (Riley et al., 2011). The order parameter that constrains 
the flow of patterns emerges in a process of circular causality where no agent or single element can 
be held responsible for the synchronicity of boundaries. Several researchers suggest that 
behavioural synchrony promotes neural synchrony which in turn establishes social bonding 
(Wheatley et al., 2012).  
 
Guastelo et al. (2006) have shown that physiological markers in conversations between strangers, 
like electrodermal skin conductance, show a high level of nonlinear coupling while often there is no 
directional influence. Konvalinka et al. (2011) have shown that relatives of fire-walkers showed a high 
level of arousal synchrony with the performing fire-walker, increasing during the performance.  
Moreover, they showed increased arousal synchrony to other fire-walkers, compared to the rest of 
the audience. In brief, when one of your relatives walks with a fire-walking crew, you can show more 
empathy to the rest of the group.  
 
Research shows that there is a high degree of behavioural contagion among interlocutors 
(Louwerse et al., 2012). Smiling, frowns, head or hand movements - all are highly likely to be 
mimicked by the discussant partner, while there is also a high level of body sway synchrony in face-
to-face interactions (Higo et al., 2012). This level of coordination is considered to promote 
understanding and collaboration. Pickering and Garrod (2004) introduced the idea of linguistic 
alignment in interaction, according to which interlocutors try to reciprocally align linguistic 
behaviour at multiple levels, such as positive feedback loops increasing volume, regulating prosody, 
lexical and syntactical alignment, etc. The ultimate goal may be coordination at the cognitive level 
that promotes facilitation on collective tasks. Bringing different perspectives, doing/saying/thinking 
different things and aligning all at the same moment, interlocutors can achieve more things 
together than alone. Fusaroli, Raczaszek and Tylen (2014) and Fusaroli and Tylen (2015) show that 
this ‘alignment’ may actually be better described by an interpersonal synergy model, where 
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functional specificity and dimensional compression facilitating the performing of collective tasks is 
softly -assembled through the process. Alignment does not actually predict the coordination, since 
while it may initially appear to be a process of establishing a shared frame it soon gives way to an 
emergent superordinate interaction structure that constrains Complexity.  
 
Ramseyer (2011), summarizing his research findings on nonverbal synchrony in psychotherapy 
sessions, notes that the quality of the therapeutic relationship is clearly reflected on the level of 
coordinated movement occurring between patient and therapist. Nonverbal synchrony was 
positively correlated to process and outcome quality measures, while attachment and interpersonal 
problems seemed to interfere with the establishment of nonverbal synchrony. Ramseyer refers to 
a study where whole-body movement was studied through Motion Energy Analysis in consecutive 
video frames. This is important, since as Ramseyer and Tschacher (2014) note that “movements 
located towards the periphery of the body are generally assumed to elude conscious control” (p.6). 
In general, Ramseyer and Tschacher conclude that resonance at the level of body movement is an 
indicator of an emerging strong bond between members of the dyad. Imel et al. (2014) showed that 
vocal synchrony is associated to empathy ratings in the dyad. Finally, Coutinho and Decety (2014) 
review the sparse but strong evidence for physiological synchrony in psychotherapy, especially 
related to empathy.  
 
In the literature by psychoanalytic clinicians included in this TA, ‘synchronicity’ as a term is 
sporadically discussed, with the notable exceptions of Orsucci (1998; 2002; 2009), Galatzer-Levy 
(2009), Marks-Tarlow (2008) and Marshall (2011). In Orsucci’s work, synchronicity occupies a 
significant part of his thinking, while the rest of the writers make more or less extensive references 
to the term. In Mind Force  – a book with the interesting subtitle, “On human attractions” – Orsucci 
(2009) presents a preliminary but elaborate theory on how matter, bodies, brains, minds and 
societies emerge from the workings of what he calls “mind force”, which is not a force in the sense 
of a concrete entity, but a force that emerges as autonomous entities emerge, relate and transform 
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and which keeps the process together. “Connections of genes and molecules, neurons and 
hormones, language and thinking, people and organizations form a continuous flow of 
synchronized interactions” (p. 129) writes Orsucci in a manifesto signed by neuroscientists like 
Walter Freeman, psychoanalysts like Peter Fonagy, and complexity mathematicians like Harald 
Atmanspacher, among other scientists. Everything that we perceive as an entity is a network of 
networks embedded within networks where fields emerge by the synchronization of coupled 
oscillators. Orsucci proposes that field theory, networks, synchronization theory and Complexity 
are the four pillars that science has to build on for a deeper understanding of ‘mind force’. The 
author refers to numerous examples of synchronicity at several levels, like the role of music in social 
bonding, the possible emergence of language out of the need for the synchronization of people 
through singing, the synchronicity of menstrual cycles among female friends and relatives, the 
gamma synchrony of brain waves among Buddhist monks; “silent conversations” of chemicals, cells 
and bodies across different scales.  
 
It seems then that there is an increased body of research studying the role of synchronicity at several 
levels as the foundation of social understanding, communication and the therapeutic process. 
Salvatore and his colleagues, studying the flow of the discourse during psychotherapy, consider it 
to be a process that tends towards the organization of a set of super-ordinate meanings which act 
as semiotic organizers that regulate the communicative exchange. Sense-making occurs as signs 
reduce their polysemy in the communication flow, so that discourse dynamics are a dissipitative 
system characterized by the presence of strange attractors. The super-ordinate frame moves 
through the flow of the process. What the researchers actually show is that the process tends 
towards the construction of a shared space of meanings, since the “reduction of phase space 
dimensionality means that after a while a constraint on the possibility of sign combination emerges 
in the dialogue” (Lauro-Grott et al., 2009 p.26). Obviously, then, each sign loses some degrees of 
freedom once it is only allowed to combine with a subset of other signs. Salvatore, Tebaldi and Poti 
(2008) compared the textual material from a psychotherapy case divided into four blocks to the 
textual material coming from an Italian novel divided into an equal number of blocks, and measured 
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the level of lexical inertia (that is, the variability in combination of signs across segments of the text) 
through a statistical, multidimensional technique. Their findings show that while in all four blocks of 
the novel inertia has an almost equal level, in the psychotherapeutic text inertia drops dramatically 
after the first block, and remains constant in the third and the fourth blocks. Findings actually 
suggest that hypersemia is reduced over the course of the treatment through the emergence of a 
“frame of sense” that constrains the combinations of signs. A shared frame of meaning-making 
emerges during the process.  
 
Process research has actually evolved out of the ‘common versus specific factors’ debate in 
psychotherapy research. Wampold (2001; Wampold & Imel, 2015), one of the most active 
researchers in the field of psychotherapy during the last few decades, believes that the debate itself 
and the perpetuating polarity are misleading since specific factors work on the grounds of common 
factors in psychotherapy. Wampold argues that humans have evolved to respond to psychotherapy; 
our innermost needs for attachment and belonging work at the foundational level of a therapeutic 
relationship. On the other hand, he thinks that much of therapeutic efficacy builds on the grounds 
of expectations, since what people experience is strongly influenced by what they anticipate. 
Wampold reviews ample evidence to support the idea that therapy works on the grounds of these 
two levels: social connection and anticipation. He believes that empathy involves synchronicity at 
the biological level (matching motor and autonomic responses), at the experiential level (emotional 
contagion, shared goals, sympathetic concern), and at the conscious level (targeted help and 
perspective taking) (Wampold & Imel, 2015).  This synchronicity of empathy is much needed for 
people’s wellbeing, since connectedness acts as a buffer for mental health, while disconnectedness 
has deleterious effects. The patient is ready to explore alternatives to his dysfunctional beliefs, 
trusting his perception of therapist’s expertise and his sense that therapy will produce positive 
results. The more similar and close the patient feels to the therapist, the more easily empathic 
processes at all three levels will operate.  
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In the psychoanalytic Complexity literature, synchronicity has entered through the work of 
researchers in mother-infant interaction like Sander (2008), Beebe and Lachmann (2002; 2013), 
Tronick (1998; 2003; 2005) and Travarthen (1998;1999). Sander’s (2008) work on recognition, 
Tronick’s work on mutual regulation and dydadic states of consciousness, and Beebe and 
Lachmann’s work on mutual regulation have had profound and pervasive influence. Sander’s work 
has influenced Complexity literature not only through his direct involvement in the BCPSG, but also 
through the dialog with his work evident in the writings of Emmanuel Ghent (1990) and Jessica 
Benjamin (1988; 1995). I think that a deeper understanding of the ‘recognition’ process requires a 
closer look at Benjamin’s work. Benjamin writes that Stein (2008) is the only psychoanalytic author 
who explicitly talks about “excess, recasting the Freudian idea in intersubjective terms and seeing 
it as an intrapsychic tension that has become unbearable in the absence of an outside other to 
absorb and process it and set limits to its growing into excess” (p.58).  Sander, like Winnicott, 
believes that mothers recognize this growing excess at a moment which allows time for the child to 
recognize the need as its own, but before this escalates into something obtrusive or unbearable. 
Sander puts the whole matter into a perspective similar to Jonas’s: dependence and independence 
are not mutually exclusive, but rather two complementary categories of our experience, the 
experience of “needful freedom”.  
 
Sander believes that mother and child, through mutual recognition, may meet in shared signs which 
will amplify through their coupling and synchrony. Coupling in phase synchrony amplifies and 
multiplies the shared information, allowing a flow of energy into the intersubjective system that 
was previously impossible. In a sense, the ‘excessiveness’ escalating in the one person is not 
‘evacuated’ to the other person, locking the system into a ‘doer-done complementarity’, but flows 
back and forth unobtrusively creating a ‘moment of meeting’. The “agentic and relational” (Kieffer, 
2007; p.701) aspects of the self, develop, according to the works of both Ghent (1990) and Benjamin 
(1988, 1995), through such a process of mutual recognition. The child needs to be known, found, 
recognized, and the child needs to find, know and recognize the object. Especially in the work of 
Benjamin, the uneasy, dialectical and unstable tension between these two processes is of particular 
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importance. Therapeutic action, according to Benjamin, ‘equals’ this ongoing dialectical tension in 
the process of mutual recognition; lost and found, broken and restored, moving always towards the 
achievement of an increased integration or Complexity, as Sander and Ghent would have it. Beebe 
and Lachman’s work builds on the works of Sander, Tronick and Trevarthen, emphasising the co-
creating nature of regulatory processes through the coordination of affect, attention, orientation, 
sensations, turn-taking, vocal rhythms and “timing of all kinds” (2015; p.29). “Mutual regulatory” 
episodes are what one observes actually in the experience of the dyad striving for “mutual 
recognition”. A dyad continuously regulates interactively and this “does not always entail a positive 
form of ‘mutuality’” (ibid; p.141).  
 
Bacal (Bacal & Carlton, 2011) mentions that Bion told him in a personal communication: “a patient 
might take one look at you and never want to see you again, the analyst might struggle similarly” 
(p.120). Budge and Wampold (2015), citing Benedetti, confirm Bion’s statement, saying that we form 
a first impression of another face in 100ms; “patients likely make initial judgments about whether 
or not they can trust their therapist” (p.222). “We should start from the most favourable condition 
for a possible cooperation” (p.171) writes Orsucci (2002), and adds that every therapist should know 
before starting a treatment the kind of pathology and personality they work best with, and whether 
they feel sympathy towards the candidate analysand. Perhaps, then, feeling a degree of sharing 
similar experiences, feeling comfortable with characterological aspects of the other member of the 
relationship, puts the system in a favourable orbit, ensuring that coupling and mutual regulation 
dynamics will prove more facilitative than inhibiting forces towards mutual recognition.  
 
Obviously some aspects of coupling and synchronization can be felt and pass into the clinicians’ 
experiential language, while other aspects can only be described in a reflective language that strives 
to remain close to experience. Others still can only be described in a reflective language that moves 
far away from the phenomenological and towards the explanatory level of discourse. We will follow 
the reverberations of coupling and synchronicity in psychoanalytic Complexity literature, moving 
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from the explanatory towards the experiential. The most notable explanatory metaphors on 
coupling and synchronicity are the ‘ecosystem’ and the ‘system evolution’ metaphors, where the 
idea of system evolution does not always differentiate between natural and artificial evolutionary 
systems. In the context of this metaphor, ‘adaptation’ as a concept appears again and again, either 
as “adaptation to influence” (Sperry, 20111, p.76) or adaptation that ensures survival through the 
coordination “to an exquisite degree” (p.340) of system components (Stolorow 97b). The “coupled 
oscillators” narrative, as well as the narrative of a system that tends towards “patterned 
connection” (Weisel-Barth, 2006), is ubiquitous. The self-organizing nature of the analytic 
relationship means that a “tighter and tighter system coordination – that is, expansion and 
collaboration of the points of meeting within and between systems – constitutes relational 
development” (ibid; p.370).   
 
Galatzer-Levy (2009) and Marshall (2011) make explicit that the system tends towards “shared 
narratives” and a “synchronized discourse”, where shared, worked-through experiences can be 
“referenced by a word or two” (Marshall, 2011, p.78). The patient learns to speak the analyst’s 
language and “[t]he analyst must not only learn to learn and speak the patient’s language, but the 
patient must trust that the analyst is in synchrony with him and resonates with his feelings” (ibid; 
p.82). Tighter coordination makes the system move in phase or anti-phase “lockstep” (Marks-
Tarlow, 2008, p.58). Miller (1999) notes that “[i]n the treatment situation, these efforts at 
understanding and coordination are expressed as role-responsive enactments, transference-
countertransference dialogues, projective identifications, self-object transferences, disruption-
repair sequences, model scenes, and the testing of pathogenic beliefs. These enactments and 
mutual regulations are the ways in which the patient and the analyst co-create the themes that 
define the content and meaning of the complex adaptive system of the analytic dyad” (p.367). 
Complex Adaptive Systems “strive to control their environments and transform its resources into 
usable material” (Miller, 1999; p.367). Analyst and analysand not only “attempt to influence the 
other, consciously and especially unconsciously”, but they also “try to get the other validate their 
subjective experience” and “accept the meanings they have each attributed to the interaction” 
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(ibid; p.367). All symptoms, notes Spruiell (1993), are “experiential responses to self-inflicted, 
functional interferences to free communication among the systems of the mind” (p.34). Analysis is 
about restoring “previously lost connections”, “unconsciously initiated separations” (ibid; p.32). 
Most psychoanalytic Complexity writers moved into this Winnicotian understanding of the mind, 
where mind both is and is not inside the person, both is and is not part of the environment. “[W]e 
find ourselves doing” (p.9) attitude, notes Coburn (2014); separations and lost connections are 
recreated by our action in the field. Personality is something we do, as Sullivan has it, not something 
we are or we have (Rosenbaum, 2015). In such a field of interpersonal forces, we restore lost 
connections, coupling and synchronizing with another person but not always in phase. Mutual 
regulation does not always entail these positive overtones of mutuality, as Beebe and Lachmann 
(2013) note. Adapting to and formulating meaning with another person is dangerous, says Sucharov 
(2007). 
 
Empathy, identification and mutual identification processes, attunement and affect matching 
processes, the automatic inference-making processes regarding the other person’s intentions and 
goals, separating the therapist and bringing her subjectivity into the field: all these are ‘expressions’ 
through which therapists try to describe attempts at synchronization in the coupling dyad, moving 
their language from the explanatory level closer to the level of the ‘language of experience’. 
Empathy, attunement or affect-matching and mutual regulation are intimately related processes. 
Attunement refers to the matching of affect in the dyad. Regulation to those intrapersonal and 
interpersonal processes that qualitatively shape and scale the emotional response to experience. 
Empathy is the more abstract term; Agosta (2015) proposes an interesting definition of empathy 
comparing it to the Gadamerian “hermeneutic circle”, as a circular, reciprocal relation of 
understanding the whole through its parts, and the parts through the whole. Empathy is not only 
related to attunement; it always involves interpretation, as Stern (2004) notes. Empathy involves 
both the bottom-up processes of identifying with the emotional experience of another person 
without merging, referring to emotional contagion, vicarious inter-affective exchanges at the level 
of posture, micro-movement and micro-expressions and top-up interpretation. Arnetoli (2002) 
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notes that we seek to “match, to some extent, the quality, intensity and direction of the affect of 
the other” and that then a “two-way influence emerges, in the two individuals building the 
regulation patterns together” (p.750). Arnetoli talks about “empathic fields” we build together by 
“living together” (ibid; p.751).  Each member brings in “his own organizing principles” but “together 
we create new ones that are typical and unique to the analytic dyad” (ibid; p.751). Arnetoli starts 
from a Complexity and a Connectionist perspective on empathic networks, and his work is 
extensively cited among Complexity writers as well as in Stolorow’s (97b) perspective on self and 
mutual regulation. We attune to one another and regulate, self-regulate and mutually regulate in a 
constant process, which is usually underemphasised in this work is the top-up interpretative 
component. Or rather, its importance is understated, for reasons that rather have to do with the 
need of writers to move away from a Cartesian mentalistic understanding of the process. Most 
Complexity authors’ intersubjective understanding of empathy is in concert with an enactivist 
understanding of empathy (see Zahavi, 2011; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2007). Agosta (2015) writes:  
“[W]e do indeed make inferences as to the experiences of other people. But rarely 
do we infer that the other person is happy because she or he is smiling. We 
experience the happiness directly in the smile. Rarely do we infer that the person is 
sad because they are crying. We immediately experience the sadness in the tear- 
stained face” (p.21).  
However, Agosta recognizes that at the same time “one is listening to one’s opinion about what the 
other person has said . . . [o]pinions happen. They are inevitable. They are then recruited by 
narcissism to form resistances to empathy. The resistance is subtle. It is pervasive” (p.14). We need 
to work, then, on bringing forth empathy and this is part of the the process of mutual regulation. As 
Sucharov (2009) noted, is dangerous for the therapist to adapt and formulate meaning. Kohut 
writes that Agosta “is explicit that the source of the resistance to introspection is that the individual 
is ‘helpless in the face of tension increase’” (ibid; p.44). Was it actually difficult for Donnel Stern to 
search into his counter-transferential involvement, invoke theory and mentalize Ron’s shame? 
Certainly it was; a ‘new perception’ of the patient was needed in order to ensure that he would not 
end up traumatized by his patient’s devaluation and shame-inducing comments. We are talking 
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about intense “shared experience” plus “self-reflection”, as Fajardo (2000) notes, not about the 
responses of a “Shell Answer Man” who simply gives his “expert opinion” (Agosta, 2015, p.43). 
Possibly, the more integrated we are through our personal analyses, the more open and available 
we are to listening to our patients, but the forces in the field are intense. We may use theory as a 
shield, as a way of “knowing the answer” (ibid; p.43), but, as Stern notes, we are then in the vicious 
circle of knowing the answer before asking the question. “Resistance to empathy looms large here” 
writes Agosta (p.43, 2015) and for good reason; it is “resistance to the vulnerability of being 






                                              
             4.3.2.1      Talking to Carla and talking to Jean: Let the matching puzzle flow 
 
At this point I will introduce two clinical cases that will help us discuss coupling and synchronicity, 
but also the next two themes. The first comes from a member of the BCPSG, Jeremy Nahum, and 
the second from Antonino Ferro4, a self-declared post-Kleinian-Bionian analyst. Nahum and Ferro 
work in a very different way: Nahum stays close to the analysand’s experience, interpreting motives, 
intentions and goals that are close to the surface and the immediate experience. Ferro interprets 






Carla is in analysis with Ferro (Civitarese & Ferro, 2015), and the author gives us some valuable 
information about the period prior to the session he describes verbatim. The most interesting 
information, from my perspective, is from a period which Ferro names “problems of the setting” 
(p.172). Carla, arriving to a session, sits on the table instead of the chair, the floor or the couch, and 
Ferro is reminded of an Italo Calvino novel in which the main character, an adolescent alienated by 
the behaviour of his parents and human race in general, withdraws into a life in the trees. Carla 
immediately comes down from the table after listening to the interpretation. Ferro narrates 
another, similar episode in which Carla, entering into the room, sits in his chair. “I was 
dumbfounded, turned to stone, and thought: ‘But she can’t possibly be occupying my space and 
leaving me without a place of my own’” (ibid; p.173). Ferro is looking into his countertransference 
for Carla’s motives and realizes that this is about an acting out of her anxiety aroused by the 
cancellation of a previous session which might have left her with the sense that she does not have 
a place of her own. Carla returns to her place after listening to the interpretation.  
 
My own theoretical puzzle and Ferro’s theoretical puzzle are dramatically different; I can only give 
an outsider’s perspective on these clinical narratives. The first thing I notice in common in these two 
episodes – missing the extra-lingual meta-messages – is Carla’s concern about her analyst. In the 
first episode, had Carla remained on the table after the context provided by the analyst, it would 
have been like she was criticizing him for alienating her. In the next episode, it was like ignoring his 
upset for having lost his place. This is an immediate interpretation I had about Carla’s intentions 
after reading the episode, which may become more complex or nuanced given more information. 
What is important, however, is that this interpretation reflects my own therapeutic subjectivity. One 
may think of this concern as related to abandonment anxieties, but even then concern is an 
important aspect of Clara’s experience. As I will soon argue, we cannot compare puzzles; Carla 
communicates through the ‘acting-out’ episodes something about the contexts Ferro provides as 
an analyst – were she in analysis with someone else, she might choose to communicate different 
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aspects of her experience. My reading of the episodes up to this point is that Ferro brings forth 
Clara’s pain of alienation and feeling left on her own in order to frame her needy, exhibitionistic and 
narcissistic attitudes, but he does not mention the ‘concern’ or the ‘obedience’, as dimensions of 
her experience.  
 
After describing in brief three other phases in Carla’s analysis, which Ferro names respectively “the 
symbiotic nuclei”, “towards a theory of mind: the mother’s womb” and a “place for the split-off 
parts”, he describes the phase in which the session he describes takes place. Carla, after her fourth 
year of analysis, seeks treatment as an inpatient at a university clinic “well known for its organistic 
approach” (p.177). There she is diagnosed with “panic attacks”; she is told that analysis is 
contraindicated but she is allowed out daily for her analysis. Gradually, Ferro arrives at an 
understanding of Carla’s decision for hospitalization as reflecting her need to communicate that the 
analytic process was contraindicated because it was too painful, and her analyst’s words were like 
drugs with serious side-effects. Hospitalization allowed Carla to bring into analysis the most 
‘suffering’ aspects of herself and make them visible. “The climate of the session changed from one 
moment to the next” (p.178) mentions Ferro, and Carla was soon discharged by the hospital. In the 
session described, Ferro will announce to Clara that they will miss the Friday session. Clara begins 
the session by asking for water, Ferro interprets the request as reflecting the lack of a session in the 
previous day, and Clara comments that she feels that he is detached (like a mother telling her child 
that she is no longer its mother but a paid employee). Ferro reflects immediately on the cancelation 
of Friday’s session that he plans to announce at the end of the session. Clara then asks Ferro if she 
is a male or a female.  
Clara: “Who else can I ask but you? I want to know if I am male or female. Roberto, 
whom I don’t understand because he is very fond of me, told me at the restaurant 
that I remind him of one of those girls in old westerns, full of pep, red-haired, 
freckled and with a pigtail … who needs to be picked up and given a spanking … 
and that it is exactly the kind of woman he likes. OK, but am I male or female?” 
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Ferro: (I felt it would be premature to interpret sexually because the level involved 
was much more primitive: “male” meant “needing to evacuate projective 
identifications” and “female” stood for “capable of accepting interpretations”). 
OK, I can tell you, putting it in your terms, that it is certainly not easy to tame you 
… we have already talked about the efforts of “Petruchio” (a reference to the 
male hero of The Taming of the Shrew). 
Clara: But I am making an effort … because I love Roberto, to dress in a skirt … to 
put on a fur coat … to do my hair nicely … I am making a terrible effort … 
Ferro: And perhaps too, it is “because you love me and with an effort” that you 
agree to abide by the rules … to lie down on the couch … and to respect the end 
of the sessions … I must tell you something—that …  
Clara asks her analyst to wait before speaking, with an air of panic, and she then speaks her fears 
that the analyst will cancel the Friday session. My immediate reading of the material up to this point 
is that Carla started the session asking for something clear and refreshing, and articulated her fears 
that her therapist was acting detached. She then confirmed her love for the therapist,-  “Who else 
can I ask but you?” – and she continues wondering what is it that Roberto finds interesting in her. 
We are informed by Ferro that Clara’s affair with Roberto almost coincides with the period after her 
hospitalization. I am reminded of Levenson (1994) mentioning Clara Thompson, who warned him in 
supervisions to always look out for the “döppleganger”, “the Other, out there somewhere who 
could effectively sabotage or complete the therapy” (p.16) in the therapist’s position. Robert finds 
her to be a charming and obedient girl that deserves a “spanking” – possibly for what she 
understands as the male disobedient part of herself. She thinks she makes such an effort to dress 
up in the analytic proper code that the ‘Roberto part of her analyst’ wants her to, an effort to 
coordinate, even when she feels the need to run away. I think at this point she clearly states her 
concern about her analyst. From my point of view, Clara seems to feel understood by her therapist. 
He is able to put this “[you] love me with an effort” dimension of her experience into words, even 
if, as it seems, in her ambivalent tension for receptivity and evacuation, Ferro favors the latter. 
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Actually, I do not understand Clara to be massively evacuating but to be running away, as she 
mentions in her dreams. She is possibly running away from the depriving part of her analyst who 
does not state in a “clear and refreshing” manner that he recognizes the part of her that is 
concerned about him and obedient, that leaves her alone on weekends and on this week a day 
earlier.  
 
Another interesting part of the session that follows the announcement of the analyst’s absence on 
Friday and the offering of an alternative time is the moment when Clara talks about a doctor at the 
university clinic:  
Clara:  I am full of drugs today. I have been to see Dr. Pivati … he told me he wanted 
to make me relax with autogenic training … I said to him that, if he touched me, I 
would kill him … and then I took to my heels … I wanted to talk about the analysis, 
but I cannot stand it …  
Ferro: I am now Dr. Pivati, who is touching you, and talking about the analysis … 
who is making you have a fit of panic … and you want to kill me. 
Carla: Roberto and I had a trial of strength with our arms … he won … he is 
stronger.  
Ferro: You felt exploited by our communication, which you are forced to accept.  
In Clara’s comment, I actually hear that she wants to talk about her analysis, about this missing 
recognition of her concern, but there is a part of her analyst that controls her with his technique, 
and she wants to stand up and stop him but feels he is stronger.  Actually, as I understand it, Clara’s 
problems relate to this difficulty of hers to stand in the spaces between her ‘male’ (‘fighting’ and 
‘confronting’) part and her ‘female’ part that she feels to be ‘obedient’ and ‘concerned’. Even if I, or 
any other analyst, had a very different way of working towards the construction of a shared 
matched puzzle, of working towards building a shared discourse that would help Clara and the 
analyst to find a more complex way of integrating the nuclei of her self, of solving the problem of 
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sharing mental space with another person, from a Complexity perspective the orbit of these phase 
and anti-phase synchronicities is what matters most. Actually I think we cannot compare puzzles at 
the level of theory.  
 
Before Clara’s hospitalization, Ferro describes a phase in the treatment where Clara was clearly 
splitting and projecting the greedy and narcissistic parts of her self to her two male brothers. “I felt 
that the time was ripe to tackle these splits” (p.176) mentions Ferro. In the session that followed his 
interpretation, Clara arrives in a state of extreme anxiety. “I realised that this interpretation had 
been premature and attempted to restore the split, by speaking once again about Piero and Stefano 
as ‘her brothers’ . . . [t]he acoustic ‘hallucinations’ then disappeared” (p.177). Bromberg, a leading 
Relational scholar, criticizes Kernberg that, through interpreting the split in the transference, the 
dissociative gap widens. The language of conflict in the face of a strong dissociative process is 
“unresponsive to the patient’s shame-ridden need for affective safety” (Bromberg, 2011; pp.76-77). 
The patient cannot have the experience and represent it cognitively at the same time. It is totally 
understandable, says Bromberg, that the patient responds with a comment like ‘I lost you’, “not to 
mention it is a deliciously accurate attachment metaphor” (p.77). Clara responded with a fear of 
disintegration later in the treatment, saying, “you won…you are stronger”.  
 
Clara asks for a replacement session for the missing Friday session, and her greed and narcissistic 
hunger are in danger of bursting into the field. ‘I want to kill you but I let you win, because I am 
afraid of my greed and hunger, I feel concerned about you, I want you to recognize my love, my 
fears and my need to run away’, ‘You are not easy to tame, I can see you love me but you have to 
absorb your wild part, you have even to absorb your need to run away’ seems to be the picture 
emerging from the coupling that Ferro and Carla achieve. Ferro, like Kernberg, works from a Kleinian 
perspective of maturity, which is related to guilt. The achievement of complexity in Kleinian terms 
is related to guilt, and guilt is the foundation of civilization. During his first meetings with Carla, 
interpreting the table and the chair episodes, Ferro actually oriented the analysand’s attention to 
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her greedy and wild part that was ignorant of other people needs. Had he immediately interpreted 
her concern about her analyst after these episodes, the orbit of the system’s coordination might 
have been totally different. By this I do not actually mean that it would have necessarily been more 
effective but different – our theories shape the context, and the contexts regulate the ways we 
coordinate. In this sense we cannot compare our theoretical puzzles, and Bromberg’s criticism may 
be overstating the differences to some extent. He justly criticizes the ignorance regarding some 
dimensions of the patient’s experience, but theory cannot describe the bifurcating orbits of a 
coordinating dyad.  
 
Ferro, a post-Kleinian clinician, pulled back from interpreting the splits when the patient sent a clear 
signal of danger, but remained stern when the patient seemed better able to handle this bringing 
together of dimensions of her experience. What is important, from my perspective, to comment on 
is that Carla’s concern for her therapist and her obedience – unmistakably apparent according to my 
Winnicottian and Relational viewpoint (which put less emphasis on guilt as the road to maturity 
compared to joy and creativity) from the very first interactions– eventually enter into the puzzle, in 
the unique orbit of the bifurcations the system followed. Empathy is always unstable, a matter of 
interpretation, a ‘hermeneutic circle’, and empathic failures may be unavoidable due to the 
multidimensionality of experience, where resistance to empathy is shaped by our personalities and 
our theories as live objects of the field. Staying attuned to her analysand, neither will a Kleinian will 
miss the connecting, loving dimensions of experience, nor will a Relational practitioner will miss the 
needy or greedy aspects. It is the orbit of the system that may be very different, as the analyst’s 
ideas as a live object of her personality enter into the field.  
 
Civitarese and Ferro (2013/2015), responding to Donnel Stern in an exchange of articles regarding 
Barangers’ concept of field, comment on what they understand as a Relational emphasis to external 
reality and consciousness. They write: “Stern considers metaphor to be useful but precedes it with 
thought, we for our part believe that nothing we can offer a patient is more valuable than living 
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metaphors, to help him to live” (p.94). Metaphors restore body to mind, and they are the most 
profound form of thought we are capable of. They are “ideas interwoven with emotion … they 
enable us to see reality from a number of different angles, investing it with a ‘poetic’ ambiguity” 
(ibid; p.94). I think that they are actually in total accordance with the thinking of most Relational 
and Complexity clinicians, differing only in the construction of the shared matched puzzles during 
treatment; the way they think in, and live, the flow of experience. Ferro follows Carla’s discourse, 
remaining closely attuned to the emotional content of his patient’s narrative. The difference 
between Ferro and a Relational analyst is that in remaining attuned he also offers a complementary 
framework that is narrated in the supposed language of the unconscious. His efforts at mutual 
regulation involve restating his patient’s communication into a language he knows well and is able 
to control, and which the patient has to learn. In this sense, Stern’s criticism that his approach is 
authoritative is justified. On the other hand, adopting an authoritative approach, such as Ferro’s, 
does not necessarily mean that you will derail treatment, even if there is a greater risk of re-
traumatizing the patient if you fail to stay closely attuned to them. Attunement and metaphor may 
describe the basic level which all psychoanalytic dyads try to match in order to move along as the 
system evolves. Mutual regulation corrects for the asynchronies that necessarily appear in the 
empathic field.  
 
I have chosen to present the case study of Jean (a patient) by Jeremy Nahum (BCPSG, 2010), 
because I think there are some close thematic affinities between Jean’s and Carla’s treatments. Jean 
feels ambivalent about her sexuality, that her sense of agency is compromised in close relationships, 
while she is only able to feel free and spontaneous at a distance. On a Friday session, she describes 
a dream with sexual content, and her analyst comments that sex appears only in dreams. Jean reacts 
to the comment, while she also accepts a part of it; “when [sexuality] comes up, it’s like a black box, 
something I’m suspicious of, uncertain of, afraid of” (p.50). On the Monday session, she makes 
another effort at mutual regulation. She stays attuned to the perceived content of her analyst’s 
experience of her – “my sexuality is compartmentalized . . . it’s true, and a very sad loss” – while she 
tries to move the dyadic consciousness into a dimension she feels is missing from her analyst’s 
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perceived experience – “things could be a lot worse and I am not sure you understand that”. She 
points again to the perceived lack: “There are certain things where your understanding is so 
different from mine,” and she continues by going closer again to what she perceives as the analyst’s 
experience of her – “Had my sexuality been better integrated, I’d have married better”. Again, she 
moves to mark the anxieties she feels that the analyst does not immediately see in his experience: 
“I would have been unable to resist the pressure to have babies”. Jean oscillates back and forth 
between her perceived image in the analyst’s mind and what she feels is lacking in this image, as if 
she is trying to bring her analyst closer to her perception, to synchronize. The analyst stays closely 
attuned with a comment that one could read as empathic: “Feeling pushed into something is the 
theme”.  
 
Jean began this treatment due to feeling suicidal after her then-partner accepted a position in 
another city and she felt unable to follow him. It seems that Nahum already had a sense that Jean’s 
nuclear anxieties related to this “taken over or left alone” polarity. “A massive impingement of her 
sense of agency would be our term to describe her experience of being with another” (p.49) writes 
Nahum in his introduction to the case presentation. While the comment is highly empathic, the 
mutual regulatory episode is not enough for Jean to mentalize her sense of being violated, 
humiliated and controlled. Jean agrees with her analyst’s comment and says: “I don’t have such a 
strong belief in myself that I’d know . . . if it would be me or the message hammered in”. A silence 
follows, and Jean asks Nahum about his thoughts, thereby marking that the mutual regulatory 
episode has not relaxed her anxieties. “I can’t help but think how vexing your fear of being 
influenced must be in dealing with me,” says Nahum, staying close to Jean’s anxieties of influence 
and bringing in the dimension of transference. Again, I read the comment as not only attuned but 
as empathic, since it encourages the regulatory episode to open up a space for the exploration of 
this “message hammered in” dimension in Jean’s experience. “When we talk about influence, and I 
say you could hurt me by not understanding, that’s different from my absorbing things from you. 
With all the help you’ve given me, I’ve always felt I had to have responsibility for filtering, presenting 
you with things, seeing where you’re coming from, that’s still an issue,” answers Jean. Remaining 
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close to her therapist’s comment, she openly acknowledges her anxieties of influence and takes 
responsibility for what happens in their relationship. Again, though, she makes an effort at 
synchronization. She wants to mark that she is taking some responsibility for what happens in her 
relationship with her therapist. “It’s unavoidable, isn’t it?” answers Nahum validating her anxieties 
and her perceived necessity of “filtering”. It seems that this mutual regulatory episode lets Jean 
mentalize her fear of being controlled and put her anxieties in words. “I’m afraid I could get to a 
place where I couldn’t control or steer where we’re going anymore,” she answers (p.50-51).   
 
On Tuesday’s session, Jean starts talking about an episode at her work where she has given some 
work to a colleague which he could easily appropriate, although at the same moment she feels 
violated. “It’s a feeling of a rape, a sexual violation, as with Paul,” she says. As I read the whole case 
presentation, I had a sense that Jean, in the mutual regulatory episodes, is able to first mentalize 
her fears of being controlled, and then her fears of being violated and humiliated. In both this and 
the next session, she is gradually able to put into words her feelings of violation and humiliation. “If 
you had that point of view, you could make me feel I won’t be happy unless I have babies. I know 
you don’t think that, you’re much more open-minded than I am, you’re not a 50s Freudian,” says 
Jean. “But you came of age in the 60s and might have the 60s delusion that integrated sexuality is 
the right thing for everyone. That’s why I felt suspicious Friday when you said I didn’t talk about sex, 
I do” she adds. Here, Nahum makes a comment in the written narrative which I think misses the 
point: he thinks that having disabused Jean herself from one reason to fear him, she constructs 
another.  I believe that Jean strives to mentalize and put into words her sense of humiliation and 
violation that her analyst’s comment created on Friday, and that she just strives to put in words the 
fact that she felt abused. She may feel that he is more open-minded than a “50s Freudian”, but she 
is afraid that he may enact a context wherein happiness is equated to integrated sexuality. “[W]hen 
you talk about what happened with Don, you’re talking about your sexuality,” comments Nahum, 
contributing to the mutual regulation by modifying the context which Jean projects. “Yes, you’re 
being too narrow-minded, I think. I talk about sex with you all the time” she says. “You Freudians, 
you think everything is sex,” answers Nahum and Jean laughs. In this segment of the flow, one can 
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recognize the striving for the amplification of information (about which Sander talks). The dyad 
recognizes the projected contexts and strives to understand how they each contribute to this 
‘narrowing’ of the field, the ‘narrow-minded’ communication that lurks in-between. After that 
session, Jean is ready to mentalize and put into words the fact that her analyst’s comment on Friday 
– “Have you realized how frequently sex comes up in your dreams?” -  was felt like a “sexual 
maneuver”; “I felt you wanted me to strip, to look at me, it gave me the creeps,” says Jean.  
 
Nahum and Jean appear to work on the metaphoric level; they see things from different angles 
which gives them a “poetic ambiguity”, as Civitarese and Ferro mention, about their own use of 
metaphor. The notable difference – between Carla and Ferro on the one hand and Jean and Nahum 
on the other – is the way that the therapist and analysand “adapt to influence”, the way they are 
working towards matching the flowing puzzle. While in the Carla-Ferro case, it seems like the analyst 
has a highly structured technique of putting the pieces of the flowing puzzle in order, Jean and 
Nahum’s relationship appears to be more improvisational and more interested in the immediacy of 
their experience, while metaphor and transference interpretations still help the analyst regulate the 
flow of the dyadic consciousness. Returning to the ‘playfield’ metaphor we constructed at the 
beginning of the Experiential theme, it seems like Ferro puts more emphasis on configuring the 
underlying structure of the game into a consistent language, while Nahum puts more emphasis in 
letting the game flow on the grounds of provisional understandings. They both stay attuned to the 
analysand’s/players’ actions. They differentiate on the way they approach self and mutual 




    4.3.2.2                Matching the flowing puzzle of experience through metaphor 
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Some complexity authors refer extensively to Modell’s (2003) work on metaphor and imagination 
as the central mechanism of the meaning-making processes, either at the intrapersonal or the 
interpersonal level (Davis, 2002; Fajardo, 2002; Lichtenberg et al., 2010; Marks-Tarlow, 2008). For 
other authors, metaphor is used theoretically in a much looser and unspecified form. As mentioned 
in the first theme, BCPSG (2010) define ‘meaning’ as the forming of a gestalt in our oscillating back-
and-forth, moving from the implicit to the verbal-reflective in an intuitive grasp. Lichtenberg, 
Lachmann and Fosschage (2010) understand this intuitive component as “affective metaphoric 
processes” (p.13). Metaphor, notes Marks-Tarlow (2008), welds “discrete experiences together” by 
ensuring a “sense of continuity versus fragmentation of the self” (p.93). It “interpret[s] and 
transform[s] experience; mark[s] value; declare[s] relationship; and hold[s] mirrors up to our being, 
doing and moving in the world” (ibid; p.93). It is the “polymodal, two-hemispheric, and 
multipersonal wealth from which the richness of a multiplicity of viewpoints derives” writes Arnetoli 
(2002). It is the “currency of the mind” (p.826) writes Davis (2002) echoing Modell; it is then what 
makes abstraction possible. I find this “currency” dimension of metaphor interesting from the 
perspective of an Enactivist understanding of continuity between the social action and the 
development of cognitive forms. Stewart (2014), for example, reviews Durkheim’s and Marx’s 
perspectives on the emergence of more developed forms of abstract thinking as related to the 
development of monetary economies. According to his analysis our abilities for abstraction as a 
cognitive form reflect the emergence of currency economies developing out of the most primordial 
exchange economies. Metaphor, then, gives us some distance from the immediate exchange, in the 
sense that it widens the experiential realm. Metaphor, blending conceptual spaces, adds 
dimensions to experience, argue Turner and Fauconnier (2003). “Metaphoric processing,” write 
Lichtenberg et. Al (2010), “is an important mode of revealing and activating similarities that are 
crucial to understanding meaning” (p.2). So, metaphor is the way we connect aspects of experience: 
the self to the self, the past and the present, the self to the other through empathic immersion, and 
the self to the world (Davis, 2002; Lichtenberg et al. 2010; Marks-Tarlow, 2008).  
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Metaphors create a ‘figure’ actually out of a ground. At the intersubjective matching, we create a 
figure in our “oscillation[s] between sameness and difference” (Davis, 2002; p.826).  Trauma 
disrupts this oscillating process of ‘figuring’ out of a ground. Trauma, argues Modell (2003), 
collapses the space between differences, turns metaphor into metonymy, which is a “substitution 
of the part for the whole” (p.102). The flopping soles of a twenty-month-old infant’s mother shoes, 
writes Modell, discussing an episode narrated by Isaacs, are not “like” a mouth that “may have 
eaten [her] right up” (p.73), they are experienced as this mouth. The differences between 
experience, past and present, self and other, self and world may collapse, we are in a “psychic 
equivalence mode” (Fonagy et al., 2005), the difference between the symbol and the thing vanishes 
(Segal, 1975). But actually, the trauma need not be so massive as to disturb the oscillating process. 
Even milder forms of traumatic excessiveness, like the one that Sperry describes, saying that she 
“knew the rage that would follow”, or the frustration that Stern describes in his work with Ron by 
saying, “I did not know which I disliked more, him with me or me with him”, are enough to disturb 
the metaphoric process.  
 
Marshall (2011) compares metaphor to “fractal fluctuations”, which like ‘behavioural pseudopodia’ 
search “for the best possible adaptation” (p.71).  Discussing the importance of identification 
processes in the coupling and synchronization of the clinical process, he writes: “I have frequently 
found myself talking and even walking like my analyst” and even if this is not an “acceptable analytic 
result”, the therapist may need to facilitate the “patient’s normal fractal growth patterns”, to let 
the patient temporarily become a “virtual clone or fractal of the analyst” (p.81). Fractals link and 
bridge whilst simultaneously creating boundaries. We cannot clearly separate brain from mind, mind 
from body, body from world, since the boundaries are of a fractal nature (Marks-Tarlow, 2008). The 
self-similar is repeated at different scales but it does not collapse into self-sameness. “How long is 
the coast of Britain?” asks Mandelbrot (quoted in Marks-Tarlow, 2008). The smaller the ruler, the 
longer the distance, it tends to infinity. Fractal dimensionality absorbs the paradox, writes Marks-
Tarlow (2008); it resides between Euclidean dimensions. “The left, logical, linear brain does 
something like Euclidean geometry and simple math – squares, circles and triangle shapes . . .[t]hat 
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simplification of pattern has great advantages in helping us to navigate the physical world, and to 
impose understandable pattern on the emotional world where complexity exceeds our grasp,” 
write Scharff and Cooper (2005; p.208). The right mind is formed by “non-Euclidean shapes and 
geometry” (ibid., p.208). Interestingly, then, beyond this mode that seems to draw clear separating 
lines, there is a mode which connects: brains are minds, minds are bodies, bodies are of the world 
in fractal dimensionality, the paradox is absorbed, the inner and the outer, leak into one another, 
without the boundaries between them vanishing at the same time.  
 
Metaphor for most Complexity writers is this function of ‘pseudopodia’ which tries to connect 
experiences and mental states, within and between people. “We begin to identify ‘fractals’ through 
which we can observe and engage different surfaces of the patient’s experience through which we 
gain access to inner and unconscious experience and an inner world that is constantly creating and 
processing it,” writes Bass (2014; p.671). We must “suspend understanding and pursue the details” 
concludes Levenson (p.20, 1994). The output of an inquiry is fed back into the system and suggests 
the input of the next inquiry, “precisely the process used in computer modelling of fractals . . . If one 
can accept the discipline of not knowing, an expanding sense of reiterating pattern begins to 
emerge” (ibid; p.20). Lichtenberg, Lachmann and Fosschage believe that the closed nature of fractal 
boundaries, “the sense that each individual’s varied emotions, intentions, and goals have the feel of 
uniqueness to that individual” makes our experience of autonomy and individuality possible (p.48, 
2010). The open nature of fractal boundaries, “captures the experience of the self entering the state 
of mind of another or merged with the other” (ibid; p.48). Experiences, then, and mental states 
within and between people, connect through these porous boundaries created by the fractal 
dimensionality of experience. The human capacity for metaphor reflects this quality, argues Modell 
(2003), and it comes independently from language and even before the evolutionary dawn of it.  
 
Holding our beliefs lightly – allowing curiosity about another mind – lets this process of 
synchronization flow beyond the level of attunement; it sets up the synchronizing processes of the 
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flow at multiple dimensions. Through self- and mutual regulation, we can handle the enormous 
forces disturbing the field, and we can transform attunement into empathy. Our desire to be known 
and found, the desire to know and find another mind, may overcome the pull of traumatic attractors 
and allow this expansion of consciousness.  
 
 
4.3.3  Shifting States and the Thin and Delicate Slicing and Sampling of Experience  
 
“Now moments” are types of frames, argues Weisel-Barth (2011), that allow us to “create the twin 
illusions, the necessary fictions, of coherence and of comprehensiveness . . . [a]t least for a moment, 
life seems ordered and complete” (p.372). They “allow us a place to stand, solid ground from which 
to face the confusing and terrifying vitality of our life surround . . . [g]ood frames delimit relatively 
organized and coherent slices of life . . . like a good CAT scan, which, although depicting only a single 
slice . . . may nevertheless contain a wealth of significant information” (ibid; p.372-373). We 
continuously seek patterns in experience, write Bacal and Carlton (2011), and when we grasp them 
they suggest our unconscious theories about our experience. Through this “‘thin-slicing’, the ability 
of our unconscious to find patterns in situations and behaviour based on very narrow slices of 
experience . . .[n]ot only do we premise many judgments on these unconscious theories, we are not 
aware that we are not aware” (p.73).  
 
I will try to frame this slicing of experience that the analyst attains through “now moments”, model 
scenes, theories (Weisel-Brath, 2011) or her unconscious theories - the pattern-seeking aspects of 
her mind - in the context that Brody (1981) sets by considering the clinician as an ethnographer. The 
two roles have clear, profound differences: the clinician works in the context of a helping 
relationship that is regulated by a strict frame, while an ethnographer may have to work for 
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achieving acceptance in a community. However, as Brody notes, both forms of knowing (the clinical 
and the ethnographic) take shape within the context of relationships. Working towards a 
qualitative, clinically relevant process model, I have found the qualitative work of another 
ethnographer, Michael Agar (2013), to be particularly relevant.  
 
Agar tries to build an overall framework for qualitative research built on the reasoning of dynamic 
systems. He develops his reasoning by showing why reliability is a problematic concept for all forms 
of social research, and that we unnecessarily sacrifice ecological validity for reliability in social 
sciences. Complex systems create flowing patterns, and we can never predict the path that a system 
will follow, since relationships among system components are not of a causal nature but are better 
described as relations of catalysis. Predictions can only delineate a bounded space of possible 
trajectories. According to Agar, Dilthey’s focus on the importance of historicity and the “lived 
experience”, and Brentano’s and Husserl’s concepts of intentionality, all point to our ability to only 
I a system empathically as insiders, and as we follow the system in its unique trajectory over time. 
Without openly acknowledging it, Agar takes an Enactivist stance towards research, saying that 
“reality emerges from our action in the world” (p.104). Reality can be known in only one way, “felt 
as a resistance to one’s will” (ibid; p.104). Either in the post-positivistic or in its hermeneutic variant, 
science actually tries to use natural human abilities - induction and empathy respectively - to build 
systematic knowledge about the world, by offsetting another natural human tendency that disturbs 
our observations, that is naïve realism, the belief that one’s point of view is an objective eternal 
truth. What is interesting in Agar’s work is his attempt to compare and match the post-positivistic 
and the qualitative forms of social research on the grounds of Toulmin’s model for an argument, 




Figure 3 Toulmin’s model of argumentation5 
 
Whether you begin from a hypothesis or a research question, you make a claim on the grounds of 
some form of evidence, and go on back it up with warrants and strengthen your claim through a 
qualifier (see figure 3). In a post-positivist hypothesis testing research, the claim is the hypothesis, 
the warrant is the statistical techniques, the backing is the research tradition that has established 
these techniques as reliable, the rebuttal is actually the null hypothesis, and the qualifier is all the 
proposals for further research. In qualitative forms of research, the claim is something that emerges 
from the process and changes throughout it. Instead of following Agar’s views on qualitative 
research, I will try to translate his thinking into the clinical process, going back to Ferro’s and 
Nahum’s modes of clinical work.  
 
Ferro’s claims/ interpretations are warranted by the complex relationships between his 
countertransference and his theory, the supposed narrative structure of unconscious experience, 
which in turn is backed by a clinical tradition. The qualifier and the rebuttal come from the 
analysand’s comments, which lead the analyst to scale the claim or even to change it over the course 




relevant clinician, with the only exception being that theory is a much more integrative mix or is 
specific to a certain dyad, and the qualifier is less strong (it reflects the “hold your beliefs lightly but 
with conviction” sensibility). They both construct metaphors by connecting threads at the fractal 
dimensionality of experience level to offer a complementary or alternative perspective while 
attuning to their analysand.  
 
Actually this is a two-directional process, as the analysand also makes claims on the grounds of 
evidence and reasons. The whole process is one of matching their claims. Looking at it through a 
Constructivist lens, one may say that beyond the explicitly stated claims there are many claims that 
both analyst and analysand make during the process of reaching a shared narrative that actually 
remain unconscious. From my Enactivist point of view, there are no unconscious claims, which is in 
accordance with many Complexity writers. Even if not always explicitly stated, there is a bottom-up 
process which organizes experience and which regulates the top-up processes trying to predict 
experience. The reasons and the evidence upon which this process of formulating claims is based, 
for most Complexity writers, are the other person’s shifting mental states as well as the analyst’s 
own shifting self-states. The warrant for the analyst is, hopefully, this metaphoric process which 
connects aspects of experience at its fractal dimensions. For the analysand it is either exactly the 
same process for those aspects of experience where he can show some flexibility, or the more 
inflexible and rule-based ways of constructing experience out of those known dimensions that are 
‘backed’ by his history. In this theme, we will follow psychoanalytic Complexity clinicians in their 
thinking about this ‘reasons and evidence’ box. I will return to Brody (1981) for a definition of the 
ethnographic work that brings it close to clinical work; it is this “adaptation to the new culture” and 
the “resolution of the crises involved in that work” that “create a kind of personal knowledge not 
attainable through uninvolved observation” (p.296). I will just add that, from a Complexity 
perspective, we are talking about adaptation to influence, which is a two-directional process. There 
are two ethnographers in the room observing relational configurations sharing the field, or learning 
about the “lived experience and intentionality” (Agar, 2013; p.97) of the other subject in a “path 
dependent” trajectory.  
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Among psychoanalytic complexity writers, it was the BCPSG that first wrote about intentions as the 
“basic unit of psychological meaning” (2010; p.166). They define intentionality as the “subjective 
sense of pulling or being pulled, or pushing or being pushed toward a goal or end state” (ibid; p.168). 
They note that whether in action or in words and stories, we naturally and compulsory look for 
motives and intentions that give meaning and coherence to action. Interacting with other people, 
we follow the unfolding of their intentions, and this dynamic “intention unfolding process” (ibid; 
p.169) is grasped intuitively. Lichtenberg, Lachmann and Fosschage (2010), following the BCPSG, 
note that three to five minutes of clinical exchange are usually necessary for tracking the unfolding 
of themes that let us recognize underlying intentions and goals. In this time frame, we can usually 
connect the rapid intuitive process with the more deliberate and articulated form of understanding 
intentions. “Tracking the shifting priorities of motivations or the intention unfolding process is 
central in understanding the wants, desires, and intentions that give meaning to a patient’s actions 
and plans,” they write (ibid; p,73). During each “present moment”, according to Lichtenberg, 
Lachmann and Fosschage, several motivational systems may either conflict, shift from one to 
another, or connect through their fractal porous boundaries. In the three-to-five-minutes frame, the 
clinician can actually make a claim about what has happened in this unfolding process.  
 
Fajardo (2000) makes a similar observation by inviting the clinician to look out for transitions in self-
states in order to understand how the patient self-regulates. Selingman (2005) notes that this is 
what clinicians always do; they “track patterns in flow, with their uneven phases and shifts, their 
stabilities and instabilities, their progressions and regressions, their repetition and novelty, and their 
often substantial uncertainty” (p.294). Bass (2014) emphasises that this is exactly what we do when 
we focus on our own internal experience; we “keep an eye on the cutting edges of our uncertainties, 
anxieties, and shifting personal states” (p.673). Quinodoz (1997) notes that the “functioning of 
psychic life may also be regarded as a dynamical system undergoing changes of state, which can 
shift from one dimension to another in a similar way to strange attractors” (p.708). It is the “quality 
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of the relationship” that “acts as a tuning variable” (ibid. p.708) during these transitions. “Bion” 
mentions Quinodoz, “introduced the concept of the ‘caesura’ to characterise both the separation 
and the continuity between these various states” (ibid; p.708).  In relying on concepts like 
“caesura”, the “fractal boundaries” of motivational states and the “intention unfolding process”, it 
seems that psychoanalysts are trying to grasp this process that unites and separates mental states 
within the person and between persons, during the flow. Through “caesura”, Bion signifies this 
human ability to live concurrently in two different worlds: conscious/unconscious, internal/external, 
symbolic/non-symbolic. The idea of causality in Bion, says Trachtenberg (2013), makes sense only for 
those mental areas that are separate from emotion or refer to the concrete world of things. Our 
difficulty in holding opposites in mind amounts to a difficulty in maintaining a “creative caesura”, 
and this caesura “becomes the vertex through which analyst and analysand may observe the 
phenomena that occur in the psychoanalytical session, and may itself become an object of 
observation” (ibid; p.232). 
 
The “shift” for psychoanalytic Complexity writers is not only the moment-to-moment shift for which 
analyst and analysand make their ongoing claims, but also the shift that occurs in bifurcation points 
and in which the overall frame that directs ongoing claims becomes a new claim that frames the 
process. These claims appearing at the emergence of a bifurcation point are not always 
symbolizable or mentalized; they appear as new perceptions and translate into attitudes, as Coburn 
mentions (2002; 2014). Shifts in attitudes change the context that regulates the flow. I will illustrate 
this by following a clinical vignette portrayed by Marks-Tarlow (2008). Though it originally comes 
from Stephen Kurtz’s (1989) The Art of Unknowing, I am more interested here in commenting on 
Marks-Tarlow’s Complexity reading of the vignette.  
 
The narrative starts with June, Kurtz’s patient, “[singing] a sensuous, sad song about giving more 
to men the more they take” (Marks-Tarlow, 2008; p.140). I consider this perspective on a clinical 
interview to be opening up a conceptual space for an Enactivist consideration of the process. We 
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sing a song to couple with another person, to let an ambience emerge in which the other joins in or 
slips in another melody. Kurtz “immediately sensed the script for their respective roles: June would 
be the star and he her “enraptured audience” (ibid; p.141). June soon “came out of her pent-up, 
private suffering and shot-up as a highly visible star, as an instant success in the music world”. She 
“moved from victim to victimizer . . . [b]ut whether in fairytale or life, mood or stock market, we all 
know that what goes up must come down”. While June was at her most shattered moment, 
“teetering under the pressures of her manic-depressive like, either/or worldview of has-been-
success/now-am-failure, Kurtz made a pivotal intervention”. He had to overlook a “vague 
premonition that he was about to do something wrong” but also “felt compelled to follow through 
on his clinical intuition”. He quoted from a Dylan song: “Τhere’s no success like failure and failure’s 
no success at all”. While there were no obvious, immediate effect, the “remark seemed like a 
torpedo carrying deep subterranean impact”. June described a dream in the next session, where 
she met a “luminous presence” with which she exchanged loving gazes and adoration until she had 
to walk away and was asked to not look back. However, as with Ruth in the Bible, she disobeys the 
warning and faces the transformation of this beauty beyond description into “death’s daunting 
visage”. Kurtz “noticed that for the first time he was no longer magnetically drawn into June’s 
suffering” (ibid; p.141). In the following months, “he maintained his newfound stance” (emphasis 
and italics mine, ibid; p.142).  
 
“[A]buse always involves betrayal” writes Marks-Tarlow, but “betrayal is not always abuse”. “[I]n 
making this paradoxical statement I had taken up a position outside the symbiosis and declared my 
separateness” (ibid; p.142) says Kurtz in an effort to theoretically mentalize his stance. Kurtz slowly 
realizes that he does something new in the field: he brings forth a new context as he is less 
“magnetically drawn” (ibid; p.141) by June’s suffering tune. Before he can claim this attitude, he just 
feels “compelled” to overlook his “vague premonition” (ibid; p.141) that he is doing something 
wrong, which is profoundly related to the magnetic draw that June’s sad tune exerts upon him. 
Where does this new claim – which at first is a stance, an attitude that he adopts in the field – come 
from? He risks abusing June, but June has recognized in her dream that the time has come to walk 
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away from the loving adoration. How does Kurtz ‘sense’ that? What I actually want to mark through 
this question is that our theoretical elaboration on vignettes lacks the mentalizing part of the 
therapist’s experience, and that this is the most important question for process research. Sperry, in 
a clinical moment, decides that it is time to differentiate from John. Kurtz does the same with June. 
What warrants this transition in attitude that transforms the field? In the shifting of their internal 
states, some states sample and synchronize with self-states in the patient, which opens the road for 
a new perception or a shift in attitude. 
 
Pinato and Moia (2012) note that every state is a complex system with its own “self-organizing, self-
stabilizing and self-correcting properties” (p.47), and the trigger for any state can be found in its 
intentionality. They cite Freeman (citing Merleau-Ponty) to explain that intentionality is the 
organism’s attempt to materialize a ‘maximum grip’ on a situation, to grasp whatever it is able to 
deal with. In the flow of shifting states, we observe patient’s efforts to self-regulate and our own 
efforts at self-regulation. During this a bifurcation may appear, where we feel that we can make a 
new claim by either grasping an experience and gradually establishing and mentalizing a newly 
formed attitude appearing in the field, or by making some explicit claims. Pinato and Moia try to put 
such a moment into words. The moment they relate is much less controversial than Kurtz’s or 
Sperry’s change of attitude, but I think it clearly exemplifies the concept of ‘maximum grip’. They 
write: “Miriam decided to go to his place and, as she was hesitantly climbing the stairs, she found 
herself in front of his apartment. As I was listening, I visualized Miriam going upstairs; and in that 
image I grasped a feeling of courage and dignity” (p.50). Miriam was not only unaware of this 
feeling, as the authors mention, but she was almost surprised. This sampling of experience, this little 
slice, finally turns a fleeting perception into an “image subjectification” (p.51). Sucharov (2012), 
discussing this article, writes that “we cannot catch the falling star and put it in our pockets . . . [i]t 
needs to be grasped in the moment and acted on in the space between the visible and the speakable 
. . . if we hesitate the opportunity dissipates” (p.76). The author of the case actually grasped the 
opportunity to mark a space of sensorial elements in Miriam’s narration and mentalize them in order 
to help Miriam formulate an unformulated area of her experience. It is like the therapist is saying, 
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‘You feel proud and dignified and I can see that’. The author also makes clear for us which self-state 
made this sampling possible when he finally mentalizes the moment in which he made the claim: “I 
was quite firm because I wished it to contrast to her sister’s judgment” (ibid; p. 51). Kurtz and Sperry 
make a much riskier attempt at achieving a ‘maximum grip’ in the shifting flow. Reveries reflect 
another class of ‘maximum grip’ efforts.  
 
A reverie process can be much more contorted and mysterious than the direct perception of 
something unformulated within slices of a narrative’s sensorial elements. Cooper (2010) draws an 
example of his reverie: “I visualized Sam at home organizing his surroundings, folding clothes, and 
cleaning up the house. I fell on these kinds of visual images of Sam despite the fact that they did not 
come from him” (p.47). It is not uncommon for him, notes Cooper, to have such reverie images 
while listening to the patients and, as he interestingly points out, these images may be either related 
to a dimension of the transferential matrix or to the therapist’s attempts at defensive distancing, 
what Cooper refers to as “a kind of isolation of affect that allows me to locate the patient outside 
the consulting room or somewhere other than with me” (p.47). In this case, Cooper realizes how 
his reverie reverberates with some of Sam’s comments, that he envied his friend for having this 
directive and opinionated father, and he realizes that what he actually imagined was Sam’s relations 
to his interpretations. A claim the analyst makes, then, - either it is shared with the analysand or it is 
kept private - it may originate on ‘evidence’, on experience lurking in the field, it may suggest an 
effort at self-regulation, or a combination of both; the system’s trajectory can only tell between 
them. In both cases, though, it suggests the “reasons and evidence”, the grounds that an analyst 
can rely on to grasp a claim, a clearer “figure” out of the flow.  
 
I will now turn to another clinical example similar to Mitchell’s ‘outburst out of impasse’, an attempt 
at symmetry breaking. Pickles (2006) discusses this clinical case, presented by Teicholz, to show 
how an oscillation between perspectives and an alternative attitude may bring the couple out of a 
“split complementarity of dominance and submission” (p.310). Derek, an analysand, invites Teicholz 
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to his boat, and Teicholz playfully kids him by “wondering whether he wanted her on his boat so he 
could scrutinize and amplify her flaws as he had scrutinized and amplified those of his latest 
girlfriend” (p.310). Pickles writes:  
“This central relational configuration that Derek learned in his family, and that coalesced 
between Derek and Judy in this alive moment in the treatment, now potentially placed 
Judy Teicholz in the exposed, vulnerable, scrutinized position and Derek in the safer 
aggressive, sadistic position. I think we could say that Teicholz rapidly oscillated among 
listening—experiencing perspectives, as Fosshage (1997, 2003) described; that is, listening 
from within Derek’s perspective; listening and experiencing herself as the potentially 
scrutinized other; and then, with improvisational freedom from her own self-experiencing 
perspective, making what she called an ‘intersubjective interpretation, hypothesizing 
motives for them both’ (p. 67) based on mutual empathy. Implicitly and procedurally, I 
imagine Derek as also experiencing Teicholz’s separateness and flexibility as one who does 
not believe she is required to comply with humiliating, flaw-finding criticism. Nor is she 
defensive, prickly, or in need of criticizing him, as evidenced by her kidding manner … 
Derek implicitly grasped that Teicholz knew a version of his own struggle. Derek 
experienced her strengths and capacities to differentiate herself, while she simultaneously 
remained connected with him” (p.310). 
What Pickles actually describes here is an attempt at ‘symmetry breaking’ and a ‘symmetry 
restoration’. Teicholz brings together two perspectives in the frame of a new attitude, which Pickles 
calls “playful kidding”. As I understand the episode, Teicholz has already ‘figured out’ “aggressive” 
slices in her experience of the narrative on the grounds of Derek’s “scrutinizing” narrative. She 
identifies both herself as the victim and how Derek might have felt as a child. On what “grounds” 
does she “figure out” that a “playful kidding” attitude will help her escape these painful shifts in 
her experience while also helping Derek “figure out”, if not a slice of his intentionality, a painful side 
of his life as a bearable experience under a new context?  
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In Chapter 3, we already had some form of answer to this question. I will summarize the findings at 
this point and discuss them within the context of the developing model of the process. Weak 
alliance predicts that an increase in transference interpretations will deteriorate interpersonal 
problems. Interpretations, on the other hand, may trigger a vicious circle where alliance is further 
compromised and defensive responses consolidated. So transference interpretations, and 
especially the interpretations of hostility and destructiveness, require the holding environment of a 
consolidated alliance. A possible answer then to the above question is that Teicholz sensed that 
alliance was strong enough to bear the burden, or that the burden was not strong enough to 
rupture the alliance to an unrepairable extent. Moreover, one may notice here how the non-specific 
element of empathic understanding merges with the highly specific component of a transference 
interpretation. Even for Kurtz, one may say that he sensed the turning point in the ‘curvilinear’ 
trajectory of the alliance.  
 
The interaction of attachment by alliance is about the felt quality of the relationship, the force and 
the quality of connection and distress upon what happens between patient and therapist. 
Attachment has an effect on how an alliance forms and is maintained, and how the secure base of 
therapy is experienced. Hierarchical patterns emerge during treatment and control the outcome of 
it. The therapist regulates the felt security so that the patient feels confident in their explorations 
inside and outside the treatment environment. Securely attached patients show the fewest 
ruptures. Patients with a preoccupied classification have wider fluctuations and a steeper curvilinear 
trajectory, while those classified as ‘dismissives’ show a clearly marked dissociation between the 
cognitive and the emotional aspects of the relationship and, in their case, the alliance increases 
towards the end. These classifications, though, create straight lines – Euclidean shapes – that are of 
little relevance for measuring the flow. Effective therapy, then, is just a matter of expertise 
developing over the years (Leffert, 2011). But then we accept this “cure happens” sentiment as a 
critical point at which our ability to make meaning out of the process is halted. By this I do not 
actually mean that we can achieve a high level of theorization, I just point to the need to push the 
threshold higher. As I will argue in the next chapter, we need idiographic research oriented towards 
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the process in order to create a new backdrop of knowledge on the grounds of which we will ‘figure 
out’ new concepts that in turn will orient our attention. The post-positivistic paradigm is unsuited 
and unfit to meet the clinicians’ needs, since it forms concepts that are not only removed from the 
flow but look at things from a distance that is irrelevant to a clinician’s specific work with a patient 
on the moment-to-moment flow.  
 
Pizer’s (2005) clinically oriented metaphor of the coastline applies here as well. When you see things 
from a distance, a coastline is just a straight line, but as you approach you face the fractal 
dimensionality of that line. Grasping things out of the flow is the way that all forms of research 
actually work on. The same can be said for therapy. What we need, then, is to go from applying 
Toulmin’s model in an inductive way closer to how this model is applied in therapy, regulating this 
distance as idiographic knowledge increases. For now, I will try to apply Toulmin’s metaphor to the 
other extreme of an inductive understanding, to the fleeting moment from which the analyst figures 
out what happens in the field of experience. Bringing together Bion and Merleau-Ponty may help us 
figure out this process.  
 
           4.3.3.1               The void at the heart of empiricism 
“To transcend the caesura,” writes Priel (2011), “implies experiencing an event’s double nature as 
break and continuity”, it “implies bidirectionality . . . it implies that the barrier separating different 
levels or modes of functioning . . . may be penetrated in both directions” (p.1618), and makes 
“binocular vision” possible. Ogden (2003) describes how a reverie on a childhood scene of his own 
gave him the necessary depth for “seeing and feeling things from inside of the two of us” (emphasis 
and italics mine; p.602). He describes his reverie not as a series of “still images” but as “lived 
experience unfolding” (ibid; p.602). In this article, Ogden uses Bion’s concept of “binocular vision”, 
the simultaneous “perception from multiple vantage points”, to “articulate what we mean by the 
truth in psychoanalytic terms” (ibid; p.597). By using her “binocular vision”, “the analyst creates the 
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potential for a new experience of what is true which is derived from the patient’s 
inarticulate unconscious experience” (ibid; p.597).  
 
Returning to Toulmin’s diagram, a figure, that is a claim or perception appears on the grounds of 
some reason and evidence (experience), because there is an ‘I’, a subject, that warrants this 
perception. Empathy as a form of perception suffers from “the same distortions as any form of 
perception” (p.19) notes Agosta (2015). “The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to 
my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my 
spontaneity, as ethics” (p.43) writes Levinas (1969). It is through the “hermeneutic circle” of 
empathy, notes Agosta, that we are able to escape an objectification of a subjectivity. I will now try 
to show the deep affinities in Bion’s and Merleau-Ponty’s thinking regarding the chasm that makes 
subjectivity possible.  
 
Subjectivity emerges at the gaps between shifting mental states, and at the shifts created by the 
opening of a bifurcation point. As the process of matching the experiential puzzle flows according 
to Gadamer’s (1975/2006) hermeneutic view, the two individuals do not lose their individuality but 
contribute to a new dynamic reality, a “fusion of horizons” (p.305). “We can now see that this is 
what takes place in conversation, in which something is expressed that is not only mine or my 
author’s, but common” (emphasis and italics mine; p.390) writes Gadamer.  I emphasise the 
‘expressive’ aspect of the process, since this is what I think is missing as an explicitly articulated 
element in Bion’s and Winnicott’s thinking, even if it is implied, while it is explicitly stated in Merleau-
Ponty’s thinking. The mechanics of a differential equation, where re-iteration leads to the 
emergence of new forms and a “fusion of horizons”, cannot grasp this Merleau-Pontian Expressivist 
component of human thinking. Beyond the mechanics, the assemblage of parts, the causative 
relationships, that we now come to understand as relations of catalysis, there is another aspect that 
will always remain beyond our grasp, since the truth is not created or constructed -  it is expressed.  
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In Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty tries to express ‘l’être sauvage’ – the wild being (pp. xlix; 
1968) – by escaping the deformations he thinks the Husserlian and Sartrean phenomenology bring 
with them. For Merleau-Ponty, the “origin of phenomena is to be sought at a level deeper than that 
of intentional consciousness” (Novotny, 2014; p.49). It is this “separation-in-relation” (Hass, 2008; 
p.129), the gap that opens between the right hand touching the left hand, this void (l’ écart), that 
makes perception possible. Merleau-Ponty (1993) thinks about Cezanne, “I am a consciousness ... 
the landscape thinks itself through me” (p.67). I who can look, I who can touch, I can be seen and 
touched, my carnal fabric makes perception possible. I can see the forest since it is separate from 
me, a schism opens between the forest and me, but I can see the forest just because the forest and 
I are deeply woven into the fabric of the world, inseparable. In this hiatus, that is “not an ontological 
void, a non-being”, since “it is spanned by the total being of my body, and by that of the world” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968; p.148) a perceiving “I” is possible. “Depth is characterized as this distance, 
difference or gap” writes Foehl, “between figure and field separating them and yet holding them 
together at the same time ...[t]he originality of depth lies in how things are simultaneously present 
and yet mutually exclusive and absent, a “contraction into a single perceptual act ... the dimension 
in which things or elements of things ... ‘envelop each other’” (p.292). We envelop things with our 
perceptual gesture and this is only possible on the grounds of “my being enveloped by them” (Hass, 
2008; p.129). “[W]e might notice” writes Hass “how strange the ‘logic’ of this double- envelopment 
is: it defies our usual dichotomies between activity and passivity, between subject and object” (ibid).  
 
Caesura is a break, an interruption that acts as a contact barrier, allowing unity and separation. It 
implies a bi-directionality. The ‘écart’ is a schism, a void that allows unity and separation, through 
reversibility. The propinquity is beyond dispute. The break, the void, the chasm, is not the subject, 
neither in Bion, nor in Merleau-Ponty, but is what makes the emergence of a perceiving subject 
possible. Depth is the “most existential dimension” (p.267) in Merleau-Ponty, notes Foehl (2014); it 
does not belong to the subject or the object, but it is created in/between. The unconscious is a 
process – it “is not in the subject; it is in the field of experiencing between subject and subject, 
between subject and world” (ibid; p.300). Talking about the unformulated, Foehl notes that it is this 
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“foreclosure of depth, the loss or the failure to develop the crucial gap that allows for shifts of figure 
and ground in the formation of meaning” (ibid). Musubu (1998) studies the shifts in Merleau-Ponty’s 
thinking over the years and the development of what he calls an “ontological psychoanalysis” 
(p.201). “Perception is unconsciousness” (p.208) is what Merleau-Ponty says when defining the 
unconscious in his effort to move away from Freudian representational thinking. Perception is 
“openness upon a field of Gestaltungen” (ibid; p.208), where we perceive figures at various levels, 
and due to the existence of those levels, as the levels themselves remain unperceived and, this is 
the Merleau-Pontian meaning of the unconscious according to Musubu. Musubu and Foehl are 
talking about the same process highlighting different dimensions. The unconscious is the perceived-
unperceived that makes the sensing of depth possible, what brings forth a figure from its 
background, and it is these levels of backgrounding that may scale from the half-perceived to the 
totally ‘consumed’ by the depths. Foehl (2014) adds that the unformulated is the silent background 
that fails to create the necessary depth for things to appear.  
 
Over the course of the process, then, the analyst witnesses the patient’s shifting mental states, as 
efforts to self-regulate and as efforts at mutual regulation at the same time. These shifting states 
synchronize in phase and anti-phase to the analyst’s own self-states. State after state, shift after 
shift, gap after gap, levels of background, let a figure emerge. We experience this dance, but we 
cannot bring into consciousness the whole richness of the flow. We rely on “slices”, as Weisel-Barth 
notes, for meaning-making; we sample ‘thin slices’ through an intersubjective process that may 
expand meaning and the dimensions of experience, or we seek to grasp in the re-iterations of the 
process similarities in the shifts until in a “moment of meeting” these slices become the geyser of 
meaning. Returning to Toulmin’s diagram, there is an ‘I’ or a subject which, following the shifts and 
the levels created by these movements, grasps a figure out of the moving background. This ‘I’ in 
turn – our therapeutic subjectivities – emerges in the flow of our own shifting mental states. When 
Nahum mentions to Jean how often sexuality appears in her dreams, he offers the grounds upon 
which a subjective self-state of “feeling pushed into something uncomfortable emerges”.  All this is 
backed up by her experience. There are levels within this background and Jean, in exploring them, 
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is able to mentalize her own subjective self-state. At the point where Jean is oscillating back-and-
forth to bring her analyst closer to her perception, she is actually expressing her experience by 
shading perceptual levels that let Nahum comment on what appears as figuring out of this levelling. 
“Feeling pushed into something is the theme,” says Nahum and Jean responds, “Absolutely”. They 
both grasp a common figure coming out of the background within this oscillating movement. 
Oscillating Jean, she was scaling the background. She does exactly the same in the next session, 
telling Nahum that he is not a 50s Freudian but a 60s hippie. She perceives him, then, as talking from 
the context of genital and not sublimated sexuality. Nahum scales Jean’s perception by mentioning 
the mutuality of hippie’s genital sexuality.  
 
Though Scaling is the next theme of my Complexity story, for the moment I want to emphasise 
another dimension in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking, which will help us re-think what Toulmin refers to 
as a “qualifier” in his argument model. As a “theme emerges from the background that encloses it, 
it is already experienced as meaningful, and as far as it involves perception of worldly things 
Merleau-Ponty notes that it is invested with some “perceptual faith” (Hass, 2008, p.126) that goes 
unnoticed. The difference, writes Morley (2003), in the case of dreaming and imagination is that this 
“quality of faith is more explicit in the case of imagination” (p. 97) for Merleau-Ponty. Levels of 
‘pathology’ make this investment of the perceptual with faith problematic. It is a misunderstanding, 
notes Morley, to think that the psychotic person believes in “the reality of [his] hallucinations” 
(p.99). He is always suspicious of the reality of both his perceptual and imaginary experience, and is 
in a state of “ontological insecurity . . . a life, without feeling alive” (Laing, p.40, 1959). McGillchrist 
(2012) notes that this form of mechanization of reality in psychosis, what Sass (1992) calls 
“hyperconsciousness” (the doubt about the reality of any experience) reflects the disconnection of 
the left from the right hemisphere. Attention is looped in the world of consciousness and feels 
disconnected from the world beyond, alienating the person from both the world and the 
experiencing self. Any experience lacks this immediacy of meaning, an investment with perceptual 
faith, that comes from the mode of being of the right hemisphere.  
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McGilchrist, reviewing the literature on hemispheric asymmetries, constructs an account according 
to which we relate to the world and ourselves through two different but complementary attentional 
modes, reflected in the workings of the two hemispheres: one mode grasps things out of a context, 
while the other attends to the wide context and connects us to the world. The world of the left 
hemisphere is “dependent on denotative language and abstraction, yields clarity and power to 
manipulate things that are known, fixed, static, isolated, decontextualized, explicit, disembodied, 
general in nature, but ultimately lifeless” (p.174). “The right hemisphere, by contrast, yields a world 
of individual, implicit, incarnate, living beings within the context of the lived world, but in the nature 
of things never fully graspable, always imperfectly known – and to this world it exists in a 
relationship of care” (ibid). The left hemispheric knowledge has the “advantage of perfection” that 
is bought at the “price of emptiness, of self-reference” (ibid). Every new experience, though, comes 
to us through the right hemisphere. Even language, in its incarnate and implicit form, is first 
mastered through the right and then moves to the left to acquire its abstract and explicit qualities. 
Things are connected in the right and compartmentalized in the left.  
 
The idea that we relate to the world through different modes is not new. Even in psychoanalysis, 
Erlich (2003) proposes two basic differential modes of experience, Bach (2006) (following 
Nietzsche) talks about “two states of being” and “two states of consciousness” (an Apollonian and 
a Dionysian (p.111)), and Grotstein (1980) talks about a “dual-track” that organizes infantile 
experience, reflecting the hemispheric differences. Kierkegaard’s (1843/1987) account is the one 
closest to McGilchrist’s. He mentions that his observation of life makes no sense at all, and he feels 
as if an evil spirit has put a pair of glasses on his nose where the one lens magnifies at an immense 
scale, while the other lens reduces at the same scale.  
 
In the next Chapter, we will explore McGilchrist’s perspective on hemispheric differences from the 
point of view of what Downes (2012) calls the primordial structure of experience, and Matte-
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Blanco’s (1980; 1988) perspective on primary and secondary processes as symmetrizing and 
asymmetrizing modes of being. There are deep affinities and complementarities in their thinking 
that are worth exploration. For the moment, concluding this theme, I will just emphasise the 
importance of conflict created during the shifting of mental states, for its importance in letting the 
“eye see itself seeing” (Stern, 2010; p.99).  
 
Downes searches for what he calls the “spatial-phenomenological structure” a “primordial 
unconscious dimension” (p.3; 2012) that organizes human experience. He finds in Levi-Strauss’s 
work, the concepts of concentric and diametric organization or structure, mirroring the way that 
space is organized in some clans and which in turn reflects social hierarchies and communal 
organization. The concentric mode is an ever – expanding circle where each circle does not lose 
connection with the centre. The concentric is actually a fractal way of organizing space and 
experience. Eglash (1999), who has studied this concentric-fractal architectural mode in African 
villages, as well as the fractal patterns in African art, mentions that people where fully aware when 
selecting this mode when building their spaces and creating art, since it is reflected in their deep 
sense of communion. The concentric mode, reflects this knowledge that everything is somehow 
connected to anything else. The diametric mode reflects disunion; it is a square cut in half. It is the 
Euclidean way of organizing experience, where the foreground, as Downes (2012) mentions, is 
detached from the background and loses its original connection.  
 
These projected structures, the concentric and the diametric, are primordial in the sense that they 
organize all experience in a fundamental way prior to any socially constructed reality; they are 
structures of relation but also structures in relation, according to Downes.  He begins his exploration 
of the interplay between these two modes, reflecting on the work of Carol Gilligan, who did during 
the 80’s an extensive qualitative study focusing on female adolescent development in the U.S.A. 
Gilligan (cited in Downes, 2012) mentions that girls experienced the difficult task of accommodating 
their own “logic of feelings” to the “either/or”, the categorical and the causal “if/then” logic of the 
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western civilization. They live in a territory “between voice and silence: if they continue to speak 
from their experience they may find that their voice is out of relationship, too loud, off key, [i]f they 
remain silent they are in immediate danger of disappearing” (p.87). Their solution is connection 
through relationships to avoid the fragmentation. The interpersonal dialogue with a concrete other 
reflects this concentric spatial-relational structure, which helps girls to avoid the fragmentation 
already inherent in the diametric projection reflected in the Western representation of otherness as 
abstract, depersonalizing and assuming separation. Gilligan notices that in order to make sense of 
girls’ experiences, one has to move from the “atomistic, positional, architectural, and highly visual 
language of structure” towards an “associative and musical language of movement and feeling” 
(ibid; p.95). Assuming separation, one needs to explore the conditions of connection. Gilligan is 
especially interested in moral development, so she thinks that starting from separation one needs 
to develop a “logic of justice” in order to connect, while assuming connection one has to individuate 
and separate growing out of an “ethic of care” (ibid; p.72).  
 
Extending Downes’ thinking to the epistemological ground, assuming a diametric questioning of 
phenomena, one may say that we have to rely on causal and necessarily structural relationships 
among disconnected entities. Assuming a concentric viewpoint, we start out from a perspective of 
embeddedness, catalysis and deep Relationality towards figuring out phenomena never fully 
disconnected from their context. Downes is clear that he is not talking about static categories which 
cohere, but about a rhythmic interaction between these spatial-phenomenological structures. The 
projected structures, that unite and separate, suggest the most fundamental “blind spot or void” 
(ibid; p.14) at the heart of empiricism, what cannot be seen while we see.  
 
As mentioned, the matching of the flowing puzzle of experience requires the breaking of a 
symmetry and a new symmetry restoration. The therapist is not able to foresee the moment of this 
breaking – the bifurcation point – but she can work towards achieving this breaking from her own 
perspective. The gaps created between the therapist’s experiential states and the experiential 
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states of the patient – the breaks created by the shifts in these experiential states that allow 
reversibility and bi-directionality – may reflect the dynamic interplay between these two different 
modes of being. We cannot see ourselves scaling the rhythmic interaction between these two 
modes of relating to the world. Each experiential state, though, may suggest a scaling of this 
rhythmic interaction in intersubjective synchronization. There is no view from nowhere, and, as 
Stern (2010) notes, Sterba’s self-observing ego cannot be a detached perch. Stern goes on to ask, 
how can the eye ‘see itself seeing’ ? (p.99).  His answer: through conflict. It is conflict, then, that 
helps us regulate the qualifier, how much we trust what we understand in the flow of the shifting 
states. A state of mind cannot observe itself, notes Stern; it cannot “twist around and think itself 
from an impossible elsewhere – the bootstrapping problem” (p.103). Conflict creates multiple 
consciousnesses; one part of the analyst’s mind becomes capable of observing another part. 
Conflict is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon and, moreover, is not always close to conscious 
experience. I suppose it was some form of conflict that helped Kurtz gradually disentangle himself 
from being “magnetically drawn” into June’s suffering song and bring forth a new attitude. Conflict 
may, in fact, have helped him introduce separation into this unity, or at least better scale the level 
of separation in unity to facilitate the emergence of meaning.                                                
 
 
                                             
                      4.3.4     Scaling for Meaning-Making  
In exploring Scaling as a theme, I actually loaded most of the codes related to symmetry breaking 
and symmetry restoration. I decided to deal with it as a unifying theme, while several subthemes 
appear as independent factors, such as scaling at the level of word meaning, the meaning of 
experience, and affective attunement. As I will soon argue, scaling may reflect the workings of the 
two different modes of being underlying the structure of experience. As a term, it appears in only a 
few Complexity authors’ work, but especially those making extensive references to fractals 
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(Levenson, 1994; Lichtenberg et al., 2010; Marks-Tarlow, 2008; Moran, 1991; Sperry, 2011). The typical 
meaning of the term refers to the self-similar repetition of a pattern across different scales, and the 
homeomorphism of parts in which they repeat the form of the whole. I use the term here in a much 
broader sense, closer to its everyday use. What I mean by Scaling is the attempts that analyst and 
analysand make to match or bring each other closer towards the same level of scale, meaning of 
words, meaning of experience and their affective responses.  
 
While this ordinary use of the concept seems quite different from its typical use in Complexity 
literature, it is in fact not so radically different. As the two members of the dyad strive to 
synchronize, a higher-order system self-organizes that directs the flow of experience. Scaling at the 
level of this higher-order self-organized system involves the self-similar repetition of patterns at 
different levels. For example, working with an obsessive analysand, an analyst may often find 
herself entrapped by the other’s attention to tiny details that block the working-through of 
meaning. However, this is the point of view of the system from the perspective of one of its 
members. Looking at the system as outsiders, we may notice a self-similar pattern of mismatching 
occurring at many different levels. The participant clinician cannot have such an outsider 
perspective, but she can still ‘feel’ the recurring matching and mismatching patterns occurring in 
the flow from her own perspective. After commenting on some clinical examples reported in 
Complexity literature, I will try to show that Scaling actually involves the workings of the primordial 
structures underlying experience. 
 
The most notable examples of scaling in Clinical literature come from narratives of mismatches at 
the level of empathic attunement, repair episodes or episodes showing the fragility of an empathic 
‘hermeneutic circle’. I will briefly mention one such episode depicting the fragility of an empathic 
attunement that repairs itself, effortlessly expanding the dyadic consciousness. Harriet reports to 
her analyst (Joseph Lichtenberg) that, after a pleasant evening she spent with her husband, he told 
her that he was dreaming to take off for the Caribbean. Harriet mentions that she understands his 
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communication as him needing to get away from her. Her analyst remains silent, and she comments 
that she feels that he is unavailable, while he himself realizes that he felt removed from his empathic 
listening attitude and was thinking of the episode from Harriett’s husband’s point of view. He 
comments that his understanding of the episode was markedly different. “I hear him as saying that 
he would like to get away from the difficult bind you told me he feels he is in at work. I didn’t hear 
him as saying he wanted to get away from you. If anything, I think his daydreaming about the 
Caribbean would be a way to continue the good feeling you and he had during the evening,” says 
Lichtenberg (Lichtenberg et al., 2010; p. 114). Harriet understands that her analyst’s comment, even 
if departing from the usual empathic way of getting into things, mark some experiential dimensions 
that went unnoticed in her own view of the episode. Moreover, she grasps the chance to ‘scale’ for 
her analyst, discovering a newfound attitude to let him speak from his own point of view, 
commenting that in the past she would not have been able to assimilate such a comment as it would 
have made her upset, while she now finds it comforting.  
 
The analyst pre-reflectively scales his attitude by thinking from his own point of view, Harriet’s 
husband’s perspective, taking some distance from his priority of listening empathically. Harriet tries 
to scale his unavailability by commenting on his silence. Lichtenberg speaks reflectively from his 
own point of view, bringing forth his subjectivity without scaling for Harriet’s subjectivity as he has 
experienced it in the flow of the system. Harriet feels relaxed and by commenting that she feels safe 
with her therapist’s subjectivity, and thus she actually validates Lichtenberg’s initiative. One may 
comment here on the ‘play within the play’, that is, the fractal, self-similar, dimension of this 
communication. Lichtenberg feels free to dream of a trip to the Caribbean, creating a relaxing 
aspect in his relationship with Harriet and Harriet, after a moment of hesitation due to his 




Davis (2002) notes that there are certain qualities in emotional expression like intensity, timing, 
contour and specificity which help the other subject feel the shifts in mental states. He argues that 
attunement is grounded on these primary emotional sensations and is mediated by the right 
hemispheric orbitofrontal area. He links the attunement process to what Edelman calls primary 
consciousness, and adopts Schore’s perspective on trauma as a disconnection between right 
hemispheric frontal and rear areas. He describes a patient, John, with an “impoverished, self-
flagellating, self-organization (p.831) whose main problem, according to Davis, is an inability to 
experience the self in any positive way at the level of primary consciousness. Davis describes a 
moment in a session where, after a comforting communication by him, John’s face momentarily 
relaxes, abruptly changing again to a state of tension and averting his eyes. Davis thinks of this state-
shift as a sign of “both disorganizing and avoidant attachment” that leaves John “afraid of himself 
and hesitant to respond naturally” (p.832). Davis asks John about this shift in state, and John 
responds that he quite often feels this tension, and that it is either relieved or exacerbated. His 
analyst links these state-shifts to John’s childhood injurious experiences that lead him to a biased 
appraisal of most experiences as ‘threatening’. While John shows curiosity about his analyst’s 
perspective, he mentions that he cannot avoid feeling horrid for all his heinous acts. For John, the 
experience of being empathically understood and recognized does not naturally lead to a positive 
feeling. The positive experience can even be more stressful than the painful but familiar sense of 
self. After some time in treatment, John tells Davis: 
“I want to believe you when you say that I’m not a bad person, but I can’t. It’s hard to 
describe. When pilots are being trained to fly they wear a hood so that they are unable 
to see anything but the instrument panel monitor. At times they feel inverted but they 
have to trust the monitor even though every sensation in their body tells them that 
they’re inverted. Maybe it’s similar with me in that everything is telling me how I am, 
but being here there’s a bit of hope that what I’ve thought is wrong” (ibid; p.837).  
In this example, Scaling is not about an empathic failure and the ensuing repair, but about an 
inability to match the experience at the level of what Davis calls “primary consciousness” (ibid; 
p.824). John, however, describes an emerging sense of trust to his analyst’s perspective. While he 
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does not feel safe yet to couple with Davis and let the system move in a direction of positive 
emotional amplification, he starts trusting his analyst’s consciousness of the system to be valid.  
 
While empathic failures often involve the analyst’s inability to remain a consistent attachment figure 
upon which the analysand can rely, always striving to remain a consistent attachment figure may 
actually compromise the working-through of transferential dynamics. Lichtenberg (Lichtenberg et 
al., 2010) describes such a case in the treatment of Veronica, a woman suffering severe anxiety 
outbursts which had been linked during her treatment to her father’s unpredictable temper 
outbursts. Lichtenberg did his best to remain consistently available to Veronica’s pressing demands 
that went well beyond the limits of an analytic relationship, like responding to her anxiety calls in 
times of severe sleep disturbance. In the narrated episode, Lichtenberg notes that Veronica started 
the session with “sarcastic references to [his] presumed ineffectiveness and disgusting 
conventionality” (ibid; p.6). Lichtenberg erupted in anger and told his analysand, “If what you want 
is to fight, I can fight too”. After a silence, where they both recovered from the unexpected incident, 
Veronica recognized that it was good for her to see her analyst erupt, since that meant she could 
not walk all over him like she did with her mother. Lichtenberg recognizes that the history of the 
dyad had “blinded him to a need to change” – “[c]onsciously he didn’t pick up that the staying 
power of his attachment consistency had come to be regarded by Veronica as a weakness exposing 
him to abuse” (ibid; p.6). Only in looking back at the episode, and after the resolution of the crisis, 
does Lichtenberg realize that there was a “slight change in Veronica’s tone and a sadistic glint in her 
eye . . . clues that her occasional depreciating attacks on him were no longer an expression of her 
largely transference-based frustration and pain, or a response to a discernible empathic failure on 
his part” (ibid; p.6). By failing to grasp the change in the experiential field, he was inviting the abuse. 
Later on, in his reflective recollection of the episode, he understands that he already had a new 
perception of Veronica as needing less “mirroring acceptance” (ibid; p.6), as she had already 
developed a more assertive stance in close relationships. Veronica’s “sadistic glint” was actually an 
experiential response to Lichtenberg’s “attachment consistency” (ibid; p.7). It was a necessary shift 
in the field, on the grounds of which the figure of Licthenberg’s pre-reflective response and change 
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in attitude emerged as a self-state, helping him mentalize and put into words the new perception 
of Veronica. After the crisis resolution, Lichtenberg feels that a benign adversarial attitude would 
better serve the flow of the system.  
 
The micro-scaling at the level of shifting experiential states serves the self-organization of the 
system and the emergence of meaning. Systems produce their own agent of change through an 
autocatalytic process (Coburn, 2007). From this autocatalytic prism of therapeutic change, the 
regular notions of causality are at least irrelevant. Change does not involve an agent acting on 
another and vice versa, but rather the emergence of an agent of change through the recurrent 
feedback in the re-iterative cycles of the system. At the intrapersonal level and in the flow of shifting 
experiential states, we experience directly the flow of this autocatalytic process, but can only 
mentalize the ‘shadow’ of this process. As mentioned earlier, it is through conflict in our experiential 
states that we are able to ‘see ourselves seeing’ or make-meaning. This kind of conflict need not be 
a massive and clearly designated conflict between experiential states, but it can even take the form 
of a subtle ‘mismatching’.  
 
In his reflective recollection, Lichtenberg, understands that he already had a new perception of 
Veronica as more assertive, even if this did not create any mismatch to his ‘attachment consistent’ 
attitude. It took a substantial and risky change in Veronica’s attitude for Lichtenberg to see the 
mismatches that had gone unnoticed at smaller scales. The incident may have further established 
Veronica’s faith that her assertiveness may not be destructive, even when she sometimes violated 
the limits of her analyst’s comfort zone. One may view the episode through several theoretical 
lenses: as the repair of a rupture, a testing of the transference, the development of missing self-
functions, of bringing forth missing relational configurations, or of achieving some insight about 
beliefs and ways of relating. All these theoretical lenses may actually describe aspects of the 
experience. The way that these understandings are employed in the flow of the relational 
experience may shape the trajectory of the system. What is most important, from a Complexity 
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perspective, is the flow itself, the experience of living, investigating, experimenting with what it is 
like to “live in a system that [is] either too ordered or too random” (Coburn, 2014; p.77). Therapeutic 
action, then, may involve living in a system in which emotional experience is the emergent property 
of “combined histories”, “combined current emotional states”, “combined relational 
environments” and which does not “emanate from an isolated, subjective mental apparatus” (ibid; 
p.77). Model scenes or ‘now moments’, slices of experience taken out from the flow, may somehow 
mark the experiential background that makes behavioural and experiential figures meaningful, but 
they certainly cannot capture the expressive dimension of the flow.  
 
Scaling is actually the process through which both members express themselves striving for an 
intersubjective coupling or matching. There can be no model scenes, ‘now moments’ or a ‘maximum 
grip’ out of the flow beyond a process of Scaling. We do not follow the shifting coupled mental 
states and then scale; Scaling and flowing are inseparable dimensions of the process. When the 
analyst thinks or speaks from her own perspective or from the point of view of the analysand – 
when she surrenders to her reverie, attempts an imaginative ‘maximum grip’ or tries to bring 
perspectives together – she is actually scaling to direct the flow. From the moment the analyst 
speaks, both the formative and the informative aspects of her speech unfold, as Andersen (1995) 
puts it. She informs the analysand about the contents of her experience, while at the same time she 
forms the awareness of her own experience. She may actually start realizing the limits of her own 
understanding, even before the analysand contributes to the process. In the flow of the coupled 
shifting states, then, ‘destabilizing perturbations’ occur that have the capacity to move the system 
into new directions. The analyst feels this movement in the mismatches experienced in her own 
mental states.  
 
Scaling, then, happens first and foremost at the level of those micro-processes through which the 
larger experiential cycles that can be captured in narratives occur. Quite often in clinical literature, 
Scaling is described at the reflective level, while the development of an experiential cycle out of the 
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micro-processes that direct the trajectory of the flow is missing. This missing piece is the organic and 
natural space for the practice of process research. At the same time, it is this missing understanding 
that creates the faulty impression that clinical narratives describe the workings of some kind of 
underlying mechanisms. Even in Complexity literature, the concepts have often been used as if 
reflecting such kinds of underlying mechanisms alongside the recognition that change is the effect 
of perturbations driving the system into unforeseen trajectories. I will briefly mention such a clinical 
narrative by Scharff and Scharff (2005), who describe an analytic case, Celia, whose positive 
transference was eventually experienced by the analyst as idealizing, superfluous and empty of real 
function. The analyst experienced the “too-good-to-be-true” (p.219) trust with which Celia invested 
him as a defence against persecutory anxieties and an inner sense of confusion regarding her 
identity.  
 
Scaling, as narrated at the reflective level, in this case involves the analyst’s recognition and 
interpretation of the “unquestioning trust” (ibid) exhibited by Celia. Scharff mentions that his 
analysand, after this change in his attitude, experienced a “slowly increasing inner chaos foreclosed 
because of the threat of disintegration” (ibid). She could no longer maintain a stable identity of 
“good-natured fixer” (p.220) which her analyst understood as a pseudo-depressive solution, based 
on the splitting and rejection of a “resentful anti-libidinal attractor” (ibid). At saddle points, that is 
points at which the person has to do rapid unconscious choices on how to be organized, she 
experienced a “destabilizing cascade of ‘period doubling’” (ibid) which intensified the sense of 
chaos and confusion. The way I understand this clinical narrative is that while it relies heavily on a 
Chaos and Complexity language, it actually frames the flow of the process in a strictly post-Kleinian 
theoretical language. Scaling here acquires a heavy theoretical sense beyond its experiential scent. 
Scharff feels Celia’s idealizing transference as empty of real function, only endorsing as “real 
function” those moments where “terror and the beauty are closer together” (p.223) and 
intervening so that the system corrects for this mismatch. The infinite possibilities of developing a 
system trajectory towards increasing experiential dimensions, expanding dyadic consciousness and 
awareness, increasing intentionality and the sense of agency and finally changing the mutual 
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regulatory patterns, are collapsed into a theoretical scaling imperative. The patient has to move 
from a transference pattern that feels empty to a complex mode of organizing experience that 
flexibly absorbs perturbations. Theory, as already mentioned, can quite often be an obstacle in 
scaling at the experiential level, since it may block our understanding of the system dynamics by 
splitting and attributing forces to certain agents. One may wonder, reading the Scharff and Scharff 
narrative, what kind of analyst’s attitudes facilitated the emergence of an ‘idealizing transference’ 
and how the analyst’s attitude that this was an ‘empty function’ shaped the field. Moreover, one 
may think about how different the system’s trajectory would feel providing alternative contexts in 
the moment-to-moment work of the dyad.  
 
Merleau-Ponty (2002/1945) writes that for each picture in an art gallery there is an optimal distance 
from which it “requires to be seen, a direction viewed from which it vouchsafes most of itself: at a 
shorter or greater distance we have merely a perception blurred through excess or deficiency” 
(p.352; emphasis and italics mine). Scaling, as I understand it, is this striving for optimal or maximum 
visibility. According to the story I have read in the Complexity literature through my qualitative 
analysis, meaning-making presupposes this dynamic relationship of optimal distance from immediate 
experience; the metaphors of the field and the flowing puzzle suggest a polarity that melts into the 
process. We couple and synchronize in phase and anti-phase, and in the shifts of this process we 
respond actively to resistance and conflict by regularly scaling to modulate distance and correct for 
excesses or deficiencies in action-perception. Scaling is a fundamental skill, as I will argue that it 
underlies our effort to enact, to bring forth a meaningful world. All psychopathology is a failure of 
“imagination”, as Mitchell (1993) argues. Scaling, then, is a process term for what our clinical selves 
‘prefer’ to think of as imagination at the phenomenological level. Any psychotherapy may aim for the 
development of different modes of this Scaling skill. Emphasis on the behavioural level scales our 
habitual ways of constructing experience; the cognitive emphasis scales our thinking modes; 
emotionally focused treatments focus on scaling our basic attitudes towards enacting an 
experiential field within a horizon consisted by different levels of affective affordances.  
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No psychotherapy can actually work leaving outside of consideration any of these levels and their 
interactions: our habits, our thinking modes, the way we enact an interpersonal field and our 
fundamental affective attitudes towards experience or the way these attitudes dynamically unfold. 
From my point of view, dynamic treatments strive to grasp an optimal visibility of our radical Scaling 
attitudes, making these distinctions less relevant in the experiential field. Dynamic treatments may 
strive for a radical understanding of our Scaling attitudes in their origins, at a level one can call the 






Scaling and the Structure of Experience 
 
After the realization of the analysis of the complexity literature, the next step was threefold. At first, 
I had to make myself sure that the concepts I brought in or found in the psychoanalytic complexity 
literature, and plugged them into the analysis, were backed by relevant conceptual and empirical 
research in other disciplines, specifically Neuroscience, Philosophy of Mind, Psychology and 
Cognitive Science. Second, during this review process, I was interested in reaching a more coherent 
and comprehensive understanding of scaling as I had read it in the clinical literature. Finally, I had to 
search among available methodologies and see what kind of tools could complement the minimal 
model of the process I already had in mind.  
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This review process led me to an unexpected meeting, the Deleuzian thinking. I realised that 
Deleuze was a pragmatist of the flux and his work made apparently sense to me after my 
familiarisation with the complexity data. Deleuze was a scholar of the multiplicity and generativity 
of life. That was a critical theoretical step away from the Piercian understanding of the recursivity, 
involved in the repeated deductive/inductive cycles that break our habits of knowledge, and 
through an abductive inference, brings perspectives into a new synthesis.  
 
Working on this project, thinking by myself and discussing my ideas with colleagues I recognized 
first hand our tendency to bring the unknown into the known. One may think that this reflects the 
workings of the concentric that brings things into a foundational relationship. But it is exactly the 
opposite. It reflects the workings of the diametric which annihilates differences, to create neat 
categories with clear boundaries, and plot action in causal sequences where intentions come in a 
‘readable’ format. Pierce’s ‘abduction’ asks us to search for the variance, the resistance of the world, 
that will break the habitual ways through which we annihilate differences. Deleuze gives to 
pragmatism its own medicine. Coherence is a measure of truth in our social practices, but underlying 
the actual world of coherence there is a real virtual world of capacities to affect and be affected 
that are more real than the actual (DeLanda, 2013; Bell, 2006). We cannot know the truth of this 
world because this is exactly what this world does; it searches for its own truth, its possibilities. But 
we can explore this world attuning to its movement.  
  
Deleuze, approaching Nietzsche’s thinking, realised that being is an empty fiction; this world is full 
of copies with no original. Underlying resemblance and identity there is a world of multiplicity, a 
phase-space of radical difference (Sommers-Hall, 2013). Hegel domesticates difference into 
dialectics; he sanitizes radical difference (Norrie, 2010). Reflecting the essence of pragmatism, Rorty 
(2006) says: “[t]ake care of freedom and truth will take care of itself” (p.xi). Freedom comes from 
conflict as already mentioned. Getting into things without memory and desire as Bion suggests is 
another road to freedom, but this is impossible we think. Deleuze asks us the impossible, life and 
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knowledge come from the impossible. My natural tendency is to think that Deleuze “repeats” the 
known psychoanalytic “not-knowing” attitude. But he just asks us to avoid this mistake, “re-
cognizing” something as evidence of something else. Words are installed in the body through a lot 
of body work (Protevi, 2012), a history of practices, he asks us to un-install them. 
 
If scaling is this search for an optimal distance from the flow of experience through which what is 
related as separate can be brought into a radical space of relation, then transference is a failed 
attempt to scale from the side of life and growth. Transferring, we scale the different to bring it into 
the known. Certainly, this is not dialectic synthesis. Dialectics, writes Deleuze (2001), is the art of 
recuperating the alienated. “But if our properties in themselves express a diminished life and a 
mutilating thought what is the use of recuperating them or becoming their true Subject?” (ibid; 
p.71).  Obviously, it is agency and the continuation of the organism, yet growth, development and 
the expansion of agency, mind and consciousness belong to the site of life, the radically multiple. 
And Deleuze asks us the impossible of riding the “machine” of difference constantly regulating the 
distance from the flux to sense the movement, instead of recuperating the alienated.  
 
This is a subtle difference, but crucial. In the last part of this chapter, following this line of reasoning, 
I will try to show that Psychoanalytic Process Research cannot do justice to the full implications of 
scaling as I have read it in the practices of Complexity clinicians if it follows the research attitude of 
a Semiotic/Mediational/Constructivist line of reasoning. Looking into positioning and micro-
positioning (Leiman, 2012), into the interplay of voices in the mind’s dialogical space (Ribeiro, 
Gonçalves & Santos, 2012), we look through the known and the formed. Can we become radically 
dialogical and look into the multiple, the space of possibilities, the movement, to understand how a 
system bootstraps? My answer is that we have good chances to reach closer to the mysteries of 
change attuning to the movement. But only if we break with methodological individualism and 
search for the motion of scaling upon the surface of experience that is created in the in/between of 
the intersubjective system.  
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The development of the argument in this chapter serves the three aforementioned purposes: 
reviewing the plausibility of the plugged-in frameworks, expanding the concept of scaling and 
deciding on what methodological qualities are necessary and sensitive enough for ‘perceiving’ scaling 
in the clinical process. The three purposes interweave the one into the other and the discursive style 
serves the “bootstrapping” of lines of evidence and reasoning coming from different theoretical 
traditions into an assembling framework. During the process, I will build on known psychoanalytic 
concepts and concepts I introduced in the previous chapter which I will gradually peel to find in their 
inner layers an action-oriented theory of the human mind.   
 
In this Chapter, I adopt an action-oriented framework since as I will argue, it best settles our 
philosophical puzzles. Mindedness is the action of the organism and it cannot be decomposed into 
regulatory and mentalizing processes. As Pessoa (2013) notes cognition and emotion are inflexible 
labels that classify behaviours, but action is not behaviour, it is what makes behaviour possible, and 
the brain is a non-decomposable part of an acting organism, which by adapting, it integrates itself 
into constantly transformable environments. 
 
In the methodological section of chapter 4, I mentioned that there is a significant debate in 
philosophy regarding the transition of the human mind from the world of sentient to the world of 
sapient distinctions.  We need to re-think the implications of our theories in the context of this 
debate. Mentalization and affect regulation theories are complementary perspectives regarding the 
question of how the mind attunes to the flow of experience. Mentalization combined in its 
intersubjective origins a cognitivist line of reasoning which was compatible with the Ego-
psychological emphasis on autonomous self-regulation. Fonagy (2006) acknowledges that the 
origins of the Interpersonal Interpretative Function are in Dennett’s intentional stance - the 
prediction of the behaviour of rational agents by treating them as having beliefs and desires - and 
Baron-Cohen’s distinction “between theory of mind and empathy” (p.57). The implications of this 
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philosophical background have been seriously criticized during the last century by pragmatists, 
Wittgenstein, Heidegger, analytic philosophers and contemporary enactivists. I think that Hill (2015) 
summarizes well one of the critical implications – for the mentalizing perspective - of this kind of 
philosophical reasoning that treats beliefs and desires as belonging to qualitatively distinct 
metaphysical categories.  In the footnotes of a chapter on mentalization, that he discusses in the 
context of his affect regulation theory, he asks us to notice the “catch22” (p.99) contradictory logic 
inherent in mentalizing. If affect is regulated, then mentalizing can perform its function which 
includes the regulation of affect. If affect is dysregulated, then mentalization fails. This contradiction 
may rather easily dissolve if ‘mentalization theory’ regulates the gap between propositional beliefs 
and affect. Hutto (2012) – a philosopher of Wittgensteinian origins - writing from a radical enactivist 
viewpoint considers the development of the ability to attribute mental states to intentional agents 
in propositional form as the effect of narrative practicing in the context of a community. 
Mindedness, as I will argue, involves a process of constructing – not extracting – invariants in the 
flow of experience. On the grounds of the normativity which is inherent in human communication 
and the cultural ‘genres’ which have a strongly embodied component we learn to practice 
“languaging”. Nevertheless, mentalization has an important role to play here, which is the creation 
of a “predictive” structure which integrates us into a certain social world. Sachs (2015), following 
McDowell, notices that detached reflection is an extremely bad model for discursive practices. It 
seems to be a response as he mentions to the breakdown of the absorbed coping in the Brandomian 
practice of ‘giving and asking for reasons’. Mentalizing then, we rather re-integrate ourselves in the 
normative cultural world of social practices, this giving and asking for reasons practice. However, 
mentalizing does not involve only detached reflection processes. It also involves the way we have 
learned to practice the normativity in which we are integrated melting it into the dynamic event of 
human communication into the autonomous self-assembled interaction order. This skill, the ability 
to give and ask for reasons, whose development is socially mediated, is constantly re-generated 
online in the softly-assembled interaction and at several levels of ‘distanced’ reflection. I will argue 
that we cannot actually ‘detach’ ourselves in an absolute way from the interaction orders in which 
we are embedded. As Tschacher (2014) notes what we understand as cognition is not a decoupling 
from the environment. Thinking seems to work on the same dynamic principles that make 
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perception possible; it may be suggested by emulated sensorimotor loops of action-perception 
cycles. Schizophrenics, I will argue, make the most intense efforts to distance themselves from the 
firm socio-affective forces, detach from the world of others and, retain their autonomy. Mentalizing 
does not seem to be about autonomy but rather about protecting our self-agency (Fonagy et al., 
2004) by making our internal dynamics more sophisticated. The autonomous interaction order 
overrides the separate dynamics of each member, but a level of sophistication in this skill of 
constantly making ourselves aware of our intentions and goals allows us to assimilate the flow 
minimizing the accommodation costs.  
 
Affect regulation theories, like Schore’s (2012), grasp, I think, the most important aspect of human 
mindedness; the fact that mindedness emerges from an interactional and an inter-affective matrix. 
Our ability to experience a coherent and integrated self is reflected in the right hemispheric ability 
to fractalize the boundaries between self-states, an ability which in turn originates in intersubjective 
regulatory processes. Hill (2015), especially, seems to recognize that affect is a dynamic event from 
which emotions as categorical events emerge. The perspective I will defend is very much in 
accordance with this one. Nevertheless, at the same moment, affect regulation theorists leave little 
if any essential room for the ‘mentalizing’ aspect of the process as I discussed it above. 
Psychotherapy is primarily a right hemisphere to a right hemisphere process according to them. 
Meares (2012) makes an effort to bring the best of both worlds together emphasising the interplay 
of two forms of consciousness reflected in two forms of language use. The way I have read scaling 
in the complexity literature makes sense from this perspective. Therapists let their mentalizing melt 
in the flow, and they search for points of minimum tension upon the surface of a mental state in 
which a form of coupling is achieved and the dyad can re-order their practices of giving and asking 
for reasons (recall Jean and Nahum in the rapidly evolving metaphoric process). 
Phenomenologically, scaling is experienced as this process where the dyad finds itself in a 
generative gap which regulates conflict into minimum tensions. “Don’t push a car with its breaks on 
and don’t push one which is already rolling”, the title of Chapter 4 is the take-away message I 
absorbed from complexity clinicians. They try to sense the flow. They know that their predictions 
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and expectations block this process. They go with the flow looking out for points where tensions 
can be minimized and generate new forms of experience. They constantly melt the linear, ordering 
and clarifying use of language into the embodied softly-assembled interaction.   
 
In this chapter, I will inject the diametric and the concentric into an enactivist vocabulary. Narrativity 
involves the human tendency to immediately attribute a causal and intentional ‘structure’ on the 
flow, making actions look as causally inter-related. Mentalizing rather involves the ability to shift 
perspectives and re-consider that which is immediately given to perception, and in this sense, it 
facilitates the maturation of ‘narrativity’ in the development of the system’s trajectory. Narrativity 
is not representation, it is a skill. Hume already knew that induction and causal thinking are habits.  
Analytic philosophy, either by thinking regularities or counterfactuals, did not find an adequate way 
to respond to the Humean scepticism about induction (Pritchard, 2016). Complexity clinicians 
constantly try to disengage from their narrativity and make it more sophisticated. Mentalizing is 
softly-assembled in the unfolding of the autonomous interactive order.  
 
From noticing that plaque re-appears on our teeth and we need to prioritize a visit to the dentist, to 
noticing the intentions of our interlocutor, we need a fairly stable and flexible predictive hierarchy 
of our goals and intentions. We need to know what is important for us in each situation, how 
situations integrate the one into the other and how actions are prioritised according to this 
hierarchy. The linear use of language that orders the relations between subjects and predicates 
serves such an ordering function. But this ordering function has to be flexible enough to 
accommodate to the flux of experience. It is through accommodation to the flux that we make this 
predictive hierarchy more complex and comprehensive and mentalizing thrives as a skill through 
this achievement. Clinicians may be more prepared to enter into the rapidly unfolding dynamics of 
the interaction order having achieved an adequate level of sophisticated skills in making themselves 
self-aware of their “predictive” hierarchies. However, the flux cannot be predicted since there are 
strong forces in the autonomous developing dynamics of the interaction order that couple our 
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bodies into forms of experience that we cannot regulate. Upon the surface of what Lichtenberg 
experienced as an empathic stance, Veronica was coupling both with her dependency needs and 
her devaluation for her mother’s weakness, a weakness that exposed the mother to abuse. 
Lichtenberg sensed the tension only once his analysand played the script for him.  
 
This sensing ability comes from the concentric, the mental space where we can bring things into a 
fundamental relationship and re-connect them. In this chapter, I employ the enactivist term 
metaphoricity for this process where we can relax the predictive hierarchy of goals and intentions 
and sense what happens in the autonomous interaction order and how we can best act to satisfy 
our intentions and goals. Veronica had to escalate her attacks for Lichtenberg to sense that his 
attitude afforded abuse in the interaction. Lichtenberg’s predictive hierarchy was catapulting the 
escalation in Veronica’s affective expression into his ‘intentional priorities’ of being a caring 
companion. He could not notice the transformation on the surface of experience because his 
metaphoricity, his sensing antennae, were overridden by the predictive dynamics. Complexity 
clinicians set themselves into this impossible task of constantly relaxing their predictive dynamics 
to find themselves into the flow, and this is the workings of scaling.  
 
As I will argue, we become gradually self-aware of our intentions and goals, and how they relate to 
outcomes, in relational episodes. This process involves the development of our self-agency (Knox, 
2010). It seems that we grasp these relational episodes, as whole scenes, involving particular styles 
of relating; particular ‘genres’ on the grounds of which we recursively develop a style of relating. 
Our ability to give and ask for reasons intra-personally and interpersonally develops in these scenes 
hand-by-hand with an awareness of our intentions and their outcomes. The stability of the self 
requires both this ability to be self-aware of our ‘predictive dynamics’ and the ability to flexibly sense 
the dynamics of the scene. Discussing reverie in the previous chapter, I mentioned that regulation 
and imagination go side-by-side. The ability to move smoothly from a self-state to another is 
important for sensing the flow. A mother that hurts by denying us this delicious ice-cream and a 
	 213	
mother that loves by offering comfort cannot be integrated in the space of giving and asking for 
reasons but only in the space of fractalizing boundaries, where the affective waves of embodied 
synchronization bring both events into the space of an underlying concentric rhythm.   
 
My answer to the question “how we get into the sapient distinctions”, the “Space of Reasons”, is 
that we are already there, right from the start, because as I will argue, the space of reasons is the 
space of action, the space of enactments, the space of relational episodes. Brandom (2009) 
rightfully praises Hegel for bringing back rationality from the transcedentalised Kantian 
apperception into the space of social practices and the story of mutual recognition. In the first part 
of this chapter, I defend the position that from interhemispheric lateralization in fishes to the human 
mind, it seems that the two modes, the diametric and the concentric, reflect the evolution of real 
interactions and social practices and not the opposite.  Mindedness seems to be action-oriented. 
‘Languaging’ is a unique human skill, a distinct kind of practice. I think that Tomasello (2014) 
beautifully summarizes what makes humans able for this distinct kind of practice, our ability to trust 



















                              5.1 Inter-hemispheric Differences and the Structure of experience 
 
 
Schore (2012) builds a model of the clinical condition from the psychoanalytic point of view, which 
gives primacy to the processing of enactments. What happens in the consulting relationship, 
according to Schore, is not the bringing into consciousness of unconscious beliefs and motives, but 
the “restructuring of unconscious itself”, the increase of “complexity of the right brain affect-
regulating system” and the “integration between cortical and subcortical brain systems”. He argues 
that “being with the patient” at times where his core implicit self disintegrates, at times where he 
experiences dysregulating affects arising within the context of the relationship, suggests the 
primary therapeutic mechanism. The left hemisphere manages and tolerates moderate levels of 
arousal, an optimal range appropriate for experiencing relational events under familiar and ordinary 
circumstances. Dissociation, according to Schore, may facilitate this left primacy by disintegrating 
the right cortical/subcortical axis, thus undermining the perception of external stimuli and their 
integration with internal felt somatic markers and felt experience. The therapist’s ability to stay in a 
right brain dominant state and her oscillating attentiveness to the cues that signal a “change in 
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state, and on nonverbal behaviours and shifts in affects” (p.43) may be essential for the resolution 
of an enactment. Schore understands the function of the right hemisphere as reflecting aspects of 
the traditional psychoanalytic primary process functioning, in line with other writers coming from 
Complexity literature (Bacal & Carlton, 2010; Miler, 1999). It is mostly involved in the perceptual 
processes regulating our relations to the environment, making rapid evaluations based on the 
nonverbal expressive functions of communication, and it regulates the extremes of arousal and 
specific affects while it is shaped by the implicit aspects of experience. Either the high arousal fight-
flight dysregulated autonomic states or those shame-inducing, down-regulating, low arousal, 
autonomic states are managed by the right hemisphere.  
 
Dissociative disconnection protects the psyche from such intolerable experiences related to early 
attachment trauma, however with the price of a psychic devitalization. The dissociative patient, 
notes Schore, attempts to stay in a relationship with the environment, while at the same time 
keeping the need for more intimate relatedness sequestered. He makes clear that the right 
hemispheric disconnection that determines dissociation reflects what Bromberg (2006) calls “not-
me” states. The experience of ‘psychic death’ and the inability to sustain an inner sense of aliveness 
are extreme forms of dissociation related to certain character pathologies like schizoid 
organizations. Stern (1997) proposes a continuum of ‘dissociation’, ranging from what he terms 
dissociation in the strong sense, where certain relational configurations are actively rejected and 
remain unformulated, to narrative rigidity, where meaning-making is bound along certain lines.  
 
Probably all forms of dissociation reflect different forms of disintegration in the right hemisphere 
(Schore, 2012; Meares, 2012a) or a “functional comissurotomy” (McGilchrist, 2009; p. 236) that is a 
disengagement of the two hemispheres. Dissociation in its more general sense as used in the 
relational literature, however, is a descriptive category of defence mechanisms which may involve 
multiple and differentially instantiated pathways of disintegration and disconnection. It seems as 
though the right hemisphere has a distinct role in integrating bodily, affective, perceptual and 
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cognitive processes that seems qualitatively different from the left hemispheric integrative 
functions. On the grounds of neuroscientific evidence, I will support the hypothesis that the right 
hemisphere fractalizes the boundaries between experiential states, while the left hemisphere draws 
clear and distinct boundaries. We may relate to the world through what Downes calls the 
“primordial dance” between a mode that keeps things connected as part of a whole and a mode 
that divides or, as Matte-Blanco (1988) puts it, a mode that symmetrizes and a mode that 
asymmetrizes.  
 
According to my hypothesis, the two hemispheres have no essentialistic qualities, but each primarily 
reflects one of those modes. Moreover, the hypothesis that we are made of two independent minds 
is rather unsubstantiated by evidence, and it may reflect an Essentialist way of thinking. It is in the 
gap, the caesura, the écart, opening between these two modes and the ensuing reversibility that a 
living and subjective experience of the world becomes possible. The gap does not simply reflect the 
anatomic hemispheric division, but functional divisions between and across the hemispheres as well, 
which manifest the evolutionary history of the species and the history of the organism’s interactions 
with the environment. The well-studied structural and functional asymmetries, reflected in the 
known analytic-versus-holistic style of processing that each hemisphere is supposed to contribute, 
are rather emergent on the basic structural architecture of each hemisphere (Tucker, 2007). The 
evidence is inconclusive regarding the characteristics of network architecture like small-worldness 
and betweeness-centrality, but it is already known that the hemispheres exhibit significant 
differences at the level of network architecture (Cayenbergs & Leemans, 2014; Ituria-Medina et al.; 
2011; Takeuchi et al., 2010). On the other hand, interhemispheric differences suggest only one 
expression of this primordial tension of the human organism to connect and divide. Even at the level 
of functional neural networks, independent of their hemispheric origins, metastability shows 
exactly this intermediate quality of neurons: a state of readiness to either connect in a functional 
network or segregate (Kelso & Tognioli, 2009; Tognioli & Kelso, 2014).  
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Beyond the cell and the inter-hemispheric level, there is also this frontal-back and upward-
downward level of organization in the human brain. Solms and Turnbull (2005) justly criticized 
earlier approaches that tried to connect the right hemisphere (RH) to the unconscious and the left 
hemisphere (LH) to the Freudian ‘Ego’, since it seems that it is the prefrontal part of the brain that 
plays the role of binding the “free energy” of the unconscious (Carhart-Harris & Friston, 2010). 
Unfortunately, they completely neglected the important differences between the hemispheres 
from an understanding of the unconscious. My hypothesis is that what we clinically understand as 
‘unconscious’ has little to do with the human brain as such, but develops during social interaction. 
However, it somehow reflects the constant dialogicality advanced in and between the frontal-back, 
the up-down and the left-right levels of the brain and the way these levels couple to the external 
world. From my point of view, the way that the left-right dialogic responds to the coupling 
affordances of the world and brings them forth by acting in the world, is essential for getting into 
the workings of the structure of experience on a less mentalistic and mechanistic mindset. Salvatore 
and Zittoun (2011) criticize the self-psychology Intersubjectivists for stripping psychoanalysis of its 
dynamic powers. Though their criticism is somewhat justifiable, I take the opposite view: 
Relationals, Intersubjectivists and the Complexity writers, bring psychoanalysis back from its 
mechanistic shadow into real life by striving to bring the Freudian “signal anxiety”, a mediational 
construct, effective only for a linear understanding of communication and experience into the 
primordial continuity of our affective life.  
 
McGilchrist (2009), building on the most extensive review of the literature on hemispheric 
asymmetries, concludes that the LH constructs a mechanistic world that abhors ambiguity, 
preferring abstract isolated entities connected through causal relations, but which is ultimately 
lifeless. The right contributes to the living, incarnate, implicit, polysemous and concrete perspective 
on the world. Trimble (2007), a neurologist with an interest in hemispheric differences, reports that 
when he once asked Cutting, a psychopathologist with special interests on lateralization, about the 
function of the right hemisphere, he responded: “Life, it is about Life” (p.213). McGilchrist has 
shown that each hemisphere contributes its own unique perspective on the organization of what 
	 218	
we understand as mental functions. Both do language, reasoning, imagination, take a distance from 
immediate experience, but in a different way. What strikes me as most important in McGilchrist’s 
work is the way he perceives the different kind of attention that each hemisphere contributes in our 
relationship to the world. Attention’s ontological status, notes McGilchrist, is prior to any other 
mental function; it is a way of acting in the world, intrinsically a relationship. The LH seems to orient 
us towards a narrow focus, mainly for the purpose of grasping, getting and feeding, while the RH 
yields a broad, vigilant awareness of new events in the world.  
 
Keeping that in mind, I will try to explore the different ways in which each hemisphere contributes 
to experience. I will start by briefly reviewing hemispheric differences in affective processing. The 
literature on hemispheric asymmetries in emotional processing supports the hypothesis that the LH 
is only indirectly involved in emotional processing through information received by the RH (Abbott 
et al., 2013; Shobe, 2014). The RH is directly involved in the appraisal of real world concrete events 
and it is solely responsible for processing, comprehending and generating the feelings related to 
primary interpretation of emotional stimuli. In contrast to the old proposed valence hypothesis, it 
seems that the right hemisphere is capable of generating both positive and negative emotions (Najt 
et al., 2013; Sedda et al., 2013) while the left shows an undeniable bias towards positive emotions 
(Abbott et al., 2013). It seems that while the left has no role in primary emotional identification, it 
contributes to the regulation of negative emotion by re-appraisal (Kim et al., 2012), hence its bias 
towards positive emotion processing. It is interesting that the right amygdala appears more 
involved in the processing of nonconscious stimuli, while the left is involved in the processing of 
conscious stimuli (Aggleton & Young, 2000). Schobe (2014) proposes a hypothesis according to 
which the phylogenetically newer left hemisphere added some emotional regulation strategies and 
a strong positive bias to the original emotional processing capacities of the right.  The right, while 
certainly capable of positive emotions, is generally more biased towards negative appraisal of 
ambiguous stimuli, even if it is more “truthful” to the experienced reality (McGilchrist, 2009, 2010; 
Shobe, 2014). However, it is certainly positively biased towards familiar stimuli and especially to kin, 
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a clear evolutionary advantage for bonding (Noriuchi et al., 2008; Minagawa-Kawai et al., 2009; 
Shobe, 2014).  
 
It seems that while the right is biased towards bonding, the left is more biased towards social 
cohesion (Tops et al., 2014). Henry (1997), discussing the neuroendocrinological hemispheric profile 
and responses, had proposed a right bias towards species-preservation and a left bias towards self-
preservation.  In an oversimplification that almost delves into essentialism, which I will subsequently 
take the pains to ‘correct’, I propose a view according to which the right hemisphere mediates 
bonding, affiliation and early experience, while the left mediates our processing towards the oedipal 
experience, that is, the continuous and dynamic management of the conflicts created in a network 
of complex interpersonal relationships from the need to control and be self-directed while not 
sacrificing belongingness altogether. Using Sidney Blatt’s (2008) terminology regarding the 
polarities of experience, the right primarily reflects our anaclitic organization of experience, while 
the left primarily the introjective organization of experience.  
 
The dominance of the right hemisphere in the first year of life is a hypothesis that has brought 
consistent results during the last few decades (Chiron et al., 1997; Schore, 2015). Reviews and 
original experimental evidence using differential paradigms6 all seem to support the view that the 
right hemisphere mediates affiliation while the LH deals with our need for autonomy, mastery, 
power and control (Hecht, 2013). Among this increasing mass of interesting studies which show a 
clear and neat distribution regarding the mediation of our need to affiliate and control, I think that 
those studying hemispheric differences in resting-state frontal activity may help us understand how 
our higher mental functions are oriented towards social reality. Koslov et al (2011) have shown that 
people with increased frontal activity at resting states seem better equipped to handle social 





hemispherical frontal resting state activity is correlated with higher empathy scores. Another study 
on two split-brain patients showed that their right hemispheres were more disturbed recalling 
histories of childhood loneliness and bullying than their LHs (Schiffer et al., 1998).  
 
Hecht (2012) offered us another interesting review discussing our basic affective attitudes towards 
social reality. He provided a host of evidence showing that the LH mediates an optimistic stance that 
may lead to uncalculated risks and disastrous recklessness, while the right mediates pessimism 
which, if unmediated, may lead to extreme passivity, exacerbation of low mood and an inability to 
act or decide. It seems that we do not need to drop the Valence hypothesis altogether, as mentioned 
earlier, but rather re-integrate it within a new context. Mohr, Rowe and Crawford (2008), in a visual 
hemifield experiment using attachment related words as stimuli, have shown a differential 
hemispheric contribution to positive and negative emotion processing in the opposite direction to 
the predictions made by the Valence hypothesis. Positive attachment words yield fast recognition 
in both fields while, RH seems to recognize negative words alone but in a slowed and less accurate 
fashion. The authors point to the RH preferential role in processing self-referential stimuli and 
suppose that findings showing a preferential role for the RH in processing negative stimuli would 
be accentuated in an avoidant dispositional attachment style. It seems then that the RH is capable 
of mediating positive emotions, but generally mediates on more pessimistic stance towards reality 
that may serve our openness to the perspective of another.  
 
Probably then, our most nuanced attitudes towards solving the complex and dynamic interpersonal 
problems of everyday life, the ‘Penelope’s loom’ according to Mitchel, lie in the complex 
dialogicality of two attitudes, a need to belong and rely on the other for our wellbeing and a need 
to self-direct our own fate and master the environment. For an analyst working from a relational-
interpersonal perspective, the complex dialectics of control and closeness are not actually ‘news’, 
which is why I want to move the emphasis towards the generative dimension of the unconscious. 
In order to do so, we need to take into account the less mentalistic perspective of this complex 
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dialogicality, focusing on what happens at the level of the minimal mind that comes from the body. 
Wilkinson et al. (2010) show that people who feel powerless are more likely to show a 
pseudoneglect phenomenon of left lateral visual bias, evident in the way they walk down a narrow 
corridor and bisect the middle line. The authors conclude that power induces hemispheric 
differences in visuomotor behaviour that affect the way we interact with the social and the physical 
world.  
 
The lateralization of courtship and aggressive behaviours in fishes, reptiles and amphibian 
vertebrates, is highly shapeable according to the environmental conditions (Bissaza & Brown, 2011). 
Hempispheres do not carry qualities of their own that shape behaviour in social contexts, but 
develop in accordance with their social context in a dynamic way so as to serve the animals’ needs. 
Both Rogers (1989) and Bissaza and Brown offer an adaptive explanation of this flexibility, especially 
for animals which rely on social synchrony for their survival, giving them the advantage of 
coordinating their predatory and mating behaviours. As discussed, though, laterality seems less 
flexible in mammals at the overall functional level. Crow (1997) notes that schizophrenia may 
suggest the price we pay for having language. From my perspective, as I will show in the next part 
of this chapter, schizophrenia may instead suggest cost of having stable and ordered societies, in 
which we coordinate our relationships according to certain rules. I do not consider the two 
perspectives as incompatible, since language may actually reflect this ordering and coordination 
aspect of human stable colonies. What I want to emphasise at this point, though, is that there is a 
basic relationship between laterality and our social practices, which eschews the rich symbolic 
environments in which humans live. Social practices shape functional laterality and functional 
laterality serves and changes social practices.  
 
There are three complementary perspectives which may help us bring forth a more nuanced picture 
of how laterality shapes our coordination in rich human symbolic environments. The first 
perspective is based on Kuhl’s (2000) Personality Systems Interaction. The second builds on Tops et 
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al’s (2010) Predictive and Reactive Control Systems (PARCS). Finally, a third perspective, coming 
from the work of Russel Meares (2012a,b), tries to understand the implicit self in terms of right 
hemisphrical integration.  
 
Kuhl, Quirin and Koole (2014), on the grounds of PSI theory, propose that the RH mediates a Jungian-
Rankian-Winnicottian integrated self, while the LH serves what we understand as the ‘Ego-
consciousness’ or ‘conceptual’ self, which is too narrow to ever fully grasp the complete self. The 
conceptual self roughly corresponds to the psychoanalytic Ego; it is mediated by an analytic 
processing-style; it is relevant for serving action-plans in a step-by-step fashion; it is easily 
communicated to others and incorporates their expectations while it can also be assessed in explicit 
self-evaluations and self-efficacy measures. One can easily imagine the conceptual self as depicted 
by the authors as a virtual self ‘sent out’ to navigate symbolic environments, which is in fact my own 
perspective on the matching of the flowing puzzle of experience as well. The integrated self can 
never be fully conscious, but brings all relevant personal experience to the center of attention in a 
concrete situation. The conceptual self strives to reduce ambiguity for its analytic purposes, while 
the integrated self holds all the ambiguity open and accessible. Clearly the analytic mode is at a 
disadvantage trying to satisfy many conflicting boundary conditions related to the motivational and 
emotional states of the self and others. Temporal connectedness - the present, past and future 
horizons - are facilitated by this integrational, RH-based self. Although inferior in logical deductions, 
the RH seems superior to the LH in making intuitive, holistic judgments and detecting multiple 
semantic associations. This is the overall context I adopt for the integration of the three 
perspectives mentioned above, since it seems to be the point where they all meet and where the 
empirical data converges. The unique component that the PARCS theory brings into our discussion 
is the emphasis on the interplay between a predictive and a reactive system in relation to 
experience, along with some interesting proposals that may help us to rethink mental functioning 
in less mentalistic and representational terms. Instead, we might see it as something coming directly 
from the body and the social interaction. We will turn to Meares to understand how what he calls 
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‘subject consciousness’, or the ‘integrated self’, mediates the background state of our going-on-
being, which he argues is not a composite of discrete states but a seamless continuity. 
 
Kuhl’s perspective explores the importance of connecting the left-right to the front-back axis, 
proposing a “rational” or high-level RH holistic processing system - the Extension Memory (EM) - 
along a high-level LH - the Intention Memory (IM). On the other hand, he proposes an “irrational” 
or low level LH-based analytic system - the Object Recognition (OR) - along a low-level mediated by 
the RH - the Intuitive Behavioural Control (IBC). IM serves thinking and planning, while EM serves 
experiencing in its richest form. OR is sensitive to discrete events, discrepancies and contradictions, 
while IBC provides the intuitive routines for action. Inferences about the necessary courses of action 
are mediated by the LH dorsolateral PFC, while possible courses of action are processed in the RH 
ventrolateral PFC (Kaschel & Kuhl, 2004; Kuhl & Koole, 2008). It is the broad and vigilant attention 
perspective of the RH, then, that makes temporal, semantic and affective connectedness possible 
and relevant for an open and fractal attitude towards experience.  
 
While PSI is actually a mechanistic theory of personality, it escapes the problems created by most 
mechanistic theories building on the premise that affects play a modulatory role by regulating the 
integration between higher and lower levels. So volition is facilitated by positive affect, modulating 
the inhibition IM exerts on IBC, and while downregulation of negative affect either by external 
support or through the modulatory activity of the EM itself, facilitates the integration between IM 
and EM. Moreover, downregulation of negative affect, either by external support or by the activity 
of EM itself, exerts inhibitory control over the OR system. In turn, this self-initiated modulation 
exerted by EM may act to modulate the inhibition IM exerts on IBC (Kaschel & Kuhl, 2004; Kuhl & 
Koole, 2008). Showers and Kling (1996) show that efficient integration of positive and negative self-
attributes in the schema of the self facilitates coping efficiently with negative affect. Kuhl, Quirin 
and Koole (2014) note that the ability to downregulate negative affect facilitates the 
accommodation to a negative experience instead of assimilating the experience to the existing 
	 224	
schema of the self, thus extending the experiential view of the self. These authors also cite evidence 
showing that sensitivity to negative affect can be an advantage when accompanied by an ability to 
downregulate negative affect, lessening the risk for psychopathology when compared to those with 
a low sensitivity to negative affects. According to PSI theory, strong emotional reaction enhances 
broad attention and integration of the experience into the self, once the negative affect has been 
efficiently downregulated. Kuhl, Quirin and Koole (2014) then offer the conclusion that self-
confrontational coping is favourable for adjustment to adverse experiences compared to a 
defensive evading of painful experience. In short, the development of the RH-integrated self has an 
important effect on downregulating negative affect and increases our sense of agency through its 
modulatory effects on IM.  
 
PARCS theory tries to remain closer to neuropsychological evidence and constructs a perspective 
according to which behaviour is controlled by two systems: a reactive and a predictive control 
system. We rely on predictive control in familiar circumstances, while we turn to reactive control to 
handle novelty. The ventral-reactive system involves behaviour and emotional control in changing 
environments with increased novelty and low predictability, while the dorsal-predictive system 
involves control in stable, familiar and highly predictable environments. What is highly interesting is 
this theory’s attempt to distinguish between different forms of self-awareness, one related to the 
Default Mode Network (DMN) (Raichle et al., 2001) and the other related to Anterior Insula (AI). The 
DMN is a network whose functional connectivity integrates through development (Fox et al., 2006; 
Kelly et al., 2009) and it has been shown to be active during self-reflection, prospection and social 
cognition (Buckner et al., 2008). The structural spine of this functional net seems absent in infants 
(Fransson et al., 2007), and Carhart-Harris and Friston (2010, 2012) propose that this fits Freud’s 
definition of the Ego. Carhart-Harris and Friston (2010) avoid making hypotheses regarding the inter-
hemispheric differences in DMN. The proposals advanced by Kuhl and his colleagues regarding the 
EM may help us as a useful heuristic on differentiating between the left and right aspects of the 
DMN. PARCS, while not making any explicit proposal regarding inter-hemispheric differences at the 
DMN level, suggests a clear and well-supported hypothesis regarding a hemispherically ‘lateralized’ 
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role for the AI/Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG), which acts to disrupt predictive control. The right IFG is 
involved in the detection of salient, novel and unpredicted stimuli and their appraisal. The left IFG 
controls elaboration and scrutiny of novel information for consistency with predictive schemes and 
may lead to ruminative processing.  
 
In general, the LH controls the assimilation of new experience into the existing schemes, while the 
RH mediates the need to accommodate to new experience. The left IFG plays an important role in 
affective labeling, elaborative re-appraisal and inhibition of interference. It is, in a sense, the switch 
that updates predictive schemes. Tops (2014) - building on a rather simplistic, but heuristically 
useful, distinction between proactive and reactive animals - builds a theory according to which the 
left reactive system mediates proactive attitudes, while the right reactive system mediates reactive 
attitudes. Proactive animals flourish in stable colonies and use their aggression to maintain 
hierarchies. Reactive animals flourish in unpredictable environments and prefer migration. 
Conscientiousness, notes Tops, combines the competitiveness and rigidity of proactive personality 
with social constraints. The left IFG secures the low-level transfer of novel information and the slow 
revision of social, moral rules and internal schemes. There is, in fact, a mixture of reactive and 
predictive control, since aggressive impulses have to be controlled. Tops (2014; Tops & Boksem, 
2010; Tops & Wijer, 2012) reviews a host of evidence showing that LH-IFG activation is related to the 
transgression of social norms and rules, and the reappraisal of emotions drawn from social and 
moral origins, while the RH-IFG is more implicated in the reappraisal of what we understand as 
‘basic’ emotions. All this information will be integrated into the argument within the next part of 
this chapter where, I discuss Blatt’s polarities of experience, our need for relatedness and self-
definition in relation to Shapiro’s rigid rule-driven, and passive reactive characters. At the moment, 
I wish to emphasise that PARCS may help us to eliminate ‘representationalism’ from attachment- 
thinking and turn towards an ‘embodied’ perspective.  
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According to Beckes, Ijzerman and Tops (2015), since cooperative social behaviour promotes 
adjustment and survival, the joint regulation of metabolic resources seems favourable and 
organisms would certainly prefer those affordances that support these regulatory practices. From 
an attachment perspective, proximity-seeking is an affordance that has clear advantages in terms 
of metabolic cost and cost of action (freeing resources from defensive purposes for exploratory 
behaviours; diminishing the need for vigilance by distributing the effort; lowering the metabolic cost 
by resource-gathering and sharing). Efficient coupling at the attachment level facilitates the 
coordination and synchronization for the maximization of the flow of information (Marsh et al. 
2006; Beckes, Ijzerman & Tops, 2015). The authors mentioned propose thermoregulation and basic 
homeostatic needs as the fundamental level at which this information flow takes place. The infant 
is free to explore once thermoregulation is at the expected baseline.  
 
This proposal is interesting since it helps us connect what we understand as ‘representation’ to the 
increased need for predictive processing. In small groups, we may stay closer to the field-reactive 
perspective since it is easier to share space and resources. In larger groups, we need to adopt an 
observer-predictive perspective since the complexity of interactions makes the disambiguation of 
involved affordances in the world and the interactions difficult. What we understand as complex 
forms of cognition from an enactivist perspective require disengagement from the immediate 
attunement to affordances.  
 
Enactivism solves in an efficient and parsimonious way one of the most significant problems that 
cognitivist architectures have been employed to address, the “frame problem”; how we selectively 
respond to the relevant and appropriate aspects of the environment, ignoring irrelevant 
information (Ward & Stapleton, 2012). On the other hand, it bypasses the insurmountable, for 
cognitivist architectures, metaphysical problem of experience, since it involves a radical continuity 
between life, action and experience. Affectivity imbues the world with value and the agent with 
normativity and goals (Colombetti, 2013). The agent is attuned to those aspects of the world that it 
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finds immediately meaningful and which are a function of its capacities and interests. Going from a 
direct attunement to an affective affordance in the world, to what we understand as cognition, it 
involves nothing more than taking another perspective towards the environmental affordances. 
Perception, in general, requires a grasp of the various perspectives we can take in relation to the 
properties of objects in the environment. What we can do affects what we ‘see’ and what we ‘see’ 
affects what we can do (Ward & Stapleton, 2012; Nöe, 2006). Complex forms of cognition then 
involve the ability to disengage from the immediate attunement to affordances and explore other 
possibilities and alternative viewpoints.  
 
Disengagement from immediate attunement does not mean disengagement from the world, but 
from a perspective towards the world. Language seems to play a related role. We orient each other 
into a shared field of intentionality and, disengagement from one’s point of view or engagement of 
another in one’s point of view becomes possible. Wittgenstein argued that language is its use. We 
learn concepts along with their normative standards in a shared culture through practice (Cavell, 
2012). As Cavell notes the partial answer to the problem of how we enter into the “Space of 
Reasons” is triangulation, the gathering of perspectives in the field of intentionality. Sachs (2015) 
notes that animals make inferences to increase the detectability of affordances. Through their 
actions, they show in practice the use of simple concepts which are inferentially structured to detect 
relevant solicitations. However, they do not enter into the ‘Space of Reasons” because they do not 
share inferences and they do not correct each other according to a set of normative standards. This 
discursive game of “giving and asking for reasons” (Brandom, 2009; p.9) then seems to draw its 
origins from elementary perceptual practices while at the same moment it reflects a qualitatively 
distinct level of normativity that it comes from the integration of the organism into the social world. 
 
What made language possible was a series of embodied evolutionary adaptations, like the cradling 
of babies since they could not hang from their mothers’ fur and the shrinking of the cornea (Terrace, 
2013). Language in its musical form rather facilitated synchronisation (Falk, 2009) possibly through 
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its effect in lowering cognitive dissonance (Perlovsky, 2012). Terrace (2013) notes that the 
aforementioned evolutionary adaptations made possible for humans their ability for fusion into a 
field of perception and a metacognition of their agency. Animals can know what affordances other 
animals detect, but they do not coordinate in solving uncertain situations by sharing inferences and 
correcting each other’s inferences (Sachs, 2015). The special human abilities in solving problems 
together require sophisticated skills in joint attention, perspective-taking, the uniquely human 
ability to trust each other and a cultural background upon which our normative practices draw 
(Tomasello, 2014). The perspective-taking ability is the essence of any minded behaviour as 
mentioned. What made human language possible then, it is the gradual development of our ability 
for trust and joint attention which may have evolved in a transactional way.  
 
Getting into a shared space of intentionality, recognising another agent’s intentions, exchanging 
messages into “readable formats” (Vouloumanos & Onishi, 2013; p.168) and regulating “referential 
specificity” (ibid; p.171), involves a lot of practice in joint attention and showing trust in practice. 
However, it seems that all these skills presuppose the ability for an inter-corporeal fusion that makes 
the fusion of the field of perception, that Terrace mentions, possible. Reddy (2005) notes that 
infants first learn 'attending' in a dyadic relationship before they get into the triadic mind-world-
mind intentionality field. Mindedness then may have evolved out of this ability to enter in an inter-
affective and inter-corporeal fusion through which we distinguish ourselves as agents.   
 
Researchers in the mirror neurons field have criticized accounts that employ specific cognitive 
architectures for mind-reading and detection of contingencies, while they propose that the 
functional architecture of the motor system may be sophisticated enough for the perception of 
other agents’ intentions and the hierarchical representation of actions in relation to a complex 
hierarchy of goals (Gallese, Rochat, Cossu & Sinigaglia, 2009; Gallese, 2013). However, they still fail 
to break with methodological individualism and the myth of the hidden and the inner as Froese and 
Fuchs (2012) mention. Froese and Fuchs arguably note that we do not only need to extend the 
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bounds of cognition into the inter-embodiment but also the “bounds of experiencing” (p. 227). The 
modelling work with interacting nonlinear dynamic agents, that they present, shows that the 
agents’ interaction develops an integrated system with complex collective dynamics. Each agent’s 
internal states are adapted to sustain the interaction process. The merits of the model, as Froese 
and Fuchs mention, is that agents with the simplest possible internal architecture exhibit social 
contingency and emergence of more complex forms of behaviour. This pre-reflective inter-
embodiment displays novel properties that cannot be reduced to the properties of each agent.   
 
This is a line of research with important implications for addressing criticisms, justified to some 
extent, against the primary intersubjectivity research that it lacks enough cognitive sophistication 
to be relevant (Roessler, 2005) while it bypasses the problems of mirror neurons accounts which 
mix action and representation dimensions in social cognition. Zahavi (2014) arguably notes that 
there is a contradiction in Gallese’s thinking; the mixing of the direct experiential language along 
with the hypothesis that we rely on inner forms of imitation for empathy. It seems highly unlikely as 
he mentions that we use mirror neurons as an internal motor knowledge to translate observed 
movement; it is like saying that we translate our native language into itself. Social cognition may be 
more like dancing than mirroring, as he mentions. Murphie (2010) following a Deleuzian line, 
proposes “virtual restructuration of futurity” (p.284) as mirror neurons’ function; “diagrams of 
future affectivity and movement” in an “abstract field including both animals” (ibid.). The 
development then of more complex forms of agency, from the physical and the social towards the 
teleological, the intentional and the representational may involve such continuous interactions 
(Knox, 2010) in integrated inter-corporeal units from which we emerge with a progressively more 
sophisticated ability for awareness of our intentions and how they relate to outcomes. The presence 
of the other agent in a self-organized interaction gives us the chance to bootstrap into a more 
flexible organization of action-perception cycles through which we exercise our agency 
disambiguating the moving horizon of available affordances.  
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Deleuze (1995) discusses an account extraordinarily similar to the predictive and the reactive modes 
regarding language.  He argues that in ‘sedentary distributions’ we attribute a predicate to a subject 
so that meanings occupy a ruled space. The interrelationships between subjects, between 
predicates and between subjects and predicates have predictable directions. Nomadic distributions 
emerge from other distributions and occupy spaces in an unpredictable way since they do not 
function according to internal or external hierarchies. Russell (2005) discusses Frege’s sense and 
reference by employing the terms connotation and denotation respectively. Denotations refer to 
the empty set, the proposition that has no immediate reference but it remains meaningful in our 
discursive practices. It seems that with the increased complexity of human communities, language 
may have changed from a function of expressing value to a rule-based practice that solves complex 
problems of affordance disambiguation in the space of ‘giving and asking for reasons’. We have 
moved from a nomadic language in which speech is integrated with immediate action to a language 
that reflects our complex social organization and institutions.  
 
Tops et al. (2014) think that the reactive and predictive mode of processing reflect a field versus 
observer perspective respectively. At the AI/IFG level, these authors make a crude distinction, 
correlating the reactive with the Jamesian “I” and the predictive with the “Me”, or Gallagher’s 
(2000) minimal and narrative self. Quirin, Kent, Boksem and Tops (2015), integrating PSI and PARCS, 
propose that resilience involves the integration of negative experiences into the narrative self. 
Clearly this integration involves the interaction of the field and the observer perspective. From a 
relational standpoint, it involves the dialectics of advancing a coordinated, shared experiential field 
perspective, while we adapt our predictive, ‘narrative-integrative’ mode. Both theories and the 
associated evidence bring us nearer to closing the gap between the neural and the 
phenomenological levels, supporting the view that change in treatment is a dialogical process 
between the bodily, experiential, reactive level and the predictive, narrative-integrative level. While 
both theories remain close to the ‘structural’ level, they shine some light on the dynamics of 
relational coordination. In order to make these paths clearer, I will look into the relationships 
between language and “languaging” (Cowley, 2011), or metaphor and metaphoricity (Müller, 2008). 
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I will start by exploring another ‘structural’ viewpoint: the inter-hemispheric differences in 
metaphor comprehension.  
	
 
Ahrens et al (2007) offer conclusive evidence that novel and conventional metaphors cannot be 
grouped, but that they are mediated by different functional networks. There are three different 
theories that have discussed this complex relationship between novel and conventional metaphors. 
Genter’s (1983) structural-mapping theory suggests that, after a correspondence has been 
established between a target and a base in metaphorical conception, the metaphor will gradually 
become conventionalized and its processing will take the form of categorization, meaning that the 
LH will take up metaphorical processing when categorized.  Beeman’s (1998; Jung-Beeman, 2005) 
fine-coarse semantic coding (FCT) proposes that the RH has no specific role in metaphoric 
processing, but that its special role is in mapping distant semantic relationships, since it is more 
capable of activating large semantic fields. Giora’s (2003) Graded-Salience Hypothesis (GSH) 
predicts that the RH is especially involved in the processing of non-salient, novel meanings, while 
the LH takes up salient and conventionalized meanings. Empirical findings generally support the 
hypothesis that the RH is involved in the processing of novel and less familiar meanings (Faust, 2012), 
more specifically that it activates and maintains multiple non-salient and weakly associated 
meanings, while the LH maintains salient and strongly connected meanings. Gold, Faust and Ben-
Artzi (2012) show that there is a correlation between verbal creativity and the processing of novel 
metaphors, according to which verbally-creative people show higher RH-involvement in the 
processing of novel metaphors.  
 
Dascal (2002) argues that the rule-based linguistic system is unable to express the spirit and the 
mind due to its mechanical limitations. Faust (2012) notes that there is ample evidence for the 
primacy of the RH’s involvement in problem solving, insight and ambiguity comprehension, showing 
that the RH is actually used to complement the precise and rule-based aspects of language. Yang 
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(2014), on the grounds of a meta-analytic review of fMRI studies, argues in favour of the RH coarse-
semantic hypothesis. Lai et al (2015), through another extensive review, propose that the RH does 
not contribute to metaphor comprehension in an absolute sense, but that the LH certainly 
contributes less. It seems that the RH is activated for both metaphoric and difficult non-metaphoric 
stimuli; conventionalism, contextual complexity and task demand play a special role in RH 
recruitment. Arguably, then, the RH is implicated in engaging with novel and ‘difficult’ linguistic 
stimuli, specifically employing coarse-semantic coding, while the LH focuses on closely related word 
meanings while it tries to suppress unusual and distant meanings (Faust, 2012; Mihov et al., 2010).  
 
Faust and Gernsbacher (1996), on the other hand, showed rather both senses of an ambiguous word 
remain active in the RH, while the LH quickly suppresses the inappropriate meaning. They also 
propose that the RH’s inability to keep alternative senses of figurative speech results in the fixation 
on one delusional meaning. We are in a good position, then, to support a view according to which 
the LH primarily mediates the categorizing, differentiating, salient, known and predictive qualities 
of our relationship to the world, while the RH primarily mediates the field, reactive view, the 
integrative qualities, the focus on ambiguity. The LH pushes for assimilating the world into the 
known schemes, while the RH pushes for accommodating the ambiguous and the unpredictable. 
This may suggest a good candidate ‘structural’ story about inter-hemispheric dialectics. From my 
viewpoint, it already reflects a value: an emphasis on the ‘predictive’ dimension which somewhat 
holds back our understanding of what happens in the dynamic situation where people coordinate 
in a meaning-making field.  
 
Cowley (2011), writing from the perspective of Distributed Language, notes that in giving primacy to 
the symbolic we take language away from its origins in the embodied activity. The integration of 
time-scales in language presupposes a non-local ontology. However, the reification of this ontology 
into structural patterns that have a life beyond the phonetics, the perceptual and the 
phenomenological of the lived experience is ineffective for the study of human communication. 
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Coordination is the glue of cognition, notes Kirsch (2006); we innovate as we coordinate mentions 
Cowley (2011). Language is renewed through interaction; we cannot depend on some hypothetical 
‘representations’ existing inside our heads for this coordination, as ‘dynamics come first and 
symbols then’. Symbolic ontologies do not carry a lot of structural information, mentions Raczaczek-
Leonardi (2011), rather they suggest just light pushes and constraints in the dynamic, self-organized 
process of communication. Thibault (2005) notices that language is an action system coordinating 
diverse space-time-scales, and Hodges (2011) mentions with emphasis that language is primarily a 
system of care, not just an action or a perceptual system. Hodges goes on to argue that any 
functionalist, representational account on language not only gives rise to insurmountable 
philosophical problems, but also leaves aside the most important fact about language: that we use 
it because we care about our econiche. The integrity of this niche requires cooperation and 
argumentation; we need to follow and lead, to conform and create.  
 
We have learned to control our actions through what we understand as values, values regulating 
social practices like conversation, driving, sharing space etc. Hodges notes that the values that 
regulate the languaging ecosystem are comprehensiveness, complexity, clarity and coherence. 
These values are not objective or subjective but ecological; they emerge from the niche and, in turn, 
control our enactment and embodiment of affordances. The way that each of these values takes 
the lead in a moment-to-moment turn and shapes the process, while the system of values is in turn 
shaped by it, is always a ‘local’ phenomenon. It is not only that intimate conversation is always 
grammatically more esoteric and irregular, but that it is dynamic and shapeable as well. From the 
above discussion on inter-hemispheric differences, we can hypothesize that the LH language strives 
for clarity and coherence, while the RH language strives for comprehensiveness and complexity.  
 
Gibbs (1994) noted that metaphoric thought plays a crucial role in the historical evolution of what 
words and expressions mean, as well as on the immediate, online use and construction of meaning. 
Müller (2008), using micro-analytic methodologies, brought enough empirical support to this view. 
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What we understand as conventionalized, sleeping or dead metaphors, the frozen semantic aspects 
of language, may be very much alive in our coordination and constantly renewed. Müller shows that 
in our communication we use multimodal salience markers, e.g. tonal and gestural, that suggest the 
foreground of metaphoricity. Once metaphoricity is activated, propositional, imagistic and 
sensorimotor forms of thinking are in a dynamic interaction that controls the waking of sleeping 
metaphors and frozen semantic aspects in a dynamic process of renewal. The default salient aspects 
may be “disregarded and new elements may be selected, may be treated as salient and create new 
readings” (Müller, 2008; p. 215). A lot of work now studies the foregrounding role of sensorimotor 
thinking and interactivity in metaphoricity, and shows that while gestures that express hand actions 
depend on the LH, gestures that embody objects as a whole activate the RH (Müller, Bressem & 
Ladewig 2011). Gibbs (2014) notes that metaphoricity is an utterly interactive process. Even a highly 
conventional metaphor such as “I can see that now” is softly-assembled, on-line, in the current 
context of sensory-motor interaction. What we then understand as conceptual and mental 
organization, the predictive aspects of our mind is simply a second-order constraint on languaging 
behaviour, advanced through our historical interactions and social practices.  Wittgenstein and 
Vygotsky were therefore correct in pointing out that language is nothing more than its use, and that 
it reflects the social practices of its acquisition and an inherent social normativity (Bertau, 2014) 
which is always renewed in our personal, expressive style (Baerveldt, 2014). Jensen and Cuffari 
(2014) explain this process through the metaphoricity concept: Coordination emerges as an 
organizational response to the multiplicity of co-enacted meanings and shapes or constrains the 
competing dimensions of felt sense and experience, driving the system towards a more shareable 
experience. A successful clinical communication moves necessarily towards meaning-
transformation if the emerging distributed system affords the opportunity to re-live and co-
experience emotions together. It is in the doubleness of “co-action, co-ordination and co-
experience” (ibid., p.283) that meaning evolves.  
 
I will briefly return to the ‘structural’ viewpoint to make a hypothesis regarding the role of the 
hemispheres in our coupling with the world. As PSI theorists mention, the LH systems are more 
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concerned with self-control, while the RH systems are more concerned with self-regulation; 
inhibition of IM is required for the expansion of Agency, while inhibition of OR is required for self-
growth (Kaschel & Kuhl, 2005; Kuhl & Koole, 2008). There is enough evidence showing that the 
development of right prefrontal areas is necessary for the inhibition of archaic defence mechanisms 
such as splitting and denial, as well as about the release of these mechanisms from the RH prefrontal 
control in cases of RH lesions (Feinberg, 2010; Northoff, 2011; Reznikova et al., 2004). My hypothesis 
is that the differentiating LH requires on a moment-to-moment basis, the “cohesive-integrative” 
glue of the RH to keep the pieces together. It is about the story of the foreground: a ‘claim’ is well-
supported, for our minds, from an integrative background. When the background collapses, the 
differentiation regresses to more primitive states. As McGilchrist (2010) notes, and as much of the 
evidence reviewed above shows, the world comes first from the RH (as it is the hemisphere which 
handles novelty), which provides the matrix upon which any differentiation the LH strives to 
establish develops. I will now discuss this ‘background’, moving the levels downwards, from the 
imagistic, sensorimotoric languaging to the ‘primordial affectivity’.  
 
Meares (2012a,b) claims that the language of the RH is analogical, and he believes that its maturation 
depends on the mother-infant analogical relatedness. He thinks that the language of the RH is what 
Vygotsky calls ‘inner speech’, where the words die as they bring forth thought, unlike the linear 
‘social speech’. It seems to be a language more focused on comprehensiveness and complexity.  He 
describes it as relatively asyntactical; subjects and pronouns tend to be left out, words are 
abbreviated, it is affective and emotional, and it presents in a synthetic fashion the shape of the 
overall feeling of a reality and it is generally figurative. Its special role writes Meares, echoing Bion’s 
‘alpha function’, is that it gives shape to disparate sensory data, ensuring the continuity of the self 
in the intermittent shifting of our mental states. Meares takes a similar perspective to PARCS and 
PSI; according to which the RH mediates the self. He calls the RH-self and the LH-self the Subject 
Consciousness and Object Consciousness respectively. What strikes me as important is the way he 
perceives the Subject Consciousness. It is the most unchanging aspect of ourselves he thinks that 
makes our most changing aspect, the Object Consciousness possible. He describes it as deeper than 
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knowledge, while it is also what makes knowledge possible, providing us with our awareness of 
existence as people. Not all states, mentions Meares; are intentional; some involve a more general 
awareness form, a background state of going-on-being, that is the fundamental state of Subject 
Consciousness. While I remain skeptical regarding the concept of non-intentional states of mind, I 
think, Meares is trying to describe this inter-hemispheric foreground-background relationship. 
Affectivity suggests the matrix from which each ‘claim’, each distinct affordance in the world, 
emerges; and it is affectivity that primarily supports its meaning for the psyche.  
 
Ross, Homan and Buck (1994) where among the first who supported the view that the LH primarily 
mediates social emotions while the RH mediates primary emotions. I actually understand this 
difference, not as a real polarity but rather as a background affectivity closer to primordial 
affectivity, and an affectivity closer to the foreground that mediates distinctive perception, 
respectively. As Collombetti (2014) has shown, proposed accounts of how basic and non-basic 
emotions relate to each other seem quite problematic as emotions are rather complex dynamic 
patterns of brain and bodily events. That means that any emotion is not a construction of simpler 
elements, but a whole, a gestalt, an emerging pattern. The LH can inhibit levels of the RH’s affective 
background through the corpus callosum, but this is not an all-or-nothing process - we may live in 
an intermittent ‘figure-grounding’.  
 
Contemporary neuroscience, both cognitive and affective, starts supporting the hypothesis that we 
are not ‘content’ consumers, or ‘representational beings’, but mostly ‘content’ producers. Coupling, 
from my Enactivist perspective, is not actually about producing but rather about co-varying and co-
relating.  It is true that much of contemporary neuroscience is already “enactive” (Anderson, 2014), 
but even for the mainstream that has not moved to a primarily enactive mindset there is a growing 
convergence into a less fragmented perspective on human beings. Adolphs and Pessoa (2010), 
through their “multiple waves” theory, move focus from the hypothesis of a distinct subcortical 
pathway to the view of an integrative processing architecture, in which the emphasis is in the 
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efficiency of neurotransmission. Moreover, Pessoa (2013) notes that “the strong assumption of the 
existence of two qualitatively different mental systems, for instance, ‘intuition’ and ‘reasoning’ [or] 
‘system 1’ and ‘system 2’ where the first is automatic/heuristic/reflexive and the second is 
controlled/analytic/reflective . . . is both slippery and conceptually unclear” (p.250). The automatic 
versus controlled dichotomy is not a viable distinction and reflects a theoretical bias that does not 
seem to fit the data. A continuous integrative framework is better notes Pessoa, even if more 
complex. Moreover, beyond the views that implicate the amygdala in all mental processing through 
its effects in vigilance and ambiguity processing (Whalen, 1998), relevance, salience and novelty 
detection (Sander, Grafman & Zalla, 2003; Adolphs, 2010; Seymour & Dolan, 2008), it seems that “it 
is both conceptually and empirically unproductive to carve the brain into cognitive and emotional 
realms” (Pessoa, 2013; p.251). Emotion and cognition, then, are labels that arbitrarily characterize 
behaviours, not an in-built distinction in the brain. It is clear that our mental experience is 
continuously affectively affected, even when it does not feel so. Anderson (2014) thinks that we 
should deeply rethink the cognitive vocabulary, giving the “brain its voice in the process . . . trying 
to discern what in the world the brain cares about” (p.302). The brain is an action-control system 
that primarily manages the values of the salient organism-environment relationships. It is interested 
in throwability and climbibaility, not weight and slope, notes Anderson. It is more interested in 
dependability and patronizability than the ‘content’ of an interpretation, if such a thing really exists.  
 
The hysteric may be sensitive to aspects of the relational world that express the instability of 
integration and dependability. There is probably no interpretation that would promote autonomy 
unless it addresses the foundational level where alliance, attachment and transference lie, the 
in/betweenity where words come from a concentric mode. The same can be said for the obsessive 
who fills the void with rules. Words need to establish the concentric to affect experience.  What I 
will argue is that this concentric spatiality comes from a primordial affective level, where space and 
time exceed their known dimensions.  
 
	 238	
The concentric involves the inter-bodily and the inter-affective as non-distinguishable levels. 
Affectivity may give shape to the thousands of bodily sensory receptors which are immersed in the 
multidimensionality of experience. We project an immense multi-dimensional complexity into some 
lower coordinates, notes Neuman (2014). The ineffable experience of a glass of wine may be 
perceptually apportioned, for example, in 5,6 or 12 (softness, aroma, acidity etc) dimensions 
depending on our expertise in winetasting. Experience expands or contracts according to how our 
skill and affectivity directs this expansion or contraction in the Bionian ‘O’. Bortoft (2013) uses an 
example by Keller to illustrate a Goethian conception of distinction in wholeness. Keller’s teacher 
uses one of her hands to write the word ‘water’ in different rhythms while her other hand is under 
a spout. Through this interaction, Keller realizes that words are endowed with life and can bring 
freedom, joy and lightness, and as she returns home every object she touches quivers with life. The 
concentric underlies language as disclosure, not distinction, either through phonetic or manual 
gestures, as Borthoft mentions. Language expands our ‘transformations in O’ by resonating the 
expansion of an inter-bodily and inter-affective space. It is not about the expansion of thinking, but 
about the expansion of consciousness. 
 
From an Enactivist viewpoint, we cannot equate any part or process of the brain as being directly 
related to consciousness. Thompson and Cosmelli (2011) note that in every aspect where we 
correlate conscious states to brain states, we are already consciously able to make such 
correlations. There is no indication at the moment that what Meares calls ‘background awareness’ 
is definitely related to neural states. However, the idea that the RH has more direct connections to 
the affective body brings it closer to the diffuse origins of affect, what Colombetti calls ‘primordial 
affectivity’ (2013). Van Orden, Hollis and Wallot (2012) suggest an interesting, if preliminary, account 
on the brain as the ‘blue-collar worker’ of the body-environment coupling. The crux of their idea is 
that the bodily-based slower changing dynamics constrain the faster changing brain-dynamics. 
Therefore, it is not the brain that controls behaviour, but our actions in the world - the body and the 
environment - that control the brain. The idea “when first heard, may sound outrageous [but the] 
brain appears to take direction from the body, just as old-school blue collar workers took direction 
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from white-collar counterparts in the front office” (p.1). Colombetti (2013) does not propose a 
mechanism of the body-brain relationship, but plainly notes that, when talking about affectivity, we 
forget the body-based hormonal and homeostatic mechanisms as part of the mind and the fact that 
affectivity involves the whole organism, its actions in the world, and is not a brain-based event. 
Bodily postures, expression and gestures tacitly influence our affective evaluations and the way we 
approach situations, as a lot of research now indicates (Colombetti, 2013; Fuchs & Koch, 2014). By 
simply adopting postures, gestures or expressions, we may experience the associated emotions 
while our attitudes and preferences are influenced. Inhibition of associated expressive movement, 
on the other hand, impairs the experiencing of associated emotions.  
 
Affective intentionality discloses the affective quality of the associated affordances and our state in 
the face of these affordances (Fuchs & Koch, 2014). The body is the “very medium of affective 
intentionality”, a “sounding board” (Colombetti, 2013, p.3). However, in the action tendencies 
inherent in affective intentionality, there is already an expressive quality; we indicate our state and 
the possibilities for action. What I want to emphasise is that this is not a simply a floating ‘sign’ it is 
a gestalt that will be grasped as a gestalt, on the grounds of a generative process. Communication, 
then, may involve an effort for this precarious and unstable synchronization of our affective 
matrices, an effort to synchronize our generative processes, the grounding aspect of figure-
grounding, which is both possible but unstable, difficult but liberating. Through interaction, our 
bodies extend the one into the other. If the Ego is first and foremost a bodily ego, the self may 
remain forever an improvisational melody, originating in the sounding board of the body.  
 
Through interaction our bodies extend the one into the other, and our practices and interactions 
are present in our bodies. As already mentioned the LH is more concerned with self-control and the 
RH with self-regulation. The right prefrontal areas, as shown, have an important role in the inhibition 
of archaic mechanisms such as splitting. It seems then that our ability to “think” ourselves, to make 
a claim, the practice of giving and asking for reasons, it is dependent upon the integrative 
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background of the RH. Languaging in our internal dialogues, we sense this movement as Meares 
(2012a) mentions. Words have a picturing function; internal scenes are created. Thoughts move 
between disambiguating and sensing how things affect us in these scenes. We scale in the privacy 
of our minds between the languaging modes, and this process is another interactional order that 
prepares our separate dynamics for entering into the dynamically unfolding event of the interaction. 
In the last section of this chapter, I will argue that we are never fully detached from the couplings in 
which we are embedded.  
 
In the analysis of the complexity literature, it became evident that therapists constantly enact a 
world of experience which is integrated into the immediate coupling and at the same moment 
distanced at several levels. Their attention focuses and relaxes. This rather reflects the movement 
from the sharply focused attention of the LH, into the fractalizing form of attention of the RH, which 
subserves regulatory and creativity processes (McGilchrist, 2009; Mihov et al., 2010). The boundaries 
between the two always blend. Enacting Cooper (2010) a reverie in which he imagines his patient 
tidying clothes, he both regulates himself by sensing what is annoying in the communication this 
certain day while at the same moment he is more able to make a claim or better to listen to his 
patient through this frame.  
 
For now, I will move gradually from a psychoanalytic language of primary and secondary processes 
or symmetrisation and asymmetrisation process – as Matte-Blanco (1998) refers them – to an 
enactivist understanding of inter-affective episodes from which the RH ability to self-regulate 
emerges. What I finally want to argue is that the RH suggests those circular causality processes - 
which I will elaborate in the last section - that keep us connected to the world of others. The RH 
constantly regulates this connection as we employ “languaging” intra-personally. We do not need 
to be in the immediate presence of an affective affordance to sense how it affects us. In our mental 
dialogues, we can sense this movement of our states in the possible presence of another and a 
certain relational script. Matte-Blanco thinks this ability in a mathematical way; it is the ability to turn 
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parts into wholes. This ability, as I will argue, it is acquired in interactions, and it is sustained through 
interactions and the circular causality processes of the RH. Colombetti (2013) discussing the 
Heideggerian in/betweenity of mood offers an interesting metaphor. Affective episodes from which 
categorical emotions emerge are like the weather unfolding events in the context of a climate, 
which is our mood. The mood, in turn, is not an organismic event but involves the transitionality, the 
in/betweenity of our integration in the world. Matte-Blanco thinks that affectivity turns parts into 
wholes. His thinking originates in mathematical sets. The dynamically unfolding affective events 
originate in another kind of mathematics that make room for an interaction between the organism 
and the environment. In Colombetti’s metaphor parts are integrated into wholes, but their 
differences are not annihilated, even if their boundaries are fractalized. As many authors now 
notice, this fractalizing property of the RH suggests our way of building a subjectivity, this sense of 
self-continuity among very different contexts (Lichtenberg, Lachman & Fosschage, 2010; Kuhl, 
Quirin & Koole, 2015). At the same moment, as I will discuss in the last section of this chapter, this 
property makes process research interesting and difficult since the lurking multiplicity in the 
interaction order cannot be neatly grasped, even if it is there, expressed in the interaction dominant 
rapidly unfolding dynamics.  
 
There is a surprising correspondence in the thinking of McGilchrist and Matte-Blanco (1998). 
McGilchrist thinks that the LH is an emissary, an ambassador of the RH. The LH is the simplified 
version of reality, the one that knows where ‘certain’ things are that matter to us. It is not reality 
mentions McGilchrist but it works better than having all the “information” available and all the 
plans. Matte-Blanco mentions that emotion has this infinite quality that cannot enter into 
consciousness. Conscious feelings are emissaries, the ambassadors of a powerful country; they are 
“highly asymmetrized, symmetrical pieces” (p.113, 1998). He discusses the case of a man whose 
colleagues delayed offering him a present for his wedding and who decided that if it was not offered 
soon he would refuse it. He sensed that the delay was a form of rejection by his colleagues for his 
ambitiousness and showing off attitudes. His analyst interprets the decision to deny the offer as 
bringing him back from a pervasive sense of non-existence; and justifies his aggressiveness as valid. 
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“The interpretation” notes Matte-Blanco, “resulted in a momentary divesting of this ambassador of 
all his threatening power and so brought relief to consciousness …But the relief was soon over 
because the emotion made itself present again” (p.298, 1998). It cannot be otherwise, I suggest, 
because affectivity is the glue of our psychic life, through its fractalizing influence.  
 
A page, says Matte-Blanco, is a proper part of the book and an arm is a proper part of the body, but 
in symmetry the page is the book and the arm is the body; affectivity turns parts into wholes. 
Coordination may suggest the glue of cognition on the grounds of a more primordial cohesive force. 
Affectivity is the gravitational force which keeps our action-perception cycles together and permits 
any viable differentiation. The dilemma then is always about, assimilating the flow into the known 
scheme of action-perception cycles, or accommodate to the flow, expand the matrix of affective 
forces that bring forth experience, to expand the narrative, the action-perception cycles. Insight, 
for the neuroscientific mindset, is a RH process (Mihov et al., 2010), from an Enactivist 
psychoanalytic mindset is this expansion of the backgrounding, that involves first the expansion of 
the inter-bodily and inter-affective matrix and the expansion of individual narrative and action–
perception cycles then; it is this opening of the boundaries of the mind that intervenes our ability to 
notice differences, differences that make differences. Any interpretation presupposes this 
relational act - the precarious synchronization in an inter-affective and inter-bodily matrix that 
makes the registration of differences possible.  
 
This story of integration and differentiation is no less mechanistic than the Freudian 
representational mind operating on the grounds of an unintelligible drive dualism, unless it is 
embedded in an overall vital cohesive matrix. A prior integrative matrix is needed for any 
differentiation to take place. Enactivism turns the tables on scientific thinking, giving priority to the 
integrative. The project of the mind as a symbolic machine which takes the world in, represents it 
and then connects the pieces and responds after having exercised some form of mental gymnastics, 
is philosophically impossible (Chemero, 2011). As Enactivists argue, mind is about life, living is 
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knowing, either at the cell level or at the level of the vertebrate organism (Thompson, 2007). The 
perspective I defend is that experience comes forth from the acting organism and action necessarily 
pushes for greater differentiation, but differentiation stops short at the limits of our ability for 
integration. Prior to integration and differentiation, there is already a true driving force that does 
not cathect something already disjointed from the world, something hypothetically internal, 
something adynamic that needs vitalization. The world co-arises with its consciousness in the 
dynamic action of the organism. The schizophrenic experience, argues Cutting (2009), resembles 
the Husserlian phenomenological reduction. The introspective experience of a blossoming apple 
tree is necessarily “adynamic” (p.150); blowing wind, clouds, sunlight and shades, moving birds and, 
most importantly, our interest for it, the “how it matters to us” perspective, are not there. Cutting 
notices that this reduced image lacks the vitality brought by what Scheller calls ‘Drang’, the animality 
of the organism. Drang is the vital force which drives the organism into action and brings it to the 
realm of absolute reality in the only way it can be known to the animal: through resistance; 
“[s]omething is there” (Cuting, 2009; p. 151). Scheller’s Drang drives us into a “non-objectified 
knowledge, a psychic manifestation” (Cutting, 2012; p.7). We never lose the non-objectified register 
of experience, the sense of “reality as resistance, the rudimentary nature of anything as pull or push 
and the value of something as an emotion or proto-emotion” (ibid.), an expression of how things 
affect us.  
 
Matte-Blanco, makes a paradoxical ‘symmetrization’ in his thinking, stating that emotions are 
mathematical sets and hyperspaces. The unconscious is an excellent mathematician in its attempt 
to handle the infinite dimensions of reality, but an ineffective geometrician of space and time. At 
the same time, Matte-Blanco (1988) writes that “nothing is found which leads to a clear and neat 
distinction between emotion and the unconscious . . . differences between emotion and the 
unconscious, if any, are yet to be defined” (p.88). So while the mind is grounded in something 
deeply bodily and worldly like affectivity and emotion, at the same moment, this something is 
already abstract and mental. Bergson (1908/1988) had noticed the fallacy even before 
psychoanalysts were committing it: “The amoeba in a drop of water,” he wrote, “will be sensible of 
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the resemblance and not of the difference . . . [B}eings seize from their surroundings that which 
attracts them, that which interests them practically, without needing any effort of abstraction, 
simply because the rest of their surroundings takes no hold upon them” (pp.159-160). From this 
similarity of reactions, we develop generalizations and, the similarity we arrive after the work of 
abstraction and generalization, is not that from which we start, which is “a similarity felt and lived” 
(ibid. p.160). Before the work of abstraction and generalization “it was habit itself, mounting from 
the sphere of movement to that of thought” (ibid. p.170). The primordial affective level is not an 
abstract similarity but the deep entanglement of the organism to the environment, what Colombetti 
(2013) considers as the level of the Heideggerian in/betweenity of mood. It is the level where our 
emotionality is not something mental and especially intra-mental but what Slaby and Wuschner 
(2014) describe as a ‘temporally extended episode’ where we feel affectively pulled or pushed by 
the expressive qualities of the environment and an action readiness (Frijda, 2004) affective cycle 
originates, a primordial sense-making episode.  
 
Much of the contemporary literature on social cognition criticizes the mentalizing and the 
simulation theories of social understanding (DiPaolo & DeJaegher, 2012; Froese & Fuchs, 2012; 
Froese & Galagher, 2012) and shows that an embodied intersubjectivity offers a more satisfactory 
explanation for the empirical observations. As mentioned earlier, we directly perceive another’s 
emotion in his bodily expression, rather than through some internal ‘computation’. Our 
expressivities modify one another’s, and Stuart (2012) introduces the concept of ‘enkinesthesia’ to 
describe how our bodies extend the one into the other: we feel our movements into the other and 
the other’s intentions inhabit our bodies. The shaping of this interbodily communication originates 
in our first interactive episodes. As Feldman (2007) notes, our ability for synchronicity, expressed as 
hormonal synchronicity, motor coupling or gaze synchronicity, includes beyond its material 
component (gazes, arousal levels, muscle tone, vocalizations etc.) a component described as 
‘energy’ that includes the flow, the tempo, the rhythm, the temporal regulation of coordinations. 
What we understand as the ‘mental’ is rather constituted by the rhythmic, the temporal, and the 
enactive, and it may be really very difficult to disentangle affective forces by the energetic 
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component of our coupling with other bodies right from the start of our lives. Research now shows 
that infants do not need a conceptual self in order to be aware of another person’s awareness of 
them. From as young as 3 months old, infants re-direct their gaze as if actively avoiding the other’s 
gaze (Reddy, 2008) while they experience a pre-reflective sense of agency by facilitating aspects of 
the joint routines they share with their caregivers (Fantasia & Reddy, 2012). They gradually become 
fluent in these joint routines and experiment, negotiate, modify, start attempts at departing from 
the known flow (Reddy, 2015). It is likely that the novel world of this flow of joint actions becomes 
routine and passes to the LH, gradually building a reified self that will eventually develop into the 
conceptual self (Rossmanith & Reddy, 2016).  
 
The RH self evolves out of this interaffective, interbodily, energetic aspect of our interaction with 
other people, where similarities are first felt and lived in joint routines. A niche of affective 
affordances (Rietveld, 2013) exerts its strong pull into us as infants, which is highly undifferentiated 
at the beginning and which gradually becomes more and more differentiated as our sense of agency 
expands in correlation to our world of experience. Gazes, smiles, gestures, and bodily movements 
exert a strong pull along our internal homeostatic needs. We actively respond to the affordances by 
routinized sensorimotor schemes and the horizon of affordances changes as we ‘consume’ them, 
assimilating them in our known schemes, or disturbs us by asking for our immediate attention in 
order to accommodate to the flow (Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014; Buhrmann & DiPaolo, 2015). Demos 
(2007) notes that infants are interested in differences, in what violates their expectations, in what 
cannot be assimilated to the known schemes, and the activities that accentuate these differences 
expand their sense of agency. We may live then in a niche of rich affective affordances in which we 
try to bring forth a known world by responding through our routinized LH schemes and which 
always asks us to accommodate to the flow by expanding our known schemes, a world of novelty 
to which we couple through our RH.  
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Through our “skilled intentionality” (Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014) we strive for the ‘maximum 
visibility’, a ‘maximum grip’ of the flow, by striving constantly to reduce dissatunement with our 
world. We regularly ‘scale’ to correct for the excessive and the deficient. In the case of trauma, the 
highly differentiated but primarily integrative world of the RH collapses, and an affective affordance 
is not like the one that caused pain in the past anymore, but “it is exactly this one”, the “felt and 
lived” timeless painful affordance. Through the LH proactive system we ‘turn off the switch’ that 
allows us to get into the flow and expand experience. What Downes refers to as the ‘primordial 
dance’ between the concentric and the diametric collapses: the diametric loses levels of connection 
to the background; the background which is at the same time the world itself and its deep continuity 
into the organism, the hemisphere that belongs both to the world and the autonomous organism, 
a ‘transitional’ flesh.  
 
At this point, we should rather start taking some distance from McGilchrist’s biological story about 
the hemispheres. I do not agree that the LH is an emissary that has usurped the master RH, rather 
it is our social practices that changed the balance. It is not that the LH is a “hall of mirrors”, the 
hemisphere of modernity and post-modernity of a “closed language system”, of schizophrenia, of 
disconnection from the world of others, a hemisphere that constructs stories of narcissistic 
perfection, the bodily container of Goedel’s and Pascal’s utterly failing rationality, it is not about the 
“Berlusconi of the brain” which controls the media of our lives, as McGilchrist mentions. All these 
may reflect our social worlds and our social practices. It is not that confabulation, the LH propensity, 
in cases of RH lesion, to “construct” stories that deform reality in the direction of self-enhancement, 
reflects an essentialist LH quality. We live in a world where our social practices perpetuate the need 
for self-enhancement, Lasch’s (1991) “culture of narcissism”. The LH is the hemisphere which strives 
to protect the autonomy of the organism in a complex social world, not as a ‘ghost’ in a biological 
‘machine’, but as a moving part of the body that has been sensitized by the moving hands, the 
moving lips, the larynx and the lungs that have been, in turn, affected and sensitized by the world’s 
expressive qualities. The movement of the tiniest details of an expressive world is transferred in the 
form of waves through our linguistically sensitive bodies into this part of the invisible body, which 
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in turn moves its attention towards these details. The precarious balance between a world that 
constantly moves and moves us and our need to remain free from its disturbing powerful forces 
pushes us to ‘doer-done complementarities’. It is the excessiveness of this world, the excessiveness 
of even our own bodies that makes us reify this world in order to preserve our precarious autonomy 
from an unimaginable pull and push exerted upon us by numerous interweaving vectors of forces 





                            5.2 Psychopathology and the Structure of Experience 
 
 
Plutchik (1980) describes four universal tasks for personality functioning: the development of a 
sense of identity; solving problems of dominance and submissiveness that arise in the social 
hierarchies; developing territoriality and belongingness and finally dealing with temporality, loss 
and separation. Livesley (2007) extends this last task by talking about the interpersonal aspects of 
intimacy, the ability to function adaptively as an attachment figure and the development of the 
capacity for prosocial behaviour and cooperation. These tasks can be neatly distributed along two 
axes: one that describes issues related to closeness, and another describing issues related to 
control, and finally along their interactions. There is an ongoing discussion in the literature about 
the need to move psychiatric diagnostic systems from a prototypical to a dimensional organization, 
especially a system of two interacting dimensions (Luyten & Blatt, 2011; 2015; 2016), what Blatt 
(2008) calls the ‘polarities of experience’. A growing consensus has developed, originating in 
different theories according to which both normal and pathological experience involve the interplay 
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of two axes: Blatt (2008) names them ‘Relatedness versus Self-definition’; Beck (1999) talks about 
Sociotropy (or social dependency) versus Autonomy (or individuality); attachment theorists speak 
about the interplay of the dimensions of Attachment Avoidance versus Attachment Anxiety 
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007); Self-determination theorists talk about the interaction between 
Relatedness versus Competence and Autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 20oo); and finally, the contemporary 
Interpersonalists emphasise the interactions between the dimensions of Agency and Social 
Dominance versus Communion, Affiliation and Nurturance (Pincus, 2005; Wiggins, 2003).  
 
Blatt’s (2008) “introjectives” think primarily in sequential and linguistic terms, and their primary 
cognitive style is juxtaposition with an emphasis on differences and detailed analysis. Their 
instinctual focus is to use aggression and self-assertion to achieve autonomy, control, and power. 
They benefit from the exploratory aspects of treatment, and their improvement is reflected by the 
increase of referential and associational activity in the Rorschach. They are mainly avoidant in 
attachment classification terms; they feel discomfort in closeness, and alliances in their treatments 
are sensitive to confrontation ruptures through which they mask their vulnerability and need for 
nurturing. Anaclitics’ cognitive style reflects a need for synthesis, cohesion and integration. They 
seek experiences of harmony and fusion, responding better to the extralinguistic components of 
treatment (Bleichmar, 1996) and a supportive emotional environment, while their improvement is 
reflected in a reduction of referential and associational activity in the Rorschach (Fertuck et al., 
2004). At the descriptive level, Blatt’s perspective may build a fairly accurate image. Such a broad 
categorization, however interesting and accurate, perpetuates an essentialist and structural 
viewpoint, a mindset that has little meaning for the clinician who has this lived, felt and 
phenomenological sense of the anaclitic and the introjective ‘moments’ of her analysands in the 
process. The introjective concerns of an anaclitic analysand - and vice versa - have their own personal 
and unique shape and feeling in the clinical situation. Shapiro (1984; 2000; 2011) offers an alternative 
viewpoint on the “polarities of experience”, which is compatible to Blatt’s at the descriptive level 
but seems less essentialist and structural and more proccessual. Moreover, it introduces a more 
enactivist consideration of pathology and mental development, as will soon become evident.  
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Blatt recognizes development as a long transaction process between “gratifying involvement” and 
“experienced incompatibility” that leads to autonomous self-regulation as a normal end-point. We 
need the other to gratify our needs and regulate the tension, and when the relationship can no 
longer meet our needs, the experienced incompatibility leads us to “internalize” this gratifying 
function and make the other’s regulatory functions our “own self-generative characteristics and 
functions” (Blatt, 2008; p.120). This is a typical psychoanalytic sensibility, evident even in the more 
romantic Winnicottian “good-enough” disillusionment or the “importance of disappointment” 
(Craib, 1994). Descriptively it may make sense, in developmental or clinical terms, but psychoanalysis 
has never offered a satisfactory explanation on how disappointment leads to autonomous self-
regulation.  On the other hand, it has offered a satisfactory explanation on how a non-traumatic loss 
of our autonomy leads to the expansion of experience and the ensuing expansion of agency. We 
‘surrender to be known’ says Ghent (1994), and we surrender our defensive hyperstructures to find 
a shared world with the other. To translate the story in the enactivist ‘narrow corridor’ metaphor, 
we come into the interaction with our own autonomous self-regulation strategies and ideas, a 
proactive figuring and, tangled up in the corridor, we either find a way to co-ordinate our 
perspectives or we end up in a ‘doer-done’ interlocking. Disappointment is just the “resistance” of 
reality, a reality about someone else being there, that cannot be known proactively but only 
interactively through the expansion of consciousness.  
 
Blatt assumes that people with anaclitic preoccupations have ‘internalized’ neglectful and uncaring 
introjects, while those with introjectives preoccupations have incorporated harsh, critical and 
punitive introjects. An obvious question is to ask what distinguishes a neglectful by a critical introject 
at the experiential level, and how a child can ‘internalize’ such an introject. This idea suffers from all 
the regular fallacies of representational thinking which consider the mind to be a ‘copy machine’. 
For example, it cannot explain how the same person can exhibit obsessive, paranoid and hypomanic 
behaviours according to the context. Shapiro hypothesizes that we develop either a rule-driven or 
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a passive-reactive attitude towards reality. The relevance of his perspective to PARCS theory is 
obvious. In pathology, we either fail to assimilate experience, restricting our agency by following 
some inflexible, internal system of rules or habits, or we respond to the pressures of the affective 
landscape to accommodate by unreflective reactions.  Therefore, the introjective axis involves the 
rule-driven personality self-regulation attitudes and the anaclitic, the passive-reactive personality 
self-regulation attitudes.  
 
It is important to note that, while people may develop tendencies towards the one or the other kind 
of strategy, they often change their way of treating experience. Many obsessives, for example, 
adopt a passive-reactive attitude in order to make a decision (Shapiro, 1984; 2000). Returning to 
Ghent’s concept, following what Shapiro calls a rule-driven attitude, we intensify the defensive 
structure, or by a passive-reactive attitude we either momentarily escape the defensive structure or 
we ‘submit’ and depend on another for our regulation. Surrendering, notes Ghent, is this smooth 
loss of the boundaries; it is what Shapiro (2000) calls ‘flexibility’, as an opposite to both rigidity and 
reactivity. In Downes’ terms, the diametric finds its seamless connection to the concentric. In 
PARCS, the switch of the LH-IFG opens to let the world enter in and expand our assimilative 
capacities.  
 
Shapiro thinks that a rule-driven attitude towards reality is almost normal for children’s immature 
cognitive systems. Ghent (2002) further discusses the role of cognitive dissonance in the defensive 
abolition of reality. Research shows that music lowers cognitive dissonance (Masataka & Perlovsky, 
2012) and Perlovsky (2012), discussing the “Mozzart-effect” experiments on cognition, proposes 
that language and knowledge could not have evolved without the background of musical emotions 
- the musicality of the human coordination - because cognitive dissonance would lead to a 
devaluation of knowledge. As I have already emphasised, our ability for differentiation is radically 
dependent on our embodied interactive and interaffective coordination and the primordial 
affectivity world of forces which keeps the differentiating aspects of our mind together. I will now 
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try to exemplify what underlies our primordial autonomy at the operational level, what PSI theorists 
call the OR system.   
 
Blatt (2008), discussing the relevant Rorschach studies, mentions that introjectives tend to attribute 
inappropriate and arbitrary relationships between separate and independent objects because of 
their spatio-tempοral contiguity, while anaclitics have a difficulty with the maintenance of clear 
boundaries between independent thoughts and objects. Popova (2014), writing from an Enactivist 
perspective and discussing Michotte’s perceptual experiments, shows that narrativity is based on 
this human tendency to attribute a causal relationship among contiguous actions and events. 
Narrativity suggests a foundational enactive ‘organization of experience’ attitude of the human 
mind, not to be conflated with narrative as the whole experience of a story or a self-narrative, which 
necessarily involves the use of metaphor. Discussing Michotte’s experiments Popova tries to show 
that contrary to the Humean belief that we infer causality in the succession or the contiguity of 
events and entities, causality is often perceptually given immediately at the low level, that at which 
we perceive shape or movement. The reason that narrativity is such an essential instrument for 
organising thought, writes Popova, is precisely because of its ability to establish causality between 
directly observed or narrated portions of experience. As in Michotte’s experiments, where people 
attribute intentions and emotions to moving shapes, we perceive movement as meaningful action 
in a direct; perceptual and non-propositional way. This perceived causality is the underlying reason 
of narrative as a fundamental cognitive mechanism of organising experience. Therefore, story-
plotting at the immediate perceptual level and metaphor suggest two distinct sense-making 
processes we use in everyday life to make sense of experience. Whether at the lower level of 
narrativity, like the direct perception of causality, or the higher narrative level of the virtual self, 
narrativity is closely dependent on our primordial affectivity and the integrative self.  
 
The expansion of the stories that the human mind constructs about the world is dependent upon 
the expansion of experience. But it seems that the expansion of experience has to overcome the 
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resistance of a low-level integrative force which is qualitatively different from affectivity, namely the 
perceptual giveness of causality that organises experience in a schematic way. In PSI discussed 
earlier, the low-level OR system is monitoring distinctions and discrepancies and isolates a group of 
details from their context. Popova describes a very similar process at the low level of narrativity, in 
which a ‘scene’ is perceptually given in a way that eliminates chunks of material to plot a causal 
sequence. Blatt, as mentioned, says that the cognitive style of the introjective mode involves 
juxtaposition and emphasis on differences and details, focus on responsibility and cause-effect 
relationships. Anaclitics, on the other hand, have a more global and impressionistic cognitive style, 
as noticed. It seems then highly likely that in our introjective attitude we prevent the expansion of 
experience by enacting the world through a narrativity mode; plotting actions in immediate causal 
sequences according to the solicitations of affective affordances that had been important for us in 
the past. Scaling towards the narrativity mode (see Appendix IB) is necessary for meaning-making. 
Probably a more stable introjective characterological organisation involves an excess of narrativity 
in the structuring of experience and ensuing costs for the expansion of agency. Scaling towards the 
metaphoricity mode, involves a flexible navigation upon the surface of experience, moving quickly 
through solicitations of affective affordances while we disambiguate meaning in the interaction 
order. Metaphoricity, as mentioned earlier, involves this softly-assembled waking and melting of the 
frozen semantic aspects in the doubleness of co-ordination, co-action and co-experiencing. And, as 
I noticed, it extends from the interactive order through the fractalization attitude of the RH into our 
mental states. In a more stable anaclitic characterological organisation, it seems that metaphoricity 
is disconnected from narrativity, probably due to the overriding importance of closeness and 
dependency in the hierarchy of values. I want to make a significant distinction concerning Shapiro’s 
passive-reactive attitude. I suppose that anaclitics are not merely reactive in the mode that PARCS 
imply. We adopt a reactive attitude when there is not an immediate need present for 
disambiguation; when there is not an overarching framework of prioritised goals and intentions and 
our monitoring processes are disengaged. The anaclitic reactivity is so strongly encased by the value 
of closeness and dependency and the ensuing goals that finally usurps metaphoricity processes in 
the interaction order, the in/between of the mental states and eventually narrativity. Introjectively, 
then, we regularly protect the familiar, narrow-focused, narrative sense-making from the 
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transformation that the waking of frozen semantic aspects brings through the on-line interactive 
and interaffective soft-assembly of meaning. Anaclitically, we tend towards an open and overly 
flexible sense-making process with a precarious and unstable connection to a meaningful narrative 
structure which may grant us access to a shared focus with another in the interaction order.  
 
Narrativity, then, reflects our struggle for autonomy, while metaphor and primordial affectivity, 
reflect our dependence in the world for the continuation of our precarious autonomy and, in turn, 
the expansion of our autonomy presupposes the expansion of experience and our deeper 
entanglement into the world. Hysteric attitudes towards experience reflect a disconnection from 
narrativity at several levels. An obsessive and paranoid attitude reflects a disconnection at several 
levels from the world of primordial affectivity and metaphor. A schizophrenic and a melancholic 
defensive solution reflects a radical disconnection from primordial affectivity. In the case of 
schizophrenia, the narrativity is disconnected from any backgrounding: the diametric loses any 
meaningful connections to the concentric. The world breaks into disintegrated narrative pieces. In 
the case of melancholia, both metaphor and narrativity (the whole figure-grounding process) are 
removed from the world of primordial affectivity while retaining their meaningful connections. All 
the while the diametric retains its connection to an abstract concentric that is self-enclosed and not 
deeply embedded into the world. In pathology, the void at the heart of empiricism reflects an active 
distancing attitude from the expansion of experience and the ensuing expansion of agency. In a 
more flexible ‘navigation’ attitude towards the ‘horizon of affective affordances’, the void reflects 
the generative element of experience. It is exactly this opening, which is not a fissure, a 
disconnection but an interweaving that, makes meaning possible by folding the flesh and the fabric 
of the world. Shapiro thinks that a defensive solution is a “form of intentionality” (Shapiro, 2000; 
p.30), an active restriction of agency. For my Enactivist mindset, we never introject the neglecting 
or harsh and punitive attitudes of another person, but develop our own attitudes by recursively 
enacting a ‘skilled intentionality’ towards the horizon of affordances, the expressive qualities of the 
social normativity in which we learn how to bring forth an Umwelt - a sustaining and enhancing 
world for the self.  
	 254	
 
Neuman (2014) notes that the Superego is the heir of a mental faculty that kept first vertebrate 
organisms away from culinary trouble. The distinction between a biological and a social normativity 
may actually suggest the distinction between a simpler and a more complex environment. All 
normativity, then, is environmental, and in this sense social. Cultural Enactivists note that what we 
understand as internalization is arguably not internalization at all, since the organism cannot 
actually incorporate something external. Rather, it is based on its own autopoetic structural 
transformation for the continuation of its precarious operational organization. Internalization is the 
acquisition of a normative style in the consensual domain of coordinated conduct (Baerveldt & 
Verheggen, 2012). We are tremendously ambiguous systems, closed and at the same time utterly 
permeable and deeply embedded into our worlds. Cash (2009) emphasises that, according to 
Wittgenstein, normativity cannot be conceptually grasped; that we learn to use language in a lived 
whole. Barveldt (2014b) agrees: it is through recursivity that we find what Merleau-Ponty refers to 
as our own ‘personal style’. For the cultural enactivists, behaviour is translated into style, cognition 
into competence, and perception into skill (Baerveldt & Verheggen, 2012). The genetic thinking of 
Piaget and Werner, the mediational thinking of the Heggelian dialectics, the Sartrean ‘neant’, a 
negating consciousness, is lost in abstraction. Language comes from the Merleau-Pontian “carnal 
kind of dialogicality” (Baerveldt, 2014a; p.70). The interweaving and all the ensuing ambiguity are 
the only means through which anything real can be expressed. Distinction is what really makes 
perception possible, but language is radically dependent on our consensual coordinations, through 
which we acquire a normativity, in the manner proposed by Vygotsky and Wittgenstein. Language 
is the expansion of the joint routines we share with our caregivers, and as infants expand their 
agency by coordinating their actions within these routines (such as lifting their bottoms during 
diaper changing, they gradually learn to do things with words and build a sense of the shared 
normativity which is not propositional or epistemic but tacit and embodied.  
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In this sense, an obsessive attitude towards experience does not develop out of internalizing 
something external, but rather through responding to the collapse of “skilled intentionality” by 
actively distancing oneself from the pull that other people exert upon the self. Shapiro (1984) 
observes in obsessive attitudes a pervasive inattention to others and a resistance to influence 
achieved through a restriction of cognition. The inability to shift attention, the impaired capacity for 
surprise and the intensely focused attention towards details do not simply reflect the narrow-
focused attentional attitudes of the LH, but also an active distancing from the concentric. The 
disruption of the affective forces that normally empower the weaving, the wrapping and the 
unwrapping of the fabric of the world, is compensated by an immobilizing sewing through threads 
made-up from rules. An obsessive attitude serves the preservation of autonomy by preserving the 
instability of the concentric actually; it is about an active inhibition of aggression and self-
enhancement, which may threaten a community context. Caldwell-Harris and Aycicegi (2006) show 
that collectivism as a personality trait, while positively correlated to empathy, is also positively 
correlated in individualistic societies and increases the likelihood of anxiety, dependency, 
depression and obsessive-compulsive disorder. On the other hand, individualism as a personality 
trait is associated with disorders of impulse control and paranoia in a collectivistic society, but not 
in an individualistic one. A paranoid attitude seems more oriented towards the preservation of 
autonomy by distancing the diametric from the engulfing forces of the concentric. The acute, 
narrow, intense and selective focus of paranoid attention (Shapiro, 1984) is biased towards 
confirming that the influence of the world is dangerous for personal autonomy. It actively resists 
the ambiguous excessiveness of this world.  
 
The hysteric attitude resists the firmness of the narrative structure of experience, the attachment 
of the flesh of the world upon the bones through which it expresses its movement. Bollas (1999), in 
a vivid description of the hysteric attitude, depicts this ‘skilled intentionality’ as that of a 
disembodied “innocent child” (p.21), an active stance that keeps loss at bay. Shapiro (2000) thinks 
that reality always comes as a surprise. The hysteric attitude escapes all the suffering from the 
passions rooted in the body. It is an active resistance of the abstract concentric towards its own 
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fleshy and embodied power. The hysteric attitude does not actually resist causality and the 
perceptual giveness of narrativity, but rather the power it gets from its attachment to the concentric 
of the flesh of the world. From an essentialist viewpoint, the world of the hysteric, the dependent 
and the borderline organizations all resist the triangulation of Oedipality; it is an emphasis on the 
primacy of the concentric, the importance of closeness. The borderline feels the power of the 
gravitational pull of the affective forces as insurmountable, the bones of narrativity feel heavy and 
sometimes immobilized, since a borderline attitude lacks access to what the hysteric owes in excess, 
the distancing of the metaphoric power of the concentric. As both Meares (2012a) and Schore (2012) 
discuss borderline patients seem to exhibit prefrontal hypofunction and failure of higher-order 
inhibitory control in the RH.  Their discussion regarding the role of the RH higher-order areas in 
attentional mechanisms, emotion regulation and the integration of the self are consistent with the 
proposals advanced by PSI theory according to which the RH-EM system mediates the integrative 
self. EM, as already mentioned, reflects our ability for broad attention and intuitive, self-consistent 
decisions that satisfy multiple-constraints among values, abilities and needs (Kuhl, Quirin & Koole, 
2015). It seems then, that borderlines cannot scale by bringing their mental states into this 
backgrounding metaphoric space of the RH-EM, where things are separate but in relation. 
Summarizing, we may say that introjective attitudes actively resist the expansion of experience, 
with the ensuing cost of failing in the expansion of their agency, while anaclitic attitudes primarily 
resist the expansion of agency, with the ensuing cost of failing at the expansion of their experiential 
realm.  
 
Schizophrenia may suggest, as I will argue, the extreme pole of structuring experience through the 
narrativity mode and the usurping of affectivity by the overriding importance of the value of 
autonomy. The person enacts a horizon of experience that protects him from the engulfing 
influence of others and the world alike.  A phenomenological reading of schizophrenia may reveal 
this active distancing from the world of primordial, affective forces and the effort to transcend 
dependence, and the ongoing precarious balance between influence and autonomy. Sass (2004, 
2011) has extensively studied and reviewed the phenomenological experience of schizophrenia and 
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emphasises three poles of the affective experience: the alienation of the lived body, the 
fragmentation of perception and the world of affordances (what he calls the “unworlding” (p.136; 
2004) of schizophrenia), and finally the preoccupation with a quasi-delusional world created by the 
subject. Using Taylor’s concept of “strong evaluations” - that is, a second-order attitude towards 
our own attitudes and evaluations, the overall frame of what kind of persons we want to be - he 
concludes that in schizophrenia the second-order value is one of absolute autonomy, an intense and 
constant resistance to Heideggerian ‘throwness’ (Sass, 2013). From a schizophrenic attitude, instead 
of seeing the normal demands of life, one is always preoccupied with existential meta-questions. 
The desire to be free from interpersonal bonds is paramount; the aversion to common sense is 
stronger than any survival needs. One’s desire to be master of one’s fate, of not being submissive, 
of being true to the values of non-conformity, shapes the overall attitude towards life. The actions 
of schizophrenics, notes Sass, confirm these attitudes; they invent their own thinking systems, their 
own languages, they ‘give birth’ to themselves, as Artaud thought he did.  
 
Much of the phenomenological research and theorization confirms this picture. Stranghellini (2004) 
talks about “deanimated bodies” and “disembodied spirits”, noting that schizophrenia is the 
“embodiment of the view from nowhere” (ibid; p.22). Excessive attunement is their constant fear, 
expressed through comments like “I am afraid to get trapped in their way of thinking”, 
“interpersonal mental bonds are total death for me” (ibid). Ratcliffe (2008) makes clear that what 
is destroyed in schizophrenia is the encountering of the world of affective affordances in a 
background of emotional attunement which anchors our thinking and structures our processual 
relationship to them. Sass and Parnas (2001) show that in schizophrenia what is always a matter of 
spontaneous processing becomes a matter of foreground, of explicit processing; the grounding, the 
orienting and the constituting function of our spontaneous relationship to the world is brought 
forth and becomes a matter of explicit thinking. Maiese (2011), adopting the perspective of what 
she calls “affective framing”, notes that schizophrenic patients lose their footing in the world 
because the mediating processes of bodily attunement that would let them enact a meaningful 
world have been disturbed. Without the guidance and framing of attentional focusing afforded by 
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affective framing, they lose their grip on even the basic structures of space and time. Without a 
hierarchy of images and ideas footed in affective framing, everything takes on the same importance. 
While I think that the view of ‘unworlding’, disembodiment and the subjective creation of a new 
virtual self is prevalent in all phenomenological research, it is Sass (2011) who puts the most 
emphasis on the active way in which schizophrenics avoid the worlding, the embodiment and the 
attunement. Sass (2011) claims that schizophrenics flirt with their psychosis; they animate their style, 
a style of psychotic eccentricities, with some intentionality, actively rejecting normal conventions. 
Since they feel perplexed, they open up a more radical mode of being that almost accentuates the 
eccentricities that contribute to their alienation. The schizophrenic quest, then, lies at the end of a 
spectrum whose other end is a quest for psychotherapeutic help in re-integrating oneself into the 
matrix of experience. Gonzalez (2014) notes that the ‘non-sense’ in a shamanic ritual, allows the 
cognitive matrix of the individual to be reset. The shamanic rituals aim at modifying consciousness 
and disrupting cognitive routines in individuals. Psychotherapy grew out of this tradition of 
shamanic wounded-healers (Ellenberger, 1970) and is called in a complex world to help the 
individual reset the virtual self, the proactive, the narrative structure of experience by immersing in 
a shared matrix that expands the world of experience in order to expand its narrative structure.  
 
Sass (2011) notes that the schizophrenic freezes before an “experience of the absoluteness of 
freedom” (p.120). As I understand it, schizophrenia reflects an exaggerated form of introjective 
pathological attitudes towards experience, an exaggeration of the sense of autonomy which 
simultaneously involves a diminishment of the sense of agency. Demos (2007; 2011) tries to show 
the complex interplay between infants’ interest in differences and the increase in their sense of 
agency, in volitional self-direction. As long as a difference emerges in the horizon of affective 
affordances, we are directed towards responding by actively ‘consuming’ this discrimination. 
Buhrmann and DiPaolo (2015) discuss an Enactivist account on agency, according to which the sense 
of agency is the experiential consequence of a network of sensorimotor schemes that successfully 
assimilate the horizon of affordances. The first person giveness of experience is implicit in the 
enaction of such a scheme and the congruence of a network of schemes with what happens at the 
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horizon of affordances; its seamless continuation is required for the pre-reflective feeling of agency. 
When the horizon collapses, when an unexpected affordance is brought forth (what Demos calls a 
‘distinction’), a second level of awareness arises from the effort we have to put in in order to re-
equilibrate.  
 
Buhrmann and DiPaolo note that the selection of a sensorimotor scheme is actually the emergence 
of a basin of attraction, whose structure determines the agent-environment coupling and where a 
slight internal or external change breaks the symmetry and means the selection of one among 
several possible actions. This passage from a metastable to a stable condition of the system places 
the organism into a state of ‘commitment’ that constrains future actions through the priming of the 
following states. In schizophrenia, the emergence of a basin of attraction may be felt as a personal 
selection, but the secondary effects on the sensorimotor repertoire are executed as decoupled from 
the remaining sensorimotor repertoire. So when suffering from delusions of control, the person 
may feel that someone else is anticipating their actions and read their intentions and initiates them 
without their intervention. This decoupling from their own actions, therefore, is a necessary step 
towards the enhancement of the sense of autonomy; they are not immersed in the world. In the 
schizophrenic experience, the person sacrifices their sense of agency for the sake of preserving their 
sense of autonomy.  
 
What is important for my point of view is that agency and narrativity are two sides of the same coin, 
while these action cycles are deeply embedded within the primordial affective matrix which keeps 
our action cycles together. In schizophrenia, the agency-narrative organization of the world breaks 
into pieces, by opening the gap between agency and autonomy, between autonomy and our deep 
embeddedness within the world. In melancholia, losing the person his footing in the world, the 
agency-narrativity cycles lose their meaning, their sense of personal relevance and importance. 
Introjective pathologies involve a loss of agency originating in a widening of the gap between 
autonomy and the agency-narrativity cycles that embed us within the world, while anaclitic 
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pathologies involve a diminishment of the agency-narrativity cycles that comes as a result of the 
restriction of autonomy. We act on the world and the horizon of affective affordances changes its 
shape and asks us to re-equilibrate by bringing forth distinctions. Introjectives diminish their sense 
of agency by restricting the agency-narrativity action cycles to protect their autonomy, while 
anaclitics diminish their sense of agency to ensure that someone else assumes responsibility for 
their care and regulation.  
 
During the emergence of a macro-state, the overall organization is qualitatively irreducible to its 
subsystems – affective, motor, skilled, competent – while the macro-state bounds and constrains 
the expression of the subsystems (Piers, 2011). An overall attractor actually emerges which 
expresses the behaviour of these macro-states and its complexity, its fractal dimensionality, 
determines the stability of the overall organization, the ability to absorb discordant fluctuations at 
the subsystems level. Stable attractors have wide, deep and steep basins. To directly translate this 
language to the clinical process language, the ability to process the countertransferential vibrations 
does not perturb a therapist’s attractor which has been set towards understanding the analysand, 
find meaning in his behaviour and so a qualitative attitude towards positive alliance. On the other 
hand, an attractor whose basin is protected for positive alliance but has little differentiation at the 
level of subsystems and qualitatively is characterized by great uniformity in order to protect its 
basin, (a less complex attractor then), it will be easily disturbed by strong countertransferential 
vibrations and it will either evade the processing of vibrations to preserve its orientation towards 
alliance or it will break down. As Piers (2011) notes, it is of utmost importance for the re-organization 
of a collapsing attractor its behaviour at the moment of the collapse. In their expansion phase, when 
attractors try to accommodate discordant fluctuations at the level of the subsystems, any collapse 
will lead to a new qualitatively more complex organization. In their contraction phase, where 
attractors try to assimilate discordant fluctuations by bounding and constraining the elementary 
subsystems, any collapse will be responded to by a further contraction of the attractor basin. 
Moreover, as Piers (2011) notes in the expanding case, the experience of agency is heightened when 
the individual directs attention to the discordant fluctuations.  
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The implications of this language for both the understanding of pathology and the clinical process 
are obvious. Scaling the therapist her attention to unimportant details and opening widely her 
attention to how such details reveal a kind of propinquity, kinship and contingency to other 
expressive qualities of the analysand, she expands her own agency-narrativity cycles. For the 
therapist, this expansion involves the elaboration of the primordial affective forces that keep her 
embedded in the world of the relationship. The expansion of the ability to absorb 
countertransferential vibrations means at the same moment a solidification of the wide, deep and 
steep attractor of alliance, her positive commitment to understanding the patient, an increase in 
complexity and fractal dimensionality. It has become fairly evident that attachment, transference 
and alliance are transformations of the forces that regulate the field of affective affordances. 
Noticing the therapist, the distinctions that emerge in the field and directing her attention, 
elaborating the affective forces - that means a return to the closeness of the attachment, the 
powerful field of affective forces - processing the qualities and meanings of these forces while the 
overall organization of the attractor basin in its successive collapsing moments finds a new always 
more complex organization of increased fractal dimensionality, solidifies her alliance orientation. 
The patient in his anaclitic moments will be helped to reconnect the agency-narrative cycles to the 
powerful primordial affective forces (if these moments have a hysteric quality), or to relax the 
power of these forces upon the bones of the agency-narrativity cycles (if these moments have a 
borderline quality), in the elaboration of the alliance ruptures that reveal a horizon of affective 
affordances that is shaped by abandonment. In his introjective moments, he will be helped to 
reconnect the agency-narrativity cycles to primordial affectivity by elaborating alliance ruptures 
which reveal a horizon of affective affordances shaped by critical, rejecting, punitive voices that 
have been actively defended by bringing forth a world where vulnerability and need for nurturance 
solicitations are desperately avoided.  
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So when Stern (2010) writes that “we are not the only authors of the meanings” in which experience 
formulates “in what we usually feel is the privacy of our minds” (p.5), he is talking about this 
unstable relationship between agency and freedom, about experience as something generated 
in/between self-states, in/between persons, in relatedness. Stern (2004) actually adopts a 
constructivist view, which he defines in Unformulated Experience as the critical distance of symbolic 
representation that makes interpretation and the adoption of a perspective possible. The view I am 
proposing here is a radically enactivist one, according to which what Stern understands as 
‘distancing’ is founded on the revelatory aspect of language. Our constructions about experience 
come second after the synchronicity of our embodied interactions that bring forth an expanded 
world of experience. I have carefully avoided the word ‘construction’ here, since I understand it 
more as a transformation of Bionian beta elements, a revelation of their shape into alpha elements, 
a joint creation, as opposed to a construction of a shareable reality out of the infinite dimensions of 
experience.  
 
Imagine a dialogue between wine-tasters: One describes the dimension of acidity as a burning 
sensation similar to the sense of little sweet flowers sprouting over her tongue, and the other 
comments that he feels this as a slower, sparkling of little stems, and the sweetness of flowers as 
overriding the acidity of sparkling. They both move their hands and their bodies; their head 
movements vivify the image; metaphoricity brings forth experience and the sensorial elements, as 
an unfinilizable source of meaning, reveal their shape. A construction is about the frozen semantic 
world of the LH; a creation is about the revelation of experience into languaging as an active bodily 
organ whose function is to orient another person’s attention. But I cannot agree more with Stern 
(2010) when he argues that, when in conflict, we are already free. As experience has started 
revealing its disturbing dimensions, we have to actively choose whether we are going to 
aggressively protect our autonomy from the influence of the world or to protect the world from our 
own aggression; to submit by seducing another in order to take up the cost of our own choices or 
to aggressively seduce another to care for our own regulation. We have to actively choose whether 
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we are going to intensify our known strategies of bringing forth experience or to expand the world 






         5.3 The Enactive Structuring of Experience in the Psychoanalytic Process 
 
The Enactivist approach seems promising for integrating the clinical teleological approach to the 
experimental mechanistic approach, according to which we simply react to stimuli in such a way 
that re-integrates teleology and experience back into science (Ellis & Newton, 2010). Consciousness 
is in no way passive, nor is it the tip of the iceberg of a set of computational processes or an 
epiphenomenon. It is the active experiencing of the world by an affective and motivated being. We 
arise into levels of experiencing and consciousness navigating the world, and in all probability this 
metaphor carries its mentalistic connotations, since we actually ‘co-arise’ with the world. We bring 
levels of the world up by rising our consciousness (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991). So it is not 
something that happens inside our heads after we take the world in, but is rather part of our 
embodied, motor and perceptual attunement to the world.  
 
In a landscape of affective affordances, we actively navigate to avoid the harmful ones and obtain 
those gradients whose reduction through a process of self-organization is what brings a solicitation 
forth (Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014). Perception, note Bruineberg and Rietveld, is the circular 
causality through which an order parameter emerges from the microscopic dynamics and in turn 
	 264	
enslaves them, while action is like the second-order circularity according to which the self-
organizing system tries to reduce and consume the effects of the gradient, the control parameter. 
Tschacher (2014) notes that this gradient reduction is a pattern formation, and this is what we 
understand as ‘representation’, the generation of an order parameter at the moment of given 
perception without any representational interlude. The cognitive system, he writes, is a dynamic, 
not a symbol system; even if abstract cognition seems decoupled from the environment, in all 
probability it works on the same dynamic principles where thinking is suggested by emulated 
sensorimotor loops of action-perception cycles.  
 
In this sense, what we understand as ‘representation’ is the perceptual given that emerges from the 
coupling of the organism to the environment and the historical priors that simply act as constraints 
in the dynamic unfolding of this coupling. We already discussed how, in the emergence of a macro-
state, the retraction of an attractor basin works to protect the assimilative capacities of the 
organism, the constraints that direct its coupling to the field of affordances. This is exactly the 
Deleuzian criticism to representational thinking: the subordination of difference to identity and an 
understanding of the world that relies on identiities, analogies, oppositions and resemblances 
(Somers-Hall, 2013; Williams, 2013). Deleuze criticizes Hegelian dialectics for the non-affirmative and 
inauthentic conception of difference, the negation of life by turning it into a mediated externalist 
affair. He understands difference as the integration of the Bergsonian, heterogeneous multiplicity, 
which is sensible, lived and felt. In Hegel, nothing is absolutely immediate or mediated; it is through 
concepts that we achieve the necessary union, a form of mediation that resolves the ongoing 
tension. Deleuze understands this need for mediation - the distancing, the need for overcoming 
something through conceptual means, the dialectics of alterity and identity - as a negation of the 
originary, affirmative and generative dimension of life (Baerveldt, 2014). The stagnancy of the self-
producing subject, the reduction of difference to contradiction in dialectics, and the conservative 
nature of recognition as an establishment of structures of identity are (according to Deleuze) only 
in the service of making the singular succumb to the generality and lose itself into abstraction 
(Lumsden, 2014). The “universalizing patterns of representational thinking” cannot reach an 
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affirmative and authentic sense of repetition in which “language speaks before words” and which 
can act “without intermediary upon spirit” (ibid; p.181).  
 
In all probability Deleuze has in mind something like the “phase-portrait” of an attractor basin with 
increased complexity and fractal dimensionality that is able to seamlessly respond to the 
accommodative pressures of experience by further expansion when needed (Somers-Hall, 2012). 
The Hegelian inauthentic mediation is the ‘sleeping meaning”, the priors, the assimilative that tries 
to impose its power upon experience. The narrative distinction, the schematic organization of 
experience, the given of perceptual causality, cannot be a “negation which affirms itself” (Lumsden, 
2014; p.192). Representation and “the recognitive project employs power not reason to make a 
value or concept universal” (ibid; p.192). Bakhtin tries to distinguish the dialogicality of human 
consciousness from the monologism of the Hegelian dialectic consciousness in a complementary 
way. Musing on the differences between dialogue and dialectics, he writes:  “Season the word of a 
dialogue (the division of voices); season then the intonations (of a personal and affective character); 
shell abstract notions and reasonings from live words and sayings; wrap the whole in a unique 
abstract consciousness - and you get dialectics” (cited in Todorov, 1984; p.104). Thus, Deleuze, 
Bakhtin, Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, and in a sense Vygotsky, all question the ontological status 
of the inner and the outer.  
 
As Cresswel and Baerveldt (2006) mention, social constructionists and positioning theorists not only 
simplify but seriously deform Bakhtinian thinking. In Bakhtin, the inner and the outer enfold the one 
into the other in the experientiality and the embodiment of the participative consciousness. Identity 
has an embodied and culturally normative grounding; it cannot be a free and inconsequential 
interplay of discourses. The uniqueness of a situation is answered at the background of normative 
practices, while meaning emerges as the interaction unfolds in a substantiation of these normative 
practices. “The better our command of genres,” says Bakhtin (1986), “the more freely we employ 
them, the more fully and clearly we reveal our individuality through them” (p.80). Bakhtin, as 
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Baerveldt (2014a) notes, liberates space from its categorical dimensionality. “[S]elf and other are 
not merely positioned but implied in one another before we come to see them as positioned” (ibid; 
p.xx). At the same time, it is clear in Bakhtin that we cannot see through our own style but that 
someone else has to embody this for us. “They give me the words, the forms and the tonality that 
constitute my first image of myself . . . human consciousness awakens surrounded by the 
consciousness of others” (cited in Todorov, 1984; p.96). In Bakhtin, as in Deleuze, the frozen 
semantic aspects - the world of previous interactions and meanings born out of these interactions - 
do not suggest a static ‘representational’ or ‘recognitive’ set of constraints on the unfolding of 
dialogical interactions. Bakhtin is the forefather of ‘metaphoricity’, saying that “[n]othing is 
absolutely dead: every meaning will celebrate its rebirth . . . [t]he problem of the great temporality” 
(ibid; p.110). I have already mentioned that it is our second-order attitudes - those towards our own 
attitudes and evaluations - that regulate the waking of the frozen in a dialogical-metaphoricity 
process and in the creation of meaning. For Bakhtin (cited in Todorov, 1984), this is not an intra-
subjective process; “[c]onsciousness is far more frightening than all unconscious complexes, 
because at the bottom of man we find the other” (ibid; p.33). The Bakhtinian idea about the 
“revealing of our individuality through genres [and the] great temporality” (i.e. dialogicality) and 
the Deleuzian idea that “there is a difference between real difference and conceptual difference” 
(Baugh, 1992; p.133) (i.e. transcendental empiricism) strive to bring the generativity of the mind into 
prominence.  
 
We try to attune internal and external dynamics. Conscious experiences are nothing but “forms of 
activity” (p.4), writes Kirchoff (2015), that are associated with this constant effort to attune. 
Consciousness then is far more frightening, since it reflects the instability of attunement, the fact 
that the shape of the self is not absorbed in a seamless assimilation of the flowing world. We strive 
for an optimal grip of a maximum of the dimensions of experience in the model we are, not in a 
model we have. We shape ourselves as a model of the flow, and experience comes back as a 
pressure for accommodation, reminding us of the reduction of its dimensionality. Scaling for the 
optimal visibility, then, is a skillful effort to reduce disattunement. What we understand as the 
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‘general’ and the ‘abstract’ comes from the recursivity of skillful performance. What we understand 
as symbolic and semiotic is a world of historical recursive interactions. The Merleau-Pontian ‘style 
of conduct’ is acquired through a recursive performance of what Bakhtin calls ‘genres’, and is not a 
movement from the sensorimotor to the abstract and the general. Rather, as Barveldt (2015) notes, 
it is an embodied disposition, an embodied sensitivity acquired through repeated action-perception 
cycles, couplings through “intentional arcs” that are reflected back to us “correlative with our 
dispositions to respond to them” (ibid; p.453).   
 
Conceptual competence, as both Wittgenstein and Vygotsky mention, requires an enculturation 
process in which we grasp the normativity of worlds of words, “genres” and social practices 
through training within the consensual domain of practicing. The normative cannot be grasped 
conceptually, since it is what makes the use of a concept possible (Baerveldt, 2014c). Disturbing the 
normative by trying to grasp it conceptually, we change the use of concepts. I first learned the 
concept of ‘transference’ at the background of a whole normative practice, and I had to show my 
conceptual competence in practice. It is the differentiation and the re-integration through recursive 
practice of what Vygotsky calls “the whole” (Baerveldt, 2014b) that allowed me to express my 
personal style. This is not a movement from the particular to the general, from the embodied to the 
abstract. Even if a concept suggests the “possibility of repeatable experiences that are identical in 
respect of their organizational form” (Baugh, 1992; p.134), it is through its interactive and embodied 
origins that it comes to regulate the unfolding of meaning as a constraint in a self-organizing 
dynamic process. A concept, then, does not actually ‘mean’ ‘something’ but it strives to reveal the 
history of the organism; it is in the self-organizing interaction that meaning emerges.  
 
I think we have reached this really subtle conceptual point where one has to choose the kind of 
mindset from which one has to study the phenomenon of clinical communication, either from the 
side of a semiotic perspective or from the side of the ground-level interactivity upon which language 
emerges as an ecological extension of this radical interactivity (Stephensen, 2015). The adoption of 
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such a mindset is clearly a theoretical question, and I will try to support the view that psychoanalysis 
cannot afford any other choice than the second. The question actually amounts to a one regarding 
the overall epistemological framework. As I will try to demonstrate, no semiotic and constructionist 
framework can reveal the process of change in psychoanalytic terms, even if it comes close to an 
overall Enactivist view about the human mind. It is only on the grounds of a primarily Enactivist 
epistemological framework that psychoanalysis can question how change happens in the clinical 
process.  
 
Salvatore and Zittoun (2011) think that sense-making is a dynamic process, which I am in total 
agreement with whilst adopting a cultural mediational perspective. However, while they propose 
that it is through semiotic devices that we transcend the present moment, I believe that it is through 
the dialogicality as an inherent state of the human condition. By constantly leveling the ‘distance’ in 
what Merleau-Ponty calls “proximity through distance” (p.128; 1968), we can transcend the 
assimilative that comes to reduce the dimensionality of the present moment.  The differences in the 
way I perceive clinical communication are really subtle but important. Salvatore and Zittoun mention 
that “the selection of one path of interpretation from the huge amount of possibilities made 
available by the cultural domain depends . . . on the affective context shared by the protagonists” 
(p.31). They think that, in a recursive process of sense-making, we reduce polysemy. Interpretation 
is always required, since meaning is constantly unfinalized. While I agree that recursivity is important 
for sense-making, it is not about a ‘reduction’ but rather about an expansion. The reduction of 
polysemy serves a pragmatic purpose that is not the only purpose of psychotherapy and 
communication. The achievement of a shared reality is not only about a pragmatic, but also and 
primarily about a generative reality.  
 
Recursivity, as I have already mentioned, involves the consensual coordination at the shared 
domain, and the ‘reduction of polysemy’ is only one of the possible endpoints of this consensual 
activity. It is in the generativity, the “extraordinary poeticité” (Castoriadis, 2011; p.46) of the 
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consensual coordination, that a need for pragmatic accordance emerges as a possible frame and 
collapses to give rise to a new shape in the field of communication. Actually, Salvatore’s thinking 
does not target the pragmatic directly, but the emphasis on the ‘semio’ aspect of what he calls the 
“semiopoietic dynamics of sense-making” (Salvatore & Venuleo, 2008) brings an unnecessary 
narrowing of focus for a psychoanalytic epistemological framework and methodology. As his 
thinking developed over the years, however, Salvatore (2015) clearly emphasises the dynamic, the 
embodied, the intersubjective nature of the mind, the importance of attuning affective contexts 
and the importance of ‘acting’ as a mediational sign. However, in trying to build a scientific model 
of sense-making, he retains this special role for signs as an operationally distinct level of the 
interactive matrix. The reduction of dissatunement, then, is not about the reduction of polysemy or 
a re-arrangment of signification chains but about an opening of the boundaries of the mind. I think 
that psychoanalysis should retain the emphasis, developed over the years, on the belief that therapy 
as a form of self-understanding is something more than expanding the assimilative capacities of the 
mind. It is about expanding our ability to let ourselves be affected by the workings of the generative, 
to acquire a competence to orient our attention towards affirmative differences and the neglected 
dimensions of experience, a competence to poetize ourselves. In order to let ourselves know how 
change happens at this level, we need to turn our attention from the constructive to the creative, 
from the semiotic to what Loewald calls “dramatization”, to the transitional flesh.  
 
For many change process models, a pragmatic orientation is perfectly sensible and sought after. I 
think that for psychoanalysis, such a pragmatic orientation, it actually bypasses the radical mystery 
of change which cannot be observed but only “sensed” by an externalist methodology. I will argue 
that process research for psychoanalysis actually means the expansion of our awareness about the 
process. The ‘Innovative Moments’ (IM) change-process model originates in a semiotic-dialogical 
cultural perspective. The question regarding change focuses on what Mitchell calls the 
“bootstrapping problem”, which in IM is defined as the “mutual in-feeding”, the return to a 
problematic voice after the emergence of an innovative voice (Cunha, Salgado & Gonçalves, 2011; 
Ribeiro, Gonçalves & Santos, 2012). The development of micro-genetic and micro-analytic 
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methodologies has helped IM theorists to expand their understanding regarding what happens in 
the oscillation between an established voice (e.g. “I feel inadequate”) and an emergent voice. For 
example, they have observed interesting dynamics of escalation of the non-dominant voice: a 
reversal of dominance in a first phase and then a phase of negotiation and assimilation of the voice 
and engagement in a new form of internal dialogue (Ribeiro, Gonçalves & Santos, 2012). This 
description of voice dynamics, however interesting, remains unearthed from the field and leaves 
outside of questioning the most important issue of the ontology of the insideness and outsideness 
of voices. In order to study the field, we need to immerse ourselves in the field and look primarily 
into the dynamics of sense-making (Salvatore & Gennaro, 2015) as the dynamics of an interactive 
and affective matrix. If my thinking up to this point is correct and the glue of cognition is 
interactivity, and if interactivity acquires this cohesive power by the affective forces that emerge in 
the field, we should look for the dynamics of change at this ground level of interactivity from which 
language emerges as an ‘extended ecology’. Any methodology, then, that studies the dynamics of 
the field at the semiotic level or at the narrative turning points level should be complemented by a 
vertical methodology that amplifies our access to the transition points by looking at “micro-units as 
observational data . . . whose resolution is higher than phenomenological experience” (Salvatore & 
Gennaro, 2015; p.205).  
 
In the previous chapter I already proposed Agar’s complexity-sensitive ethnographic methodology 
as a relevant overall framework for a process-oriented qualitative psychoanalytic case study. 
Moreover, as I have shown, this empathic form of knowledge is an ongoing process within the 
clinical situation. Both members of the dyad, in repetitive cycles of coupling and scaling through the 
shifting of mental states, create a shared domain of interaction which actually amounts to a process 
of change. The figure-grounding is nonstop, but at some transitional points claims emerge on the 
grounds of the experiential history of the system, which somehow coordinate the assimilative 
capacities of both members creating a shared focus. This coordination, which expresses the 
assimilative capacity of the system itself, simultaneously retains a level of uneven tension at the intra-
subjective level, a generative phase-difference which gives to the analytic process its forwarding 
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power. These tensions create accommodative pressures at the experiential level, which are expressed 
in the ongoing cycles of coupling, scaling and shifting. The recursive process will conclude in a 
narrative, a story told twice, the ‘truth’ of the system as an assimilative structure.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, its third aim is to discuss the methodological 
qualities that are relevant for studying scaling processes in the clinical situation. Studying the 
Deleuzian thinking I realized that complexity clinicians are already doing a form of Deleuzian 
research in their practices. The “do not strive to predict in advance because you will block the flow” 
mentality, a recurring code in my analysis, it is in accordance to the Deleuzian researchers who ask 
us to find ways to portray the affective, the intensive, the moving that which exceeds meaning and 
representation (Coleman & Ringrose, 2013). Both complexity clinicians and Deleuzian researchers 
try to get into the messiness of the real without smoothing it out. We cannot probably grasp scaling 
at the intra-subjective level, this messiness of going back-and-forth between an ordered language, 
the interactional scenes unfolding in our minds, and the affective waves that radiate their powers 
into multiple timescales of interactions, persons, experiences, sensations. However, we may be able 
to sense scaling following the history of the interaction dominant dynamics of the autonomous 
order at several important ‘phases’ of the system’s trajectory.  
 
A complexity-sensitive ethnographic description of the system may help us get an overall picture of 
time irreversibly unfolding of the assimilative structure of the system and its bifurcation points. 
However, we need to complement this horizontal methodology with vertical methodologies that 
amplify our access to the accommodative pressures that regulate the dynamics of the process. The 
examination of the accommodative level is of the utmost importance, especially for psychoanalysis 
which, as a process, aims for a radical understanding of Scaling. My proposal is that we should turn 
to the methodological thinking of Dialogicality (Linell, 2009), the Distributed Language Approach 
(DLA) (Cowley, 2011; Stephensen, 2011; 2015b) and the ethnomedological thinking of Conversation 
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Analysis (Peräkÿla, 2008) to look for the development of methods that will helps us approach that 
which happens at the level of the “interaction engine” (Levinson, 2006; p.39).  
 
While I will not discuss at length the differences between these three approaches, I am interested 
in emphasising a crucial difference that seems important for the development of the 
psychotherapeutic methodological thinking.  To start with, I should mention that all three 
approaches have significant commonalities that reflect in essence an Enactivist mindset regarding 
the communication process, emphasising the interaction-sensitive and dominant dynamics. 
Dialogicality brings the crucial understanding that human communication is made possible on the 
grounds of a re-created tension between dialogical positions. As already mentioned in Bakhtin’s 
writing, the ontological boundaries, the ‘insideness’ and the ‘outsidness’ of each of these positions 
are fluid. The Bakhtinian normativity, as Cresswell and Baerveldt (2006) show, involves a 
foundational embodied matrix on the grounds of which this dialogical tension becomes intelligible. 
I have already shown that this bi-phasic tension is reflected in an embodied inter-hemispheric 
tension, an architectural morphological tension that serves the coupling of a bilateral body in a 
social world that regulates our dialogic ability to “make sense of [ourselves] and the world together 
with others” (Linell, 2015; p.121).  
 
Goffman’s ethnomethodological viewpoint and Conversation Analysis (CA) emphasise the 
emergence of an autonomous “interaction order”, which regulates the coordination of the 
behaviour of the interaction partners by enabling and constraining the identity of the interaction 
(Buccholz & Kächele, 2013; Peräkÿla, 2008; Vehviläinen, Peräkÿla, Antaki & Leudar, 2008; Voutilainen 
& Peräkÿla, 2015; 2016). DLA seems to get closer to an ‘organismic’ understanding of Enactivism by 
emphasising not only the cultural shaping of the skillful, thinking and attentional competences that 
make the emergence of an interaction order possible, but also the “temporal multi-scalararity” 
(Steffensen, 2015a; p.111) of the ecology of interaction. Beyond the “situation-transcending aspects” 
(Steffensen, 2015b; p.124) carried by genres and which in turn reflect the cultural normativity, there 
	 273	
are multiple scales of coordination that regulate languaging such as neural, physiological, 
behavioural, the system’s interaction history, the topic of discussion, and the relational history 
(Steffensen, 2015a;b; DeJaegher, Peräkÿla & Stevanocic, 2016).  
 
As Steffensen (2015b) notes, for the DLA approach it is not enough to distance oneself from a 
Structuralist perspective, which creates an image of language as ontologically autonomous. We 
need to naturalize language, extending it beyond a functionalist and cultural hermeneutic 
perspective in order to approach the ecological nature of the “interaction engine”. Therefore, DLA 
emphasises the fluidity and the inter-penetrability of the boundaries between the autonomous 
organism and the social order, while at the same time it extends the interaction order into a fluid, 
emergent and context-specific order. Any semiotic approach - even the Peircian semiotics, which 
according to Rosenbaum (2015) can help us illuminate the Sullivanian interpersonalist thinking - is 
finally unable to radically break from the seriality that lies at the heart of monologism. In order to 
approach the accommodative, we need not only break from a representational, information-
processing, code and ‘transference of content’ model, but reach closer towards the tension 
between the assimilative and the accommodative.  
 
It is impossible to ‘ontologize’ the ecological interaction substrate, but adopting an interaction-
oriented mindset we will better equip us for sensing the ground level emergent interaction order 
that regulates the system dynamics. Questions originating in CA like “Ηow we do transference?” or 
“Ηow we do projective identification?” (Peräkÿla, 2008; Voutilainen & Peräkÿla, 2015) are 
interesting, but must be expanded into “Ηow we do interaction?” and “Ηow in turn does the 
emerging interaction order transform the way we do communication?” (Steffensen, 2015b). In the 
context of DLA, methodologies develop which study micro-episodes of problem solving as the 
emergence of a distributed cognitive system. For example, Steffensen (2013) presents the case of 
such a micro-episode, in a naturalistic setting, where two people search for an identification number 
in an invoice. The researcher notices that in the ultrafast interaction micro-cycles, which sometimes 
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appear as repeated patterns of words, there are small physical and contextual changes in each 
repetition - such as postural sways, eye contact and changes in eye direction - which lead to a self-
organized, unpredictable and at the edge-of-chaos cognitive trajectory that cannot be described in 
terms of schemes, plans and blueprints.  
 
It was Hutchins (1995a) who first showed that in “cognition in the wild”, imagination and thinking 
have their origins in the interaction system that develops by the body talking and acting in a specific 
cultural world. Hutchins’ important insights came from researching cockpit situations (1995a) and 
navigation practices (1995b), where he showed that the mind is extended: navigation tools suggest 
a part of what we perceive as the mind, and that the expertise lies in the system of people 
interacting with artefacts. Van Orden, Holden and Turvey (2003; 2005) and Van Orden, Kloos and 
Wallot (2011) have shown that cognitive tasks are quite often interaction-dominant, and the 
development of what they call “1/f scaling”, “fractal” or “pink noise” reflects the tight integration 
between components in such a way that their interaction overrides any separate dynamics that the 
components may exhibit. The idea of the brain as a modular machine is rather misguided, since most 
cognitive tasks are softly-assembled within an interaction context and as Kloos and Van Orden 
(2009) note: “[S]oft-assembled mechanisms emerge in contextually constrained, collective action 
of the brain and the body . . .[T]hey come into existence with enaction, and they are only realized 
within the immediate context of enaction” (p.258).  
 
Self-organized criticality can explain the soft-assembled, context-specific, interaction dynamics 
(Juarrero, 1999; Kloos & Van Orden, 2009). Our assimilative capacities strive to keep us in synch with 
the field of affordances and ensure the coordination across multiple scales of time and space. The 
accommodative pressures are responded to through this ability for self-organized criticality, but 
often the interaction dynamics are disrupted and the system’s tight integration collapses. Our ability 
for self-organized criticality at several levels allows us in the clinical situation to play the 
transferential drama in the matrix while the alliance is not disrupted. The analysand/analyst coupling 
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occurs at several levels, and the advancement of ‘pink noise’ as a sign of self-organized criticality is 
the sign of a tight integration and coupling. According to the terminology used by Van Orden, Kloos 
and Wallot (2011), “white noise” is the overly random, the chaotic coupling, while “brown noise” is 
the overly regular and coherent coupling. The reduction of constraints and the development of 
constraints turns brown and white into ‘pink noise’ respectively. In this sense, the concentric is the 
advancement of a shared domain by tightly integrating into a pink noise system while the diametric 
is the effort to avoid integration into a ‘pink’ system by making the reduction or the development 
of constraints possible. The analytic dyad will therefore probably find itself at different phases of 
integration at the same time and on several levels. Even in terms of alliance, for example, if one 
accepts the view that alliance expresses the quality of the interpersonal relationship - the mutual 
agreement on goals, the patient’s motive to stay committed to the therapeutic work and the dyad’s 
ability to overcome resistances (Safran & Muran, 2000; 2006) - the system may be unevenly 
integrated for each one of these components on several timescales. We therefore need to study 
the system in a qualitative manner that does not divide it into unintegrated components but strives 
to examine the system’s expressive dynamics.  
 
Wagman and Chemero (2014) discuss the integration of a computer mouse while playing a video 
game in an extended cognitive system via the development of the 1/f scaling fractal noise. In a one 
minute trial, the connection between the mouse and the object it controls on the monitor is 
disrupted temporarily before returning to normal, and the 1/f scaling integration of the hand-mouse 
system is equally disrupted so that the mouse is no longer a part of the extended interaction 
dominant system but a “mere contextual factor that the cognitive system was engaged with” 
(p.119). Bringing the example closer to human communication, I propose that we consider Murray 
and Trevarthen’s (1985) comparison experiment of mother/ infant on-line and out-of-phase, delayed 
interaction through monitor which clearly shows how this integrated interactivity is disrupted after 
a brief disruption of the on-line communication. In treatment we almost never experience such a 
disastrous disruption of the 1/f scaling, but cases of failed reparation of alliance ruptures reflect a 
massive disintegration of the coupling system at several levels.  
	 276	
 
The dialogical tension creates the conditions for working towards the emergence of a shared 
domain of normativity. We do not strive towards the reduction of polysemy but towards the 
emergence of a shared normative and generative domain where what Koubova (2014) calls the 
“unsignifiable” (p.3) of our action-provoking experience can be smoothly integrated around a 
fractal dimensionality, within the context of an overall interactive ecology created by our bodies, 
their expressive styles and their affective or linguistic sensitivities. For Merleau-Ponty (1968), it is 
through the resistance to perception that anything can become visible; the non-transparent, the 
inherent excessive of our bodies expressed in ideas and affective forces is at the same time the 
precondition for the expression of anything real and the force that makes us strive for this 1/f scaling 
with another. ‘Uncovering’ the dynamics of the interaction order in the clinical situation, we may 
manage to work out the mystery of how an extended assimilative self emerges through the 
transitionality of ‘pink noise’ integrative coupling, with someone other, at several levels. The 
mystery lies in the movements created by the accommodative pressures and the ensuing change of 
our expressive ‘style’. Before turning into examining through the developed minimal model of the 
clinical situation a case study, resourced from the pubished literature, I will try to make once again 
transparent the way in which I perceive languaging as an extended ecology of the interaction order, 
in clinical terms this time.  
 
Scaling is about letting the “unthought known” show its dimensions. Since it is exactly an unthought 
known, it is not hidden but grounding. The sensible is there for us to enactively turn our attention 
towards it. I will use two examples drawn from Buccholz (2014) to explain the role of leveling the 
implicit. “Being married to another therapist,” writes Buccholz, “I have very often witnessed the 
fact that by listening to one’s partner responding to the client’s first phone call, the bystanding 
partner can make a kind of diagnostic proposal just from listening to the voice of the partner 
answering the phone” (p.1). An affective and dramatic matrix sets in right from the start and will 
regulate the movements of sense-making. “More often than not”, continues Buccholz, “this 
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diagnostic assessment turns out to be correct” (ibid; p.1). In the space of two paragraphs, Buccholz 
cites Elizabeth Nutt Williams reporting that she once wanted to review a video session which she 
remembered as being full of quick and vibrant verbal exchanges. Reviewing the session, she was 
“struck by the vast difference between [her] experience and the recorded tape”, and was “stunned 
to see a low-key, slow and fairly quiet” (ibid; p.1) session. I think that both cases will sound relevant 
and familiar to any experienced therapist and reflect our couplings to aspects of the transferential 
matrix and the wider systems in which we are embedded.  
 
Sensing the kind of system we make with a new patient, we show in practice the competency 
acquired by embedding ourselves in several extended and interacting experiential cycles. Reviewing 
a session means that we give ourselves a second chance to sense the kind of couplings that emerged 
and how these regulated the horizon of affective affordances. It is not so much that Williams’ sense 
of the session had been incorrect, but rather that the experiential coupling over the course of the 
process was, for reasons that remain unexplained, different from the coupling she made when 
reviewing the session. This tension creates an interesting space for developing process research 
thinking. My proposal is that through researching an autonomous, emergent interactive order, we 
can start unpacking the ‘directness’ element that is included in our ‘correctness’ or ‘incorrectness’ 
by the accommodative pressures that are exerted upon us by the field which includes not only the 
analysand’s but even our own actions, attitudes, expressive utterances - thought or articulated - and 
affective or bodily experience as they are reflected back on us. There is always a ‘flexibility tension’ 
between analyst and analysand that does not amount to a rigid and a flexible system but into two 
autonomous agents which exhibit different degrees of flexibility at several levels when embedded 
in a certain overall system where an autonomous interaction order emerges. Moreover, there is a 
‘flexibility tension’ experienced in/between mental states for both members of the dyad. It is in the 
shifting of our mental states that experientially we enact this ‘1/f scaling’ integrative coupling, and 
even if our sense of ‘correctness’ is not shaken by a distinctive conflict, we may actively turn our 
attention towards making subtler distinctions. We may not ever be in a position to put the process 
through which an expert therapist like Kurtz senses the moment to change his enacted attitude in 
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the field into a concrete theory, but we can certainly expand our awareness about our subjectivities 
and will expand our knowledge base regarding these processes.  
 
Schlesinger (2003) mentions that the expressive style of transference talking cannot be considered 
as communicative. The “patient's speech and other actions must be heard as somehow intended to 
influence the analyst/listener to get him to do something to, with, or for the patient . . .  or to prevent 
him from taking some undesired action” (p.191). Shapiro (2011a) agrees that neurotic patients do 
not “talk straight” (p.17), but for him this is not the repetition of anachronistic transferential 
anxieties. The neurotic style - the dramatic aspect that regulates sense-making - may originate in 
early relationships; but it has been developed over the years as a self-protective, restrictive attitude 
that forestalls “new conflicts and anxieties” (ibid; p.19). There is a sensible rigidity in this ‘neurotic 
style’ of engaging in an interaction order. On the other hand, there is also a qualitatively different 
‘therapeutic style’ that is hopefully less rigid yet requires the analyst has to rethink its effect on the 
field. Analysts are aware of the disturbing effects that their own ideas (Suttie, 1935/1999) and their 
subjectivities (Cooper, 2010; Hoffmann, 1998; Stern, 2009) bring into the field. Process research may 
suggest a valuable tool for extending this kind of awareness that we gain through analyses, 
supervision and training. Enacting an experiential field in treatment is a highly creative and non-
repeatable experience, raising our awareness about it we may extend our expertise, while we create 
possibilities for theorizing this expertise, making the psychotherapy knowledge base richer. “The 
world of the expert performer,” as Baerveldt (2014b) notes, “is not narrower but richer and deeper 
. . . [and] . . . consists not simply in ignoring irrelevant things, but in being “in tune” with this richer 
world, being able to make distinctions . . . being fully and generatively immersed in its depths and 











5.4 “Being banal and inadequate? What should bother me about that?”: Enacting 
Curiosity in a Bootstrapping Matrix 
 
I will now use material resourced from a case study in order to discuss the importance of looking 
beyond the horizontal level of system’s emerging history of transition points. Unfortunately, we 
cannot use the full power of the proposed methodological tools – Dialogicality, CA and DLA – since 
the presented material is resourced from published literature and we lack access to relevant audio-
visual data. However, I will try to show how an understanding of the dynamics of the operating 
interactive order, as far as we can approach the qualities of this interaction order at the level of 
printed words, enable us extricate the accommodative pressures that emerge in the field. I will also 
hope to delineate the processes through which the dyad manages to handle these pressures in 
order to create zones of proximal development in which the patient can reach a higher level of 
assimilation (Leiman & Stiles, 2001) while the system also expands its assimilative capacity. Ι selected 
the material after reviewing 36 single case studies involving adults retrieved from the Single Case 
Archive7 by using the keywords ‘transference’ and ‘interpretation’ during September 2014. The case 







material. While I found the theoretical underpinning of the author highly relevant to my own 
Relational-Interpersonalist clinical thinking, I initially felt puzzled by the style of his clinical work, 
which involved an exaggerated use of questioning and which I felt as being almost persecutory for 
the patient, at the first reading. One can also immediately tell apart the zero-level interpretative 
work and the sticking out lack of metaphor use. In short, the case material is not a typical 
psychoanalytic kind of clinical work, with the only exception, being the way the analyst uses his 
understanding of the transferential dynamics when ‘enacting’ his therapeutic involvement. The case 
is published in Vol. 44, N. 3 of Contemporary Psychoanalysis, with the title Reflections on 
Psychoanalysis Conducted as a Talking Cure and is written by Dr. Robert Carrere8.  
 
In the Jean-Nahum case, the way that the emerging interaction order serves Scaling is certainly 
apparent. Using Nahum empathic attunement, the ground is prepared for the dyad to let metaphor 
do its job and for Jean to expand her narrativity-agency cycles. A critical moment in the discussion 
that depicts the closing of the tension gap between Jean and Nahum, and Nahum’s effort to further 
fractalize this gap, is the moment in which Jean explicitly states her perspective by saying: “You’re 
being too narrow-minded, I think. I talk about sex with you all the time.” Nahum returns to the 
metaphor that helped them build an ‘internal scene’ for processing the tension by replying: “You 
Freudians, you think everything is sex”. In this, Nahum tries to achieve what Mitchell calls a 
“quantum leap” by bringing together their projected contexts and carry out a rapid review of the 
achieved 1/f scaling. Meares (2012a) notes that the internal scene of the RH languaging is the basic 
unit of selfhood, and that psychotherapy is a visuospatial praxis. The capacity for scene production 
is diminished in those who dissociate. In the Nathan/Carrere case, the noticeable lack of use of 
explicit metaphor makes one wonder, in what way does how the emerging interaction order serves 
the expansion of the narrativity-agency cycles. I will try to show that metaphoricity as a grounding 
process may work beyond the field of dreams or the use of linguistic tropes in treatment, or better 




interaction order. Metaphor is not only embodied and embedded, but an ‘extended ecological and 
enactive’ interactive process.  
 
Carrere presents Nathan, a 32-year-old man chronically dissatisfied with his professional 
achievements and personal relationships. Carrere describes the very general profile of Nathan’s 
enactive strategies for coupling to the field of affective affordances as “persecutory self-loathing” 
and “obsessive thinking about how to correct his self-deficiencies”. By describing his 
countertransference, we are informed that the therapist feels plagued at times by a sense of 
hopelessness and helplessness, which he is interested to explore experientially with Nathan. Carrere 
mentions that he actively strives to gain emotional freedom against a sense of impatience that he 
considers as resistance against the more disturbing feelings of helplessness. What we know about 
Nathan’s history is that his convictions of utter worthlessness and the depressive affect that 
accompanies it have been actively used in the past to mitigate his father’s attacks. At the same time, 
Nathan has developed a kind of “social compliance in order to navigate safe passage around his 
father”. His father is described as harsh and demanding, waiting from Nathan to become “a paragon 
of rectitude and accomplishment”, while mother seems to passively agree with father’s “bootcamp-
style attitude”. From his therapist’s subjective description of the system history, we also learn that 
Nathan tries to work things for himself, keep his therapist at a distance and protect his therapist 
from his rage. Nathan seems to actively avoid speaking his own mind and, while he desperately 
wants some vitality in his relationships, he is rather reluctant to bear this vitality since it usually 
evoked his father’s “unconscious envy, wrath and harsh critiques”.  
 
We have access to four interactional episodes between Nathan and Carrere that take place at 
different times around the first year of treatment. In the first episode, which takes place during the 
sixth month of analysis, Nathan talks about the very familiar affects of feeling lonely, lost, 
directionless and devitalized that he expected treatment would have already changed. In the 
second episode, the therapeutic dyad talks about the therapist’s impact on Nathan and his 
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difficulties in unpacking his thoughts regarding this impact. The third episode revolves around a 
discussion regarding trust and Nathan’s reluctance to speak his mind and bring his ideas and feelings 
about his therapist’s impact on him into treatment. In the fourth episode, which is the episode on 
which I will focus most of my analysis, the transferential relationship is enacted.  
 
In the first, second and fourth episode, it is evident that most of the therapist’s interventions involve 
questioning. It seems as if Carrere enacts a curiosity attitude that helps Nathan expand his 
narrativity-agency cycles. Using the typical CA terminology, we may say that Carrere’s interventions 
have a high degree of consistency over the epistemic, the deontic and the emotional levels of the 
interaction order. The epistemic order level involves the right and the obligation to know about 
another person’s experience and amounts to the status of one’s knowledge - what one knows - and 
his stance - a display of how knowledgeable one is and in what ways (Heritage, 2013; Stevanovic & 
Përäkyla, 2014). The deontic order level has “to do with power, control and agency” (Stevanovic & 
Përäkyla, 2014; p. 190) and involves the interactants’ respective rights to determine through their 
actions the micro-organization of the interaction (Stevanovic & Përäkyla, 2012; 2014). The deontic 
status of interacting members suggests a resource for action recognition, while the stance is a 
public display of how powerful one is or can be in directing the interaction micro-organization and 
in what ways (Stevanovic & Përäkyla, 2012; 2014). At the emotional order level, status involves the 
shared expectations regarding experiencing, expressing and sharing emotions, which also acts as a 
resource for action recognition, while the emotional stance involves the means and relative 
strength of expression (Stevanovic & Përäkyla, 2014). Carrere making questions in almost each of 
his turns in the first, the second and the fourth episode readjusts the orbit of the emerging 
interaction order by fine-tuning his epistemic, deontic and affective stance, and by adjusting his 
status, which is mostly an enactment of curiosity or an interrogative attitude.  
 
Heritage (2013) proposes that we make reference to an epistemic gradient, revealing the knowledge 
asymmetry between the interacting participants. Content questions reveal a steeper epistemic 
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gradient, that is, a higher knowledge asymmetry; interrogative questions a less steep gradient, 
reflecting that the speaker is predisposed to a “yes” answer (Hayano, 2013); “tag questions” involve 
a relatively flat gradient and reveal the speaker’s strong belief that he knows what the response will 
be to his answer (Heritage, 2010; 2013; Hayano, 2013). In the first episode, Carrere’s questioning 
mode is mostly interrogative (e.g. “Does it bother you to feel the same feelings here with me that 
you do in the rest of your life?”, “So, you want to have a feeling of something happening here?”), 
revealing a less steep epistemic gradient which satisfies the conditions for being considered 
empathic, while at the same time is consistent with the overall deontic and emotional stance of 
curiosity that the therapist employs throughout the reported episodes. As Weiste, Voutilainen and 
Përäkyla (2015) show, therapists use several mitigating practices for marking that they lack direct 
access to the patient’s experience, and that they try to talk from a shared perspective in order to 
downgrade their ‘epistemic firstness’. They do this either by framing a formulation as hypothetical 
using rhetorical devices like ‘and’, ‘so’, etc, or by continuing the intonation and prosodic contours 
employed in the client’s turn. Empathy generally, as they mention, increases our epistemic rights to 
describe another person’s experience. Therefore, it seems that in this first episode Carrere fine-
tunes the epistemic gradient of his questions to reach a higher level of empathy, while at the same 
time he continues to enact a curiosity attitude.  
 
The three last interactions of the first episode establish the direction of the emergence of the 
interaction order which we will follow in the next three episodes. This first episode marks the onset 
of an alliance rupture which will be handled throughout without Carrere changing his questioning 
attitude. Nathan mentions his dissatisfaction with the fact that he is plagued in treatment by the 
same kind of feelings that disturb his everyday life, and Carrere - after briefly exploring these feelings 
- employs an epistemic privilege that is allowed by the treatment setting (and in turn establishes the 
treatment frame) by stating: “I want you to know that it does not surprise me that you would have 
the same bad feelings with me as you do in the rest of your life”. Nathan’s curiosity is activated, and 
he asks: “You don’t? But why? I thought therapy would give me different feelings, or correct the 
way I do things so I don't end up feeling miserable. How is feeling miserable here going to help? I've 
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got to get myself out of this, and I thought you could help me do that”. Feeling miserable, worthless 
and depressive, is an overdetermined affective strategy for Nathan, since as already mentioned he 
mostly used it to mitigate his father’s attacks. After expressing his curiosity about the therapist’s 
perspective that seems so misaligned from his own and so ‘impossible’ in the context of how he has 
been used to employing the depressive affect, he offers the therapist his presuppositions about 
treatment. He expects from treatment to “give him” positive feelings or “correct the way he does 
things”. As a person that often employs introjective, obsessive strategies for enacting his 
experiential and affective field, Nathan here shows the typical resistance to influence that 
accompanies the restriction of cognition (Shapiro, 1981) observed in rule-driven obsessive 
strategies. However, the expression of his curiosity marks a re-alignment at the motivation level of 
alliance and a mitigation of resistance.  
 
Carrere continues his effort to repair the initiated rupture by answering: “I find myself interested in 
being of help to you, and, if you want me to help you develop a satisfying personal relationship and 
more satisfying feelings about yourself, I need you to bring all your feelings of misery, being lost, 
lonely, and directionless, and talk about them, including those feelings that develop while you are 
here with me”. The therapist emphatically uses the deontic and epistemic privilege of directing the 
advancement of the treatment frame, while he introduces the use of this privilege by stating that 
his overall affective stance is one of being interested in offering his help to Nathan. We may 
hypothesize that he scales for the emerging rupture at the affiliation and motivation level of alliance 
by re-aligning with Nathan at the level of aims. As already mentioned in Chapter 3, alliance with 
avoidant patients presents an almost constant pattern during treatment, while it increases towards 
the end of treatment. Moreover, the cognitive and emotional aspects of alliance seem more 
dissociated in the treatment of avoidant patients, and, since Nathan employs mostly introjective 
attitudes towards the experiential and the affective field, we can safely hypothesize that this is the 
expected pattern of therapeutic alliance. So, during the sixth month of treatment where affiliation 
for an avoidant patient is expected anywise to be low, the therapist handles the rupture that 
appears as a drop in motivation by re-aligning at the level of aims using the epistemic and deontic 
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privilege provided by the treatment frame. This is not a kind of working-through of resistance that 
may intensify the secure exploration base by promoting affiliation at the experiential level, but 
rather the therapist’s “knowledge surplus” (Buccholz, 2014; p.14) which may serve to secure a 
needed level of affiliation for the continuation of treatment (Buccholz, 2014; Heritage, 2012). 
Nathan’s expression of curiosity may offer a necessary bridge for the re-alignment at the 
‘motivation and aims’ level of alliance.  
 
In the second episode, which follows  several months after the first one, Carrere enacts his curiosity 
stance by mostly employing questions that have a steeper epistemic gradient compared to those in 
the first episode. This serves the unpacking of imposed presuppositions in Nathan’s thinking and 
the expansion of his narrativity-agency cycles. “Have you considered that I am responsible for your 
treatment?”, “If you expected more of me, what might you say about that?” are some of the 
questions that Carrere asks. The whole episode is marked by Nathan’s difficulty in imagining that he 
can vitalize treatment by bringing up negative feelings about his therapist’s impact. After Nathan 
expresses his resistance to talking about his therapist’s negative impact by phrases like “I don’t 
know” and, “You want me to pretend?”, the therapist offers an empathic formulation that is 
followed by the question: “That would be fine. Or how about imagining something? You come here 
session after session, week after week. You lie on the couch, you talk, I don't believe you've missed 
one meeting, and yet you feel you are not making progress. What thoughts might you have if you 
let yourself imagine how it is that you are working so hard yet feel you have so little to show for it?”   
 
Carrere tries to expand Nathan’s narrativity-agency cycles by turning his attention away from his 
known strategy of feeling pathetic and showing the gap between what he offers as an empathic 
recognition that Nathan works hard and yet feels he gets little back. “This seems impossibly slow,” 
replies Nathan, reflecting his therapist’s cognitive elaboration, which seems to be a form of scaling 
at the level of thinking but that it may reflect an emerging ability to notice anger at the affective 
horizon and enact it into the field. “I do work slowly,” answers his therapist, validating Nathan’s 
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perception and leaving the emerging affective horizon undisturbed. Nathan responds by exposing 
his vulnerability and asking once again for help to get out of the mire he is in. In the following turns 
Nathan actively tries to avoid the expansion of the experiential and affective field by intensifying 
the use of his known strategies and a narrowing of attention, while his therapists employs the 
questioning curiosity strategy to help him unpack his restrictive narrative cycles that serve the 
restriction of the affective and the experiential matrix. “What might I say to get you out of your 
mire?” asks Carrere. “I should tell you? I don't think so,” replies Nathan. “Why are you opposed to 
giving me your ideas about that?” asks his therapist, marking that Nathan actively restricts the 
expansion of his affective field and the ensuing narrative schemes. “Tell me how am I doing? What's 
wrong with me?” answers Nathan in an effort once again to keep the affective field restricted by 
narrowing his attention to what he is doing. “You want me to criticize you?” asks Carrere in order 
to expand the restrictive narrative scheme, showing to Nathan that through his active avoidance of 
noticing anger in the affective horizon he seems willing to be criticized.  
 
Nathan expands the narrative scheme by asking for some advice.  “What would you like advice on?” 
asks Carrere, and Nathan returns to the known form of resistance by restating the aims of treatment 
– “Who the hell wants bad feelings? I want good feelings. I want to feel more alive. I want a 
relationship with someone that's exciting. I want to feel excitement in my life, aliveness” - and by 
trying to collapse all the emerging affective space which would help the dyad expand its narrativity. 
“That's what we're working on and that's the direction we're heading. My advice is to keep talking, 
particularly about any bad feelings you might be experiencing with me,” replies his therapist, using 
a strategy of employing the epistemic and deontic privilege once again, but this time expanding the 
focus of treatment by mentioning that it is important for Nathan to talk about his feelings regarding 
the therapist’s impact. After another six turns of speaking, in which Nathan expresses his resistance 
to expand the experiential field by insisting on his known strategy to collapse all uncomfortable 
feelings into his knowing strategy of feeling miserable and by using expressions like “I don’t know” 
and “I can’t”, he finally recognizes the existence of negative feelings about his therapist’s impact. 
“It’s hard enough dealing with what I feel when I have to grin and bear it” says Nathan with a tone 
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of irritation. “What will happen if you relax your effort to grin and bear things and tell me what you 
really think of me?” replies his therapist. Carrere mentions that he responds with enough counter-
irritation to match Nathan’s affective stance. Enacting this form of coupling and attunement, 
Carrere shows Nathan that he already understands the affective context of Nathan’s censored 
thoughts, and he carefully devises his formulation by talking about ‘thinking’ as the element most 
lacking in their communication. The implicit presupposition (McGee, DelVento & Bavelas, 2005) in 
Carrere’s question is that he knows how Nathan feels but that he does not know what Nathan 
thinks. The episode after Nathan expressing his fear that his anger could escalate concludes with a 
re-assurance by his therapist that the treatment frame protects them from hurting one another, so 
they should feel safe to express and explore their thoughts and emotions. 
 
In terms of alliance, this second episode is interesting since it involves a careful working-through of 
resistance in rapid alternating cycles which conclude in the opening of a possible safe secure base 
for experiencing the dyad’s strong emotions. We could expand on the subtle use of empathic forms 
for micro-repairing the ruptures that widen during the process in which the therapist strongly 
challenges the analysand with his questioning and curiosity stance. Përäkyla (2008; 2013) notes that 
change in treatment is effected most by the therapist employing two strategies: empathic 
attunement and challenging the client’s beliefs and ways of being. The combination, he notes, of 
empathy and a challenging attitude usually leads to an augmentation of reflective talk. In this 
episode, the therapist lowers his epistemic status regarding the content of Nathan’s experience, 
either as thought or affect while he intensifies his epistemic status regarding the aims of treatment 
and makes this even more focused strongly challenging Nathan to align to these aims. He does this 
by intensifying the emotional stance of curiosity, and by employing a strong and assertive deontic 
stance at several points during the interaction, such as when he asks Nathan to “imagine anything”. 
What we may safely conclude from this data is that Carrere uses empathy in a subtle way to correct 
for the micro-ruptures created by Nathan’s resistance, embedded within questions with steep 
epistemic gradients. In the periodic working-through cycles, he seems to remain stern in the 
employment of enacting curiosity regarding Nathan’s experience, utilising a matching counter-
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resistance force. Carrere seems to risk a rupture in alliance in order to set forth a secure base for 
exploration and the affective context that will activate the experiencing of transference. His 
affective and deontic stance is stern and challenging, reminding us of Nathan father’s affective and 
deontic stance. At the same time, his epistemic status and stance is exactly the opposite - he is not 
supposed to know what Nathan thinks and feels. At the same moment, his affective and deontic 
stance is exactly the opposite to Nathan father’s stance, since he not only avoids but invites Nathan 
to express his thought and emotions about his impact on him. This reversal, a non-interpretative 
dramatization of Carrere’s understanding of the transferential dynamics, an effort for a “quantum 
leap”, creates for Nathan a new affective field horizon.  
 
In the third episode, Carrere mostly seems to stay away from his questioning attitude. We may 
suppose he does so because Nathan is enacting curiosity about his own mind and starts exploring 
the affective horizon. Nathan talks about the tension that does not allow him to explore his feelings 
with his therapist. He makes clear how he understands Carrere’s epistemic privilege: “You know 
what you're doing. You have all those books you've read. You know a lot”. So he notes that this 
employed privilege makes him uncertain that he can express his thoughts and feelings without 
being hurt by a retaliating therapist. “Don't take this the wrong way, but I guess what I'm saying is 
that I don't trust you to be fair,” says Nathan, expressing the dialogical tension. It seems as if Nathan 
has absorbed the dramatic reversal that Carrere tried to effect on his experiential and affective 
horizon, but that he still does not trust a therapist that employs the epistemic privilege in such a 
stern and challenging way. The episode concludes with Carrere validating Nathan’s hesitations, and 
a re-alignment at the level of aims, by saying: “Not until I prove myself trustworthy”. In a process of 
lowering constraints, the dyad has been able to scale on the level of aims and motivation, the sense 
that there possibly exists a secure base for exploration and their hypotheses about the plot and the 
dramatic aspect of the transferential “play”.  
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In the fourth episode, Nathan seems ready to break the habitual coupling to his therapist’s stern 
and challenging dimensions of attitude and explore a new form of affective and experiential 
coupling by bringing fourth his unmet needs and the way he understands his therapist’s impact 
upon him. Before discussing the analysis of the case material, I have to introduce some concepts 
that will help us understand the role of periodicity in the session material and how it relates to the 
dramatization of the transferential plot as a model scene. Mergenthaler (2015) assumes that 
therapeutic change involves the ability to reflect on affective experience after regulating the 
disturbing, strong emotions that block access to experience. His Therapeutic Cycles Model (TCM) 
suggests that the therapeutic process involves the periodic cycling of four affective-abstraction 
patterns which are distinguished by a unique combination of emotional and abstract language. 
Relaxing involves low emotional and abstraction language; Reflecting involves low emotional tone 
and increased abstract language use; Experiencing involves high emotional tone and low abstraction 
language; and finally Connecting involves high emotional tone and abstraction language. Connecting 
patterns are related to good outcomes for all diagnostic groups, notes Mergenthaler (2015). 
Experiencing and Connecting probably reflect the reactive pressures advancing in the field. Walter 
et al. (2009) has shown that Experiencing follows a therapist’s challenging formulations or 
questions that address emotion, while Connecting follows a therapist’s challenging interventions 
that address the integration of emotion and cognition.  
 
In the second episode, we observed several periodic Experiencing cycles that followed Carrere’s 
challenge to Nathan’s emotion. In the fourth episode we will observe micro-challenges to emotion 
that lead to intense Experiencing cycles, and challenges to the integration of thinking and affect 
that lead to micro-Reflecting cycles which rapidly scale into Experiencing and Connecting patterns. 
DiMarino and Mergenthaler (2003) have shown that such rapid shifts between overmodulated 
(Reflecting) and undermodulated (Experiencing) periodic cycles usually precede Connecting 
patterns. Moreover, Gelo and Mergenthaler (2012) have shown that the use of unconventional 
metaphors precedes Connecting patterns, and that their frequency is related to the quality of 
cognitive-affective integration and the moments of therapeutic engagement. In the fourth episode, 
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we will not observe any unconventional metaphors in the typical linguistic sense, but rather the 
increased Experiencing affective tone that is reflected in the use of language in the context of the 
dramatization of the transferential plot, and which may help us safely conclude that there is an 
increased level of metaphoricity. I employ the term metaphoricity here, not only to mention the 
extra-linguistic components like bodily and phonetic gestures that sustain the interaction order, but 
also to designate the use of ordinary utterances and affective expressions that Nathan seems to 
engage with for the first time in a relationship where he mostly couples to its asymmetric power 
dimension.  
 
The session seems to develop in two discrete phases. From turn 67 to 829, the dyad dramatizes the 
transferential plot without enacting Nathan’s transferential dynamics and engages in rapid 
alternating Experiencing cycles. From turn 82 to 96, the dyad engages in rapid alternating 
Reflecting, Experiencing and Connecting cycles. The plot is a model scene for Nathan. Buchholz and 
Reich (2014) mention that we usually know both sides of a model scene by actively engaging to 
explore them, just as a child take turns to feed the mother. This process facilitates communication 
since it shortens the time for thinking elaboration and the time of serial turn-taking matches the 
time of simultaneous thinking. Moreover, this stock of interactional knowledge ensures that 
anticipation, which is much needed for communication, is faster than the conversational processes. 
The stock of interactional knowledge is the “result of model scenes if these scenes could be 
experienced in full – from, at least, both sides” (ibid; p.8). If we do not experience model scenes in 
full or the experience of either side is incomplete, then the result “might be what clinicians call 
‘dissociation’” (ibid; p.8).  
 
In the first phase of the session, Nathan extends the experiential knowledge of this model scene by 




question!” he answers when his therapist asks him what kind of difficulties does it create for him 
given that he is a banal guy. Carrere asks Nathan to give his question some thought, and Nathan 
intensifies his negative affect expression, changing the usual “I don’t know”, “I can’t” form of his 
resistance into an assertive question: “To what end? To go on an endless loop of obsessions about 
you?” In his next turn Nathan extends the usual “I don’t know” into a tension that creates space for 
alternating positions: “I don’t know if you ‘re really so stupid or you’re just holding back.” When his 
therapist asks him what reasons might he have to deprive him from what he truly has to offer, 
Nathan says: “You want to see me suffer. I think you get sadistic pleasure from it”. His therapist 
asks him if he thinks that he enjoys exercising his sadism on him and Nathan erupts: “I hate you. I 
hate this treatment. Talk, talk, talk. That’s all we do. No action. No results”. The structure of this 
utterance is symmetrical to the one through which Nathan expressed his depressive affect in the 
first episode: “Discouraged that . . . everything is listless . . . still . . .flat . . . there’s no movement, no 
color. I wish I could cry. I feel so . . . tight”.  
 
Obviously the prosodic gestures and the intonation contours might be very different, if not 
antithetical. The two of them may express the dialogical positions of Nathan’s model scene. 
Rhythmicity, notes Buchholz (2014), serves the interaction engine at a level deeper than language. 
Nathan explores the rhythmic-affective side of the model scene, about which he would have had 
little if any knowledge. Over two turns Nathan seems to already have a different sense of how to 
express his negative affect about his therapist’s impact: “You just take whatever I dish out. You are 
masochistic.” Over another two turns, Nathan recognizes this side of the model scene as the familiar 
position which his father occupied, and expresses his reluctance to feel like he is being like him. His 
therapist tries to help him make a distinction by asking an interrogative question which builds on an 
empathic stance: “How are you like him? Because you are telling me off and demanding my best 
effort?”. Nathan expresses his reluctance to take up this side of the model scene even in a 
constructive way: “I just don’t want to be like him”. His therapist insists that he makes a narrative-
schematic distinction by expanding his affective-experiential matrix with a challenging question: 
“How in the hell are you like him? And why can’t you be like him?”. Nathan seems to elaborate in a 
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rapid cycling of Experiencing and Connecting micro-cycles: “No, I’m not like him. He was cruel. I’m 
not cruel. (Pause) I hate you and you don’t hate me back. He would attack and attack. He wouldn’t 
let up. I’d be crying and then he’d rally around me for a goddamn pep talk. No Hug. Hell, no apology 
. . . I hated hating him. Why don’t you hate me back? Torture me”. Torturing feels real says Nathan 
in his next turn and his therapists asks him: “Am I torturing you with my saintliness?” “No, confusing. 
You don’t feel the same way about me,” replies Nathan, showing that he can make the distinction. 
 
By this time, we have observed how creating a tension in his epistemic status as well as in his stance 
and respective tensions in his deontic status and stance, the therapist has created the space for 
Nathan to explore the restrictions in his narrative-schematic structuring of experience while he 
expands piece-by-piece the affective-experiential matrix. The alliance in the first two episodes is 
mostly served by an alignment at the level of aims and Nathan’s motivation, which is expressed as 
curiosity about his therapist’s challenging insistence that he has to speak his mind about all his 
problematic feelings, especially those that involve the therapist’s impact on him. In the third 
episode, Nathan actively explored his own mind and made his first attempts at mentalizing his trust 
issues, while his therapist retreated from his pervasive questioning attitude. The dyad is able to 
reduce some constraints at this point and scale at the affective-experiential level, creating a new 
space for affiliation and experiencing the relationship as a possible safe base for exploration.  
 
In the fourth episode, the ‘assertive’ and ‘challenging’ dimension of the therapist’s epistemic status, 
which has been worked through by this time through an expansion of other dimensions of 
experience, becomes the vehicle for the dramatization of the transferential plot. Carrere makes 
clear in his description that he recognizes the generativity of this model scene and the need to keep 
the tension between the dialogical positions open for further exploration:  
“I understood that his ambivalence about being engaged with me remained unresolved, 
and so the transference need for me to remain an object of dread remained. My 
countertransference was particularly instructive at this moment as I felt relieved that he 
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was shifting in his thinking of me as the cruel, stupid father or as himself, a banal, inept 
guy who could not stand up to his father.” 
Nathan is more competent in taking some distance from his over-determined strategy to enact an 
affective horizon of misery and helplessness as a habitual way of coupling to any affordance that 
reminds him of his father’s assertive stance, collapsing a whole intermediate space of possible 
distinctions. However, as his therapist mentions, this competence can be expanded by recursively 
working through the dimensions of experience in this generative model scene.  
 
“It's not a requirement that we feel the same way about each other,” says Carrere, emphasising the 
generativity of this model scene. “I'm a banal kind of guy who's been slow to help you out of your 
suffering, and you don't have any confidence that this relationship will deliver you where you feel 
you want to be in your life nor give you the feelings of vitality, aliveness, and success you so rightly 
deserve,” he continues, showing empathy while avoiding to disturb the experiential tension that 
has opened up between the positions of the transferential plot. “How do you sleep at night? Doesn’t 
that bother you?” asks Nathan, expressing a genuine curiosity about his therapist’s mind. One can 
hear the reverberations of the anaclitic dimensions of his experience, which have been expressed 
throughout the episodes by expressions like “Help me get out of this mire”, come forth once again 
as a synchronizing vibration to the empathic element of his therapist’s comment. His therapist, 
instructed by his countertransference, chooses to remain close to the generative tension created 
by the dramatization of the transferential plot and avoids bringing forth these dimensions of 
experience. “Being banal and inadequate? What should bother me about that?” he asks, 
emphasising that there is a whole world of distinctions that has been collapsed in Nathan’s 
traumatic experience. “I could have interpreted empathically his feeling of being emotionally 
dropped by me as his mother has done,” writes Carrere. Nathan takes up the challenge and asks: 
“Are you real?” and, after a silence, he marks the emerging expansion of the affective-experiential 
matrix by talking about the experiential and affective dimensions of his own position as he lived it: 
“I was so tortured, a torture chamber of feelings, at the hands of my father”. The expressed 
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curiosity about the ‘realness’” of his therapist’s experience marks the possibility for a fractalization 
of the boundaries of his own traumatic experience and the possibility for making new narrative 
distinctions. I think that in this small episode it becomes clearly apparent that Scaling is not about 
the reduction of polysemy and about the creation of a shared frame of understanding as a mostly 
pragmatic act, but mainly about the adoption of a frame that will enliven the generativity of a model 
scene or an experiential episode.  
 
One may say that this was a good treatment, made up of ordinary materials, no elaborate and 
complicate interpretations, no elegant and sophisticated or unconventional metaphors. Enacting 
the therapist a genuine form of curiosity about Nathan’s experience and through an elegant 
handling of the micro-ruptures in alliance and communication, he facilitated the deepening of the 
alliance, the emergence of a secure base for exploration and the elaboration of Nathan’s 
transferential plot as a generative model scene. Obviously this is not about a certain way of doing 
therapy, but rather the illustration of a system’s emergent history. Analyst and analysand seem well 
attuned within an introjective matrix, evident in the avoidance and the careful use of seductive 
empathic moments, the challenging communications that do not end up into violent epistemic 
claims upon another’s experience, a lot of micro-repairing work that facilitates the promotion of 
generativity without seriously compromising each member’s autonomy.  
 
Process research cannot answer questions regarding the appropriateness of a mode of working, 
but, by augmenting the resolution of interaction episodes, it can study the emerging interaction 
order at levels well beyond the horizontal history of the bifurcation points that determine the 
system’s trajectory. Having access to the full flesh of the system, the manual, facial and prosodic 
gestures and the intonation contours, we may had reached a higher resolution of the interaction 
order at dimensions well beyond the ones visible at the level of the printed word. For example, it 
would certainly be interesting to analyze the several moments in which the analyst made use of the 
epistemic privilege to re-align with Nathan at the level of aims, and to examine prosodic and 
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intonation differences in those different moments. The overall aim of psychoanalytic process 
research is to look deeply into the process for the unique ways in which the scaling of constraints at 
several levels - either deficient or excessive - fractalizes the boundaries in/between experiential 
states and in/between people in order to achieve the emergence of a generative field. As Carrere 
(2008) argues, “[t]he truth will not cure, but the process will” (p.417). We need then to expand our 
























The elemental question of this thesis is: if in order to make sense of the process data we need more 
and better theory, what is the most efficient ‘minimal’ theoretical model of the process that can 
bring together the markedly different psychoanalytic viewpoints so as to justly service an 
understanding of how “bootstrapping” is effected?  
 
To answer the question, I employed a conceptual bi-phasic in-depth analysis of the psychoanalytic 
complexity literature on the grounds of a pragmatist methodological design. I reduced the data 
complexity into a multitude of descriptive codes and worked deductively and inductively towards 
the creation of overarching minimal categories that describe essential elements of the process. 
During this analysis, I used psychoanalytic and extra-psychoanalytic concepts, ideas and frameworks 
to condense the open codes into categories and then fine-tune their interrelationships. The most 
important abductive ‘moment’ in this process was an understanding that underlying all the 
categories that I was formulating during the fine-tuning, there seemed to be an elemental process 
that could unify their various dimensions, namely Scaling.  
 
Scaling as a set helped me bring together seemingly unrelated actions, practices and concepts, like: 
playing what you cannot bring into language, regulating between talking empathically and from 
one’s point of view, shifting of attention, reveries, discussing a case with a colleague, experiences 
that reveal their meanings in new contexts, regulating between orderliness and randomness in 
order to make meaning, etc. and understand them as a process of searching for an optimal visibility 
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towards the flow of experience and an effort to reduce disattunement on the surface of coupled 
mental states, intra-personally or interpersonally.  
 
Tavory and Timmermans (2014) note that abductive theorising through the data needs to be 
evaluated for fit, plausibility, and relevance. Evaluating my analysis, I thought that Scaling seems a 
simple yet parsimonious way for explaining disparate phenomena and bring them under a single 
explanatory principle regarding ‘how experience is structured.' In this sense, it is relevant to the 
aims of studying ‘bootstrapping’ in the process, since it points towards a focused direction where 
we should look for change processes. It also seems plausible through my analysis that 
“bootstrapping” may involve the workings of a process through which seemingly unrelated 
elements upon the surface of a mental state are brought into a fundamental connection.  Such a 
process seems to create randomness revealing other dimensions upon the surface of the mental 
states. Its plausibility is enhanced by the parsimony and the fact that it seems to work well with 
many different psychoanalytic in-process descriptions beyond the ones included in the complexity 
literature. In example, Ferenzci’s ‘repetition tendency that strives to break through’, Pick’s ‘states 
of mind which seek out other states of mind’, Racker’s ‘synchronic oscillations’, Heimann’s call to 
‘make impulses conscious at the moment they arise’, Wilhelm Reich’s ‘stratification of defences’, 
Joseph’s ‘relationship to interpretation’, the ‘evenly hovering attention’ and many other in-process 
descriptions we explored in chapter 3 can all be brought under a single framework. Any mental state 
reflects a structuring of the horizon of experience that brings some elements to the foreground, 
which in turn retain statuses of connection to several backgrounding stratums. Scaling may suggest 
the structuring mechanism which regulates this unfolding process. Locked interactions in the 
horizon of experience may reflect scaling processes that catapult differences into sameness to 
protect the experience’s organizational structure. “Bootstrapping” may involve a continuous 
reorganization of the interaction matrix on the grounds of this bringing of elements that are related 
in a ‘relation-in-separation’ mode into a fundamental backgrounding relationship and the re-
organization of the backgrounding levels of the structure of experience; the re-structuring of the 
‘space of implications’. In this sense, ‘bootstrapping’ is something that happens continuously. Its 
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effects are obvious in the dyad only when a critical threshold has been exceeded, and change is 
expressed as a new form of adaptation to influence, a new perception and a new attitude towards 
the interaction. Attitude suggests a critical change in the ‘space of implications’ expressed in new 
perceptions. Besides being plausible, Scaling, as an overarching mechanism of structuring 
experience, it seems to fit well with the data of the complexity literature. It brings together under 
an explanatory principle disparate actions and concepts of differential origins, while at the same 
moment, it brings all the categories of analysis into meaningful interrelations in a coherent 
framework. Scaling phenomenologically is experienced as areas of minimal tension upon the 
surface of a mental state on which the dyad can work to enhance coupling while the tension remains 
at a generative level.  
 
While the relevance of the model is more or less obvious, fit and plausibility required extra steps to 
be established since the analysis involved an array of concepts that were brought into the process 
to enhance my sensitivity to the data. The extra steps involved reviews in neuroscience, psychology, 
philosophy of mind and cognitive science. During this process, beyond the enhancement of the fit 
and plausibility of the ‘Scaling’ construct, I needed to explore scaling from different perspectives 
and uncover dimensions that were hidden for me in the analysis of the complexity literature.  
Undertaking the relevant reviews, it was not only fit and plausibility of scaling as a construct that 
was enhanced, but also my belief that only through an action-oriented perspective we will ever 
achieve an elaborate understanding of the human mindedness that does not fail to account for 
experience.  
 
We need more theory to understand the process, and we need to settle out our philosophical 
puzzles. Aristotle believed that mind and object are shaped by the same ‘eidos’, form, rhythm; we 
know the world because we are in touch with the world. Descartes created a huge gap between the 
subject and the world. Kant regulated the gap, Hegel brought again mind and world into a close 
contact. It seems that the fall of the old-fashioned artificial intelligence project signalled the collapse 
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of the representational and cognitivist thinking along the isolated subject and a tough dispute of 
‘mediational’ theories of knowledge.  A resurgence of interest in Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and the 
pragmatists, in brief, the rise of the anti-representational camp and “contact” theories of 
knowledge is evident in contemporary philosophy (Taylor, 2013). Computational mechanisms and 
cognitive architectures will always be in trouble because they “don’t give a damn” (Haugeland, 
1998; p.47) about this world. To think means to care about the world. The trouble for all those 
accounts that consider the mind as a flexible system that encodes stimuli in informational formats 
which then determine classificatory responsiveness is that they always fail to account for the “what 
it feels like” (Rhode, 2010; p.24) aspect of the mental. As Rhode mentions “experience is an 
‘embarrassment’” (ibid) for them.  
 
Enactivism as a development of the anti-representationalist camp starts from the premise that we 
enact a world of experience. Mindedness reflects the action-perception cycles themselves not any 
detached intermediate. If there is any ‘point’ of convergence in the contemporary philosophy, this 
is about ‘engagement.' Even those who endorse the view that all experience is conceptual and 
pervaded by rationality, they agree that the mind cannot be disengaged from the world (Rouse, 
2015). We are first engaged, deeply embedded, and mental growth suggests exactly such a process 
of learning disentanglement from our immediate attunement to the world. In this sense, the ubiquity 
of Coupling in the complexity literature points towards an enactivist understanding of the process.  
 
Action forms and frames experience, and experience is about action. Affordances, either physical 
or social, are given to us as properties of the phenomenological field and immediately determine 
our action possibilities. As we are affectively embedded in a field of affordances, we learn about our 
capacities to affect/be affected closely coupled to the world’s affordances, that is the world’s 
capacities to affect and be affected. We develop a hierarchy of goals and norms according to our 
affective integration in the world of others. Our sense of agency increases as we can make finer and 
efficient distinctions in this niche of affordances that enable us to act flexibly in accordance with our 
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hierarchy of goals and intentions. I tried to show that there are good reasons to argue that scaling 
underlies our efforts to attune to the flow of experience in this niche of affordances, a perspective 
already supported by the analysis of the complexity literature.  
 
The two modes underlying scaling, namely the relation-in-separation and the separation-in-relation 
do not involve some transcendental abilities, as I argued, but suggest the evolution of social 
practices gradually reflected in human mindedness. However, my interest was far from simply 
defending a naturalised account of interhemispheric differences. Chapter 5 tried to defend the view 
that mindedness is an expression of the organism’s action and that scaling involves the interplay of 
two attitudes towards experience; assimilating the flow into the known or growing with the flow. 
It seems that neuroscientific findings, embedded in theories of self-regulation and personality 
theories, bring enough support to the primacy of a scaling-like mechanism for our self-regulation in 
social interactions. I reviewed PSI and PARCS and showed that there is an interplay between 
regulatory processes that predict and focus on decontextualized aspects of the interaction on the 
one hand, and reactive processes that accommodate to the interaction. It seems that we get into 
the interaction order ready to control the flow or grow with the flow. An understanding of scaling 
as the regulation between the predictive and the reactive mode fits well with my understanding, 
coming from the analysis of the complexity literature, of scaling as a regulation between orderliness 
and randomness.  
 
Research on metaphor, as a linguistic trope, supports a similar view. The LH foregrounds the 
conventional, salient, differentiating aspects of language, while it depends on the RH for novelty, 
handling ambiguity, keeping semantically distant relationships activated. Research on 
metaphoricity shows that we actively ‘melt’ the frozen semantic aspects, categories, and 
differentiations into the interaction, where meaning is softly-assembled in an on-line primarily 
embodied process. Re-living in the ‘doubleness’ of co-action, co-ordination and co-experiencing we 
enact meaning. Scaling seems to involve both intrapersonal processes that bring foregrounded 
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distinctions into a background of implications, where their relationships are re-ordered, as well as 
interpersonal processes in the interaction order. Once the horizon of our experience is re-ordered, 
the overlapping space of the horizons of the interacting agents changes its shape. However, the 
direction of change is from the interaction towards the personal horizon and scaling reflects this 
influence, our efforts to attune.  
 
Starting from the hypothesis of predictive and reactive modes and developing a series of 
arguments, I endorsed the view of scholars writing from the Distributed Language Approach, that 
language is an action system and its use reflects an attitude towards experience. The gist of the 
argument is that by ‘languaging’ we scale. We either disambiguate and bring some order, clarity, 
and coherence in the interaction, or we mark what is relevant, important, what makes a difference 
for us and bring some complexity and comprehensiveness. In the interaction order, we necessarily 
and continuously move between these poles. “Bootstrapping” as a qualitative shift in the relational 
matrix reflects the integration of ‘languaging modes’ into a single integrated evolving system, 
where resonance regarding what is relevant and important for each member is flexibly achieved. 
The essence of “bootstrapping” then is that each member of the dyad achieves to bring their 
respective hierarchical goals-intentions organization into resonance. This achievement marks the 
emergence of an integrated system where scaling between the predictive and the reactive flows 
without serious conflicts and becomes generative.  
 
Bringing together Colombetti’s account on primordial affectivity, Adolph’s and Pessoa’s ‘multiple 
wave theory’ and Anderson’s ‘neural re-use,' I tried to show that we have good reasons to believe 
that mindedness is grounded in affectivity. I discussed this view in relation to several lines of work 
coming from psychoanalysis, enactivism, and developmental psychology to show that affectivity 
expands the world of experience through the interaction order and keeps together our meaningful 
distinctions. It seems that we emerge from the world of a socio-affective matrix and making 
distinctions we turn this niche of socio-affective affordances into a highly differentiated and 
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complex world. Our affective integration in this world is reflected in the hierarchical organization of 
the norms, the goals and the intentions that regulate our interactions. Scaling involves our 
attunement to the changing shape of the horizon of affective affordances in the interaction order 
and presupposes a flexibility in our affective integration in the world, reflected in the hierarchical 
organization of norms, goals and intentions.  
 
Trying to ‘clean’ the two modes of experiencing structuring of all their transcendentalist 
connotations, I ‘injected’ them into an enactivist vocabulary. Narrativity is the foundational enactive 
strategy that we use to make distinctions in the horizon of affordances and assimilate the flow. The 
horizon is immediately given to us. We plot actions into meaningful intentional-causal sequences. 
Metaphoricity is the foundational enactive strategy that we use to accommodate to the flow of the 
horizon in the interactive order. By ‘metaphorizing,' we reveal on the surface of affordances 
dimensions that are relevant and important for us, and we innovate the horizon. So metaphoricity 
is another way of making distinctions and a different kind of distinctions. Metaphorizing, we relax 
the goals-intentions hierarchical structure, and we immediately sense a re-structuring that brings us 
closer to the flow of experience. Narrativizing we immediately plot the observed actions in 
intentional sequences according to the structure of the hierarchy of our goals and intentions. We 
always need to parametrize between these strategies to attune, to disentangle from our immediate 
coupling, and find ourselves in an optimal position from the flow and this is a never-ending process.  
 
Up to this point, my ‘enactivist’ thinking is in accordance with psychoanalytically-oriented 
perspectives that give primacy to regulatory processes of the RH, like Meares’s (2012) ‘analogical 
relatedness’ and Schore’s (2012) RH implicit self and affect regulation. The ability to ‘metaphorize’ 
is the ability to have a ‘backgrounding’ self that integrates aspects of experience and facilitates 
intuitive perspective-shifting immediately satisfying multiple-constraints. I tried to make an 
important distinction which emphasises the enactivist reasoning I employed and that it is I think 
already implied in the work of those thinking from a primarily ‘regulatory’ point of view. If 
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mind/brain and world are closely coupled, if mindedness is about perspective-shifting, then we 
should look for the mechanisms of change in the interaction. This is already explicit in the way I 
employed scaling in my analysis, where change is ‘represented’ as involving the extended ecology 
of the interaction and the interaction of multiple time-scales. Metaphoricity is not something that 
happens in the privacy of our minds. We immediately sense the possible movements in the horizon 
of solicitations, since we are affectively integrated with the world. Bringing together, Bakhtin, 
Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty, Vygotsky and Wittgenstein I argued that the normative cannot be grasped 
conceptually and that there is a difference between conceptual difference and real difference. The 
integrative self does not seem to ‘extract’ values from experience. It immediately recognizes 
solicitations because they are coupled with its intuitive routines. Narrativity is equally flexibly 
employed in micro-disattunement episodes. The ability to move flexibly in this space of intuitive 
routines attuned to the world, the flexibility of metaphoricity, is built in experience and it is shown 
in experience, in action. I will repeat Anderson (2014) for the very important remark he makes, we 
should give the “brain its voice in the process . . . trying to discern what in the world the brain cares 
about” (p.302). As I argued, by ‘integrating’ themselves in a helping relationship, patients have 
intuitive expectations; and each enacted episode in the context of this relationship is directed by 
particular intuitive expectations. This is the metaphor of the macro-state attractor that organizes 
sub-attractors and absorbs discordant fluctuations by assimilating the flow or by breaking and re-
organizing into a more flexible or a more rigid macro-state. This metaphor describes experience as 
well as the brain. It is also reflected in the ‘languaging’ processes of scaling. Scaling about an 
episode, other relational episodes find their way towards the interaction order; scaling is exactly 
about the re-organization of the backgrounding space of implications. Harris notes that (2008) that 
“we must use caution in claiming a mutative effect of either the dramatic enactments or the 
powerful resonant interpretation” (p.45). I cannot agree more. Enactment is a constant process. 
While the dyad enacts in an episode of power, an episode of care makes its way towards the surface, 
as I have shown in the coupling section. Following Geertz (2012), I may say that, not only in 
anthropology but in psychotherapy as well, the enactment is the interpretation.   
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 I argued that, we should doublethink the philosophical problems that a metaphor like 
“Internalization’ creates. Acting recursively in relational episodes we acquire our unique abilities to 
make sense of experience and it seems that we grasp these episodes as a whole ‘genre’. ‘Genres’ or 
roles in interactional episode, as I discussed, have positions and voices, but first and foremost they 
have an embodied shape through which they are open to transformation. Discussing coupling I 
argued that, empirical findings suggest that meaning is founded on embodied choreographies that 
regulate the processes of its construction. It seems that a constructivist/mediational/semiotic 
understanding of change processes that emphasises positions and voices in dialogical space cannot 
grasp this level of multiplicity which is important for an understanding of how we grasp a ‘genre’ in 
a relationship. Emphasising the ‘positions’ or the ‘voices’ in an interactional episode, we obliterate 
a lot of the multiplicity that is lurking in this process of minimizing tensions to let a generative gap 
emerge. In order to become radically dialogical, we need to approach the interaction order with 
methodologies that reveal its multiplicity and the movement of the generative. When the dyad 
rapidly oscillates across such a gap of minimum tension, the interaction dominant dynamics, appear 
at multiple-scales from the embodied synchronies, to physiological events, the regulatory processes 
in the RH and the propositional content of our thoughts. Events in each scale control the unfolding 
of events in the other scales. In this friction between processes their dynamics transform. As I 
mentioned, we cannot neatly describe the directionality of change processes. If we want to learn 
more about ‘bootstrapping’ it seems that we have to look into the lurking multiplicity of these 
interactional events. My proposal is that a thick description of the system’s trajectory alongside 
methodologies - originating in the Distributed Language Approach - which amplify access to the 
embodied processes of communication and methodologies that amplify access to the interaction 
order may let us approach closer to the multiplicity and the generative tensions that unfold in the 
interaction dominant dynamics of state coupling.  
 
The shift of experiential states and attitudes that appear at the bifurcation points where the system 
expands its dyadic awareness and the level of order and complexity, generative tensions appear 
expanding our sense and meaning-making capacities. The patterned coupling oscillations and our 
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expanded capacities for more complex forms of coupling, if studied at the relevant level of 
resolution, they may reveal a complex multi-dimensional web of couplings in phase and anti-phase, 
as shown through the analysis in the Nathan-Carrere case study.  
 
By studying the shifts in the experiential states and the shifts that appear at bifurcation points, we 
may reveal the ways in which the members of a dyad enacting a horizon of affective affordances 
may strive to scale to the other member’s horizon, anticipating a scaling response. Each experiential 
state may actually reveal a response that anticipates scaling of the rhythmic interaction in 
intersubjective synchronization. Shift by shift, we strive for a maximum grip of those experiential 
dimensions that carry the potential to expand the shared reality as a generative field. The therapist 
strives to engage those surfaces of experience that may bridge lost connections and inflicted 
separations. Resistance to empathy and even to self-introspection - the premature closure of the 
dialogical space - reflects an active avoidance of helplessness inflicted by a possibly unwelcome 
increase in tension. Repetitive failures at scaling, in the shifts of our experiential states either at the 
intra- or the intersubjective level, warn us that we are entrapped in an unproductive web of 
couplings which leave little room for fractalizing the boundaries between experiential states. Stern 
(2010) alerts us that therein lies a freedom for the “eye to see itself seeing”, and that the patient is 
giving us our “own chance for ‘cure’ in the transference” (p.99). 
 
What we mostly need to approach is the generative tensions that are created in the shifting of the 
experiential states. A therapist’s empathic response scales the ‘brown noise’ by closing the gap and 
creating a generative space for a fractalizing scaling experience. Otherwise, it brings some order in 
the ‘white noise’ and creates the possibilities again for a fractalizing generative space. Talking the 
therapist from her own perspective, she is testing the fractalizing dimensionality of the generative 
space, and is anticipating a scaling response. And finally talking the therapist in a spontaneous and 
pre-reflective way or revealing countertransferential emotions, she is trying to elicit a scaling 
response by the analysand.  
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In the Nathan/Carrere case study analysis, I showed how islands of order permit the couple to take 
its expedition into creative disorder and how these islands of order are themselves suggestible to 
disorder and fractalization once other islands of order emerge.  In the Jean/Nahum case it may be 
more evident how the dyad, on the grounds of a metaphor through oscillating fractal fluctuations 
between sameness and difference, creates a generative space that helps Jean mentalize her 
experience and Nahum to make sense of Jean’s subjectivity by following the expressive movements 
around this generative gap. As I argued in both these cases, we were lacking a valuable level of data 
that would permit us a higher resolution of the interaction episodes and the emerging interaction 
order. However, I think it was made clear by the analysis in the Nathan/Carrere case that our 
perceived empirical ontologies of transference, alliance and attachment are actually 
transformations of the system’s expressed qualities. This does not mean that Nathan does not have 
a certain profile of self-regulatory scenarios, but the expression of these takes a unique shape within 
the field. In turn, this is the most interesting form of knowledge for the clinician: the ways in which 
she finds herself enacting a field with different analysands.  
 
Process research suggests a space of exploration that may increase our sense for the nonlinearity 
and the periodicity that underlies a system’s orbit (Lauro-Grotto et al., 2009). Sensing how attitudes 
change during the system’s evolution and how the periodicity expresses itself as spaces of order 
and emerging disorder at several levels of the system’s characteristics from the micro-embodied 
level (gestures, tonality, silences etc.) to the level of interaction episodes, metaphoricity and 
expressed affect can give us a valuable form of knowledge regarding how we enact in the field 
“ontologies” perceived as alliance, transference, affiliation, meta-cognition, mentalization etc. 
Moreover, as mentioned, in linking the two levels of nonlinearity and periodicity we increase our 
chances to observe how the extended ecology of enacted attitudes and the emerging interactive 
order give shape to the system’s expressed and phenomenologically-felt qualities. In the 
Nathan/Carrere case, we observed how the enaction of a curiosity attitude took many different 
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shapes throughout the process. We also saw how the small assimilative changes where Nathan was 
helped to expand his narrative-schematic organization of experience piece-by-piece brought about 
a qualitative shift in the third episode, where Nathan independently explored issues of trust and 
where the therapist eased his own curiosity attitude. In the last episode, we observed how, in the 
heightening of periodicity and through an act of emotional freedom, the therapist became able to 
facilitate some ordering in the surfaces of experience and allow space for the emergence of a 
generative tension. Sensing the synchronicity, the multiple forms of dance between the concentric 
and the diametric, and how the shifts in experiential states that call for a scaling response and 
generate experience at the phenomenological level change the web of couplings, and at transition 
points expand its fractal dimensionality, may suggest an important form of knowledge for the 
psychoanalytic process research.  
 
Lichtenberg enacted an attitude of ‘mirroring acceptance’ with Veronica, and Kurtz was 
magnetically drawn to June’s sad song, until in both systems a shift in attitude appeared. As it 
became evident in the Nathan/Carrere case, an attitude is a multi-dimensional object. The therapist 
uses the generative surface of an attitude to provide a scaling response that strives to bypass the 
direct entanglement within the analysand’s affective horizon by being consumed through a gradient 
reduction that turns it into a familiar solicitation. It is not only within the context of an interpretation 
that we strive to find ourselves within a ‘quantum leap’. The whole process may suggest such a 
moment-to-moment striving for a ‘symmetry breaking’ at the field of affective horizons. New 
attitudes are materialized in the field, as new multi-dimensional objects are generated out of the 
surfaces of an old one. Through the analyst’s scaling responses fractalizng areas appear upon the 
surface of an attitude. On the surface of curiosity, by scaling to Nathan’s responses, Carrere enacted 
embodied transformations of the attitude’s surface which carried the dynamic of being consumed 
by Nathan as carefully empathic, supportive or persecutory affordances. Lichtenberg failed to see 
that Veronica had already introduced a new multi-dimensional object in the field, and Kurtz sensed 
that there were already enough fractalized ordered couplings upon the surface of his empathic 
stance for the dyad to endure the appearance of a new multi-dimensional surface.  
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 It seems that research on interhemispheric differences in emotion and attention, regulatory 
processes (PARCS), personality theories that take into account regulatory processes (PSI), research 
on metaphor and metaphoricity, theoretical work integrating neuroscience, philosophy and 
psychology on affectivity  and finally the recent developments in cognitive science and neuroscience 
that move rapidly towards an enactivist perspective on the human mind bring some valuable 
support to the concepts that I used to enhance my sensitivity to the data and the construct of scaling 
as an explanatory principle. As already mentioned in the methodological section of chapter 4 
abduction is risky. The fact that the concepts I used may be backed to some extend by empirical and 
theoretical work does not ensure anything else, but that one can use the proposed model with some 
level of ‘practical certainty’ and enrich or restructure its proposals with further conceptual research. 
It seems that the main dimensions of the model are well supported by the theoretical, philosophical 
and empirical work on action-oriented theories of the mind. Coupling and Flow are categories 
resourced from the surface of the data, and as evident they tightly ‘couple’ psychoanalytic 
complexity thinking to enactivism. Shifting is another category that exists close to the surface of 
complexity data and if not ubiquitous it seems to ‘couple’ well with the perspective-shifting 
dimension of enactivist thinking. The sub-categories that occurred during the fine-tuning process 
(see Appendix IA or 4.3 for a rich description) require empirical work to prove that they are a useful 
heuristic for a thick process description of a psychoanalytic system’s trajectory, and necessary 
refinements with further systematic conceptual work upon the particular constructs.  
 
In the first paragraph of the introduction, I mentioned Greenberg’s (2013) statement that we should 
refrain from beliefs that therapists do something that has curative effects. Coburn (2014) nods, 
affirmatively. We just live in a system that is neither too ordered nor too random, and that is 
therapeutic by itself. Levenson (1994) cautioned us that it is our beliefs about what is therapeutic 
that usually block treatment. After this project, I am convinced that we can learn a lot more about 
the process, but we cannot control the process; or better that the essence of therapeutic action is 
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refraining from controlling the process. It seems that therapeutic power does not reside neither in 
the dramatic enactments nor the powerful interpretations as Harris (2008) mentions. The dyad 
constantly enacts a world of experience. We can see this process from a multitude of perspectives. 
We are becoming more competent in the game of giving and asking for reasons, what we regularly 
call mentalizing. We become re-integrated in our cultural forms of giving and asking for reasons. 
Our regulatory processes become more efficient in fractalizing the flow from one state to another 
and facilitate the attunement to the flow of experience. I argued that scaling rather involves both. 
It primarily involves the development of this ability to constantly move towards the optimal position 
from which things can affect us in a way that makes sense without compromising our integration 
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